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iThe powers of the Executive relating to war have received
surprisingly little attention in treatises and commentaries on the
Constitution. They are usually passed by with little more than a
repetition o p the constitutional provision making the President
the Commander-in-Chief of the armed forces of the nation. This
study is an attempt to describe these war powers more fully and
systematically than has heretofore been done. For this purpose,
the terra "war porers" has been interpreted somewhat liberally,
80 as to include not only the powers that may be exercised curing
the actual conduct of war, but also those that relate to the initia-
tion and termination of war and to the reconstruction period fol-
lowing war. It has been necessary, in great measure, to work over
old materiel and to make use of familiar historical incidents,
nevertheless, it is hoped that something has been contributed to
s v ow more clearly the comprehensive scope and the almost unlimited
nature of this phase ®S the Presidents power.
The writer is indebted to members of the Seminar, and
more especially "to Professors Garner and Fairlie, for valuable sug-
gestions and kindly criticism. He is alone responsible for any
errors of fact or conclusion.
University of Illinois
April, 1920.
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"It is difficult to describe any
single part a great governmental sys-
tem without describing the whole of it.
Governments are living things and operate
as organic wholes."
Woodrow Wilson.
Constitutional Government
in the United States.

1.
Chapter I.
Introduction.
"the executive power shall be ye ate d in a President of the
United States of America."
1
The language here used by the Constitu-
tion in describing the executive power in the government of the
United States is strikingly different from that describing the gene-
ral power of either of the other two great departments. The article
dealing with the Legislative department uses the words, "All legis-
2latlve powers herein granted • • f " showing that the following
specified powers clearly constitute a limitation on the possible
claims of that department to power; while the article devoted to the
Judiciary also expressly states that the judicial power of the
United States "shall extend to" certain enumerated cases, thereby
obviously excluding all other cases over which the Judiciary might
otherwise claim jurisdiction.
The lack of such express limitations in the article deal-
ing with the Executive has led to some difference of opinion as to
whether the executive power vested in the President by the Constitu-
tion is defined and limited by the following specified powers, or
whether it includes other powers not enumerated but naturally execu-
tive in character. Even if the former interpretation of the Consti-
tution is accepted as correct, the conception of the term "executive
power" still remains somewhat vague, since several of the expressly
enumerated powers of the President, such as his powers as Commander-
in-Chief and his power to see that the laws are executed, are in
themselves undefined in the Constitution, uncertain as to their
1 Const itution . Art. II, Sec. 1.
2 Ibid .. Art~I. Sec. 1.
g Ibid.. Art. ITI. Sec. 2,
> 4 or*t\ •46 h\
97 90 IXftrf.l riOq 9T!lfru9T» DfT?"
; Mt2 rV«i>J*i**A >o «<iiai£ baJiaU
1ay '.tiuti *.j9.i i J via J-a*d cc. J f.slx MuAmA
iw ^o^ro? oi fro.'
9.f
1 no i ,f I i
1/ «b Hi
an
roq iioi^riudqta nirJ"foiloT Ml enJJ. I f fcu* £»al*fjh 3f noli
rixrJifn fird ipJhtmhihs icfl atrsoo; taaMo JU>*ii }l **rtj«»riir
I To noi J3t9-xjr**^*»i t*ino* «fj *i orS .i*Jo*iaa*o ci trii
•f>Tf?J to aoli^acnoo 0*1$ # Jo">iiov «»f». r j*»oo9 al
MV \a,Xai9Vf»s *uiiia ,j»ir?jav Jrirfwawoa *i\.lin»3 ri Hi fa •iwojj
*• eirwoq »lrf a* cfoo» ,ia9?>i*0Y5[ 1c »t?*t><t fcafmsacrno
.i^.'.rusxa 91 a*«X 9rtl iac'J 9«b o? lo^O'i 9JH hna *l%idC-itl
0$ oa utni ?8i:}:tj taai$xi*l ianoS erfrf al ftaalTa r>.ur r 1 »: n-saif
>
8.
limits, and therefore subject to various interpretations.
The article dealing with the Executive has therefore been
characterized as "the most defective part of the Constitution", its
loose and general expressions enabling the President, by implication
and construction, "either to neglect his duties or to enlarge his
powers." A distinguished historian says that while our Constitution
in the main is of the rigid type, its flexible character is shown
in the provisions conferring the powers and defining the duties of
the Executive. "Everything is clearly stated, but the statements
do not go beyond the elementary." Pointing out that while the Con-
stitution did not authorize certain of Lincoln's acts, neither did
it expressly forbid them, he holds that there is "room for inference,
a chance for development, and an opportunity for a strong man to im-
print his character upon the office."** Somewhat the same idea was
expressed by President Wilson some years ago when he wrote: "The
President is at liberty, both in law and conscience, to be as big
a man as he can. His capacity will set the limit."
A doctrine of constitutional construction the so-called
Wilson-Roosevelt doctrine with regard to the control of matters
within the "twilight zone" between the national and state jurisdic-
tions 7 -- was translated by President Roosevelt into terms of in-
4 View of Secretary of State Upshur. See his more extended
statement, quoted in Taft, Our Chief Magistrate and His Powers . 141.
5 Rhodes, Historical Essays
.
204. £14^
6 Constitutional Government in the United States
.
70.
7 First enunciated by James Wilson in 1785, recently advocated,
by President Roosevelt, and stated as follows: "That when a subject
has been neither expressly excluded from the regulating power of the
Federal Government, nor expressly placed within the exclusive con-
trol of the State 8, it may be regulated by Congress if it be, or
become, a matter the regulation of which is of general importance
to the whole nation, and at the same time a matter over which the
States are, in practical fact, unable to exercise the necessary con-
trolling power." Willoughby, On the Constitution . I, 47.
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herent executive power. He 88id: "The most important factor in
getting the right spirit in my Administration, next to insistence
upon courage, honesty, and a genuine democracy of desire to serve
the plain people, was my insistence upon the theory that the execu-
tive p6wer was limited only by specific restrictions and prohibi-
tions appearing in the Constitution or imposed by Congress under its
constitutional powers. My view was that every executive officer in
high position was a steward of the people bound actively and affir-
matively to do all he could for the people, and not to content him-
self with the negative merit of keeping his talents undamaged in a
napkin. I declined to adopt the view that what was imperatively
necessary for the Nation could not be done by the President unless
he could find some specific authorisation to do it. My belief was
that it was not only his right but his duty to do anything that the
needs of the Nation demanded unless such action was forbidden by
the Constitution or by the laws * Under this interpretation I did
and caused to be done many things not previously done by the Presi-
dent and the heads of the departments. I did not usurp power but I
did greatly broaden the use of executive power . In other words, I
acted for the public welfare, I acted for the common well being of
all our people, whenever and in whatever measure was necessary, un-
less prevented by direct constitutional or legislative prohibition?
Roosevelt's theory of executive power is disputed, how-
ever, by equally eminent authority. Senator Eayner, one of the
leading constitutional lawyers of his time, contended that the
clause dealing with the executive power relates simply to the dis-
tribution of governmental functions, and should not be considered
8 Roosevelt, Autobiography . 388-589.
.V
4.
as a grant of power at all. Professor Goodnow says that the holder
of executive power "is for the most pert to exercise the powers
which have clearly been given to him by the Constitution, and the
Constitution itself is regarded as a grant of power not otherwise
possessed , rather than as a limitation of power already in exis-
tence."*^
The Supreme Court has likewise not only repudiated the
Wilson-Roosevelt doctrine of constitutional construction as being
contrary to the 10th Amendment,*''' but it has also definitely re-
futed the Roosevelt theory of executive power. "We have no officers
in this government," says the Court, "from the President down to
the most subordinate agent, who does not hold office under the law,
with prescribed duties and limited authority ."^ It would there-
fore seem that ex-President Taft reflected the better opinion when
he stated the true view of executive power to be "that the President
can exercise no power which cannot be fairly and reasonably traced
to some specific grant of power or Justly implied and included with-
in such express grant as proper and necessary to its exercise. Such
specific grant must be either in the Federal Constitution or in an
Act of Congress passed in pursuance thereof. There is no undefined
residuum of power which he can exercise because it seems to him to
be in the public Interest .... The grants of Executive power are
necessarily in general terms in order not to embarrass the Execu-
tive within the field of action plainly marked for him, but his
9 Speech in U. S. Senate, Jan. 31, 1907. Cong . Record ,
21 I, Pt. II (59 Cong., 2 Seas.), 2010.
10 Principles of Constitutional Government . 89.
11 Kansas v. Colorado . 206 tJ. 5.. 46, 63-90, (1907). The 10th
Amendment reads as follows: "The powers not delegated to the United
States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are
reaerved to the States respectively, or to the people."
12 The Floyd Acceptances. 7 Wall.. 666 676 (
1
86Q )
.
oi <i#lM
no.
— " **
9t<f $&&Sn b4 oj *«wcv
vivsJnoe
fVI9Mdl ©Jii ^i^ ©d'f • • • • JtO i *" *ui oi
*T*. ol *! 01*10 9M0B
ton ssein^ ni
it ,a . rJ r.i de**«r£ I
5.
jurisdiction must be justified and vindicated by affirmative con-
stitutional or statutory provisions or it does not exist. 1,18
Although the weight of authority upholds the contention
that executive power in the United States is limited definitely
to the powers enumerated in the Constitution, or clearly implied
therefrom, the interpretation of those enumerated powers is fre-
quently such as to give to the President an extraordinary and practi
oally undefined range of authority. Thus, for example, it has been
authoritatively held that the President, under his power "to take
oare that the laws be faithfully executed, " may undertake measures
and exercise authority, for the enforcement of the law or the pro-
tection of federal rights, not specifically granted by Constitution
14
or statute. Other of the President's enumerated powers, such as
his power as Commander-in-Chief and his power to receive and send
ambassadors and ministers, are likewise subject to the same broad
interpretation.
If the general conception of executive power in the United
States is somewhat vague and open to various interpretations, that
is especially true of the nature and extent of executive power with
regard to war. It has rightly been said that "the domain of the
exeoutive power in time of war constitutes a sort of 'dark conti-
13 Our Chief Magistrate and His Powers . 139-140.
14 in re HeagleV 1S>6 tf. S.. 1. 65-64. 67 (1890). Cf. dis-
senting opinion, which held that such enforcement or protection
must proceed not from the President, but primarily from Congress"
,
and that if Congress does not pass laws in reference to such mat-
ters, "there is not the slightest legal necessity out of which to
imply any such power in the President." Ibid . . 82, 83. See also
view of Prof. Willoughby: "The obligation to take care that the
laws of the United States are faithfully executed, is an obligation
which is to be fulfilled by the exercise of those powers which the
Constitution and Congress have seen fit to confer. On the Con-
stitution, II, 1151.
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nent ' in our jurisprudence, the boundaries of which are undetermin-
.a.-
15
Prom the very beginning of our history as a nation, states
men and commentators have held that since it is impossible to fore-
see what may be the exigencies or circumstances endangering the
public safety, therefore "no constitutional shackles can wisely be
imposed", and none are imposed upon the so-called war powers. 16
They have held thst there are two distinct classes of powers under
the Constitution the peace powers, which are subject to the re-
strictions of the Constitution, and the war powers, which are
limited only by the laws and usages of nations, 17 and under which
16 J. W. Garner, in Rev, de Droit Pub, et de la Sci» Pol ..
XXXV, 13 (Jan. -Mar., 1918).
16 See argument of Hamilton, in The Federalist
.
Ho. 23 (Gold-
win Smith ed., pp. 119-120). Cf. speech of Senator Sumner, in
U. S. Senate, June 27, 1862: "Pray, Sir, where in the Constitution
is any limitation of the War Powers? Let Senators who would limit
them mention a single section, line, or phrase, which even hints
at 8ny limitation. . . The War Powers are derived from the Consti-
tution, but, when once set in motion, are without any restraint
from the Constitution ; so that what is done in pursuance of them
is at the same time under the Constitution and outside the Consti-
tution. It is under the Constitution in the latitude with which
it is conducted; but, whether under the Constitution or outside the
Constitution, all that is done in pursuance of the War Powers is
constitutional." Works of Chsrles Sumner . VII, 131-132. See also
Pisher, Trial of the Constitution . 199.
"
17 "There ere, then, in the authority of Congress and of the
Executive, two classes of powers, altogether different in their
nature and often incompatible with each other — the war power and
the peace power. The peace power is limited by regulations and re-
stricted by provisions prescribed within the Constitution itself.
The war power is limited only by the laws and usages of nations.
This power is tremendous; it is strictly constitutional, but it
breaks down ever;y barrier so anxiously erected for the protection
of liberty , of property ana"^o~life . . . The powers of war are all
regulated byThe laws of nations, and are subject to no other limi-
tations." Speech of John Quincy Adams, in House of Representatives,
May 25, 1836. Cong. Debates . XII, Pt. IV (24 Cong., 1 Sobs.), 4038,
4039.
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the rights of peace may even be disregarded or curtailed. They
have asserted that the war power implies the right to do anything
that may seem necessary to carry on the war successfully, even to
19
the extent of performing otherwise unconstitutional acts.
These claims with regard to the extent of the war power
have also Deen sanctioned by the Supreme Court. Thus, in uphold-
ing the Confiscation Acts of the Civil War, the Court said: "If
the statutes were not enacted under the municipal power of Congress
to legislate for the purishment of crimes against the sovereignty
of the United States; if, on the contrary, they are an exercise of
the war powers of the government, it is clear they are not affected
by the restrictions imposed by the Sth and 6th Amendments . ... Of
course the power to declare war involves the power to prosecute it
by all means and in any manner in which war may be legitimately pros-
18 "But in bestowing upon the Government War Powers without
limitation, they (the makers of the Constitution) embodied in the
Constitution all the Eights of War as completely as if those rights
had been severally set down and enumerated; and among the first of
these is the right to disregard the Rights of Peace." Works of
Charles Sumner
.
VII, 136-137.
"It seems to be pretty well settled by the common sense of
mankind that when a nation is fighting for its existence it cannot
be fettered by all the legal technicalities which obtain in time of
peace." Rhodes, Historical Essays . 214.
"What is the effect of our entering upon the war? The ef-
fect is that we have surrendered and are obliged to surrender a
great measure of that liberty which you and I have been asserting
in court during all our lives; power over property, power over per-
sons. This has to be vested in a military commander in order to
carry on war successfully." Speech of Elihu Root at Saratoga Spring^
Sept. 1917, quoted in Va. Law Rev .. V, 179.
19 "When the Constitution conferred upon Congress the right to
declare war, it by necessary implication conferred upon Congress the
right to do anything that in its judgment is necessary to carry that
war to a successful conclusion." Senator P. C. Knox, in U. S. Senatty
May 29, 1917. Cong. Record . 65 Cong., 1 Sees., 3276.
"I felt that measures otherwise unconstitutional might be-
come lawful by becoming indispensable to the preservation of the
Constitution through the preservation of the nation." Letter of
Lincoln to A. G. Hodges, Apr. 4, 1864. Kioolay & Hay, Complete
Works of Abraham Lincoln
.
II, 508.
"If the Union and the Government cannot be saved out of
0? nun 1 :w
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ecuted."*^ Even the dissenting justices in this case admitted that
legislation founded upon the war power is subject to quite different
considerations from that based upon the municipal power of the gov-
ernment, and 'is subject to no limitations, except such as are im-
posed by the law of nations in the conduct of war . . • The war
powers of the government have no express limitations in the Consti-
tution, and the only limitation to which their exercise is subject
21is the law of nations." The same principle has also been upheld
go
by the Court in other cases. *
Though authorities thus seem to agree regarding the nature
and unlimited extent of the "war powers" as such, the extent to
which the exercise of these war powers is vested in the President
or in Congress is a matter of some dispute. For example, Senator
Browning, during the Civil War, asserted the complete authority of
the Executive in determining upon the measures necessary to meet
any war emergency, denying that Congress hed even coordinate power
with the President in that respect. "It is not true", he said,
"that Congress may decide upon the measures demanded by military
necessities and order them to be enforced. . • These necessities
can be determined only by the military oommander, and to him the
Constitution has intrusted the prerogative of judging of them.
When the Constitution made the President 'Commander-in-Chief of
the Army and Navy of the United States', it clothed him with the
incidental powers necessary to a full, faithful and sufficient per-
this terrible shock of war constitutionally, a Union and a Govern-
ment must be saved unconstitutionally." Fisher, Trial of the Con-
stitution
.
199.
55 killer v. U. S .. 11 Wall., 268, 304-305, (1870).
21 Ibid .,
22 Stewart v. Kahn .. 11 Wall., 493, 506-607, (1870): Mechanics
and Traders Bank v. Union Bank . 22 Wall., 276, 296, (1874) ;""gcCor-
mlcfr et al. . v. Humphrey. 27 Ind.
,
144, 154 (1866).

9formance of the duties of that high office; and to decide what are
military necessities, and to devise and execute the requisite mea-
sures to meet them, is one of these incidents. It is not a legis-
lative, but an executive function, and Congress has nothing to do
with it." 23
On the other hand. Senator Sumner disputed this claim to
executive power, and held that the exercise of the war powers
rested with Congress. "Of the pretension that all these enormous
powers belong to the President, and not to Congress, I try to speak
calmly and within bounds. I mean always to be parliamentary. But
a pretension so irrational and unconstitutional; so absurd and
tyrannical, is not entitled to respect. Such a pretension would
change the national Government from a government of law to that of
a military dictator . . ." 24
As a matter of fact, the growth of executive power into
a practical dictatorship in time of war, does not seem to have been
especially feared in this country. During the Revolution, attempts
were made, both in New York and Virginia, to create a dictator, who
in the latter state was to be "invested with every power legislative,
executive, and judiciary, civil and military, of life and death over
AC
our persons and over our properties", a proposal apparently ap-
23 Speech in U. S. Senate, June 25, 1862. Cong. Globe . 37
Cong., 2 Sees., 2919, 2920, 2922.
24 Speech in U. S. Senate, June 27, 1862. Works of Charles
Sumner
.
VII, 139-140. But of. Sumner's remarks in a speech at Bos-
ton, only a few months later (Oct. 6): "In war there is no constitu-
tional limit to the aotivity of the executive, except the emergency.
The safety of the people is the highest law. There is no blow the
President can strike; there is nothing he can do against the Rebel-
lion, that is not constitutional. Only inaction can be uuoonstitu-
tional." Ibid., 217.
25 ETTTot's Debates
.
II, 357-361; Writings of Thomas Jeffer-
eon, 111,231. "
~
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proved by suoh a democrat as Patrick Henry. Washington was actuals
£7ly given the power of a dictator on three separate occasions;
while Lincoln has been referred to by impartial writers as exercis-
ing "more arbitrary power than any Englishman since Oliver Crom-
28
well", and as one whose acts were "worthy of a Tudor." Daring the
recent world war, the necessity of making the President the supreme
dictator in order to win the war was seriously suggested in Con-
29
grees.
That the President can of his own accord constitutionally
assume dictatorial power in time of war has been denied by the
30
courts as "an extravagant assumption"; although most authorities
hold that the war powers of the President constitute a "latent
power of discretionary action" capable of almost unlimited expansion
in times of emergency and making the President practically absolute
31
within a certain sphere of action.
26 Elliot's Debates
.
Ill, 160; Writings of Thomas Jefferson
.
Ill, 231. They were, however, bitterly opposed by Jefferson.
27 See resolves of Dec. 27, 1776, Sert. 17 & Nov. 14, 1777.
Jour. Cont. Cong .. VI, 1045-1046; VIII, 752; IX, 905. See also
Elliot's Debates
.
Ill, 79.
28 Rhodes, Historical Essays
.
213; cf. Bryce, American Common-
wealth, I, 65-66. 72; Ford. Rise and Growth of American Politics , ^80
29 Senator Harding (Ohio) made the suggestion in August, 1917:
"What the United States needs and what it must have if it is to win
the war is a supreme dictator , with sole control of and sole respon-
sibility for every phase of war activity, and this today means prac-
tically every phase of Government. Hot only does this country need
such a dictator, in my opinion it is sure to have one before the war
goes muoh further. • .The sooner it comes the better for all of us .
• . For supreme dictator at the present moment there is but one pos-
sible man, the President of the United States." H. Y. Times . Feb. 10. 191t
.
30 Jones v. Seward , 40 Barb. (N.Y.) 563, 571, (1863).
31 Goodnow. Comparative Administrative Law
.
I, 32; Watson, On
the Constitution
.
II. 914; Baldwin. Modern Political Institutions
.
91-92; Channing, History of the United Stetes
.
III. 513; W. A. Dun-
ning, "The War Power of the President". Hew Republic XI, 76-79 (May
19, 1917). For a somewhrt extravagant claim as to the absolute
nature of the President's war powers, see remarks of Senator Lewis,
in U. S. Senate, June 30, 1917, Cong. Record LV, Pt. 5 (65 Cong.,
1 Sees.), 4552, 4553. '
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The exact limits of this sphere of action for the President
and the line of demarcation between his war powers end those of Con-
gress, are difficult to determine. An attempt to draw such a line
and to delimit such a sphere of action was made in a famous case in
the following language: "Congress has the power not only to raise
and support and gorern armies, hut to declare war. It has, there-
fore, the power to provide fcy law for carrying on war. This power
necessarily extends to all legislation essential to the prosecution
of war with vigor and success, except such as interfere with the
command of the forces and the conduct of campaigns. That power and
duty belong to the President as Commander-in-Chief. Both these
powers are derived from the Constitution, but neither is defined by
that instrument. Their extent must be determined by their nature
and by the principles of our institutions. The power to make the
necessary laws is in Congress; the power to execute in the Presi-
dent. Both powers imply many subordinate and auxilliary powers.
Bach includes all authorities essential to its due exercise. But
neither can the President in war more then in peace, intrude upon
the proper authority of Congress, nor Congress upon the proper
authority of the President. Both are servants of the people, whose
32
will is expressed in the fundamental law. H Other authorities
have attempted a briefer and simpler delimitation by saying that
"Congress regulates wahtever is of general and permanent importance,
while the President determines all matters temporary and not general
in their nature. 1,33
The main source of the President's war powers is of course
32 Ex parte Milllgan . 4 Wall., 2, 139 (1866).
33 Peirlie. National Administration of the United States
.
33;
cf. Von Hoist, Constitutional Lew of the United States . 193.
i *5 vt.
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the Constitution. Besides certain powers relating directly to war
that are expressly conferred upon the President by that instrument,
other powers and duties are vested in him that may have an important
hearing on the oonduct of war; while still other clauses of the
Constitution not referring directly to the President may by neces-
sary implication add to his war powers. 36 Other of the President's
powers with regard to war ere derived from international law and
practice, are conferred by statute, or are established as a result
of custom and usage. To define more clearly these war powers of the
President, to determine their nature and source, and to discover
the manner of their exercise, is the purpose of this study.
The most common forms through which the President in per-
son exercises his powers, are by proclamations and executive orders,
the former generally containing announcements and decisions of the
widest interest and broadest scope, the latter usually concerning
matters not of such general interest. Either may be issued as a re-
sult of express or implied statutory authorization, or by virtue of
the President's constitutional position as Chief Executive. The
great increase in the number of these proclamations and executive
orders issued in war time is also an excellent indication of the
growth of the war powers of the Executive over his power in time of
peace.
Other forms of Presidential action include rules and
regulations issued under statutory authority or by virtue of the
34 Art. II, Sec. 2, CI. 1 (commander-in-chief).
35 Art. I, Sec. 7, CI. 2, 3 (sign and veto bills); Art. II,
Sec. 1, CI. 8 (oath of office); Sec. 2, 01. 1 (power of pardon);
Sec. 2, CI. 2 (power with regard to foreign relations and appoint-
ment of officers); Sec. 3 (recommend measures, call special session,
and execute the laws).
36 Art. I, Sec. 9, CI. 2 (habeas corpus); Art. IV, Sec. 4,
(guaranty of republican government and of protection).
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President's constitutional power; directions, instructions, or order^
to heads of departments and other agencies; and decisions on matters
requiring his approval or coming to him through appeals from the
decisions of subordinate officials. Finally, the commissioning of
officers appointed by him with or without the consent of the Senate,
the recommendation of measures to Congress, and the signing or veto-
ing of bills, may be included among the means through which the
President exercises his authority, and which must be considered in
37
connection with this study of his powers.
Hot all of the acts required of the President can possibly
be performed by him personally, and the courts have definitely recog-
nised that he may act through the heads of departments. "The Presi-
dent speaks and acts through the heads of the several departments in
relation to subjects which appertain to their respective duties",
and the acts of the heads of departments are "in legal contemplation
the act of the President". 38
It has also been held that heads of departments may in
39
turn act through subordinate officials in the departments; but
the question as to how far this delegation of power may be carried
and still be considered the act of the President seems as yet to be
unsettled by the courts. It has been pointed out that most orders
and regulations are in feet prepared by subordinate officials in
the several departments, although issued in the name of the hesd of
the department or in the name of the President; and also that in
some cases, and especially during the recent war, such orders and
regulations have been issued by subordinate officials, acting by
37 Cf. Fairlie, National Administration of the U. S. . 41-42.
38 Wilcox v. JacVson
.
13 Pet.. 498. 513 (1839); 7T"3. v .
Ellas on
.
16 Pet., 291 (1842).
3T U. S. v. Warfield . 170 Fed., 43 (1909).
t
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authority of the head of the department, in matters where the sta-
40
tutes vested the power in the President. This practice, undoubt-
edly becoming more common, opens up a vast new field for a study of
the exercise of Presidential powers. Since, however, as has been
suggested, it is still an open question how far such exercise of
authority by subordinate officials can be considered as the act of
the President, this study makes no attempt to include any exercise
of power but by the President himself, or for which he may clearly
be immediately responsible.
40 J. A. Pairlie, in Mich. Law Rev.
.
XVIII, 188 (Jan., 1920).

POWERS RELATING TO THE BEGINNING OP WAR.
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Chapter II.
Control of Foreign Relations .
The function of managing the foreign relatione may he
classified into two distinct branches: (1) the power of inter-
course, intercommunication, and negotiation; (£) the power of en-
tering into formal or binding international compacts."*" The latter
2power is shared by the President with the Senate, but the former
belongs exclusively to the President. "The President is the sole
organ of the nation in its external relations, and its sole represen
tative with foreign nations."
Although diplomatic negotiations and intercourse are
regularly conducted through the Department of Stete, the acts of
that department are in legal contemplation the acts of the Presi-
4dent, and, in fact, the Department of State has generally been
recognized ae having a special status, as being more directly sub-
ject to the control of the President than any other department.
This was clearly set forth by Senator John C. Spooner in a speech
before the United States Senate on January 23, 1906, when he said:
"The act creating the Department of State in 1789, was an exception
to the acts creating the other Departments of the Government. . . .
It is a Department which from the beginning the Senate has never
assumed the right to direct or control, except as to clearly de-
fined matters relating to duty imposed by statute and not connected
1 Pomeroy, Constitutional Law (Bennett's ed.) , 564; Fairlie,
National Administration of the United States , 29-50.
2 Constitution
.
Art. II, Sec. 2, CI. 2.
3 John Marshall, in House of Representatives, Mar. 7, 1800.
Annals of Cong . 6 Cong., 613; cf. Pomeroy, op. clt . » 564; Corwin,
The President's Control of Foreign Relations , 55.
3 Jones v. U. S . 157 U. S. 202, 217 (1890); Crandall, Treaties
Their Making and Enforcement (2nd ed.) f 93.
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with the conduct of our foreign relations. We direct ell the other
heads of Departments to transmit to the Senate designated papers or
information. We do not address directions to the Secretary of
State. We direct requests to the real head of that Department , the
President of the United States
,
and. as a matter of courtesy, we
add the qualifying words, 'if in his Judgment not incompatible
with the public interest '.
"
5
This control which the President exercises over our for-
eign relations has, with regard to his war power, several principal
phases. In the first place, it gives the President the whole power
of initlat ing and formulating the foreign policy of the government
,
and virtually o^ committing the nation to its execution. Jeffer-
son expressed this idea in a letter to M. Genet, November 22, 1793:
"He (the President) being the only channel of communication between
this country and foreign nations, it is from him alone that foreign
nations or their agents are to learn what is or has been the will
of the nation; and whatever he communicates as such
,
they have the
right
.
and are bound to consider as the expression of the nation ."
Ex-President Taft, referring to the President's power of conduct-
ing the diplomatic correspondence, expressed the same thought in
the following words: "He is bound in such correspondence to discuss
the proper construction of treaties. He, must formulate the foreign
policies of our government . He must state our attitude upon ques-
tions constantly arising. While strictly he may not bind our
government as a treaty would bind it, to a definition of its rights,
still in future discussions foreign Secretaries of other countries
5 Cong. Record . 59 Cong., 1 Sess., 1420; cf. Ogg & Beard,
National Governments and the World War . 97.
5 Am. State Papers . For. Rel.. I. 184.
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are wont to look for support of their contentions to the declara-
tions and admissions of our Secretaries of State in other contro-
versies as in a sense binding upon us. There is thus much pract ical
framing of our foreign policies in the executive conduct of our
foreign relat ions."'' President Wilson has put the case for the
President even more strongly: "One of the greatest of the Presi-
dent's powers (is) . . . his control, which is very absolute , of the
foreign relations of the nation. The initiative in foreign effairs,
which the President possesses without any restriction whatever , is
virtually the power to control them absolutely. The President can-
not conclude a treaty with a foreign power without the consent of
the Senate, but he may guide every step of diplomacy, and to guide
diplomacy is to determine what treaties must be made, if the faith
and prestige of the government are to be maintained. He need dis-
close no step of negotiation until it is complete, and when in any
critical matter it is completed the government is virtually commit -
ted . Whatever its disinclination, the Senate may feel itself com-
mitted also." 8
This power of the President has also been definitely up-
Q
held by the Supreme Court, and there can thus be no question as
to his right and power under ordinary circumstances to initiate and
formulate such diplomatic policies as he may deem proper, and vir-
tually commit Congress and the country to their execution. It is
also freely conceded by authorities that the Executive Department,
by means of this branch of its power over foreign relations, "holds
7 Our Chief Magistrate and His Powers , 113.
8 Constitutional Government
.
77-78; See also President Wil-
son's letter to Senator Fall, Dec. 8, 1919. Infra. , -29; s. E.
Baldwin, in Yale Rev .. IX, 407.
9 Foster v. Ueilson . 2 Pet., 253, 309 (1829); Williams v.
Suffolk Ins. Co .. IS Pet., 415, 420 (1839).
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In its keeping the safety, welfare, and even permanence of our
internal and domestic institutions."10 This fact, that policies
leading to disturbed relations with other powers and even endanger-
ing the peace and safety of the country may be, and in fact have
been, adopted at the will of the Executive, has led to considerable
discussion as to the propriety of entrusting the sole responsibility
for these matters to the President. The question has been raised
whether, in view of the power of Congress to declare war, the Presi-
dent is under a constitutional obligation not to formulate and pro-
secute such diplomatic policies as might incur the risk of war, or
whether, in case grave consequences are feared, he should not at
least advise snd consult with Congress.
The idea that the President is under some such obligation
has been brought forward on several occasions. It was raised in
18E6, when the proposal of President Adams to send representatives
to the Panama Congress*1 aroused the opposition of such senators as
Hayne, Woodbury, White, Van Buren, and Benton, largely on the ground
that this Congress was to be really a congress of belligerents, and
that the United States, by taking part, would compromise its neu-
trality, become involved in "entangling alliances", and incur the
12
risk of war with Spain. Their sentiments were expressed by Van
Buren (later President), when he said: "It is, then, the design of
the Executive to enter into an agreement at the Congress . . . that
if the powers of Europe make common cause with Spain, or otherwise
attempt the subjugation of Spanish America, we shall unite with the
l8tter, and contribute our proportion to the means necessary to
10 Pomeroy, op. cit . . 565.
11 Richardson. Messages and Papers of the Presidents
.
II,
318-320.
12 Benton's Debates
.
VIII, 423,425,435,436,441,446,450,462.
01 «t
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make the resistance effectual; and further, that we shall bind our-
selves, at that Congress, as to the manner in which we shall resist
any attempts, by the European powers, to colonize any portion of
this continent". Such a proposal he characterized as "a measure by
which the peace of the country is to be exposed to a contingency
beyond the control of our Government — by which the great question
of peace or war will be taken from the Representatives of the peo-
ple — by which, instead of retaining that freedom of action which
we now possess, we shall bind ourselves, in a certain event, to
pursue a certain course, whatever those, to whom the Government of
the country may have been committed, shall think the honor or
interest of the country may require.
In the House of Representatives there was likewise con-
siderable opposition to the President's proposal on the same grounda
Thus Mr. Rives spoke of the result of our participation in the Con-
gress as "most probably the adoption of measures endangering the
future peace of the country", and of the President's declaration
with regard to foreign interference in the affairs of South America
as "a conditional, or, to use a more diplomatic phraseology, a pro-
14
visional declaration of war;" while Mr. Hamilton remarked, "We
have become, at the execlusive will of the President, the arbitrator
of the New World, and, in that character, have sent bullying pro-
tests to the old. The Cabinet has, in our name, made two solemn
contracts, to go to war in two contingencies, without, 'as a matter
of preliminary advisement', even condescending to consult us."^
Others spoke to the same effect, and an attempt was even made to in-
13 Benton's Debates
.
VIII, 446-447.
14 Ibid .. IX, 107, 111.
15 T5T3". , 136.
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struct the envoys to the Congress by attaching conditions to the
16
resolution providing for the mission.
These conditions were vigorously opposed in the House by
Webster and others as an invasion of the power of the President to
instruct ministers, 17 and were eventually beaten. 1® There was,
however, considerable sentiment to the effect that while there was
no power in the House to issue instructions either to the President
or to ministers, still the House, through its power of granting or
refusing appropriations, might exercise a restraint upon foreign
diplomatic intercourse a power which should, however, be exer-
cised only when the policy of the Executive was clearly tending to
19involve the country in war. Senator Johnston (of Louisiana)
probably best summed up the position of the President and his sup-
porters when he said: "There is nothing peculiar in the present
case. The President has
,
at all times, the power to commit the
peace of the country , and involve us in hostilities , as far as he
has power in this case. To him is confided all intercourse with
foreign nations. To his discretion and responsibility is intrusted
all our delicate and difficult relations: all negotiations and all
treaties are conducted and brought to issue by him."^ Even Van
Buren, who had spoken against the mission, admitted that, no matter
what action the Senate or Congress might take, the President could
still constitutionally provide for such mission on his own eutho-
16 Benton' 8 Debates
.
IX, 91.
17 Ibid
..
94-S5, 101, 115, 150.
18 IbTcT
.
.
217, 218.
19 See, for example, remarks of Mr. Thompson, Ibid
. .
182.
20 Ibid .. VIII, 439.
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Whether or not the Panama mission of 1836 actually carried
with it 1 he dangers attributed to it by its opponents may still be
a matter of some dispute, but is of little consequence to this
study. The important point to be noted, on which both advocates
and opponents of the mission were agreed, is that, if it was within
the power of the President alone to decide upon a certain diplo-
metic policy, such as this mission, it was likewise within his
power, and his alone, to determine whether or not its consequences
might involve the peace and safety of the country. The President
having made his decision and carried out his policy, Congress and
the country would be committed to it, regardless of consequences.
This power of the President has been demonstrated in
actual practice again and again. During a period of about twenty-
five years (1823-1849), the Cuban policy of the Executive was con-
sistently friendly to Spain and a guaranty of Spanish sovereignty;
after the Mexican War that was changed to a policy whose chief end
was the acquisition of Cuba by the United States, and in the de-
velopment of which American diplomacy has been characterized as
"agressive and intolerant"; while during the period after the Civil
War, it was again changed to a policy of commercial and humani-
tarian interest, culminating finally in actual intervention and
El Benton' 8 Debates
.
VIII, 441. "But though neither Congress
nor the courts may direct the President in the discharge of his
constitutional powers, yet either the Senate or the House separete-
ly, or both concurrently, may p8ss resolutions expressive of their
desires in relation to questions of an international character, and
the President may give such resolutions any weight he chooses, not-
withstanding that they have no legal effect. Indeed, it is a part
of the President's discretion to pay heed to such resolutions or
not, as he elects." Corwin, The President's Control of Foreign Re -
lations , 40.
I
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2£
war.
President Grant's handling of the Virgin ins incident in
1873, President Cleveland's of the Venezuelan affair of 1897, and
President Wilson's of the Mexican situation throughout the entire
course of his administration, illustrate the power of the President
both to bring on and to avert diplomatic crises. 23 Mention need
only be made of such events as Washington's neutrality policy, the
Monroe Doctrine, the annexation of Texas, the Mexican War, the
Alabama Claims settlement, the acquisition of the Panama Canal, the
Big Stick doctrine, our entrance into the war with Germany — "all
these, and many more," says Corwin, "must be set down to the credit
24-
of executive leadership in the field of foreign relations."
It may therefore be asserted that the Preeident, through
his control of diplomatic intercourse, holds in his keeping the
peace and safety of the United States, that he may initiate such
diplomatic policies and so conduct diplomatic negotiations as to
force the country into a war, "without any possibility of hindrance
from Congress or the Senate".
22 Benton, International Law and Diplomacy of the Spcnish-
American War, 14-20; Rhodes. History of the United States
.
II.""35Q-
354. See message of President Cleveland to Congress, Dec. 7, 1896;
and President McKinley's statement of the grounds for intervention,
in his message of Apr. 11, 1898, Richardson, op. cit .. IX, 719-721;
X, 147.
23 Rhodes, op. cit .. VII, 29-36; Chadwick, Relations of the
United States and Spain: Diplomacy
.
214-357. "In an hour, by this
executive act (Cleveland's action in the Venezuelan affair), we are
brought face to -"ace with a question of war with the leading power
in Europe, and the danger of it passes away through a diplomatic cor
respondence, for the issue of which the President was again alone
responsible. The very ground of our interference in this quarrel
of Venezuela what was it but a doctrine proclaimed, and indeed inff
vented, by a President of the United States? The Monroe Doctrine
has laid down the law for our hemisphere, and it was the single act
of the executive department." Baldwin, Modern Political Institu-
tions 105-106.
24 The President's Control of Foreign Relations. 126; cf. Ford
Rise end Growth of American Politics
.
279. 260.
85 Pa i rli-e ,jff^t-.—Admini&tr&t i <
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A second phase of the President's control of foreign re-
lations that should be considered in this connection is his power
to recognize the belligerency or independence of new states and
gove rnments . This power of recognition is not expressly granted
by the Constitution, but is implied from the general power to enter
into diplomatic relations with foreign countries through the making
26
of treaties and the exchange of accredited envoys. It is not
conferred in terms upon any one department of the government, but
27is now generally conceded as belonging to the Executive. In
26 Constitution . Art. II, Sec. 2, CI. 2; Sec. 3; cf. Taft,
Our Chief Magistrate end His Powers
,
112-113; Story, Commentaries on
the Constitution
.
II. 370-371.
"5? In several cases the courts have declared the power of
recognition to be vested in the "political department" of the govern!
ment, without indicating clearly whether the executive or legis-
lative department, or both, was meant. Rose v. Himely . 4 Cr., 241
(1801); Gelston v. Hoyt . 3 Wheat., 246, 324. (1816); Foster v. geil-
son, 2 Pet., 253, 307 (1829) ; Jones v. U. S.
.
137, U. S., 202, 212
( 1890) • However, in other cases, both the language and tone of the
decisions are such as to show that the executive department is
meant. U. S. v. Hutchings . 2 Wheeler's Criminal Cases, 543, cited in
Sen. Doc. No. 56, 54 Cong., 2 Sess., 24; Williams v. Suffolk Ins .
Co., 13 Pet., 415, 420 (1839); Kennett v. Chambers . 14 Uow.
.
38.
76", 50-51 (1852); U. S. v. Trumbull . 48 Fed.. 9ft. 104 (1891);
The Stata
.
56 Fed., 505, 510 (1893).
See also Senate Document No. 56 . 54 Cong., 2 Sess., containing/
a report of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, presented
to the Senate Jen. 11, 1897, in which, after an exhaustive investi-
gation into the whole subject of recognition, it was held that the
power of recognition rested properly with the President. In 1864,
the Mexican situation brought about the passage of a House resolu-
tion declaring that "Congress has a constitutional right to an
authoritative voice in declaring and prescribing the foreign policy
of the United States, as well in the recognition of foreign powers
as in other matters"; and in 1896, a concurrent resolution was passef
recognising a state of war in Cuba end offering the good offices
of the United States for the recognition of Cuban independence.
These resolutions were ignored by Presidents Lincoln and Cleveland,
respectively, on the ground that recognition was a matter for the
Executive alone. Cong. Globe
.
XXXV, Pt. I, 65, 67; Latane, America
as a World Power
.
9.
The Joint resolution of 1898 authorizing intervention in Cuba,
declared "That the people of the island of Cuba are, and of right
ought to be, free and independent"; but authorities hold that this
is a mere statement of policy and not to be regorded as a claim by
Congress to the power of recognition." Benton, International Law
and Diplomacy of the Spanish-American tfer , 99; Corwin. The PresT^
4
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practice, recognition has always been extended as the exclusive act
£8
of the President.
New states generally come into existence by breaking off
from an actually existing state, and although recognition even in
such cases is "a normal act, quite compatible with the maintenance
of peaceful intercourse with the mother-country"
,
provided the new
community has actually won its contest and successfully maintained
£9
its independence and separate existence, authorities agree that
premature recognition is a wrong done to the parent state, that it
amounts to an act of intervention, and may properly be considered
30by the parent state as a cause for war. Through the exercise of
this power the President is thus upon occasion enabled to determine
the question of peace or war for the United States.
The serious responsibility thus resting upon the President
has been recognized on several occasions. When the South American
provinces were clamoring for recognition in 1817, President Monroe,
although sympathetic with their aspirations, evidently feared pos-
31Bible complications with Spain, and in spite of pressure from
dent
'g Control of Foreign Relations. 80-81 .
Senator King (Utah) proposed a Senate resolution, May 23, 1919,
for the recognition of the Omsk government of Russia, which seems
to have been buried in oommittee, Cong. Record
.
66 Cong., 1 Sess.,
(May 23, 1919), 154.
28 For the manner in which recognition has been extended to
other countries by the United States, see Senate Document No. 40
.
54 Cong., 2 Sess.
29 Lawrence, Principles of International Law (6th ed. ) 88 .
30 Ibid
. ; Hall. International Law (6th ed.J. 83; Moore *s
Digest of International Law
.
T] TS~.
31 See memorandum of questions submitted to his Cabinet,
Oct. 25, 1817. Writings of James Monroe
.
VI, 31.
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Clay and his following- in Congress, declined to recognize these
new states until he was satisfied thet Spain would not resent the
33
act with war.
President Jackson, curiously enough, was likewise extreme-
ly cautious about arousing the hostility of Mexico through a pre-
mature recognition of Texas, declined to receive the Texan commis-
sioners sent to Washington in March, 1836, to ask for recognition, 34
and apparently was unwilling to take the sole responsibility in
cases involving possible international complications. Referring to
the Texas situation in his message of December 21, 1836, he spoke
of the acknowledgment of a new state as independent as "at all times
an act of great delicacy and responsibility, but more especially
so when such state has forcibly separated from another of which it
had formed an intergral part and which still claims dominion over
it. A premature recognition under these circumstances, if not
looked upon as a justifiable cause of war, is always liable to be
regarded ss proof of an unfriendly spirit to one of the contending
parties. " He therefore announced th&t he considered it "with the
spirit o^the Constitution, find most safe", thrt the power of recog-
32 Clay in 1817 mounted what John Quincy Adams called "his
South American great horse", and by means of resolutions proposed by
himself and his followers, kept 'he question of recognition of
these provinces constantly before Congress from 1818 to 1822, in an
effort to force the hand of the President. Memoirs of Jo^n Quincy
Adams
.
IV, 26; Annals of Cong *. 15 Cong., 1 Sess., II, 1468, 1569,
1646, 1652, 1655; ibid .. 16 Cong.. 1 Sess., II, 2223, 2229-2230;
2 Sess., 1071, 1077, 1081, 1091-1092; ibid . . 17 Cone-., 1 Sess., I,
854, 982.
33 "The dela^ which has been observed in making a decision
on this important subject will, it is presumed, have afforded an
unequivocal proof to Spain, as it must have done to other powers,
of the high respect entertained by the United States for her rights
and of their determination not to interfere with them. . . It may
be presumed that the successful progress of the revolution through
such a long series of years . • . will reconcile the parent country
to an accommodation with them on the basis of their unqualified
independence." Messege to Congress, Mar. 8, 1822. Richardson,
op. cit .. II, 116-118.
34Reeves, American Diplomacy under Tyler and Polk . 78.
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nltion, when probably leading- to wr, should be exercised "with a
previous understanding with that body by whom alone war can be de-
clared, and by whom all provisions for sustaining its perils must
be furnished." 35
The Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, in its report
of January 11, 1897, already mentioned, " although strongly up-
holding the President's right to the power of recognition, empha-
sized also the dangers involved in the exercise of that power, since
the older nation might regard such recognition as a cause of war.
The question whether a nation should recognize another, and thus
risk going to war with a third, was stated to be largely a question
of expediency, of which the Executive was the best qualified to
judge, though it was added that "if recognition of such independence
is liable to become a casus belli with some foreign power, • . •
it is most advisable as well as proper for the executive first to
consult the legislative branch as to its wishes and postpone its
own action if not assured of legislative approval. If, on the other
hand, the Executive did not consider that the time had arrived to
act, expressions of opinion by the legislature should be made with
some caution."
It seems therefore to be the general consensus of opinion
that, while the power of recognition belongs properly to the presi-
dent, it is a poorer that may easily involve serious complications
with foreign nations, and in such cases should be exercised with
due regerd for the wishes of that branch of the government whose
function it is to declare war. It should be noted, however, that
any action of Congress would be merely advisory, that the whole
power rests with the President alone. "It is the proper province
35 Richardson, op. cit .. Ill, 266-267.
36 Senate Document No. 56 . 54 Cong., 2 Sess., 2.
==
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of the Executive to refuse to be guided by 8 resolution on the part
of the legislature, if, in his judgment, to do so would be unwise.
The legislature may express its wishes or opinions, but may not
37
c ommand
.
n
Prom his power to receive and send accredited envoys, the
President also derives the power to withdraw the diplomatic repre-
sentatives of the United States at his pleasure, or dismiss those
of foreign powers, and thus sever all relations with any particular
country — a power which a distinguished authority has said "may
be so exercised as to produce most momentous results."^®
This power to sever diplomatic relations is a power that
has always been considered as peculiarly within the province of the
President, and until very recently no attempt was ever made by Con-
gress to assert any authority in that respect. However, the unset-
tled condition of affairs in Mexico, and the opinion of some people
that President Wilson was being too patient in his handling of
Mexican affairs, led to the introduction by Senator Pall (Hew Mexi-
co), on December 3, 1919, of a concurrent resolution requesting the
37 Willoughby, On the Const itut ion . I, 462; of. Corwin, op.
cit
.
. 82. "It is not, indeed, a power likely to be abused, though
it is pregnant with consequences often involving the que st i on of
f
eace or war . And, in our own short experience, the revolutions
n Prance , and the revolutions in South America, have already
placed us in situations to feel its critical character, and the
necessity of having at the head of the government an executive
of sober judgment, enlightened views, and firm and exalted patrio-
tism." Story, Commentaries
,
II, 371.
38 Burge se. Politicel Science and Comparative Constitutional
Law
,
II, 251. Hamilton did not seem to appreciate the tremendous
possibilities in the exercise of this power, especially to receive
ministers, for he passed it by with this brief comment: "This,
though it has been a rich theme of declamation, is more a matter
of dignity than of authority. It is a circumstance which will be
without consequence in the administration of the government." The
Federalist
.
No. 68 (Goldwin Smith ed., pp. 383-384.)
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President to withdraw recognition from the Carranza Government end
"to sever all diplomatic relations now existing between this Govern-
39
ment and the pretended Government of Carranza".
Though this resolution clearly went "beyond the traditional
view that the President elone has the entire responsibility for de-
ciding whether or not diplomatic relations should at any time be
severed, there seemed to be a disposition on the part of the Foreign
Relations committee of the Senate to recommend it favorably and
push it to a vote. President Wilson, however, in a letter of Decem-
ber 8, 1919, to Senator Fall, vigorously asserted the power and
responsibility of the Executive in this matter, expressing himself
as follows: "I should be gravely concerned to see any such resolu-
tion pass the Congress. It would constitute a reversal of our con-
stitutional practice, which might lead to very great confusion in
regard to the guidance of our foreign affairs. I am convinced that
I am supported by every competent constitutional authority in the
statement ^hat the initiative in directing the relations of our
Government with foreign Governments is assigned by the Constitution
to the Executive, and to the Executive only. Only one of the
Houses of Congress is associated with the President by the Constitu-
tion in an advisory capacity, and the advice of the Senate is pro-
vided for only when sought by the Executive in regard to explicit
agreements with foreign Governments and the appointment of diplo-
matic representatives who are to speak for this Government et
foreign capitals. The only safe course, I am confident, is to ad-
here to the prescribed method of the Constitution. We might go
very far afield if we departed from it." 40
39 See text o* resolution in W. Y. Times . Dec. 4, 1919.
40 H. Y. Times
.
Dec. 9, 1919.
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Upon receipt of this letter, Senator Lodge, chairman of
the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, immediately announced
that the committee would not push the Pall resolution, hut would
leave the entire responsibility for the Mexican situation with the
President, thus virtually acknowledging the soundness of the Presi-
41
dent's position.
The breaking of diplomatic relations, while not in itself
an act of war, and not necessarily resulting in war, is meant to be
42
a marked affront and generally does lead to war. President Wil-
son thus understood very well, as did the whole country, that his
action, on February 3, 1917, in dismissing the German ambassador
to the United States and recalling Ambassador Gerard from Berlin,
was very likely the first step towards actual war, although in his
address to Congress on that date he expressed himself as hopeful
43
that further complications might be avoided.
Finally, the President may to a considerable extent deter-
mine questions relating to the peace of the United States through
his power to enter into so-called execut Ive agreements with other
41 "Of course the committee will do nothing now. The Presi-
dent desires complete responsibility for the Mexican situation to
rest on him. Let it rest there. We desired only to assist him;
he does not wish us to do so. He does not even allow us to express
our support or make a suggestion. The committee will not again
consider the resolution. We are through." Statement of Senator
Lodge. N. Y. Times Dec. 9, 1919.
42 See T. S. Woolsey, "The Beginning of War", Proc. Am. Pol .
Sci. Assn.
.
I, 54-68, esp. 57-60.
Diplomatic relations with Brazil were severed in 1827 and with
Mexico in 1858, but in each case were very shortly restored without
any intervening complications; with Mexico they were broken off
also in 1836, and continued broken for three years, without war;
relations between Turkey and the United States were severed Apr.
20, 1917, but war was never declared between the two countries.
Reeves, American Diplomacy under Tyler and Polk
.
76; Moore's Digest
.
VII, 103-105; H. Y. Times Currentgist. Mag .. VI. 437.
43 See text of address in McKlnley. Collected Materials for
the Study of the War
.
(1st ed.), 11-12.
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powers. The Constitution requires that treaties can only he made
44
by the President by and with the advice and consent of the Senate,
but "treaties" by no means include every sort of international
arrangement entered into. Agreements of various sorts, some con-
cerning only minor and routine matters, others on matters of con-
siderable importance and delicacy, are frequently made by the
President without the knowledge or consent of the Senate, and are
4by long practice considered to be within the range of his authority.
Such agreements, although not a part of the "supreme law of the
land", as ere treaties, nevertheless are considered binding upon
the administration making them, but not upon succeeding administra-
46
tions. As a matter of fact, most of these agreements covering
matters of any considerable importance have been respected by the
successors of those making them, and have by general consent come
have the effect of a settled law.
Such executive agreements take the various forms of a
protocol, a modus Vivendi, an exchange of notes or memoranda, or a
mere "gentlemen's agreement", and are entered into by the President
by virtue of his powers as Commander-in-Chief or of his diplomatic
47powers. As an example of executive agreements based upon the
first class of powers may be mentioned the agreement of 1817 with
Great Britain for the limitation of naval armaments on the Great
Lakes.
This agreement was brought about by an erohange of notes
between the British minister at Washington (Mr. Bagot ) and the
44 Art. II, Sec. 2, CI. 2.
45 J. B. Moore, in Pol. Sci. Quar .. XX, 388-390; Ogg & Beard,
National governments and the World war , 102.
4"6 Butler, The Treaty-Making Power of the United States . II,
370; Angaries v. Bayard , 127 U. S., 251, 261 (1888).
47 Corwin, The President's Control of foreign Relations. 116.
I
• .... ... '
'
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Acting- Secretary of State (Mr. Rush), and provided that neither
party should keep in service on Lakes Charaplain and Ontario more
than one, and on Lake Erie and the upper lakes more than two armed
vessels, none of these to be armed with more than one cannon, and
48
all other armed vessels of both parties to be dismantled. Al-
though President Monroe nearly a year later submitted the arrange-
49
ment to the Senate for its approval, this action was merely per-
functory, since the agreement had become effective immediately
after the date of the original exchange of notes (April 28-29, 1817),
through orders issued by the Secretary of the Navy to the naval of-
50ficers commanding on the Great Lakes. The arrangement was defi-
nitely undertaken as a measure to preserve the peace between the
two countries, and remains to this day as a striking example of
what may be done twoards that end by purely Executive action.
Another agreement between these two countries of some-
what similar import with respect to armament was entered into by
48 Am. State Papers. For. Rel .. IV, 205-206.
49 Message to the Senate, Apr. 6, 1818, Ibid . . 202. John Quin
cy Adams says on Jan. 14, 1818, that the President did not think
it necessary to communicate the arrangement to Congress. Memoirs
,
IV, 41. The Senate gave its approval Apr. 16, 1818, following
"
which the President issued a formal proclamation April 28, announc-
ing that the agreement was in effect. Am. State Papers, ffor. Rel ..
IV, 207.
50 The terms of the agreement were communicated by Mr. Rush
to Secretary of the Navy Crowninshield on Apr. 30, 1817, and the
necessary orders were issued by the latter May 2. Ibid . . 206-207.
51 "The President (Madison), being satisfied that, if each
nation should maintain on the l8kes a naval foree, it would expose
both to considerable and useless expense, while it would mult iply
tre risks of collision between them , instructed Mr. Adams, shortly
after the peace, to make the proposals ... in the hope that it
might be carried into immediate effect." Monroe to Bagot, Aug. 2,
1816, Ibid . . 203. "This arrangement for mutual disarmament on the
lakes has undoubtedly been the greatest single factor in the con-
tinuance of peaceful relations between the United States and Great
Britain during the last one hundred years." Updyke, Diplomacy of
the War o* 1812
.
465-466.
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means of a protocol signed at London, December 9, 1850, by the Unite
States minister (Abbott Lawrence) and Lord Palmerston, under which
the British government ceded Horseshoe Reef in Lake Erie to the
United States, the latter agreeing to erect a light-house but to
maintain no fortifications * The agreement was ratified by an ex-
change of notes in London, February 10, 1851, with no formal ratifi-
cation on the part of either country, and the light- house was
erected in 1856 upon appropriation of the necessary funds by Con-
52gress.
In 1859 a dispute between the United States and Great
Britain over the island of San Juan off the Pacific coast, which
threatened to cause serious difficulty between the two countries,
was settled by an agreement, reached through an exchange of notes,
53for joint military occupation of the island. This arrangement,
which continued until the entire island was given over to the
United States under an arbitral decision in 1873, was upheld by the
courts as a proper exercise of Executive authority, even to the ex-
tent of modifying, in the interest of peace , existing statutes for
54
the government of the disputed territory.
Perhaps the most remarkable exercise of the President's
power to make international agreements without the consent of the
Senate, by virtue of his authority as Commander-in-Chief, is the
. * . •
52 J. B. Moore, in Pol. Sci. Quar .. XX, 390.
53 Crandall, Treaties: Their Making and Enforcement
.
106;
Foster, Practice of Diplomacy
.
321.
54 "The power to make and enforoe such a temporary convention
respecting its own territory is a necessary incident to every nation
al government, and adheres where the executive power is vested
This particular convention should be allowed to modify for the
time being the operation of the organic act of this Territory, so
fsr forth as to exclude to the extent demanded by the political
branch of the government of the United States, in the interest of
peace, all territorial interference in the government of that island
Watts v.U.S., 1 Wash. Terr. ,288, 294 ( 1670 ), quoted in Crandall, op. c it
106-107.
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protocol concluded September 7, 1901, between Chine end the Allied
Powers thet had intervened during the Boxer uprising. This proto-
col required reparation for the murder of the German minister, and
punishment of the principal authors of the outrages committed
against foreigners during the uprising; prohibited to China the im-
portation of arms and ammunition or of materials used exclusively
for their manufacture; demanded an indemnity of 450,000,000 taels;
constituted an extraterritorial quarter for the foreign legations
in Peking; permitted temporary occupation by the Powers of certain
strategic points; and required numerous undertakings on the part
of China, especially with regard to the conduct of her foreign rela-
55
tions.
This protocol was signed on the part of the United States
by W. W. Rockhill, whose appointment as special commissioner to
China had not been submitted to the Senate; it went into effect
without any further ratification, the whole matter thus being carrier
on and concluded by authority of the Executive alone.
It is now authoritatively recognized that the President,
without legislative authority, but solely by virtue of his powers
as Commander-in-Chief, m&y permit or refuse the entry of foreign
troops into the United States. By virtue of the same authority,
arrangements wero made with Mexico in 1882, through an exchange of
55 See text of protocol in For. Rel . 1901, App., 312-318.
Poster calls this "probably the broadest exercise of executive
authority in -foreign matters without the concurrence of the Senate."
Practice of Diplomacy
.
318.
55 Tucker t, ~A1 e XSnd rof
f
.
183 U. S., 424, 435 (1902). Cf.
Washington's refusal to permit British troops to cross United States
territory in 1790, and the opinions of his Cabinet on the question.
7/ r it i nps o f ge orge Wo sh ingt on . XI, 497, n. ; Writings of Thomas Jef-
ferson. V. 238-259; Works of Alexander Hamilton
,
IV. 20-49; Life
and Works of John Adams
.
VIII. 497-500.
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notes, for the reciprocal passare of troops across the border in
pursuit of hostile Indians. It is worthy of note thet the Mexican
Executive was distinctly authorized by the Mexican Senate to permit
such crossing of troops, while in the United States the terms of the
agreement were referred, not to the Senate, but to the General of
57
the Array, and approved by him and the Secretary of War. These
arrangements were renewed at various times, ^® and form the basis
for the attempted agreements of like nature during the border trou-
bles in 1916. 59 A similar arrangement with Great Britain for the
reciprocal crossing of the Canadian boundary was proposed by Secre-
tary Frelinghuysen in 1883, but was rejected by Canada on the
ground that it involved the "risk complications worse than that
of Indian raids." 60
Among executive agreements entered into by virtue of the
President's diplomatic powers, and dealing with matters causing
considerable dispute, difficulty, and possible complications, may
be mentioned an agreement of 1865 with Great Britain, reached by an
61
exchange of memoranda, with regard to the fisheries question; a
57 For. Rel. 1882. 396-397, 405, 419-426. The memorandum
signed by Secretary Frelinghuysen and Minister Romero stated that
since the Mexican Senate had authorized the President of Mexico to
allow the passing of Mexican troops into the United States and of
United States troops into Mexico, "and the Constitution of the
United States empowers the President of the United States to allow
the passage without the consent of the Senate, this agreement does
not require the sanction of the Senate of either country, and will
begin to take effect twenty days after this date (July 29, 1882)."
58 June 28,1883; Oct. 31, 1884; Oct. 16,1885; June 25,1890;
Nov. 25, 1892; June 4, 1896.
59 H. Y. Times Current Hist. Mag.
.
IV, 403, 616, 618-619, 627.
60 See report of the Indian Commissioner for the Northwest
Territories (Canada). For. Rel. 1883, 528 .
61 For. Rel. 1885
.
460-469. "This agreement proceeds from the
mutual good-will of the two governments, and has been reached solely
to avoid all misunderstandings and difficulties which might other-
wise arise from the abrupt termination of the fishing of 1885 in the
midst of the season." Statement of Secretary Bayard. Ibid . . 460.
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modus Vivendi with the same country in 1899 fixing a provisional
boundary between Alaska and Canada; the protocol of 1873 settling
the Virginius affair with Spain; 63 Secretary of War Taft's adjust-
64
ment of the boundaries of the Panama Canal Zone; and the Root-
Takahira and Lansing- Ishii agreements of 1907 and 1917, respective-
ly 65ly.
The action of President Roosevelt in 1905 with regard to
Santo Domingo is especially noteworthy in this connection, in that
a treaty was first negotiated providing that the United States
should guarantee the integrity of that country, take charge of its
customs, and settle its obligations; and when this treaty failed
of ratification in the Senate, President Roosevelt nevertheless
put its terms into effect through a modus Vivendi. For two years
the affairs of that island were administered under the sole autho-
rity of this executive agreement, until in 1907 the Senate yielded
66
and ratified a slightly revised treaty.
62 For. Rel. 1899
.
328-330.
63 Crandall. op. cit .. 107-108.
64 "I had no power to make a treaty with Panama, but I did
have, with the authority of the President, the right to make rules
equivalent to law in the Zone. I therefore issued an order direct-
ing the carrying out of the plan agreed upon, in so far as it was
necessary to carry it out on our side of the line, on condition
that, and as long as, the regulations to be made by Panama were en-
forced by that government. This was approved by Secretary Hay and
the President, and has constituted down until the present day, I
believe, the basis upon which the two governments are carried on
in this close proximity. It was attacked vigorously in the Senate
as a usurpation of the treaty-making power, and I was summoned be-
fore a committee in the Senate to justify what had been done. There
was a great deal of eloquence over this usurpation by Mr. Morgan
and other Senators, but the modus Vivendi continued as the practi-
cal agreement between the nations for certainly more than seven
years, and my impression is that it is still in force in most of
its provisions." Taft, Our Chief Magistrate and his Powers . 111-112
65 For. Rel. 1906. 510-512; Am. Jour. Int. Lew . XIT r Sum). 1-3.
66 Latane. America as a 7/orld Power
.
280-281; J. B. Moore, in
Pol. Sci. Quar .. XX. 386-387; Roosevelt. Autobiography . 551-552.
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The President is thus enabled, through his power of enter-
ing into these executive agreements which do not require the sanc-
tion of the Senate, to assume complete responsibility for the
handling of matters of almost every variety in the field of foreign
relations, many of which involve complications and delicate ques-
tions that might easily affect the peace and safety of the United
States.

38.
Chapter III.
Military Measures Short of War .
By virtue of his position as Commander- in-Chief , as well
as by authority of other constitutional and statutory provisions, th<
President may undertake numerous military measures that are short
of actual war. In the first place, there are many instances in
which he may employ the armed forces to aid the civil authorities
within the United States. Thus, for example, the constitutional
clause guaranteeing to every state a republican form of government
and protection against domestic violence, 1 is held to give the Presi-
dent power to use troops, without special legislative sanction, when
needed for those purposes, and even to anticipate and prevent local
disturbances by a show of force.
In 1878 an attempt was made to restrict the President's
povrer to use the armed forces in executing the laws of the United
States through an act of Congress forbidding the employment of the
army as a posBe comitatus
.
except as expressly authorized by the
Constitution or by statute. It has been held, however, in spite
of that statute, thet the provisions of the Constitution vesting
the President with the executive power and making it his duty to
4
"take care that the laws be faithfully executed", must be construed
as giving to the President the general power of enforcing the laws
and the "peace of the United States" by any means that he may find
1 Art. IV, Sec. 4.
2 Lieber, The Use of the Army in Aid of the Civil Povrer . 30-
37, 45; Wlnthrop. Abridgment of Military Law (2nd ed.) t 336-337.
Cf. the sending of troops under Gen. wood to Gary in 1919 to pre-
vent disorder during the steel strike.
3 Act of June 18, 1878. 20 Stat, at L., 146, 152 (Sec. 15).
4 Art. II, Sec. 1, CI . 1; Sec. 3.

39.
necessary. "Congress may, by disbanding the Army, render it impos-
sible for the President to resort to his constitutional power as
executive and commander-in-chief of employing the Army in aid of
the civil power, in the execution of the laws, or may couple an ap-
propriation for the support of the Army with a condition as to the
use of the money appropriated; but, if it be true that the Consti-
tution directly vests the President with (this) duty and power • .
,
Congress cannot make the exercise of such power illegal. It may pre
vent its exercise, but it cannot make it illegal."**
Thesr const ituional powers are also reinforced by statutory
authorization to use the armed forces in aid of the civil power in
several specific instances. Thus the President is expressly em-
powered to employ the land or naval forces to such extent as may be
necessary for the protection of civil rights; for carrying out the
guarantees to the Indians; for the preservation of the public lands
and forests; and for the enforcement of the laws with respect to
7
quarantine, extradition, and neutrality.
In none of these instances should the exercise of his
powers by the President cause any difficulties or complications with
foreign nations, except in the case of the enforcement of the neu-
trality laws of the United States. In this connection, mention need
only be made of such incidents as Washington's famous neutrality
6 Lieber, op. clt.
. 14, 37, 40, 56; Ex parte Slebold . 100
U. S., 371, 394-395 (1879) ; In re Neagle . 135 U. S., 1, 63-64, 67,
69^?#Cf. President Cleveland's use of troops in Chicago during the
railroad strike of 1894, over the protest of Gov. Altgeld.
6 Lieber, op. eit. . 56-67. See also opinions of ex-Attorney
General Miller and Senator Edmunds. Ibid . t 15 n. , 43; cf. Pomeroy,
Constitutional Law (Bennett ed.) . 537-538.
7 U. 5. RevT Stats.
.
Sees. 1984, 1969; 2118, 2147, 2150-2152;
2460, 5596; 4792, 5275; S3 Stats, at I. . 322; 31 ibid., 618; 35
ibid
.
.
1088, 1089. These are conveniently listed in Army Regula.
tlons (ed.1917)
.
106-109.
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proclamation of 1793, the Fenian invasion of Canada in 1866, y the
numerous filibustering expeditions against Cuba and other coun-
tries, 1 and the strong feeling of the Central Powers against the
manner in which the neutrality of the United States was enforced
during the first years of the recent world war, to indicate the
delicate nature of the President's responsibility in this regerd,
and the possible international complications that may result. 1^
The President has also been empowered on some occasions,
and on other occasions has exercised the power without specific
authority, to undertake military measures for the protection of the
so-called "inchoate interests of the United States — measures that
involve a considerable interference with the rights of other nations
and are therefore fraught with serious possibilities. As early as
January 15, 1811, a resolution of Congress asserted the peculiar
interest of the United States in the Spanish province of Florida
and declared, "That the United States, under the peculiar circum-
stances of the existing crisis, cannot, without serious inquietude,
see any part of the said territory pass into the hands of a foreign
Power; and that a due regard to their own safety compels them to
8 The first neutrality law of the United States was not passed
until 1794, hence Washington's proclamation was based not on statu-
tory authority, but on the obligations of neutrality as defined in
the law of nations. Writings of George Washington
.
XII, 281-282.
Cf. with Wilson's proclamations of neutrality in 1914. U.S.Stats .
.
63 Cong., 2 Sess., Pt. 2, Procs., 62 ff.
9 For an excellent account of this incident, together with the
complications it involved, see Oberholtzer, History of the United
States since the Civil War
,
I, 524-537, esp. 528, 532, 534-535.
TT5 Latane\ America as a World Power
.
8-9; Chadwick, Relations
of the United States and Spain: Diplomacy , 411-426; Smith, Parties
and Slavery
.
251-256.
11 President Polk in 1848 found it difficult to reconcile his
frank sympathy for the Irish with his duty to enforce the neutrality
laws against American citizens aiding the Irish revolt, and when
called upon by the British government to act, hesitated in the hope
that the issue might be evaded. With regard to the expedition of
the so-called "Buffalo Hunters" against Mexico in the same year, he
had no such qualms, but immediately sent instructions to Gen. Tay-
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provide, under certain contingencies, for the temporary occupation
of the said territory; they, at the same time, declare that the said
territory shall, in their hands, remain subject to future negotia-
tion.
Following out the sentiment of this resolution, an act of
the same date authorized the President, by means of the military
and naval forces, to take possession of, hold, and occupy the terri-
tory of East Florida, if necessary to prevent its occupation by any
foreign government, and to establish a temporary government over that
region; while another act of February IE, 1813, authorized him to
1£
take similar action with regard to West Florida.
As a result of these acts, Amelia Island in East Florida,
captured from the Spanish in 1811 by a party of so-called "patriots'*
assisted by a few American troops and gun-boats, was held by the
United States and subject to regulations imposed by American offi-
cers for more than a year; while in East Florida, the city of Mobile
was seized by General Wilkinson in 1813, under orders from the
13
President, and never surrendered.
Again in 1819, the treaty ceding Florida to the United
lor to use such military force as was necessary to check the move-
ment. Diary of James K. Polk
.
IV, 104-106, 109, 112.
12 These are the famous "secret laws" referred to by John
Quincy Adams as "those singular anomalies of our system which have
grown out of that error in our Constitution which confers upon the
legislative assemblies the power of declaring war'.1 He also says
that there are four of these secret laws and one resolution; "and
one of the laws, that of 25th June, 1812, is so secret that this day
it could not be found among the rolls at the Department". Memoirs ,
IV, 32 (Dec. 30, 1817). The act of 1812 referred to by Adams has
apparently not yet been found or published, while the fourth law to
which he refers is probably that of Mar. 3, 1811, which placed the
ban of secrecy on these acts, including itself. The injunction of
secrecy was removed July 6, 1812, but the laws were not published
until 1818. See Annals of Cong . .15 Cong.,1 Sess.,11, App. , 2601-2604,
13 Thomas. Military Government in Newly Acquired Territory of
the United States. 55-56*.
i
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States having "been signed, but not yet ratified by Spain, President
Monroe suggested to Congress that the interests of the United States
in Florida were such that he should be authorized to occupy that
territory and carry out the provisions of the treaty as if it were
14in effect. Military measures for the occupation of Florida were
contemplated, even to the extent of reducing St. Augustine by "regu-
lar siege
,
if necessary, but fortunately for the peace of the
two countries, Congress did not see fit at that time to authorize
such action.* 6
The right of the President to undertake military measures
for the protection of these "inchoate interests" of the United Staten,
even without legislative sanction, was apparently first asserted in
1844. In that year President Tyler, having entered into negotiations
with Texas for its annexation to the United States, ordered such a
concentration of the land and naval forces as to protect Texas
against the danger of a Mexican invasion while the treaty of annexa-
17
tion was under consideration in the Senate. In response to a
Senate resolution of inquiry, the President defended his action by
declaring it as his opinion "that the United States having by the
treaty of annexation acquired a title to Texas which re quired only
the action of the Senate to pe rfeot it . no other power could be per-
mitted to invade and by force of arms to possess itself of any por-
tion of the territory of Texas pending your deliberations upon the
treaty without placing itself in a hostile attitude to the United
14 Message of Dec. 7, 1819. Richardson, Messages and Papers
of the Presidents. II, 57; cf. Memoirs of John Quincy Adams , IV, 480.
15 Jameson, "Calhoun Correspondence" . in Report. Am. HigL Assn ,
1899
.
II, 164-165, 165-166.
16 The act for carrying the treaty into effect was passed
Mar. 3, 1821, while the exchange of ratifications occured in February.
17 Corwin. The President's Control of Forelpn Relat ions , 156
;
Re eve s.American Diplomacy under Tyler and Polk . 169 ;Richardson. op.cit t,
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States and justifying the employment of any military means at our
disposal to drive back the invasion. "18
In spite of vigorous denunciation of this action in Con-
19gress and a threat of impeachment against President Tyler, the
same doctrine of an inchoate interest in Texas was advocated by
President Polk. He declared that Hthe moment the terms of annexa-
tion offered by the United States were accepted by Texas the latter
became so far a part of our country as to make it our duty to afford
20
such protection and defense"; and therefore, in May, 1845, he or-
dered General Taylor to cross into Texas Jbo protect it pending an-
21
nexat ion . Clearly, the action of President Polk had more basis
than that of President Tyler. Tyler considered himself empowered
to protect territory whose acquisition was merely proposed in a
treaty not yet ratified, and which, in fact, failed of ratification;
while Polk's action had at least the justification that the annexa-
tion of Texas was then an assured fact, although at thft time not
formally in effect.
President Grant's policy with regard to Santo Domingo
(1869-1871) likewise involved the principle of an inchoate interest
18 Message to Senate, May 15, 1844. Richardson. op. cit . IV. 317.
19 Reeves, op. cit .. 163. Senator Benton replied to the
President's message as follows: "This is a reversal of the power
of the Senate, and a reading backwards of the Constitution. It
makes an act of defeasance from the Senate necessary to undo a
treaty which the President sends to us, instead of requiring our
assent to give it validity. It assumes Texas to be in the Union,
and protected by our Constitution from invasion or insurrection,
like any pert of the existing States or Territories; and to remain
so till the Senate puts her out by rejecting the treaty! This, in-
deed, is not merely reading, but spelling the Constitution back-
wards! It is reversing the functions of the Senate and making it
a nullifying, instead of a ratifying body." Cong. Globe
.
XIII,
At>p., 498 (28 Cong., 1 Sess., June 1, 1844).
£0 Message to Congress, Dec. 2, 1845. Richardson, op. cit ..
IV, 388.
21 Ibid
.
.
388-389; Reeves, op. cit .. 277.
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on the part of the United States which the President was empowered
to protect. Having negotiated with President Baez a treaty of an-
nexation by a most unusual method and almost without the knowledge
of his Cabinet, Grant sent a strong naval force to the island to
protect it from invasion and from internal disorder, not only dur-
ing the consideration of the treaty by the Senate, but even after
its rejection
.
on the ground that "the Government of the United
States is peculiarly interested in the exemption of the Dominican
Republic both from internal commotions and from invasions from
abroad." 23
The President's action was severely condemned on the floor
of the Senate, especially by such men as Sumner and Schurz. Schura
declared the doctrine that the President could, by making a treaty,
create en inchoate right to some foreign territory, and then, with-
out authority from Congress, commit acts of war -*or the enforcement
of that inchoate right, to be "the hugest absurdity, the most auda-
cious preposterosity , the most mischievous, dangerous, and anti-
republican doctrine that ever was broached on the floor of the
Senate ,"24
Senator Sumner likewise bitterly scored the action of the
President, and offered a resolution condemning the employment of the
Havy without the authority of Congress against a friendly foreign
nation or in belligerent intervention in the affairs of a foreign
nation, as "an infraction of the Constitution of the United States
2E Rhodes, History of the United States . VI, 346-354; Corwin,
op. cit .. 156. For Grant's instructions to the U. S. naval offi-
cers, see Moore's Digest of International Law . I, E78.
23 Secretary of State Pish to Mr. Bessett, minister to Hayti,
Nov. 16, 1870. Moore *8 Digest, I, 279. The treaty had been reject-
ed June 30, preceding.
24 Cong. Globe . 42 Cong., 1 Sees., Pt. II, App., 52.
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and a usurpation of power not conferred upon the President. n The
resolution further declared, "That while the President, without
any previous declaration of war by act of Congress, may defend the
country against invasion by foreign enemies, he is not justified
in exercising the same power in an outlying foreign island, which
has not yet become part of the United States; that a title under an
unratified treaty is at most inchoate and contingent, while it is
created by the President alone, in which respect it differs from any
title created by act of Congress; and since it is created by the
President alone, without the support of law, whether in legislation
or a ratified treaty, the employment of the Navy in the maintenance
of the Government there is without any excuse of national defense,
as also without any excuse of a previous declaration of war by Con-
gress.
"
However, other Senators, such as Harlan (Iowa) and Morton
(Indiana) came to the defense of the President, and Sumner's reso-
26lution was laid on the table by a large majority (39-16), so that
there would seem to be some point to Professor Corwin's remark about
Harlan's argument that it "at least demonstrated the futility of at-
tempting to confine the President's protective function to the mere
27duty of repelling invasion or immediate physical attack"
•
President Roosevelt's action in 1903 in preventing the
interference of Colombia in the Panama revolution was likewise based
25 Cong. Globe
.
42 Cong., 1 Sess., Pt. I, 294.
£6 Ibid .. 5297
27 The President's Control of Foreign Relations . 160. Presi-
dent Roosevelt's action with regard to Santo Domingo in 1905 was
similar to that of President Grant in that the contemplated measures
were undertaken even after a treaty authorizing them nad been re-
jected. Roosevelt's action, however, was not based on the doctrine
of inchoate interest, but seems to be more properly classified under
the policy of police supervision. Infra . , 51 ; cf. also supra . , 36.
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on the ground of an inchoate interest on the part of the United
States in the Panama Canal and therefore in the success of the
go
revolution.
The President may also on his own authority undertake
military measures for the protection of American rights and interest; ;
£9
broad. This power was exercised in 1853 in the famous Koszta
incident, when liartin Koszta, a native of Hungary who had become an
American declarant (not yet fully naturalized) but who had been
seized at Smyrna at the instigation of the Austrian authorities, was
released through the vigorous action of an American navel captain
in training his guns upon the Austrian vessel on which Koszta was
held. The incident caused considerable excitement and was protested
by the Austrian government; but Captain Ingraham's action was sus-
tained by public opinion, by Congress, and by the Executive, Secre-
tary of State Marcy laying down the principle that any individual
"clothed with our national character" is entitled to claim the pro-
tection of this government, "and it may respond to that claim with-
out being obliged to explain its conduct to any foreign power; for
it is its duty to make its nationality respected by other nations
and respectable in every quarter of the globe. "^
Another demonstration of this power occurred a year later
(1854), when Greytown (San Juan), in Nicaragua, was bombarded "un-
til the town was laid in ashes", in default of reparation demanded
31for an attack on the United States consul. This action was ap-
28 See Jones, Caribbean Interests of the United States . 199-
203; Roosevelt, Autobiography , 553-569.
29 Corwln. op. cit ., 142; Root, Military and Colonial Policy
of the United States. 157-158.
30 Rhodes. History of the United States . X, 416-419. The Supren
3
Court also referred to This incident with approval in a decision
rendered some years later. In re fleagle . 135 U.S., 1, 64 (1890).
31 Rhodes, op. cit ., II, 9-10.
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proved and defended before Congress by President Pierce, and later
upheld by the courts, Justice Nelson declaring that it is to the
President, as the Executive head of the nation, that citizens abroad
must look for protection of person and property, and that, for this
purpose, "the whole Executive power of the country is placed in his
hands, under the Constitution, and the laws passed in pursuance
thereof; and different Departments of government have been organized,
through which this power may be most conveniently executed, whether
by negotiation or force — a Department of State and a Department
of the Navy." He further declared that the duty of such interposi-
tion abroad, for the protection of the lives or propery of the
citizen, "must, of necessity, rest in the discretion of the Presi-
dent". 33
The attack by American war vessels upon the Barrier forts
34
of China in 1856, in order to avenge an alleged insult to the flag,
undertaken without authority of Congress, was apparently approved
even by the cautious Buchanan, although further active participation
in a military expedition into Chinese territory was declined as be-
yond the authority of the President alone to undertake. Secretary
Cass thus stated the position of the administration: "Our naval of-
ficers have the right — it is their duty, indeed -- to employ the
forces under their command, not only in self-defense, but for the
protection of the persons and property of our citizens when exposed
to acts of lawless outrage, and this they have done both in China
and elsewhere, and will do again when necessary. But military ex-
peditions into the Chinese territory can not be undertaken without
38 Message to Congress, Dec .4, 1854. Richardson. op. cit . .V, 280-26'l.
33 4 Blatchford, 451, 454, quoted in Corwin, op. cit .. 144.
34 For account of this affair, see Foster, American Diplomacy
in the Orient. 225-227.
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the authority of the National Legislature." 36
President Buchanan also, without authority from Congress,
ordered a naval force to Cuban waters with directions "to protect
all vessels of the United States on the high seas from search or
detention by the vessels of war of any other nation". A conflict
with Great Britain was avoided only the the letter's abandonment of
her claim to the right of visit and search in time of peace. 36
Even the qualification upon the President's powers admittec.
by Secretary Cass in 1857 was abandoned in 1900, when President Mc-
Kinley, without any express authorization from Congress, sent a
naval force under Admiral Kempff and an army of about 5000 men under
General Chaffee to China, not merely for the purpose of rescuing
and protecting the lives and property of American citizens in China,
but also to cooperate with the forces of the other Powers in aveng-
ing and punishing the murder of the representatives of these Powers
that had been killed during the Boxer uprising. Although the en-
suing campaign involved hard fighting and many casualties, the Presi-
dent said that our declared aims "involved no war against the Chineso
35 Cass to Lord Napier, Apr. 10, 1857. Moore's Digest
.
VII. 164
36 Richardson, op. cit .. V, 507. Buchanan was, however,
curiously inconsistent, deeming it necessary to appeal to Congress
for authority to protect American citizens in Nicaragua, New Grenada
and Mexico, and to keep the Panama and Tehuantepec routes of transit
open and safe for them. "The executive government of this country",
he said, "in its intercourse with foreign nations is limited to the
employment of diplomacy. When that fails it can proceed no further.
It can not legitimately resort to force without the direct authority
of Congress, except in resisting and repelling hostile attacks. . .
Without the authority of Congress the Executive can not . . , with-
out transcending his constitutional power, direct a gun to be fired
into a port or land a seaman or marine to protect the lives of our
countrymen on shore or to obtain redress for a recent outrage on
their property. . . Without the authority of Congress the President
can not fire a hostile gun in any case except to repel the attacks
of an enemy." Richardson, op. cit .. V, 516, 539, 570.
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„37
nation. We adhered to the legitimate office of rescuing the imperil
ed legation, obtaining redress for wrongs already suffered, securing
wherever possible the safety of American life and property in China,
and preventing a spread of the disorders or their recurrence.
A still more recent example o+ this exercise of the Presi-
dent's power is the action of President Wilson in April, 1914, in
ordering a force of sailors and marines to capture Vera Cruz by way
of reparation for Huerta's affront to the flag of the United States.
This measure, characterized by en eminent historian as "an act of
war" which looked to Latin-American countries like "the beginning
of a war of conquest" and which was "fiercely resented in Mexico",
38
was undertaken without authority from Congress, the city, more-
over, being occupied for a period of seven months (until November
£3, 1914) by an army of 6000 men under General Funston.
The power of the President to employ the land and naval
forces on his own authority, whether for the purpose of protecting
the so-called "inchoate interests" and honor of the United States,
or the rights and property of American citizens abroad, has thus
been demonstrated in actual practice arein and again, and seems also
to have been approved by Congress, by the courts, and by public
opinion. It seems scarcely necessary to suggest the possibilities
of international complications and conflicts that may result from
an unwise exercise of this power, and hence the enormous responsi-
bility for the peace of the United States that rests in this way
upon the shoulders of the President.
37 Message to Congress, Dec. 3, 1900. For. Rel. 1900 . xiv.For an
account of the expedition, see Root
,
Military and Colonial Policy of
the United States
. 333. 336-347;cf. Taft. Our Chief Magistrate ana ki's
Powers. 114-115.
3*8 Vera Cruz was captured Apr. 21, 1914. The next day Congress
passed a resolution declaring the use of troops justifiable and dis-
claiming any purpose to make war. 36 Stat, at L .. 770.
39e Qgfr. National Progress. 293-295.
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But in addition to these powers of protection, which are,
after all, inherent in government, a more recent development of
American foreign policy has vested in the President considerable
power with respect to intervention end police supervision over the
affairs of other nations. The so-celled "zone of the Caribbean",
because of its proximity and strategic importance to the United
States, the unsettled character of the governments in that zone, and
the inclination of the United States under the Monroe Doctrine to
look with disfavor upon action by any foreign power, is now con-
sidered as being under the general police supervision of the United
States; the policy of this country having undergone a gradual change
from one of sympathetic interest but absolute non-interference in tho
affairs of t ese Caribbean states to one of direct and active inter-
vention in their internal affairs. 4^
This power of intervention and police supervision was
probably first exercised by President Cleveland in 1885, when during
the course of a civil war in Colombia, he sent troops to keep open
the transit across the Isthmus of Panama. Although this action was
taken under authority of a provision (Article 55) in the treaty of
1846 with Colombia, its execution, as the President informed Con-
gress, "necessarily involved police control where the local authori-
ty was temporarily powerless, but always in aid of the sovereignty
of Colombia" 41
The doctrine upon which the exercise of such police con-
40 Jones, Caribbean Interests of the United States . 17-23.
See also several articles by P. M. Brown -- "Our Caribbean Policy",
Proc. Acad. Pol. Sci. t VII, 418-42E; "American Diplomacy in Central
America". Am. Pol. Sci. Rev .. VI, supp., 152-163; "American Inter-
vention in Central America", Am. Jour. Race Development . IV, 409-
426.
41 Message to Congress, Dec. 8, 1885. Riohardson, op. oit ..
VIII, 326.
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trol might be justified was laid down by President Roosevelt in
his message to Congress, December 6, 1904, when he said: "Chronic
wrongdoing, or an impotence which results in a general loosening
of the ties of civilized society, may in America, as elsewhere, ul-
timately require intervention by some civilized nation, and in the
Western Hemisphere the adherence of the United States to the Monroe
Doctrine may force the United States, however reluctatntly, in
flagrant cases of such wrongdoing or impotence, to the exercise of
an international police power.
The doctrine here laid down has since been developed into
a definite policy largely through numerous military measures under-
taken on the sole authority of the President. Thus, in 1905, even
before he entered into the executive agreement with Santo Domingo
43
already referred to, President Roosevelt directed United States
naval forces to interfere and prevent any fighting in that country
44
which might menace the custom-houses. United States marines have
since been landed on several occasions both in Hayti and Santo Do-
mingo to preserve order and to maintain the customs service; since
1912 the latter country hss been favored with at least one visit a
42 For. Rel. 1904
.
xli.
43 Supra
.
36.
44 "Santo Domingo had fallen into such chaos that once for
some weeks there were two rival governments in it, and a revolution
was being carried on against each. • . The situation had become in-
tolerable by the time that I interfered. There was a naval com-
mander in the waters whom I directed to prevent any fighting which
might menace the custom-houses. He carried out his orders, both
to his and my satisfaction, in thoroughgoing fashion. On one oc-
casion, when an insurgent force threatened to attack a town in which
Americans had interests, he notified the commanders on both sides
that he would not permit any fighting in that town, but that he
would appoint a certain place where they could meet and fight it
out, and that the victors should have the town. They agreed to meet
his wishes, the fight came off at the appointed place, and the vic-
tors, who if I remember rightly were the insurgents, were given the
town." Roosevelt, Autobiography . 549.

52.
year from United States cruisers; and in 1916 8 military occupation
of the island was established that has apparently not yet been aban-
doned (February, 1920 )t6
In February, 1907, during the course of a war between
Nicaragua and Honduras, American warships actively intervened in
order to protect life and property from needless destruction and to
prevent the spreading- of the war, and the American charge (Philip
Marshall Brown) even assumed temporary authority in Honduras when
46
the government fled. In 1909-191C, by the use of naval vessels
end marines, the resignation and flight of an obnoxious president of
Nicaragua (Zelaya) was forced and the success of a revolution as-
47
sured; while in 1912 end 1914, United States marines again activelj
intervened in Nicaragua, but on these occasions on the side of the
government to put down revolutions that might otherwise hare suc-
48
ceeded. In Honduras, the joint intervention of American and Brit is
marines prevented fighting between the two factions in that country,
and secured the election of a provisional president agreeable to botj
49factions; while only recently an American naval force was again
landed in that country to preserve order during a chenge of govern-
ment?
In all these numerous instances of intervention and police
supervision in the Caribbean zone, the use of the marines has been
46 Ogg. op.cit . . 261;Am. Jour. Int .Law . XI. 394-599 ; see also infra ,
note 53.
46 For.Rel. 1907 . 11.627.628; P.M.Brown. op.cit .. in Am. Jour. Race
Development .
47 For. Rel. 1909
.
452-459; ibid. 1910
.
738-767.
48 Jones, op.cit
.
.
176-178; Ogg. or.cTF . . 261-262. President Taf
mentions the intervention of 1912 as "the landing of marines and quih:
a campaign, which resulted in the maintenance of law and order and
the elimination o^ the insurrectos'.' He says this was "not an act of
war, because it was done at the request and with the consent of the
lawful authorities of the territory where it took place." Our Chief
Magistrate and His Powers
.
96
49 P.M.Brown. op.cit
.
. in Am. Jour. Race Development
.
Am. Pol . Sci . Re V
5Q N. Y. ^mnn, ftopt 12, 1919 .
<
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so common es to warrant the suggestion of a new constitutional prin-
ciple, that the landing of marines may be considered as a "mere local
police measure" , while the use of regulars for the same purpose would
51
be an act of war. Intervention is, however, defined in a recent
authoritative publication as "an interference by a nation in the
affairs of a nother without the intention of waging war. It is com-
monly defended es a police measure by the intervening power, but is
often followed by war, and may always be regarded by the second power
58
as an act of war . Hence, even though the suggestion of a consti-
tutional principle may be accepted in the United States as justify-
ing the President in his frequent resort to such measures of police
control in the zone of the Caribbean, as it apparently has been
accepted, this exercise of the President's power may not be so
readily accepted by the other countries concerned, but may, on the
other hand, be resented by them and lead to serious difficulties and
53
entanglements, if not to actual war.
Recent events have also shown the possibilities involved
in an extension of these powers of intervention and polioe super-
vision, even beyond the zone of the Caribbean. The landing of
United States bluejackets at Trau in September, 1919, in order to
prevent a conflict between the Italians and the Serbs, although
54
apparently done at the request of the Italian authorities, was en-
51 See Taft, Our Chief Magistrate and His Powers . 95.
58 War Cyclopedia ( lBt ed.), 138.
53 Cf. Jones, op. cit .. 190. In the fall of 1919, a commissioli
from Santo Domingo issued a plea for self-government and the aban-
donment o^ the American military government; while at about the same
time the Spanish government transmitted to Washington a letter from
the heads ofall the Spanish parliamentary parties, suggesting that
the time had come for e termination of the American military occu-
pation of that island. N. Y. Times , Sept. 11 & 12, 1919.
54 See statement of Admiral unapp, transmitted by Secretary
Deniels to the ^enate, Oct. 2, 1919, in response to a Senate resolu-
tion. Ibid ., Oct. 3, 1919.
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tirely without the previous knowledge or consent of Congress or the
Senate.
This use of American forces for police purposes in Hel-
met ia, and the report that troops were also to he sent to supervise
the plehiscites in Silesia and to preserve order in Armenia and
55
elsewhere, aroused a storm of criticism in Congress. The action
in Dalmatia was denounced as against law and precedent, and Senator
Sherman (Illinois) introduced a resolution declaring that the assign
ment of foreign territory to be policed or guarded by United States
forces was beyond the power of the Supreme War Council or the Execu-
56
tive, without the consent of the Senate.
Such a conception of the President's power with regard
to the use of the armed forces might have some weight, had the
action under criticism been taken in time of peace. Under the cir-
cumstances, howrver, of a continuing state of war, the correct view
was undoubtedly stated by Senator Hitchcock (NebraskaJ when he said
that the action taken with regard to the Dalmatian coast was within
the war powers of the President and delegated by him to the Supreme
far Council. The failure of the Senate to take any action on the
Sherman resolution would seem to indicate its approval of this view.
The incident serves at least to illustrate the possibilities in-
volved in an extension of the sphere within which the President may
undertake these military measures without the authority of Congress.
55 li Y. Times Current Hist. Mag., XI, 225-226 (Nov., 1919).
According to press reports a force of American troops was sent to
Coblens with a view to their possible use ultimately to help police
the plebiscite in Upper Silesia; but Secretary of War Baker announce
that these troops would remain at Coblenz as a part of the garrison
there, unless the Senate should ratify the treaty and thus make
American participation in the plebiscite strictly legal. See N. Y.
Time
8
.
Nov. 21, 1919.
56 N. Y. Times
,
Sept. 27 & 30, 1919.
57 Ibid
.. Sept. 30, 1919.
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Chapter IV.
Power of Defense .
A formal declaration is not necessary to constitute a
state of war, and is a comparatively unimportant factor in dating
the beginning of a war, because it does not necessarily precede
hostilities, nor has it in fact often done so. Until recently, a
formal declaration of war was not, as a matter of international law,
necessary or usual. 1 Most wars during the eighteenth and nineteenth
centuries were fought "under the rule of a word and a blow, with the
gblow coming first and the word possibly left unsaid." A declara-
tion of war, says Woolsey, is "a warning issued by a state to its
own people, or to the neutral, that war has begun, and not a warn-
ing to the enemy that war will begin at a certain future date. Mark-
ing thus a status already existing, it cannot itself originate that
status. The outbreak of war gives rise to the declaration, not the
declaration to the outbreak. . . It is the fact of violence, then,
and not the declaration of a status, upon which we must really fix
our eyes, if we should ask when war begins."
The question then arises, under what circumstances may a
war be begun before a formal declaration is made, or even without a
formal declaration, and with what branch of the government the power
rests to begin such a war.
Authorities agree that the power to begin an offensive
war, or a war of aggression, rests in the United States only with
1 S. E. Baldwin, in Am. Jour. Int. Law , XII, 1; Woolsey,
International Law. Bee. 120: Moore's Digest of International Law .
vii, in.
2 For a list of wars begun without a declaration, see Am .
Jour. Int. Law
.
II, 57-62.
3 T. S. Woolsey, "The Beginnings of 'War", Proceedings. Am. PqI l
fini» Annn
., T, 54 - 68 - I
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Congress, and should properly be preceded by a declaration made by
that body. 4 The Constitution establishes the mode in which this
government shall commence wars of its seeking-, but the Constitution
hae no power to prescribe the manner in which otherB should begin
war against us. There is in every nation an inherent power of self-
defense, and it is to be presumed that, though the power to declare
a war is by our Constitution clearly vested in Congress, in the ab-
sence of such a declaration the Constitution does not leave the
nation powerless for defense against attack. Hence it follows, as
Whiting says, "thet when war is commenced against this country by
aliens or citizens, no declaration of war by the government is
necessary.
Whiting also contends that the power to begin and wage a
war of defense rests clearly with the President. "The fact that
war is levied against the United States", he says, "makes it the
duty of the President to crll out the army or navy to subdue the
enemy, whether foreign or domestic. • • If the commander-in-chief
could not call out his forces to repel an invasion unless the Legis-
lative department had previously made a formal declaration of war,
a foreign enemy, during a recess of Congress, might send out its
armed cruisers to sweep our commerce from the sees, or it might
cross our borders and march, unopposed, from Canada to the Gulf be-
fore a majority of our Representatives could be convened to make
4 Whiting, War Powers under the Constitution
. 39; Burgess,
Political Science and Comparative Constitutional Law
.
II, 261; Taft,
Our Chief Magistrate and His Powers
.
95; Prize Cases. 2 Black, 635,
668, (1862).
5 Whiting, op. cit .. 39; cf. amendment proposed by the Hart-
ford Convention of 1814, providing for a two-thirds vote of both
houses to declare war or authorize hostilities, "except such ects
of hostility be in defense of the territories of the United States
when actually invaded." The Federalist (Ford ed. ) , Appendix, 689.
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that declaration". He claims that the Constitution, which gives
the Legislature authority to declare war whenever initiated by the
United States, also imposes upon the President the duty, as com-
mander-in-chief, "to engage promptly and effectually, in war, or,
in other words, to make the United States a belligerent nation
without a declaration of war or any other act of Congress, whenever
he is legally called upon to suppress rebellion, repel invasion,
or to execute the laws against armed public resistance thereto."**
This view is supported by Birkhimer, 7 who admits that a formal de-
claration of war can be made only by Congress, but says that it is
necessary sometimes to prosecute hostilities without such a declara-
tion, and that the President then must act, for the time being, at
least, independently of Congress. "When the authorities of the
Union are assailed, either by foreign foes, . . or by domestic
ones, . . it is the duty of the President to repel force with force
without waiting for any formal declaration."
The power of the President to begin and carry on a defen-
sive war without a declaration by Congress is also vigorously up-
held by the Supreme Court of the United States. In handing down the
decision of the court in the famous Prize Cases, Justice Grier,
after admitting the full constitutional power of Congress to de-
clare a national or foreign war, said: "The Constitution confers
on the President the whole Executive power. He is bound to take card
that the laws be faithfully executed. He is Commander-in-Chief of
the Army and Havy of the United States, and of the militia of the
6 Whiting, op. cit .. 39-40; cf. Birkhimer, Military Govern-
ment and Martial Law (End ed.), 48.
7 Military Government and Martial Law , 47; cf. also Chambrun,
The Executive Power
.
12"5T
5 2 Black, 655 (1862).
- !

58.
several states when called into the actual service of the United
States. He has no power to initiate or declare a war either against
a foreign nation or a domestic State. But by the Acts of Congress
of February 28th, 1795, and 3d of March, 1807, he is authorized to
call out the militia and use the military and naval forces of the
United States in case of invasion by foreign nations, and to sup-
press insurrection against the government of a State or of the
United States. If a war be made by invasion of a foreign nation,
the President is not only authorized but bound to resist force by
force. He does not initiate the war, but jls bound to accept the
challenge without waiting for any special le^islat ive authority .
And whether the hostile party be a foreign invader, or States or-
ganized in rebellion, it is none the less a war, although the de-
Qderation of it be 'unilateral* ."
That defensive wars are clearly contemplated by the Con-
stitution is shown by the provision which gives to Congress the
power "to provide for calling forth the militia to execute the laws
o-
r the Union, suppress insurrections, and repel invasions. Under
that provision. Congress has, by the acts referred to in the Supreme
Court decision, and other acts, vested the President with authority
to call out and use the militia in the cases contemplated, and in
that sense wage a defensive war without further declaration by Con-
gress.
The Supreme Court need not have rested its case, however,
9 Prize Cases . 8 Black. 635, 668 (1862). Cf. Talbot v. John-
son, 3 Dall., 133, 160 (1795)*. "War can alone be entered into by
naTional authority; it is instituted for national purposes, and
directed to national objects. . . Even in the case of one enemy
against another enemy, therefore, there is no color of justification
for any hostile act, unless it be authorized be some act of the
government giving the public constitutional sanction to it."
10 Constitution, ^rt. I, Sec. 8, CI. 15.
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solely on those Acts of Congress, but might have gone beck to the
language and intent of the Constitution itself. The action of the
Convention of 1787 is significant in this connection. The Committee
on Detail had reported a clause giving to Congress the power "to
make war . During the discussion over this proposition, it was
suggested that the wording of the clause gave Congress practically
unlimited control over all the operations of war. Hence Madison
and Gerry moved to strike out the word "make" and insert "declare",
with the avowed purpose of "leaving to the Executive the power to
repel sudden attacks ."^ suggested change in language was
adopted with little opposition, and there would here seem to be some
constitutional sanction for the power of the President to wage de-
fensive wars without direct authorization from Congress.
That power of the President is now at least a generally
recognized and well established principle of American constitutional
law, the validity of which was vigorously asserted in 1907 by our
delegates at the Hague Convention. When the proposal was made for
an article requiring that hostilities should not begin without a
previous warning, in the form of a declaration of war or of an
ultimatum accompanied by a conditional declaration of war, the
American delegation expressed its entire sympathy with the purport
of the article. It called attention, however, to the -fact that
Congress under the Constitution had exclusive power to declare war,
and that the delegation could enter into no agreement to modify that
power in any way. The statement of the delegation then went on to
say, however, that it has been the unbroken practice of the Govern-
ment of the United States for more than a century to recognize in
11 Madison's Journal (Hunt ed.), II, 82.
IE Ibid ., leol
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the President, es the Commander-in-Chief of the constitutional land
and naval forces, full power to defend the territory of the United
States from invasion, and to exercise at_ all times and in all places
the right of national self-defense The delegation announced its
willingness to support a proposition favoring a formal declaration
of intent to engage in hostilities, providing it were nonmandatory
13in character.
The power of the President to wage a defensive war without
a formal declaration and without specific authorization by Congress
is thus, according to all authority, clearly granted, if not in so
many words, at least by implication and the inherent purpose of the
Constitution. The questions still remain as to what constitutes a
defensive war, and to what extent the President may exercise these
powers of defense. They are best answered by some references to
history.
President Washington had appointed General Wayne' to suc-
ceed St. Clair in command of the western department , and in the sprinj
of 1794 Wayne was ready to move against the Indians. Meanwhile,
the British had established a fort at the rapids of the Miami,
twenty miles within American territory, near which the Indians took
their stand. The action of the British was, of course, entirely un-
justified, and technically constituted an invasion of American
territory; but it is not clear that any aggressive act of war was
intended. Washington recognized that an attempt to dislodge them
would probably bring on a conflict, which he was especially anxious
to avoid. He seemed, however , to have no doubts as to his power in thti
regard, for, after weighing carefully the expediency of such action.
13 See article by George B. Davis, "The Amelioration of the
Rules of War on Land", in Am. Jour. Int. Lew, II, 63-77.
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and without consult ing Congress , the following instructions were
issued to Wayne by General Knox, the Secretary of War: "If, there-
fore, in the course of your operations ep-ainst the Indian enemy,
it should become necessary to dislodge the party at the rapids of
the Miami, you are hereby authorized, in the name of the President
-14
of the United States, to do it. Fortunately, Wayne was able to
defeat the Indians without becoming officially involved with the
British, end a conflict was for the time being averted.
The question of the extent of the President's powers in
the case of a war begun by another nation was more clearly raised
in Jefferson's administration, with regard to Tripoli. Tripoli
had declared war on the United States because of the letter's failuro
to comply with demands which Jefferson said were "unfounded either
in right or in compact". Jefferson apparently had no doubt of his
power to take certain defensive measures without special authority
from Congress, ^or he immediately despatched a small squadron of
frigates into the Mediterranean, with orders to protect our com-
merce against attack. A conflict ensued, as a result of which one
of the Tripolitan cruisers was captured together with what remained
of her crew. But further than to fight in the strictest defense,
Jefferson felt that he had no constitutional authority, and so, as
he explained in his message to Congress, "Unauthorized by the Con-
stitution, without the sanction of Congress, to go beyond the line
of defense, the vessel, being disabled from committing further hos-
tilities, was liberated with its crew. The Legislature will doubt-
less consider whether, by authorizing measures of offense also,
they will place our force on an equal footing with that of its ad-
14 Pish, American diplomacy , 83-84.
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versaries. I communicate all material information on this subject,
that in the exercise of this important function confided by the Con-
stitution to the Legislature exclusively their judgment m8y form
itself on a knowledge and consideration of every circumstance of
weight". 16
It is not strange that such a timid attitude should have
aroused the wrath of Hamilton, who attacked the President's inter-
pretation of his war powers in his usual vigorous style. He called
it a "very extraordinary position" that, though Tripoli had made a
formal declaration of war against the United States and had perform-
ed acts o-p actual hostility, yet there was no power, for want of the
sanction of Congress, to capture and detain her crews. That positioi
meant nothing less, he said, than "that between two nations there
may exist a state of complete war on the one side — of peace on the
other." Such a position was to him ridiculous. "It is impossible",
he maintained, "to conceive the idea, that one nation can be in full
war with another, and this other not in the same state with respect
to its adversary. The moment that two nations are, in an absolute
sense, at war, the public force of each may exercise every act of
hostility, which the general laws of war authorize, against the
persons and property of the other. As respects this conclusion,
the distinction is only material to discriminate the aggressing
nation from that which defends itself against attack. The war is
offensive on the part of the state which makes it; on the opposite
side it is defensive; but the rights of both, as to the measures of
hostility, are equal." Hamilton then went on to explain the con-
stitutional phrase granting to Congress the power to declare war,
15 Richardson, Messages and Papers of the Presidents . I, 3£7.
v.
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"the plain meaning of which", he said, "is thet it is the peouliar
and exclusive province of Congress, when the nation is at peace, to
change that state into a state of war, whether from calculations
of policy, or from provocations, or injuries received: in other
words, it_ belongs t o Congress only , to £c £0 War . But when a foreigr,
nation declares, or openly and avowedly makes war upon the United
States, they are then by that very fact already at war , and any de-
clarat ion on the part of Congress is nugatory ; it is at least un-
necessary. This inference is clear in principle, because it is self-
evident, that a declaration by one nation against another, produces
at once a complete state of war between both, and that no declaration
on the other side can at all vary their relative situation; and in
practice, it is well known, that nothing is more common than when
war is declared by one party , to prosecute mutual hostilities with-
out a declaration by the other .
*
Congress felt somewhat as did Hamilton, that a declaration
of war would be a useless formality against a horde of pirates, as
the Barbary Powers were considered; but to remove the President's
scruples, an act W8S passed empowering him to proceed with hostili-
ties.! 7
Jefferson himself was evidently not convinced by the
argument of Hamilton, for in 1805, in a confident ial message to Con-
gress with regard to the Spanish depredations on United States ter-
ritory, he again asserted the doctrine that only by authority of
Congress could any hostile act be performed, beyond the strictest
necessities of self-defense. Although the Spaniards had authorized
16 Works of Alexander Hamilton . VII, 201-204.
17 McMaster, History of the People of the United States . Ill,
E01; Act of Mar. 26
r
1604. Annols of Cong .. 8 Cong., 1 Sess., App.
,
1301.
: =1
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the inference that it was their intention to advance on our pos-
sessions, Jefferson wrote: "Considering thet Congress alone is
constitutionally invested with the power of changing our condition
from peace to war,. I have thought it my duty to await their authority
for using force in any degree which could he avoided. I have barely
instructed the officers stationed in the neighborhood of the ag-
gressions, to protect within the borders actually delivered to us.
and not to go out of them but when necessary to repel an inroad, or
"ID
to rescue a citizen, or his property". Congress took no action
beyond referring the message to a committee, and hence the inactive
19
and undecided attitude of the government continued.
In 1818 the question as to the extent of the power of de-
fense came before the administration in a different and more extreme
form. President Monroe strongly asserted his right to take defen-
sive measures against the Indians in the South, even to the extent
of pursuing them across the border into Florida, at that time a
Spanish possession. "The inability of Spain", he said, "to maintain
her authority to fulfill the treaty (of 1795), 20 ought not to ex-
pose the United States to other and greater injuries. When the
authority of Spain ceases to exist there, the United States have a
right to pursue their enemy on a principle of self-defence . . . To
the high obligations and privileges of this great and sacred prin-
ciple of self-defence will the movement of our troops be strictly
confined." Acting on these principles, the President had given
General Jackson orders which clearly authorized him to enter Florida,
18 Am. State Papers , For. Hel ., II, 613; Annals of Cong .,
9 Cong., 1 Sess. , 18-19.
19 Annals of Cong . . 9 Cong., 1 Sess., 947.
20 Spain had bound herself in this treaty to restrain the
Indians from committing hostilities sgainst the United States.
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[but only in the pursuit of the Indians, and had carefully instructed
lim in that case "to respect Spanish authority wherever it is main-
tained", 8nd "to withdraw his forces from the province as soon as
le shall have reduced that tribe to order. • ," 21
General Jackson accordingly carried the campaign against
the Indians into Florida, hut in so doing came into conflict with the
Spanish authorities, and even stormed a Spanish fort and occupied
Pensacola. When the subject of his transaction came before the Cabi-
net for deliberation, John Quincy Adams argued strenuously in support
of the proposition that Jackson's acts were justified as purely de-
fensive measures. "My opinion is", he said, "that there was no real,
though an apparent, violation o^ his instructions; that his proceed-
ings were justified by the necessity of the casT, and by the mis-
conduct of the Spanish commanding officer in Florida. The question
iB embarrassing and complicated, not only as involving that of
actual war with Spain, but that of the Executive power to authorize
hostilities without a declaration of war by Congress. There is no
doubt that defensive acts of host ility may be authorized by the
Execut ive ; but Jackson was authorized to cross the Spanish line in
pursuit of the Indian enemy . My argument is that the quest inn of
the constitutional authority of the Executive is precisely there;
that all the rest, even to the order for taking the Fort of Barran-
cas by storm, was incidental, deriving its character from its ob-
ject , which was not hostility to Spain, but the termination of the
Indian war". Jackson's justification was the eminently practical
one that an imaginary boundary line could not afford protection to
our frontiers from the Indians in Florida, that the Spanish authori-
21 Message to Congress, Mar. 25, 1618. Am. State Papers . Mil.
Affairs
.
I, 681; cf. Jackson's defense of himself, Ibid .. 755-757.
I
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ties had interfered with the success of his campaign, and that all
his operations were founded on those considerations. This argument
appealed to Adams, who said that "everything he did was defensive ;
that as such it was neither war against Spain nor a violation of the
Const itution. 1,22
This seemed to he a rather extreme view of what consti-
tutes a "defensive measure", and Adams was unable to convince the
President and the other members of the Cabinet, all of whom were of
the opinion that Jackson had acted not only without, but against
his instructions; and that he had committed war upon Spain, which
could not be justified and must be disavowed by the administration.
The President supposed, however, that there might be circumstances
which would have justified such measures as Jackson had taken, but
thst he had not made out his case.
President Wilson's despatch of a punitive expedition into
Mexico after the Columb-s raid in March, 1916, involved the exercise
of powers of defense similar to those claimed by Monroe in 1816.
The expedition was thought to be necessary in order to protect the
United States against bandit raids which events had apparently shown
the Mexican government too weak to suppress. In a statement to the
press, President Y/ilson announced that the expedition would have the
"single object" of capturing Villa and putting a stop to his forays.
"This", he said, "can and will be done in entirely friendly aid of
22 Memoirs of John Quincy Adams , IV, 108, 111. About a year
later, Adams advised the President tnrt the occupation of Florida,
a measure then proposed, would be "in itself an act of war. It may
very probably involve us in a real snd very formidable war". He
very frankly admits, however, that this opinion did not reflect his
real views, but was given in order to secure just that result, since
he had discovered that his advice usually resulted in the opposite
action being taken. Memoirs, IV, 450.
23 Ibid., 108.
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the constituted authorities in Mexico and with scrupulous respect
for the sovereignty of Mexico." 24 Though the expedition later in-
volved threatening complications with the Mexican authorities, and
even some encounters with Mexican troops that resulted in blood-
25
shed, it is justified by eminent authority on the ground that "the
President was in this instance but performing his constitutional
86function of repelling invasion."
The President has also in another way shown himself able
to exercise important powers of defense without express authoriza-
tion from Congress. When the difficulty with France reached a crisis
in 1798, President Adams announced to Congress that ho had revoked
his former instructions to collectors not to permit the sailing of
armed merchant vessels, and thereby indirectly authorized the arming
27
of such vessels as a measure of defense. This exercise of Execu-
tive power was opposed by Jefferson, who looked upon it as a measure
leading to war and proposed that there should be "a Legislative pro-
hibition to arm vessels instead of the Executive one which the
President informs them he has withdrawn." 2®
That suggestion was favored also by Madison, who denounced
the action of the President as a usurpation of power. "The first
instructions", he said, "were no otherwise legal than as they were
in pursuance of the Law of nations, & consequently in execution of
the law of the land. The revocation of the instructions is a virtua!
change of the law, & consequently a usurpation by the Ex. of a
legislative power. It will not avail to say that the law of Nations
24 See Am. Jour. Int. L8w. X. Supp.
,
180, 184.
25 For a brief account, see Ogg, National Progress . 297-299.
26 Corwin, The President's Control of Forelpn Itelat ions
.
163. n.
27 Message of Mar. 19, 1798. Richardson, op. cit .. I.*""265.
28 Je-P-^erson to Monroe, Mar. 21, 1798. Writings of Thomas
Jefferson
.
VII, 221.
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leaves this point undecided, & that every nation is free to decide
for itself. If this be the case, the regulation being a Legislative
not an Executive one, belongs to the former, not the latter Autho-
rity; and comes expressly within the power, 'to define the law of
£9
Nations', given to Congress by the Constitution."
While the right of the President to authorize the arming
of merchant vessels for defense was thus disputed, the seriousness
of such action was not questioned even by his supporters, but* on the
other hand, it was frankly admitted to be a step leading to war.^O
More recently the President's right to exercise this power
of arming merchant vessels for defense again became a sharp issue.
Germany having announced the renewal of her ruthless submarine war-
fare, President Wilson went before Congress February 26, 1917, and
asked for authority "to arm our merchant vessels with defensive arms
should that become necessary, and with the means of using them, and
to employ any other instrumentalities or methods that may be neces-
sary and adequate to protect our ships and our people in their
legitimate and peaceful pursuits on the seas." While thus request-
ing express authority, the President at the same time announced
that he considered himself as already possessing that authority
"without special warrant of law, by the plain implication of ray con-
stitutional duties end powers." He said, however, that he preferred
under the circumstances not to act upon such general implication,
but wished to feel "that the authority and power of the Congress
31
are behind me in whatever it may become necessary for me to do."
29 Madison to Jefferson, Apr. 2, 1798. Writings of James
Had is on
,
VI, 313. Cf. Const itution . Art. I. Sec. 6, CI. 10. nn3U v.'illism Vans Murray, minister at The Hague, wrote as follow I
to John Quincy Adams, June 1, 1798: "I have seen the circular, it
permits arming in defence. It was all that the President could au-
thorize, but it is war". Rerort. Am. Hist. Assn. 1912. 416.
31* IT. Y. Times Current Hist. Lag ., VI, 48.
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The bill granting the authority asked for was favored by
an overwhelming majority in "both houses of Congress, hut was de-
feated by a filibuster in the Senate, the measure being opposed
principally on the ground that it was a step leading to war, and
therefore a delegation o* the war-making power of Congress to the
President. The view of this "little group of wilfull men" — as
they were characterized by President Wilson in a public statement —
was perhaps best expressed by Senator Stone (Missouri ) , when he
said: "This bill, if enacted, would confer power upon the President
to initiate war, if he should so desire or determine, and to do
that supremely solemn thing without first submitting the choice of
war or peace to the Congress." Regarding the President's claim to
that power without express authorization, he said: "I csn not con-
sent that this clause (i. e., the clause of the Constitution giving
the President power to execute the laws) confers, or v/os ever in-
tended to confer, power upon the President to determine en issue
between this Hat ion and some other sovereignty -- an issue involving
questions of international lew -- end to authorize him to settle
that law for himself, and then proceed to employ the Arm}" and Navy
to enforce his decision".
^
In spite of the failure of Congress to grant his request
for express authority, President Viilson, still convinced of his own
power, and ^ortified not only by the known sentiments of the majority
in Congress but also by, the advice of his Secretary of State and
32 Conp. Record. LIV, Pt. 5, (64 Cong., 2. Sess.), 4878, 4884.
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Attorney General, 53 gave formal notice on March 12 o^ his determina-
tion w to pl8ce upon ell American merchant vessels sailing through
the barred areas en armed guard for the protection of the vessels
and the lives of the persons on board". Accordingly, a lerge number
of merchant vessels were equipped with sir-inch guns and gunners frori
the United States Uavy were assigned to man them, supposedly with
instructions not to await an attack by a submarine, but to fire at
34
Bight, the presence of a submarine presupposing its hostile intent.
The expedient of armed neutrality so adopted by the Execu-
tive as a measure of defense merely, was later acknowledged by
President Wilson himself in his war address of April 2, to be not
only "impract icrble" and "ineffectual enough at best", but under
the circumstances even "worse than ineffectual" and "practically
33 IT. Y. Times Current Hist. Mag
., VI, 55-56. An Act of Mar.
3, 1619, provided that 8ny merchant vessel of United States registry
might, by armed force, oppose or defend against "any aggression,
search, restraint, depredation, or seizure", attempted by any other
merchant vessel or "any armed vessel v;hatsoever, not be ing a publ ic
armed vessel of some nat ion in amity with the Un it e d Stat esT" This
act, still in force, wai held by some to forbid the action contem-
plated by the President, since Germany was still officially a
nation "in amity with the United States". Secretary Lansing and
Attorney General Gregory advised the President, however, that the
statute had been enacted with reference to protection against the
pirates o* that time ana could not be held to apply to the present
circumstances. See the act in Annals o^ Cong .. 15 Cong., 2 Sess.,
II, App., 2523.
34 IT. Y. Times Current Hist, Mag .. VI, 56. ".Because submarine
are in effect outlaws when used as the German submarines have been
used against merchant shipping, it is impossible to defend ships
against their attacks as the law of nations has assumed that mer-
chantmen would defend themselves against privateers or cruisers,
visible craft giving chase upon the open sea. It is common prudence
in such circumstances, grim necessity, indeed, to endeavor to des-
troy them before they have sh own the ir own intention . They must be
dealt with u^on sight
.
if f.ealt with at ellT" Address to Congress,
Apr. 2, 1917. LicKinley, Collected Materials for the Study of the
War (1st ed. ) , 13.
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certain to draw us Into the wsr without either the rights or the
effectiveness o^ belligerents." 35
In 1846, the question o^ the President's powers of defense
was raised in an even more complicated end contentious form. The
events leading up to the Mexican t'ver involved the question of the
President's power to recognize e state of war as already existing,
and thereby begin defensive measures without authorization from Con-
gress. They also illustrate to what extent hostile sets may be
performed by a vigorous President in bringing about such a state of
war, and how far operations may be conducted in the name of "de-
fense".
General Taylor hr.d been sent, after the annexation of
Texas, to occupy the disputed territory beyond -Jthe Nueces River,
with instructions, however, so the President said -- "to abstain
from all aggressive acts toward Mexico or Mexican citizens, and to
regard the relations between that Republic and the United States as
peaceful unless she should declare war or commit acts of hostility
indicative of a state of war." President Polk, however, had also,
in the fall o^ 1645, instructed Taylor that the crossing o^ the Del
Norte by the Llexican arnty was to te regarded es an act o^ war , and
in that event he should net wait to be attacked, but should attack
f irst . Moreover, he was not only to drive the invaders beck across
the river, but he was vested with discretionary authority to pursue
the Mexican army into Mexican territory, and to take Matamoras or
any other post on that side of the river, with only the caution "not
to penetrate any greet distance into the interior of Mexican Terri-
tory." likewise Commodore Conner, commanding the American squadron
35 KcKinley, op. cit ., 14.
36 Richardson, op cit .
,
IV, 441.
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in the Gulf of Mexico, was instructed in a similar event to blockade
all the L'exican ports on the Gulf, and to attack end take them if
practicable, excepting only Yucetan and Tobasco, which had been
reported as against the threatened war with the United States.
The President evidently held none of Jefferson's timid
views with regard to the Executive's powers of defense. Folk ex-
pected war, he was indeed fully determined on war, but meant that
the war should be "defensive" on the part of the United States. He
had no intention, however, of limiting such a war of defense to
merely repelling invaders. Polk did make inquiry of one of his
friends in Congress (Senator Bsgby of Alabama) as to the necessity
or propriety of calling Congress, in the event of a declaration of
war or en invasion of Texas by Mexico, and was plainly relieved
when the Senator cave it as his "clear opinion" that Congress should
not be called. 38
Having thus manipulated the situation so that actual hos-
tilities were finally precipitated on the morning of April 25,
President Polk thus summed up the situation in his message of May
11, 1846: "After reiterated menaces, Mexico has passed the boundary
of the United States, has invaded our territory, and shed American
blood upon the American soil. She has proclaimed that hostilities
have commenced, end that the two nations are now at war. As war
exists
,
and, notwithstanding all our efforts to avoid it, exists by
the act of Mexico herself , we are called upon by every consideration
of duty and patriotism to vindicate with decision the honor, the
rights, and the interests o^ our country. . . In further vindication
of our rights and defense of our territory, I invoke the prompt
37 Diary of James K. Polk, I, 9, 12.
38 Ibid'
..
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action of Congress to recognize the eristence of war, end to piece
at the disposition o^ the Executive the means of prosecuting the war
with vigor, and thus hastening the restoration of peace."
Even "before the President asked Congress thus to "recognize
the existence of war", his instructions o^ the year before had been
carried out, two battles hftd been fought, 40 and the war was already
beine- carried on without any declaration or authorization by
Congress. Tn Congress, in fact, the President's statement that "war
exists by act of Mexico", and his consequent assumption that the
war would be a "defensive" one, were not accepted without dispute.
Senator Benton, for example, was willing to vote men end mone^ for
defense of American territory, but was not prepared to make aggres-
sive W8r on Mexico. He left it to be inferred that he did not think
the territory of the United States extended west of the ITueces River,
41
and therefore he had not approved Taylor's occupation of that region.
Mr. Morehead (of Kentucky) denied that war could exist
without some prior action on the part of Congress. "If war does now
exist", he said, "- if the people of the United States now -*ind
themselves in a state of war with Mexico, it is a war which has
not been brought about or declared by the legislative department of
the United States, to which const it ut i onelly the power of declaring
war belongs. The President of the United Stat s has no constitution-
al power to involve the nation in war. But if war does exist 8t
this time between the United States and Mexico, it may follow that
39 Richardson, op. cit .. IV, 442, 443.
40 Palo Alto and Resac8 de la Palma, on May 8 and 9, respec-
tively.
41 Pier;/ of James K. Polk
.
I, 390. Benton also suggested that
a peaceable adjustment micrht be hao
,
referring to the proclamation o:!
the President ad interim of Mexico denying his own right to declare
war but leaving it to the consideration of the Mexican Congress. See
Benton's Abridgment of the Debates of Congress, XV, 499.
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the President of the United Stetes may involve the country in war
without the assent of the legislative department of the Government? 4 *
Mr. Archer (of Virginia) likewise declared that the intervention of
Congress was absolutely indispensable to constitute war, that the
existence of hostilities on one of the frontiers of the United States
did not necessarily put us in a state of war with a foreign power;
that the President's statement could not alone be accepted as in-
dicating a sta*e of war, since an investigation might show the sta'.e
of things on the Rio Grande to be misunderstood and the Mexican
authorities to have acted justifiably; that if the President's state-
ment were to be accepted as a legal and constitutional acceptation
of a state o-* war, then the officers and men on the Rio Grande might
43
involve the country in war at their pleasure.
The most vigorous assailant of the President's declaration
was Calhoun, who insisted that "in the sense of the Constitution
war could be declared only by Congress", that only through its
authority could the state of things called "war" be announced to the
country end the world. "War must be made", he said, "by the sover-
eign authority, which in this case, were the Mexican Congress, on
the one side, and the American Congress, on the other. The President
of Mexico could not make war. It could be done only by the two
countries. Even if the two Presidents had declared war, the nations
could disavow the act." He declared it was "monstrous" that he
should be asked to affirm "that a local rencontre, not authorized
by the act of either Government, constituted a state of war between
the Government of Mexico and the Government of the United States —
to say that, by a certain military movement o* General Taylor and
42 Benton's Debates
.
XV, 469, 492.
43 Ibid .
.
469, 490.
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General Arista, every citizen of the United States was made the
enemy of every mon in Mexico. . . It stripped Congress of the power
of making war; and, what was more end worse, it pave that power to
every officer, nay, to ever^ subaltern commanding a corporal's
guard." 44
The President was, of course, not lacking in supporters,
among them General Cass, who took direct issue with Calhoun. "There
can be no hostilities undertaken by a government", he said, "which
do not constitute a state of war. War is a fact, crested by an ef-
fort made by one nation to injure another. One party may make a
war, though it requires two parties to make a peace." Y/hile admit-
ting that Congress alone has the right to declare war, end that "no
authority but Congress can commence an aggressive war", yet he as-
serted that another country "can commence a war against us without
the cooperation of Congress", that it can, "at its pleasure, termi-
nate the relations of peace with us, fend substitute for these the
relet ions of war, with their legitimate consequences. War may be
commenced with or without a previous declaration. It may be com-
menced by a manifesto announcing the fact to the world, or by hos-
tile attacks by land or sea." Whether or not the disputed terri-
tory rightfully belonged to the United States or to Mexico made no
difference, in the opinion of Cass. The ultimate claim to the
country was a matter for diplomatic adjustment, but the United States
was meanwhile in possession, and any attempt to dislodge her forces
was an act o^ aggression and an act of war. Hence he argued thst
45
the war became for the United States one of defense.
Under the stress o^ the patriotic feelings aroused by the
44 Benton's Debates
,
XV, 491, 497, 500.
45 Ibid
.
.
503, 504.
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shedding American blood, and under the plea that the war was
strictly one of defense, Congress sut-tained the President, recognizee
a state of war as already existing by act o 4" Mexico, end authorized
46
the carrying on of hostilities. Its real feelings were, however,
perhaps better expressed when the House of Her resentat ives , about
two yeers later, passed a resolution "that the war was unnecessarily
4' 1
end unconstitutionally begun by the President of the United States".
Lincoln's proclamation of blockade o^ the Southern ports
in April, 1861, e?ain raised the question of the President's power
to recognize the existence of a state of war without a declaration
by Congress. The situation was all the more peculiar, in that this
was- not a foreign war, but an insurrection, and therefore a blockade
of the Southern ports was really a blockade of the nation's orn
ports, something unknown to international law. Nevertheless, the
Supreme Court, in the decision of the Prize Cases already referred
to, sustained the validity of the president's action, and asserted
his right to recgnize a state 0* war as already existing, and to
take measures of defense in advance of Congressional authority. "A
civil war is never solemnly declared," S8id the Court, "it becomes
avch by its accidents the number, power, and organization of the
persons ho originate and carry it on. . . As a civil war is never
publicly proclaimed e_o nomine against insurgents, its actual exis-
tence is a f« ct in our domestic history which the Court is bound to
notice and to know. The true test of its existence . . . may be
thus summarily stated: When the regular course of justice is inter-
46 Act of May 15, 1846. 9 Stat . at L . , 9.
47 See amendment of Mr. Ashmun to resolution 0^ thanks to
Gen. Taylor, adopted Jan. 3, 1848. On i'eb. 14, 1648, the House
tabled r motion to expunge this amendment from the Journal. Cong .
Globe
. 30 Con^., 1 Sess., 95, 345*544.
=======
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rupted by revolt, rebellion, or insurrection, so thet the Courts of
Justice cennot be kept open, c ivil we r exists and hostilities may be
prosecuted on the seme footing as i 4" those opposing the Government
were foreign enemies invading the lend." The Court held that the
question of ^act as to when an insurrection has reached such alarm-
ing proportions as to be celled a war and the insurgents to be ac-
corded the character o^ belligerents, is a question to_ b_e decided b^
the President in his capacity ss Commander-in-Chief. The Court
would be governed by the decisions and sets of the political de-
partment to which the power was entrusted. "The proclamat ion of
blockade," said the Court, "is itself official and conclusive
evidence to the Court that a state o-" war existed which demanded
and authorized a recourse to such a measure under the circumstances
48
peculiar to the case". The Court thus in effect held that, while
the existence of a state of war was necessary to the validity of a
blockade, the ''act that e blockade had been proclaimed was proof
thet a state of war existed; and the President having authority to
proclaim the blockade, v.as thereby empowered to declare the existenc
of a war, and bind the Court and the country to his declaration.
Pour Justices, including Chief-Justice Taney, dissented
vigorously from this opinion. They argued that, although Congress
had conferred upon the President euthority to meet sudden emergen-
cies — to repel invasions and suppress insurrections — that autho-
rity did not invest him with the war power. If so, they maintained,
then we are in a state of war every time a military force is called
out, "for the nature o^ the power cennot depend upon the numbers
called out." "The Acts of 1795 and 1807", they said, "did not, and
48 Prize Ceses . 2 Block, 635, 666, 667, 670, (1862).
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could not under the Constitution, confer on the President the power
of declaring? war against a State of this Union, ojr of deciding that
war existed . . . This greet power is reserved to the legislative
department by the express words of the Constitution, end cannot be
delegated or surrendered to the Executive". The minority held,
therefore, that if the insurrection were to he placed on the footing
of a war, within the meaning of the Constitution, and he accorded
belligerent rights under international law, it must be recognized
or declared as a war by the war making power of the Government, that
is, by Congress. "There is no difference in this respect", said the
49
Justices, "between a civil 8nd a public war."
Such an eminent authority as Professor Willoughby is in-
clined to agree with the minority rather than with the majority of
the Court. He says that while all nations have the power and right,
in case of a civil contest in another State, to determine whether
the struggle is to be treated as a war and the contestants as bel-
ligerents, yet the State concerned is not bound by such action and
m^y continue to treat the insurgents as rebels. Therefore, he says,
"it would seem tha+ , in the United States, from the constitutional
viewpoint, it should lie with the wsr-declfiring power, that is, with
Congress, to determine when the civil struggle should be recognized
ae a war." 50
Whether or not we agree with Professor Willoughby and the
minority of the Court as presenting the most logical argument from
a strictly constitutional standpoint, the decision of the majority
stands as law in the United States, as it also represents the more
practical point of view. The Constitution, made as it was by precti
49 Prize Cases . 2 Black, 688-689, 690-693.
50 Willoughby. On the Constitution . II, 797.
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M 52
cal men who had just emerged from e long, herd struggle of defense,
must be construed as giving the power to take measures for defense
as quickly as those measures may he needed. Vihile the decision of
the Court in this case upheld particularly the President's power to
recognize an insurrection as 8 "state of wer" ana undertake the
necessary defensive measures in that case without authority from
Congress, the principle has also been held to apply to foreign wars
as well. "In f^ct", says one authority, "according to the terms of
the judicial decision just cited, a President who conducts affairs
with a foreign power, so as skillfully to lead it to attack the
United States, can always engage the ection of the country and
inaugurate defensive wer. In a word, his remaining on the defensive
is all that is required to authorize him to act."*51
It has been noted hov.' the power of defense has been as-
sumed and asserted by the Executive, in varying degree, as a necessary
and inherent function of his office. The law and practice are thus
in accord as to the nature and location of the power. With regard
to the "stent to which the President may constitutionally exercise
this power o r defense. Professor Corwin draws an analogy between
this Presidential power and the right of a state under international
law to self-preservation, and concludes that while the power is
theoretically reserved for "grave and sudden emergencies", in prac-
tice it is limited only by the "powers of Congress and public
opinion"
.
51 Chambrun, The Executive Pov-er . 121-122. Cf. ilcClain, Con-
stitutional law in the United States. 190; Schouler, onst itut ional
Stud ies. 129; Ogp* & Beard, Nrjtional Governments and the World v;er
,
102; Sens' p document !To. 56. 54 Conr-., 2 Sess., 5.
52 The President's Control of Foreign i-eleMons, 156.
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Chapter V.
Powers with regard to a Declaration of War .
The Constitution gives to Congress the power "to declare
war, grant letters of marque and reprisal, and make rules concern-
ing captures on land and water". Those functions were not granted
to Congress as a matter of course, but only after much serious
thought and discussion. The Congress under the Confederation had
the "sole and exclusive right and power of determining on peace
end war"; but the decision in the Convention of 1787 to create
separate and distinct departments of government in pursuance of
Montesquieu's theory o^ the separation of powers, opened up anew
the whole matter of the proper functioning of each department, in-
cluding the question of the proper depository for the war-making
functions.
Hamilton had suggested, in his plan presented quite early
in the course of the Convention, that the power of declaring war
should be vested exclusively in the Senate,^" but the report of the
Committee of Detail gave to the legislature as a whole the power
5
"to make war". When this clause came up for consideration on
August 17, it because a subject for warm debate. Mr. Pinkney op-
posed vesting the power in the Legislature, whose proceedings he
said were too slow; the House of Representatives he thought too
numerous a body for such deliberations; and hence he agreed with
1 Art. I, Sec. 8, CI. 11.
2 Articles of Confederation . Art. IX, in Mcdonald's Documen-
tary Source-Book of American History , 199.
3 June 18.
4 Madison's Journal (Hunted. ), I, 163.
5 Ipld.. II, en—
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Hamilton that the Senate was the best depository. 6 Mr. Butler thought
the objections against the Legislature would operate in great degree
also against the Senate, and favored vesting the power in the Presi-
dent, "who will have all the requisite qualities and will not make
war but when the nation will support it". Mr. Sherman, on the other
hand, thought the Executive should not be able to commence war; and
Mr. Gerry "never expected to hear in a republic a motion to empower
the Executive alone to declare war". Mr. Mason likewise thought the
Executive was not safely to be trusted with the war power, nor was
the Senate in his opinion so constructed as to be entitled to it.
He was for clogging rather than facilitating war; but for facili-
tating peace". As a final conclusion, the word "declare" was sub-
stituted for the word "make", and the power "to declare war" was en-
7trusted to the Legislative body.
It seemed evident to the makers of the Constitution that
a power involving such tremendous consequences must in a represen-
tative government rest with the body most directly representative of
the people. To vest the power of declaring war in the Executive
savored too much of monarchy and of old-world institutions. Few
have disputed the wisdom of that theory, few would do so today.
Nevertheless, such an intense American as John Quincy Adams, spoke if
1817 of the provision which confers upon the legislative the power
of declaring war as "that error inthe Constitution" and a piece of
"clumsy political machinery." He thought that, in the theory of
government according to Montesquieu and Rousseau, the power of de-
6 Pinkney had earlier in the Convention (June l) expressed
his fear of extending the "powers of peace and war" to the Execu-
tive, which he said would render the Executive a "monarchy of the
worst kind, to wit, an elective one." Madison's Journal ( Hunt ed . )
,
II 49.
1
7 For the debate on this entire proposition, see ibid. ,11, 187f>
jftQj^ ffn-rrand'a Hacorda of_the_Federal Convention. II. 318-520.
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daring war is "strictly an Executive act".
It is believed that a brief examination will show, that
though the power to begin war through a formal declaration is clear-
ly and definitely granted to Congress, the President is by no means
excluded from all share in such declaration. A declaration of war
is a simple legislative act, going through the same procedure as any
other legislative measure, and requiring no extraordinary majority
9for its passage. The President has therefore all the rights and
powers in connection with a declaration of war that he has with re-
gard to matters of ordinary legislation. Judge Baldwin^ remarks
that there may be said to be three stages in a declaration of war:
(1) Doings o* the President in informing Congress of the state of
relations with the Power against which war may be declared; (2) do-
ings of Congress in making the declaration; and (3) approval of the
declaration by the President.
In the first place, then, the President, under the consti-
tutional provision requiring that he "shall from time to time give
to the Congress information of the state of the Union, and recom-
mend to their consideration such measures as he shall Judge neces-
sary and expedient", is empowered to recommend a declaration of
war, first communicating to Congress the facts and circumstances
8 Memoirs of John Quincy Adams
.
IT, 32; but of. XII, 51.
9 It is rather curious to note that Jefferson was for a time
under the impression that a two-thirds majority was required to pass
a declaration of war. He later admitted his error on this point.
Writings of Thomas Jefferson
.
VII, 220, 222, 243-244. The Hew York
ratifying convention 0* 1778 proposed an amendment requiring a two-
thirds majority of each house to declare war, and a similar amend-
ment was proposed by the Hartford Convention in 1814, neither of
which received any serious consideration. See The Federalist (Ford
ed.), Appendix, 643, 689.
10 S. E. Baldwin, "The Share of the President in a Declaration
of War", Am. Jour. Int. Law
.
XII, 1-14.
11 Art. IT, Sec. 3.
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that in his opinion call for such declaration. The President,
through this power o^ giving information to Congress and of reoom-
mending measures to be taken, may largely influence that body in de-
termining upon war or peace. He may withhold certain information,
the disclosure of which would vitally affect the action of Congress.
He may, if he is desirous of war, reveal only such information as
will tend to inflame Congressional opinion, or he may select a
moment for his disclosures and recommendations when opinion is ex-
oited and ready to hear the worst.
Thus Jefferson charged that President Adams "kept out of
12
sight in his speech" (of May 16, 1797) Spanish protests and de-
mands, and "thereby left it to be imagined that France is the only
power of whom we are in danger;" that the Executive had war in con-
templation, with the expectation that the legislature "might catch
the flame"; that the convocation of Congress was in fact only "an
experiment on the temper of the Nation, to see if it was in uni-
son". 14 Both Jefferson and Madison charged that the X Y Z corres-
pondence was laid before Congress for the particular purpose of
arousing the war temper of that body and of the country. In his
message of March 19, 1798, 15 the President, without revealing the
content of the famous despatches, spoke psssimistically about the
accomplishments of the mission to France, urged the adoption of
defensive measures, and announced the action he himself proposed to
take. Referring to this message, Madison wrote: "The Constitution
supposes, what the History of all Governments demonstrates, that the
12 Richardson, Messages and Papers of the Presidents
,
I, 233-
£39.
13 Congress had been summoned to meet in special session May
15, 1797.
14 Writings of Thomas Jefferson . VII, 126, 138-139, 146,148-14®.
15 Richardson, op. cit ., I, £64-265.
J
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Executive is the branoh of power most interested in war, find most
prone to it. It has accordingly with studied cere, vested the ques-
tion of war in the Legislature. But the Doctrines lately advanced-*- 6
strike at the root of all these provisions and will deposit the
peace of the Country in that Department which the Constitution dis-
trusts as most ready without cause to renounce it. For if the opinion
of the President}-7 not the facts and proofs themselves, are to sway
the judgment of Congress in declaring war, . . it is evident that
the people are cheated out of the best ingredients in their Govern-
ment, the safeguards of peace which is the greatest of their bless-
ings." 18
Madison was equally vigorous in referring to the actual
revelation of the famous papers. "It is easy to foresee," he wrote,
"the zeal and plausibility with which this part of the despatches
will be inculcated, not only for the gene ral purpose of enforcing the
war measures of the Executive
.
but for the particular purpose of
diverting the public attention from the more important part, which
shows the speech and conduct of the President to be now the great
obstacle to accommodation . . . The readiness with which the papers
19
were communicated and the quarter proposing the call for them,
16 Madison evidently refers here to the proposed measures of
defense, especially the announcement of Adams that armed merchantmen
of the United States would now be permitted to sail, whereas before
the collectors had instructions to hold such vessels in port. See
Richardson, op. cit
.
I, 265; also supra., 67-68.
17 Adam8 had expressed his opinion, formed from an examination
of the correspondence, that the objects of trie mission to France
could not be accomplished "on terms conpatible with the safety, the
honor, or the essential interests of the nation", and that the nati
should prepare for defense. Richardson, op. cit ., I, 264. It should
be remembered that the correspondence had not yet been laid before
Congress
.
18
'
writings of James Madison
.
VI, 312-313.
19 The IY Z correspondence was submitted to Congress April 3,
1798, in response to a resolution of the House calling for the same,
passed April 2. See Annals of Cong .. 5 Cong., II, 1370, 1371.
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would be entitled to praise if a mass of other circumstances did not
force a belief that the view in both was more to inflame than to in-
form the public mind."*^
A study of the debates in Congress shows that Jefferson
and Madison were not alone in their contention that the President
was manipulating the situation and molding Congress to war. Mr.
Livingston suggested that since Congress had been practically called
upon to decide between peace and war, it was entitled to see the
whole correspondence. "The right to judge what it was proper to
publish in consideration of the public safety and interest, should
not be transferred to the President, as he might withhold such parts
of the papers as might prevent a correct judgment being formed upon
them."*^ Mr. Gallatin had opposed the call for the papers and favor-
ed going ahead at once to determine on peace or war, since, as he
said, "if it had first been determined to call for further informa-
tion, how d id he know that it would be given , or . if given , whether
it would be _in a mutilated state . rather than which he would choose
to act without it upon the Message of the President alone. • • It
was true, when the concessions were made known, it was possible that
he might differ in opinion from the President as to their reason-
ableness; but this House has no control over the President in this
respect. Therefore, the information which he has given to the
House is sufficient for them; and they ought now to say whether they
22
will go to war or remain in peace." Many members expressed their
belief that the President's message was tantamount to a declaration
20 Writings of James Madison
,
VI, 316; cf. Writings of Thomas
Jefferson
.
VII. 255-256.
Tl Anns Is of Cong .. 5 Cong., II, 1359.
22 Ibid .. 13g5T~^
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of war against France.
In fact, the messages and actions of the President were
considered as so inflammatory of the war passions, that Mr. Sprigg
of Maryland, in order to counteract that effect, proposed a resolu-
tion "that it is not expedient for the United States to resort to
24
war against the Republic of France". Such a negative resolution
was very unusual, and its propriety was strongly questioned, both
in Congress and out. Madison admitted that it was "in ordinary
cases . • . certainly ineligible", but he thought that cases might
obviously arise for which it was proper: w l. where nothing less thaji
a declaration of pacific intentions from the department entrusted
with the power of war, will quiet the apprehensions of the consti-
tuent body, or remove an uncertainty which subjects one part of them
to the speculating arts of another; 2. where it may be a necessary
antidote to the hostile measures or language of the Executive De-
partment. . ; 3. where public measures or appearances may mislead
another nation into distrust of the real object of them, the error
ought to be corrected; and in our Government where the question of
peace or war lies with Congress, a satisfactory explanation cannot
issue from any other Department" Madison and a large number in
Congress were convinced that an obvious case had arisen, that the
President was deliberately trying to lead Congress into a declara-
tion of war.
Whatever the truth in these charges against Adams, the
above-mentioned resolution failed of passage, and it is clear that
when the crisis was at its height in 1798, the President had brought
23 See, for example, the remarks of Giles and Galletin. Annals
of Cong.
.
5 Cong., II, 1323, 1364.
54 Ibid., 1319.
25 See the debate on the resolution. Ibid . . 1319-1357.
26 Writings of James Madison , VI, .317-318.
il M
to>u it
D o *!<f
87.
matters to a point where "both Houses were safely committed to any
27policy of vigor which he would recommend. " The sentiment of Con-
gress was perhaps best expressed by Mr. Otis when he said that "the-
President having declared his orinion that there is no hope of suc-
cess from that mission, he wished for nothing further to convince
him of the propriety of going into the different defensive measures
proposed."28 Under the President's leadership, therefore, acts of
hostility were authorized, 29 and for more than two years a "limited
30
or imperfect war" was carried on. Even so, peace was undoubtedly
"the first object of the nation", as Jefferson had grudgingly acknow*
lodged?* no formal declaration was asked for or made, and Adams is
generally credited with having "probably saved the country from war
and from internal dissensions". Certainly there was not a moment
during his entire administration when Adams, by a word, might not
have secured from Congress a declaration of war. He refrained from
speaking the word, and a disastrous war was avoided.
President Jefferson was also able to prevent a declaration
of war during his administration, though under somewhat different
circumstances. The long series of incidents arising from the strain-
ed relations with Great Britain had culminated on June 22, 1807, in
the attack of the Leopard upon the Chesapeake . The country was
33
aroused as it had not been since the battle of Lexington. "Never?
says an eminent historian, "had a more just cause for war been given
27 Bassett, The Federalist System . 237.
28 Annals of Cong .. 5 Cong. > II. 1370.
29 Acts
-
of May 28 and July 9, 1798; ibid . . 5 Cong., Ill, App.
3733, 3754.
30 Bas v. Tingy
.
4 Dall. 37; Gray y. U. S .. 21 Ct. of CI. 340,
in Scott's Cases on International Law . 452.
31 Writings
.
VII. 149.
32 Bas6ett
,
op. cit .. 251; cf. also BaBcom, Growth of National*
ity
.
26.
33 Writings of Thomas Jefferson . IX, 105.
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34
to any people. Never had a people called more loudly for war. 1*
Jefferson "believed that It was strictly within the province
of Congress to determine whether the outrage was a proper cause of
war, and that the Executive should be careful not to perform any
act that would commit Congress to a particular course. He might
therefore have summoned Congress at once to meet in special session
to consider the extraordinary situation that had arisen. Jefferson
and his Cabinet knew, however, that were Congress to meet while the
excitement was at its height, it would be difficult to prevent en
immediate declaration of war, or at least some action that would
hopelessly embarrass the negotiations about to begin at London. He
hoped that a delay would bring cooler counsels and some chance for
adjustment, that, "having taught so many useful lessons to Europe,
we may • • • add that of showing them that there are peaceable meanB
of repressing injustice, by making it to the interest of the ag-
35
greBsor to do what is just, and abstain from future wrong". He
therefore issued a proclamation setting forth the grievances of the
United States and declaring the ports closed to the armed ships of
36
England; but, under the pretence that Y/ashington was too sickly
a place for Congress to come to in the summer, its date for assembliiii|g
37
was fixed at October £6.
The delay proved useful. The British government sent a
minister to adjust the Chesapeake affair, recalled the Admiral who
38
gave the order for the attack, and disavowed his act. Thus Jef-
ferson, if he did not succeed in finally averting a war with Greet
Britain, at least, by refusing to summon Congress at the moment of
34 Monaster. History of the People of the United States . III. £62
35 Writings
.
IX. 87-88.
36 Richa rdson, op. cit .. I, 422.
37 Ibid
. .
424.
38 EcEaster, op. cit .. Ill, 263, 269-270.

89.
excitement, delayed the war for several years.
President Madison aroused the war passion of Congress in
1812 by submitting to it the "Henry correspondence", which aimed to
show that Great Britain was attempting to sever the New England
39
states from the Union. The British Government denied any connec-
tion with the Henry mission; no evidence was produced to show that
the Hew England states had contemplated any plan of secession; and
the Federalists charged that the entire affair had been trumped
up by Madison in order to augment the feeling for war, evidence
being produced to show that the President had paid $50,000 for the
40papers. Madison, however, was slow in taking advantage of the
war passion he had thus aroused. Congress, now thoroughly in favor
of war, fumed and fritted at the delay, but hesitated to act with-
out a recommendation from the President. Finally, a delegation
from Congress, headed by Clay, waited upon the President and de-
clared the readiness of the majority in Congress to vote the war,
41
if recommended . Thereupon Madison sent a special message June
42
1, 1812, recommending war, to which Congress responded by passing
the declaration on June 18.
The significance of this is not so much in the apparent
domination of the President by the majority element in Congress, as
in the fact that Congress, even though fully convinced of the neces-
sity for war end fully determined upon such action, yet found itself
39 For the Henry correspondence, see Annals of Cong . . 12 Cong.,
I, 1162-1181; for Madison's message, Richardson, op cit ., I, 498.
40 Updyke, Diplomacy of the War of 1812 , 126-127.
41 Writings of James Madison , VITI, 192, n; Joseph Cale's ac-
count in Am. Hist. Rev. XITI, 309; cf. also accounts in Hildreth,
History of the United States
,
VI, 298; Von Hoist, Constitutional and
political History of the United States . I, 230; McMaster, op. cit ..
Ill, 448 — all to the effect that Madison was promised a renomi-
nation if he would send Congress a war message.
42 Writings
.
VITI, 192-200; Richardson, op. cit .. I, 499-505.

90.
unwilling to act without first securing the recommendation of the
President , Had the President been less hasty in passing judgment
upon, and submitting to Congress, the Henry correspondence, the
authenticity of which had at least not been thoroughly established;
had he delayed his war message a little longer, the new conciliatory
attitude of the British Government might have been met and the war
of 1812 very likely altogether averted. These are the facts that
John Adams probably had in mind when he wrote in 1815: "Mr. Madi-
son' 8 administration has proved great points, long disputed in
Europe and America,
1, He has proved that an administration under our present
Constitution can declare war,
£• That it can make peace. . ."425
President Polk came into office in 1845 with the avowed
purpose o^ acquiring California and, later, also New Mexico. He
tried first to secure them peacefully by purchase, and for that pur-
pose sought an appropriation of a million dollars from Congress,
concealing the real object under the euphemistic phrases of "effect-
ing an adjustment of our differences with Mexico", and "the conclu-
44
Bion of a Treaty of boundary". Failing in this, Polk, as early
as February, 1846, declared himself in favor of "strong measures"
45
against Mexico, and from that time was steadily determined on war.
The sending of a war message was postponed, however, partly because
of the unsettled state of the negotiations with Great Britain over
the Oregon question, but probably rather because Polk was seeking
43 Life and Works of John Adams
.
X, 167-168.
44 McMaster. op. cit .. VII. 452, 439; Reeves, American Diplo-
macy under Tyler and Polk
.
272; Diary of James K. Polk
.
I. 34-36.
303, 306-308, 310-313, 317.
45 Reeves, op. cit.
.
284, 287, 288, 294; Rhodes, Historical
Essays
.
211; Diary of James K. Polk . I, 233-234, 319, 337, 343.
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something that might serve as a plausible cense for war.
Certain sundry claims of American citizens upon Mexico
had been a matter of difficulty and negotiation between the two
46
governments since 1836, and were still largely unsettled. The
President now hit upon these claims as the "aggravated wrongs" which
47
should be the basis for the complaints against Mexico, although
48
"many of the claims were exorbitant and some of them fraudulent".
Meanwhile, General Taylor had been sent to occupy the disputed ter-
ritory beyond the Uueces River, had advanced to a position opposite
Matamorae where a strong Mexican force was located, and Polk seemed
to think there was some hope of a collision in the near future,
^
which would give him more satisfactory ground for his war messege.
For some time, however, no hostilities occurred, the Presi-
dent became impatient of delay, and on May 9 the Cabinet agreed that
a message recommending war should be prepared and submitted by the
following Tuesday (May 12), whether the Mexican forces had committed
any act of hostility against Taylor or not. Buchanan, the Secretary
o* State, h8d already drawn up a statement of the causes of corn-
plaint, the President had decided to substitute practically the pre-
cise language he himself had used in dealing with the Mexican claims
in his annual message of the year before, when suddenly the situation
was changed by the receipt of news thet same evening from Taylor
that the Mexicans had attacked and hostilities had begun. The Cabi-
net was immediately summoned again, and it was agreed that a mes-
sage should be sent recommending "vigorous and prompt measures to
50
enable the Executive to prosecute the war.
46 Reeves, op. cit .. 76, 86, 93, 96, 107-108.
47 Mary of James K. Polk , I, 363, 377, 382.
48 Reeves, op. cit. , 86."""
49 Diary of James K. Polk
.
I, 380, (May 6, 1846).
50 Ibid .. 384-386.
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Polk's opportunity had come. He recognized that "public
excitement in and out of Congress was very naturally very great";
unlike Jefferson, he determined to play upon that feeling, so he
spent Sunday in writing his message, and on Monday, May 11, it was
submitted to Congress. There was now no mention of the long-unset-
tled claims as the "aggravated wrongs" borne by the United States;
the entire emphasis was laid on the fact that the Mexicans had at-
tacked American forces and shed American blood on American soil,
end that since war had thus been begun by Mexico, the issue must be
51
accepted and hostilities carried on with vigor.
In spite of the fact that there had been, 8nd still was,
52
bitter opposition in Congress to a war with Mexico, the President's
message was quickly responded to. In two hours, of which time one
and a half hours were occupied in reading the documents accompanying
the President's message, the House of Representatives passed the bil|
reciting that war existed by act of Mexico and providing for the
53
support of hostilities. The Senate could not be hurried quite
so rapidly, but by evening of the next day (May 1£), it had also
given its sanction; and the President's actions were sustained.
Whether or not Congress would have sustained the President
and authorized hostilities, had not the news from Taylor changed the
situation from an admitted war of aggression to an ostensible war of
defense, it is impossible to say with any degree of certainty. Cer-
tainly, as Reeves suggests, "Taylor's skirmish with the Mexicans
was an occurrence that saved Polk from a dangerous situation".
51 Richardson, op. clt .. IV, 437-443.
52 A motion in the House of Representatives for a formal de-
claration of W8r was rejected by a large majority. Cong. Globe .
29 Cong., 1 Sess., 792, 794.
53 Statement of Senator Benton, Diary of James K. Polk. 1.392.
54 Reeves, op. cit. . 298.
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Nevertheless, Polk had been able to so handle matters as to make an
armed collision almost inevitable, and he took advantage of the ex-
citement thus aroused to^ secure from an unwilling Congress a strong
backing for his war policy. His actions, says Rhodes, "illustrate
the power inherent in the executive office" • Certainly, but for
the action of the President, the war would not have been sanctioned
by Congress; because of the action of the President, the war was
sanctioned, and the objects sought by the President were obtained.
Had President Grant been eager for war with Great Britain,
a mere message and recommendation from him to that effect would
undoubtedly have brought on such a conflict. The unanimous passage
by the House of Representatives, in 1866 of a bill modifying the
neutrality Isws in such a way as to permit the sale of war-ships and
56
munitions to other powers; the sympathy and support given to the
Fenian movement against Canada; the resolution proposed in the
Senate in 1667 for the recognition to Abyssinia during its war with
Great Britain of the same rights which Great Britain had recognized
57
to the Confederacy; the action of the Senate in 1869 in rejecting
by a vote of 54-1 the treaty providing for a joint high commission
to pass upon the claims of subjects of either government 8geinst
58
the other; speeches such as that of Senator Sumner delivered dur-
59ing the consideration of the above-mentioned treaty; the angry and
excited discussion in the press of the two countries — these vari-
ous incidents shov/ed that the bitter feeling aroused against Great
55 Historical Essays
.
212.
56 Cong. Globe
,
39 Cong., 1 Sess., Pt. V, 4194, 4197. See
Sec. 10, which was the addition. The debate on the bill shows
that it was 8imed particularly at Great Britain.
57 Ibid
. .
40 Cong., 1 Sese., 810.
58 Sen. 3Ss. Jour .. XVII, 163.
59 On April 13, 1869. 7/orks of Charles Sumner . XIII, 53-93.
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Britain during the Civil Wer had assumed hostile form; that, as
an eminent authority has expressed it, "in the opinion of the
majority, the country had a just cause for war in the escape of the
Alabama and the Florida". 61
The President and his wise Secretary of State, Hamilton
Pish, chose to disregard this sentiment of the country and of Con-
gress for an unyielding and belligerent attitude towards Great Bri-
tain. On the other hand, the two points in the American case which
h8d given especial offense to the British were allowed to recede
62into the background, if not conceded altogether, negotiations
were persistently carried on for the arbitration of the Alabama and
Plorida claims, and the peace was preserved.
President Cleveland, on the other hand, very nearly preci-
pitated war with England, when in his special message of December
65
17, 1895, he made his strong declaration with regard to the Vene-
tuelan boundary situation. The President stated that arbitration
hed been declined by Great Britain, and proposed an independent in-
quiry and report by a strictly American commission. "When such re-
port is made and accepted", he said, "it will, in my opinion, be the
duty of the United States to resist by every means in its pov/er, as
a willful aggression upon its rights and interests, the appropria-
tion by Greet Britain of any lends or the exercise of any governmen-
tal jurisdiction ov^r any territory which after investigation we
64
have determined of right belongs to Venezuela". Though the coun-
60 Cf. Dunning, Reconstruction: Political and Economic ,160^16^
61 Rhodes, Historical Esrays , 218-219,
62 These were the claim that wrong- had been done to the United
States by the recognition of the Confederates as belligerents, and
the demand for compensation for "national" or "indirect" losses.
See Dunning, op. oit .. 167.
63 Richardson, op. cit .. IX, 655-658.
64 Ibid., 658.
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try had up to this time been ignorant of the peremptory demands of
the administration, and the message threatening war came therefore
as en unexpected shock; though Congress and the President had here
tofore quarreled over almost every question of consequence. Congress
now sustained the President in his demands and passed almost with-
out debate, the bill for the appointment of the commission asked
L»."
-m* * u
It is not important in this connection whether or not the
President had made a valid interpretation end a correct application
of the Monroe Doctrine. The important thing to notice is that he
had raised an issue which meant simply this, that if arbitration
were refused by Great Britain, the United States would mark the
boundaries of one of her colonies and compel the mother-country to
accept the limits so prescribed; that a hostile Congress had ac -
cepted without question the issue so raised ; and that the President
had thereby placed the United States and Greet Britain unexpectedly
in a position where one or the other must openly recede from its
ennounced intention, if a conflict was to be averted. A conflict
was averted, but only by reason of England's conciliatory agreement
to arbitrate; and it is worthy of note that, as one authority has
expressed it, "only in the case where he (Cleveland) was led, by
whatever influences, to offer a gross insult to Groat Britain, such
as would not have been borne for a moment by this country from any
other without prompt resentment, did he receive the unanimous sup-
65 Dewey, National Problems , 308; Latane, Prom Isolation to
Leadership
.
49
•
66 Cong. Record
,
XXVIII, Pt. I, (54 Cong., 1 sess.), 234-235,
255-265; Dewey, op. cit .. 310.
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67
port of "both houses. H
In the case of the difflenities with Spain over the Cuban
question, it has been raid that "Presidents Cleveland and McKinley
kept the national legislature from a declaration of hostilities
68for more than two years before final action was taken." It is
true that the temper of Congress was for war long before the Presi-
dent was ready to recommend such a step; it is likewise undoubtedly
true that the President might have delayed such recommendation still
longer, and possibly -- almost certainly — have averted war alto-
gether.
Congress in 1890 had, by concurrent resolution, requested
the President "to invite from time to time, as fit occasions may
arise, negotiations with any government with which the United States
has or may have diplomatic relations, to the end that any differen-
ces or disputes arising between the two governments which cannot be
adjusted by diplomatic agency may be referred to arbitration, and
69
be peaceably adjusted by such means". In the spring of 1898 Spsin
had made several concessions, which, according to eminent authority,
"fully covered" the expressed wishes of the United States for
70Cuba, and on March 31, she proposed arbitration of the Main con-
71
troversy. General V/oodford, the American minister to Spain, evi-
dently did not consider the situation hopeless, for he wrote: "I
know that the Queen and her present ministry sincerely desire peace
67 Bradford, The Lesson of Popular Government
.
I, 358, n. Other
authorities say that President Cleveland, in this instance, recom-
mended "demands Great Britain could hardly regard as anything but
unfriendly." Ogg & Beard, National Governments and the World gar,10lt«
68 Young, The Mew American Government and Its Work
.
£7.
69 Yale Rev.
.
IX, 402.
70 For these concessions of March 30, March 31, and April 9,
Bee For. Itel.. 1898
.
7£5, 762, 750; cf. also Benton, Internat ional
Law and Diplomacy of the Spanish American War . 83-91.
71 Benton, op. cit ., 85.
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and that the Spanish people desire peace, end if you can still give
me time and liberty of action I will get for you the peace you de-
sire so much and for which you have labored so hard;" and on
April 10, in a personal appeal to the President: "I hope that noth-
ing will now be done to humiliate Spain, as I am satisfied that the
present Government is going, and is loyally ready to go, as fast
and as far as it can.""^
But neither the above-mentioned resolution of Congress,
74
the overtures of Spain, the proffered mediation of the Powers,
nor the pleadings of the American minister, had any effect on the
75
President. No reply was made to the offer of arbitration, and
on A r ril 11, the message recommending war went to Congress, with
the usual and natural response. The vitsl question, says Benton, is
"whether the President did not yield prematurely and whether he had
exhausted the resources of diplomacy;" 7^ he answers that question
by saying that in the opinion of neerly all writers on international
law the prrticular form of intervent io/i in 1696 was "unfortunate,
77
Irregular, precipitate, and unjust to Spain".
The influence of President Wilson with regard to the
events of the recent world war, and the readiness of Congress to fol
low his recommendations — to be a "peace Congress" when the Presi-
dent desired peace, to be a "war Congress" when the President recom-
mended war -- are too evident to require any extended comment. Al-
72 For. Rel. 1696
.
732.
73 Ibid .. 747":
74 On April 6 the Ambassadors of Great Britain, Germany, Aus-
tria, France, Italy, and Russia, united in a personal appeal to
President McKinley for a peaceful adjustment. Two days later, even
stronger representations were made at Madrid. Benton, op.cit
.
.
69-90.
75 President McKinle^ , in his message to Congress, dismissed
this offer of arbitration with these laconic words: "I made no reply
76 Benton, op. cit . . 95.
77 Ibid. . iWl
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though basing his claim for re-election in 1916 largely on the
ground that hp had "kept us out of war", with the presumption that
he would continue to do so in the future, end carrying with him a
Congress presume hly committed to the same policy; and although stand
ing, as late as January, 1917, for "p^ace without victory", 78 Presi-
dent Wilson felt compelled by the turn of events to recommend war
upon Germany in his address of April 2, a recommendation at once
adopted by the "peace Congress" with very little opposition. 79
Although the governments allied with Germany could with
difficulty be distinguished in method and policy from the government
of Germany — the Austro-Hungarian government especially having
openly avowed its endorsement of Germany's submarine policy, and its
ambassador having been implicated in plots to destroy our factories
— , the President was not at that time ready to make war upon any of
them, because, as he said, "they have not made war upon us or chal-
80lenged us to defend our right and our honor." Congress therefore
took no action towards declaring war against these countries.
However, by December of the same year, President 7/ilson
had discovered that "one very embarrassing obstacle that stands in
ottr way is that we are at war with Germany, but not with her al-
lies." He therefore recommended a declaration of a state of war
with Austria-Hungary, that nation being "not her own mistress, but
simply the vassals of the German Government." The President admit-
ted that the same logic would seem to demand a declaration of war
also against Turkey and Bulgaria, since "they also are the tools of
Germany", but he declined to recommend such action against these
78 See his address to the Senate, Jan. 22, 1917. McKinley,
Collected Materials for the Study of the War (1st ed.), 9-11.
79 Joint Resolution o* Apr. 6, 1917. Ibid . , 137.
80 Address to Congress, Apr. 2, 1917. Ibid . . 15.
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countries, because "they are mere tools, end do not yet stand in
the direct path of our necessary action. "81 in each case Congress
followed the recommendation of the President without question, de-
claring war upon Austria-Hungary, 82 and, despite some feeling that
Turkey and Bulgaria should have been included, 83 no decleration was
84
ever made against those countries.
These examples and incidents from the history of our own
country illustrate clearly the very important position conceded to
the President with regard to a declaration of war. They would seem
to bear out the statement of one of our Congressmen, when he said
in a recent speech: "History shows . . • that while Congress does
possess that power (to declare war), in reality, the President exer-
cises it. Congress has always declared war when the President de-
sired war , and Congress has never attempted to declare war unless
the President wanted war . That was true of the war of 1812. It
wae true of the Mexican war. It was true of the Spanish-American
war. It was true of this war. It will probably be true of every
war in which the nation engages so long as the present method of
declaring war continues." 8 *5
81 Address to Congress. Dec. 4, 1917. N. Y . Times Current Hisft .
Mag., VII, 66-67 (Jan., 1918). For further reasons why Turkey and ['
Eulgaria were omitted, see ibid . , 74.
82 Joint Resolution oFUec. 7, 1917. Ibid
.
, 69
83 Cf. attitude of Senator Lodge. Ibid . . 75.
84 Diplomatic relations were broken off with Turkey, Apr. 20,
1917, but the initiative had been taken by that country; with Bul-
garia relations were not even severed during the entire course of
the war.
85 Congressman Dill, Cong. Record . 65 Cong., 3 Sess., (Jan. £1,
1919), 1624; see also an editorial in The Nation . Mar. 1, 1919; cf.
Pinley & Sanderson, The American Executive and Executive Methods . 260;
Bryce, American Commonwealth
.
I. 54; Bradford, The Lesson of Popular
Government
.
I. 559; Case. Constitutional Histor.y of the United States ,
232-233; Young, The New American Government and Its Y/ork . 27; Schoult}
er. Constitutional Studies , 138.
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The power of the President to recommend war and to com-
municate facts as a basis for such recommendation gives him also an
opportunity to set forth the grounds and to explain the purposes of
the nation in entering upon war. Since the ratification of the
Hague Convention of 1907, such a statement of reasons is required
before the beginning of hostilities. These are the terras of the
article in question: n The Contracting Parties recognize that hos-
tilities between them must not commence without a previous and un-
equivocal warning, which shall take the form either of a declaration
of war, giving reasons , or of an ultimatum with a conditional decla-
ration of war."®** It would seem, from the language of the article,
that the body in any country to which is entrusted the power of de-
claring the war was? considered the proper body to specify the rea-
sons for such declaration.
As a matter of fact, the uniform practice in the United
States has been otherwise. Even before the adoption of the Hague
Convention, the President, in his messages to Congress recommending
wer, has always stated what seemed to him to be the reasonable
grounds for such action. There is no doubt that Congress, under its
power to pass the declaration, might likewise have expressed its
87
reasons, which might agree with those of the President, or might
differ, either wholly or in part. The President would be bound to
88
accept or reject the declaration as psssed by Congress, as a whole.
86 Convention relative to the Commencement of Hostilities,
Art. 1, Higgins, The Hague Peace Conferences . 198.
87 "It may be said. . .that this power (of declaring war)
naturally includes the right of Judging whether the nation is or is
not under obligations to make war. . • However true this position
may be, it will not follow that the executive is in any case exclude^,
from a similar right of judgment, in the execution of its own func-
tions." Works of Alexander Hamilton
.
IV, 142. "The power to judge
of the ce.uses of war, as involved in the power to declare war, is
expressly vested, where sll other legislative powers are vested, thalt
is, in the congress of the United States." Writings of James Ksaiso
jl^-a&4,; of . ibld^ X£2 , 1&L*__
88 S. E. Baldwin, op . cTt . , ^Am . Jour .Iht .Law. XII. 10.
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He could not accept the conclusion and disapprove of the grounds
given for the action. Congress h8s, however, contented itself with
a mere formal declaration of war or a formal recognition of a state
of war as already existing, without adding any specific statement
of reasons or objects. Long reports have been made in every case
by the Foreign Relations committees of each house, justifying the
action about to be taken, but in no case has the statement of rea-
sons embodied in these reports been incorporated into the declara-
j
tion itself, not even since the adoption of the Hague Convention.
Congress, in thus refusing or neglecting to give a specific state-
ment of its own, has apparently recognized the President as having
the right and as being the most suitable authority to set forth to
the world the grievances of the nation. At all events, the Presi-
dent, rather than Congress, is now regarded, both at home and abroad;
as the spokesman of the nation with regard to the reasons and ob-
jects of a war, and his statements are generally accepted as com-
mitting the nation to the policies therein laid down.
The power of the President with regard to a declaration
of war does not end with the functions of communication of informa-
tion, and of recommendation. A declaration of war, like any other
bill, order, resolution, or vote requiring the concurrence of both
houses of Congress, must be submitted to the President for his ap-
proval or disapproval.^ If it were possible to imagine Congress
as passing a declaration of war without first being certain of the
President's approval, or in direct opposition to his known views
89 Constitution
.
Art. I, Sec. 7, CI. 2, 3. The declarations
in the cases of the War of 1812, the Mexican 7/ar and the Spanish-
American War were passed in the form of Acts of Congress; those
against Germany and Austria-Hungary in the form of joint resolu-
tions.
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(as is often done with other measures), the President could exercise
his power of veto and thus prevent the decleretion from going into
effect. Theoretically, Congress might in turn, by a two-thirds
90
majority, declare war even against the wishes of the President.
Strictly speaking, it is true, as an eminent Senator has said, that
;
"the President not only cannot declare war, end it is not only con-
ferred in terras upon Congress, but even if the President should be
opposed to a proposed war, two thirds of each Branch can declare
war. It. would not require his approval. There is the most impor-
tant of all foreign relations. It does not belong to the President'.^
In practice, however, such a situation cannot be imagined. The suc-
cessful prosecution of a war would be impossible without the hearty
cooperation of that department of the government which has in its
sphere the actual direction end management of the war. Consequently,,
though Congress technically has the power, it has chosen to follow
rather than to lead with respect to a declaration of war. It always
has sought, and it is safe to assume thrt it always will seek, to
8ssure itself of the President's approval before passing or even
92proposing a declaration of war.
90 See Schouler, Constitutional Studies . 137.
91 Senator Bacon, Cong. Record . XL. Pt .5. (59 Cong. ,lSess. ), 2132.
92 "Certain it is that the war with France was begun that way,
•Congress following the lead of, and seeking knowledge from, the
President at every step." Sen. Doc. No. 56 , 54 Cong., £ Sess., 17.
A recent newspaper dispatch with regard to the Mexican situation
is significent as illustrating the absolute subserviency of even
a hostile Congress in such matters: "President Wilson is in com-
plete control ofthe direction of American policy in dealing with
Mexico. . . If President Wilson should indicate that Congress should
adopt the PpII resolution requesting a severance of diplomatic rela-
tions with Mexico and withdrawal of recognition of Cerranza, there
would be little opposition to the papsage of the measure. If, how-
ever, he should oppose such a step, the resolution will be modified
to confor to his views or shelved." Chicago Tribune ( Staff Cor-
respondence ) . Dec. 8, 1919.
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After the enactment end spprovel of a declaration of war,
it becomes the right and duty of the President to give public notice
93
of it to all neutral powers. The Hague Convention of 1907 re-
quires such notice to neutrals, without specifying by whom it is to
94
be given. The President, however, as the sole organ of communica-
tion with foreign powers, is the natural authority for the exercise
of that function, and there has been no dispute as to his right or
duty in that respect. The exercise of the function is of consider-
able importance, since by the article referred to a state of war is
to be regarded as of no effect towards neutrals until they have re-
95
ceived such notification, and hence a delay or neglect in fulfil-
ling the requirement of the Convention might affect the validity of
captures at sea and other warlike operations involving neutral
rights. The chief ends of such announcement to neutrals are, there-
fore, to give formal notice of the fact of the declaration and the
time of its going into effect.
In addition to notifying neutrals, the President usually
elso gives official notice of the existence of a state of war to
the citizens of this country. This he does by means of a public
proclamnt ion. Presidents Madison end Polk both issued such procla-
mations, merely announcing to the country that war existed by act
of Congress and exhorting the people to exert themselves "in pre-
serving order, in promoting concord, in maintaining the Authority
and the efficacy of the laws, and in supporting and invigorating
all the measures which may be adopted by the constituted authori-
93 8. E. Bsldwin, op. cit .. Am. Jour. Int. Law. XII, ll«
94 Convention relative to the Commencement of Hostilities,
Art. £., Higgins, op. cit. , 199.
95 Ibid.

ties for obtaining a speedy, a just, end an honorable peace."
There does not appear to be any express constitutional or
statutory authority for the issuance of such proclamations, though,
if any were needed, it might be implied from the power to "take care
97
that the laws be faithfully executed." It may also be inferred
from an act passed in 1798. This act provided, among other things,
for the removal of enemy aliens "whenever there is declared a state
of war between the United States and any foreign nation or govern-
ment, or any invasion or predatory incursion is perpetrated, attempt
|
ed, or threatened against the territory of the United States, by any;
foreign nation or government, and the President makes public procla -
mation of the event ." It further authorized the President, "in any
such event, by his proclamation thereof , or other public act", to
establish the necessary regulations for the conduct, restraint,
98
residence, or removal of such aliens. President Wilson, in his
proclamation of April 6, 1917, announcing the state of war with
99
Germany, referred specifically to this section of the Revised
Statutes for his authority, though he was probably referring rather
to the authorization to proclaim alien enemy regulations than to
the mere announcement of a state of war. President McKinley issued
several proclamations after the declaration of war against Spain,
but none announcing the existence of a state of war. It was pro-
jbably thought unnecessary since the war had already been going on
96 Richardson, op. pit ., I, 512; IV, 470.
97 Constitution, Art. II, Sec. 3.
98 Act of July 6, 1798, Annals of Cong . , 5 Cong., Ill, App.,
3753. See also U. S. Rev. Stats ., sec. 4067.
99 Tert in McKinley, Collected Materials for the Study of the
War, 169.
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for several days before the retroactive declaration was adopted.
The President can hardly be said to be under any obligation to issue
such a proclamation, since the passage of the declaration should
be sufficient notice to the country of the existence of a state of
war. He has generally deemed it wise to do so, however, and there
can be no question of his power in that respect, even without ex-
press authority. The statute mentioned may be said to confer the
authority by implication, and, indeed seems to expect from the Presit
dent that action.
100 The joint resolution authorizing the President to use the
armed forces in compelling Spain's withdrawal from Cuba was passed
April 20, hostile measures were tsken at once, and the formal de-
claration, passed ^Dril 25, declared the war to have existed since
the 21st.

II. MILITARY POWERS IN TIKE OF WAR.
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Chapter VI.
Power to Raise end Organize the Armed Forces.
It has come to be an axiom in public law that the power to
raise and support the armed forces of a democratic state should be
jconfided exclusively to the popular branch of the government.^ The
Constitution of the United States accordingly gives to Congress the
power nto raise and support armies", and "to provide and maintain a
»2
navy". Raising armies includes such matters as the determination of
the number of men to be enlisted; their enlistment qualifications;
their organization into the different arms of the service; the num-
ber end arrangement of the various units; the number and rank of of-
ficers; the term of service for officers and men. Providing a navy
Includes the determination of the same class of subjects relating
to the seamen and npval officers; the number, size, character, and
Ljost of vessels of war, navy and dock yards, and other similar mat-
ters. 3
Over all these matters the power of Congress is complete
and exclusive. The President is vested with no constitutional
power in regard to the raising and organization of the armed forces.
He derives none from his position before international law. Hence
such powers as he does possess in this respect must rest wholly upon
the euthority of custom and statute. Congress in this field is
supreme, but Congress has from the first recognized the wisdom and
necessity of entrusting the President with some statutory authority,
which has at times amounted to the exercise of a considerable dis-
cretionary power.
1 Pomeroy, Constitutional Law ( Bennett's ed .). 382.
2 Art. I, Sec. 8, CI. 12, 13.
- ? Pomer-oy, op . . pit. .. flftfl .
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The common method of raising armies under ordinary circum-
stances thr.t of voluntary enlistment — has generally been exer-
cised in peace time in accordance with detailed statutes, leaving
to the President little or no real power. Congress is ordinarily
careful to prescribe definitely the number of men to be enlisted,
their enlistment qualifications, the terra of their service, and other
details, merely authorizing the President "to accept", "to call for",
"to call for and accept", or "to employ", within these well-defined
limits. Occasionally the statutes have prescribed only the maximum
number of men to be raised, giving to the President some little
discretion in determining upon the size of the forces within that
number. Likewise when providing for the navy, the statutes general-
ly prescribe in detail the number and kind cf ships to be constructed,
contracted for, or purchased, the cost and details of equipment end
armament, and other corresponding matters, leaving to the President
only the duty to see that the provisions of the statutes are carried
cut
.
In times of war or emergency, however, and occasionally
even in peace time, the President has been vested with more or less
discretion in these matters. Thus the foundation of the army under
4
the Constitution had scarcely been laid, when by the Act of March
3, 1791, which added another regiment to the regular forces, the
President was given power, "if of opinion that it will be conducive
to the public service", to employ "levies" (volunteers) in addition
to the number of 2000, for six months, as a supplementary force,
4 By the Act of Sept. 29, 1789, the array existing under the
Confederation was "recognized to be the establishment -for the troops
in the service of the United States"; and by the Act of Apr. 30,
1790, the beginning was made of e permanent military establishment.
Annals of Cone-.
. 1 Cong., II, App., 2199, 2222.
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obviously to be used only for emergency purposes. An act of the
next year (March 5, 1792), passed as a result of St. Clair's defeat
by the Indians, provided three additional regiments for the protec-
tion of the frontier to be enlisted for three years, but gave the
President the power "to forbear to raise, or to discharge after they
shall be raised," the whole or any part of these forces, "in case
events shall, in his judgment, render his so doing consistent with
the public safety." The President was further authorized to call
into service "for such period as he may deem requisite, such number
of cavalry as, in his judgment, may be necessary for the protection
of the frontiers;" and also to employ "such number of Indians as
he may think proper ... in case he shall deem the measure ex-
pedient." 6
The crisis with Prance resulted also in the granting of
considerable discretionary power to the President. The Act of May
28, 179f , authorized the President to raise a Provisional Army of
10,000 men, "in the event of a declaration of war against the United
States, or of actual invasion of their territory by a foreign Power,
or o* our imminent danger of such invasion, discovered, in his
opinion , to exist, before the next session of Congress"; and also
to create a sort of reserve force by accepting, "if in his opinion
the public service shall require", volunteers liable to service at
7
any time within two years. Other acts during the same period like-
wise vested the President with some discretionary power, such as to
prescribe the enlistment qualifications for the forces provided and
5 Annals of Cong
.
. 1 Cong., II, App., 2350.
6 Ibid. . 2 Cong.. App., 1343, (Sees. 11, 13, 14).
7 Ibid
.
. 5 Cong., Ill, App., 3729, (Sees. 1, 3). It was under
authority of this act that 7/ashington was appointed Lieutenant-
General and Commander-in-Chief of the forces to be raised for the
expected war with France.
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to discharge the troops at his discretion.
The Acts of February 24, 1807 and February 6, 1812, passed
in anticipation of trouble with England, each again provided a sort
of reserve force, of 30,000 and 50,000 men, respectively, to be
liable for duty at any time the President might deem proper , within
9
two years from the date of their acceptance into the service; while
another act passed during the war (Act of January 29, 1813) autho-
rized the raising of such a force "as in the opinion' of the Presi-
dent may be necessary for the public service", up to twenty addi-
tional regiments.
^
During the Mexican War very little real discretionary
authority was granted to the President in the matter of raising the
necessary forces, although the Act of May 13, 1846, recognizing a
state of war, empowered him to employ the militia, naval, and mili-
tary forces, and "to call for snd accept" up to 50,000 volunteers;
while another act o 4* the same date authorized him to increase the
companies in the regular amy to 100, to be reduced again to 64
when the exigency should cease
•
The earliest acts for the raising of volunteers and for
the increase of the regular army during the Civil War were similar
in character, the President being authorized to accept volunteers,
"in such numbers as the exigencies of the public service may, in
his opinion
,
demend", up to 500,000 for three years or the duration
of the war; and to increase the regular army by 11 regiments, such
increase to be only for the period of the emergency. The Act of
8 Acts of July 1£, 1798 and Mar. 2, 1799. Annals of Cong ..
5 Cong., Ill, App., 3785, 3933.
9 Ibid
.
, 9 Cong., 2 Sess., App ., 1259 ; ibid ., 12 Cong. , II , App, 222
10 Ibid., 12 Cong., 2 Sess., App., 1322-1325.
11 9 Stat, at L .
.
9, 11.
12 Acts of July 22, July 25, & July 29,1661.12 Stat. at L. .268.27<
-.. 2JZ5
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July 17, 1862, however, vested the President with somewhat larger
powers, in that, besides authorizing him to accept an additional
100,000 volunteers "for nine months, it empowered him to accept
volunteers as replacements, "in such numbers as may be presented
for that purpose"; and also to employ persons of African descent,
without limit as to number, for any labor, or military or naval
service, for which they might be found competent. 13 Considerable
power was also given with regard to increasing the navy by an act
which authorized the Secretary of the Havy to hire, purchase, or
14
contract for such vessels "as may be necessary".
The most sweeping grant of power with regard to the raisin
of forces by voluntary enlistment came during the Spanish-American
War, when no limit was placed on the numbers the President might cal
for in that way. Both the Joint Resolution of April 20, presenting
the ultimatum to Spain, and the Act of April 25, formally declaring
war, empowered the President, in identical language, "to use the
entire land and nrv8l forces the United States, and to cal}. into
th«= actual service of the United States the militia of the several
States, tj) such extent as may be necessary to carry these resolution^;
(and this Act) into effect."15 The Act of April 22, 1898, authoriz-
ing the Volunteer Army, apparently contemplated some legal limit,
as it provided that when necessary to raise a volunteer army, "the
President shall issue his proclamation Etating the number of men
16
desired, within such limits as may be fixed by law ." With the
17
exception of provisions regarding special organizations, no limit
13 12 Stat, at L. , 597 (Sees. 3, 4, 12).
14 Act of July 24, 1861. Ibid . . 272.
15 30 Stat, at L
,
364, 738.
16 Ibid ., 361 (Sec. 5).
17 Ibid., (Sec. 6); see also Act o^ May 11, 1898. Ibid . . 405.
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to the number of troops to be raised wes ever made. Under the pro-
visions of this act, President McXinley issued two proclamations,
one on April 23, calling for 125,000 volunteers, and the other on
May 25, calling for 75, 000. 18
During the recent war with Germany, the principle of rais-
ing troops by voluntary enlistment was almost entirely abandoned,
although the President was at the beginning of the war empowered
in that way to raise the increments of the Regular Army provided
for by the National Defense Act of 1916, to recruit all Regular
Army oganizations to their maximum strength, and to raise and main-
19
tain at his discretion four infantry divisions.
Though considerable power has thus on many occasions been
granted to the President to raise forces by the process of volun-
tary enlistment, the adoption of conscription has carried with it
a still larger grant of power and a wider range of discretion.
There is no longer any doubt as to the constitutional right of Con-
gress to provide for the raising of armed forces by conscription
20
as well as by voluntary enlistment, and this method has been used,
18 Richardson. Messages and Papers of the Presidents
.
X, 203-
204, 205-206.
19 Selective Service Act of Kay 18, 1917. The authorisation
of the volunteer infantry divisions wes in response to the offer of
e^-President Roosevelt to raise this number of troops from the coun-
try at large. President Wilson declined to exercise the authority
granted him under this provision.
20 Arver v. U. S .. 245 U. S., 366 (1918), in Wigmore , Source -
Book of Military Law ana "ar-Time Legislation . 617-626. The general
understanding that the Constitution contemplated and permitted con-
scription was indicated by the following amendment proposed b; the
Rhode Island ratifying convention. May 29, 1790: "That no person
shall be compelled to do military duty otherwise than by voluntary
enlistment, except in cases of general invasion; anything in the
second paragraph of the sixth article of the Constitution, or any
law made under the Constitution, to the contrary notwithstanding."
Elliot's Debates
.
I, 336. The arguments for and against conscript iofli
are well summed up in Pomeroy, Constitutional Law . 391-392.
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less commonly than the other, hut on occasions of greater emergency.
Conscription was recommended hy Congress, and used to
21
some extent by the states during the Revolution, and was first
proposed under the Constitution in 1814. Other methods having
failed to bring forth the required number of troops, Secretary of
War Monroe, in a report submitted October 17, suggested to Congress
22
several alternative plans of raising men by draft. Some sort of
conscription measure would undoubtedly have been adopted, had not
its necessity been obviated by the termination of the war.
The Enrollment Act of March 3, 1663, is notable as being
the first instance of resort to conscription in the United States
under the Constitution. This act constituted all able-bodied male
citizens and declarants between the ages of 20 and 45 into the
"national forces", made certain classifications, divided the country
into enrollment districts, and empowered the President to assign
to each district the quota of men to be furnished and to call forth
23
these "national forces" by drrft. Amendments added in 1864 made
it clear that the President's power to cell for men by this means
was to be practically unlimited, he being authorized, "whenever he
shall deem it necessary, during the present war, to call for such
number of men for the military service of the United States as the
public exigencies may require"; and further, at his discretion
,
to cell for volunteers for one, two, or three years, deficiencies
24
in quotas to be filled by draft.
Under the provisions of these acts, President Lincoln
issued five separate calls for men — by proclamation of October 17,
21 Upton, Military Policy o* the United States . 27-26. 29. 35-36.
22 Am. State Papers , "11. Affairs . I, 514-517.
23 12 Stat, at L
.
. 731.
24 Acts of Feb. 24 and July 24, 1664. 13 Stat .at L. .6.390.
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1863, a call for 300,000 volunteers for three years or the war,
to serve as replacements for those whose term of service expired
during the year, and any deficiencies in the quotas of any state to
be made up by draft on January 5, 1864; by executive order of
February 1, 1864, a draft for 500,000 for three years or the war,
with deductions for men furnished under the call of October 17, and
therefore in reality a call for only 200,000; by executive order of
March 14, 1864, an additional draft for 200,000 to supply a force
for the Navy and an adequate reserve; by proclamation of July 18,
1864, a call for 500,000 volunteers, deficiencies to be filled by
draft on September 5; and by proclamation of December 19, 1864,
a call for 300,000 volunteers for one, two, or three years, to sup-
25
ply deficiencies and to provide for casualties.
The Spanish Tar was fought principally with volunteers,
but it haB already been noted that the President was given practi-
oally unlimited pover with respect to the raising of those. ° The
threatening situation that had been developed by the great European
War led, however, to the passage in 1916 of the so-called National
Defense Act, 27 into which was incorporated to a certain extent the
principle of conscription, in that the President was empowered,
among other things, to draft the National Guard and the National
Guard Reserve created by that act, into the federal service, when-
ever Congress should authorize the use of armed forces for any
purpose requiring troops in excess of the Regular Army.
This act increased considerably the President's powers to
25 Richardson, Messages and Papers of the President
.
VI, 169,
226-227, 232, 235, 271-272.
26 Supra
.
, 111.
27 Public No. 85, 64 Cong., in Wigmore , Source-Book of Mili -
tary Law and War-Time Legislation , 384-444.

use the militia forces at his discretion, since the troops so
"federalized" were by that action automatically discharged from
the militia and taken over bodily into the national forces, end
might therefore be used, not merely a_s militia , but for any purpose
for which the regular military end naval forces might be used. 2®
Under the provisions of this act, the National Guard was "federa-
lized" and drafted by the President into the service of the United
St8tes during the Mexican border troubles of 1916, and at the be-
29ginning of the war with Germany in 1917.
Finally, the principle of conscription v;as adopted in the
30Selective Service Act of May 18, 1917, as the one means for rais*
ing the immense number of men required in the war with Germany, and
the President was vested with wide powers in connection therewith.
He was authorized to draft into the service of the United States the
various Rational Guard organizations, in accordance with the natio-
nal Defense Act of 1916; to raise immediately by draft 500,000 men
in addition to the Regular ^rmy and the National Guard; to raise
and begin training, "in his discretion and at such time as he may
determine", an additional 500,000; and to raise by draft such ad-
ditional units "as he may deem necessary" for the maintenance of
the above forces at the maximum strength.
Though an army of nearly 2,000,000 men was thus provided
28 It was under the provision of this act that the President
was enabled to send the National Guard organizations overseas dur-
ing the recent war, practically intact, and thus add in short order
an immense number of already organized and at least partly trained
men to the fighting forces.
29 N. Y. Times Current Hist. Mag.
,
IV
f
617; see proclamation
of July 3, 1917, U. S. Stats ., 65 Cong., 1 Sess., Procs., 37.
30 Public No. 12, 65 Cong. , in Wigmore, op. cit .. 460-468.
This act was amended at various times — Apr. 20
,
Ma^ 16, Msy 20, &
Auff. 31, 1918. Ibid., 469-474.
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for, President Wilson wan not satisfied with the powers granted and
on May 2, 1918, through Secretary Baker, he requested Congress to
remove all limit on the numher of men that might he drafted for
military service and to give him authority to summon as many as he
31
might find necessary. Congress acceded to this request, and in
32
the Array Appropriations Act o^ July 9, 1918, extended the autho-
rity of the President n so as to authorize him during each fiscal
year to raise by draft . . . the maximum numher of men which may be
organized, equipped, trained, and used during each year for the
prosecution of the present war until the same shall have been
brought to a successful conclusion."
The President has thus from the very earliest period of
our national history exercised a considerable power in connection
with the raising of armed forces, 8 power that has been increased
with the needs of the emergency, but a power b-sed generally on
definite statutory authority. It is beyond dispute that without
such authority the President has no right to raise armies or provide
for the navy. Nevertheless, there have been occasions when such
power has been exercised without any legal sanction. Thus, during
the Seminole War of 1818, the military commanders (Generals Gaines
and Jackson) took the responsibility of raising and organizing a
force of volunteers and Indians without statutory authority, and of
formally mustering them into the service of the United States.
General Jackson, on taking command, had been ordered by the V/sr De-
partment to call on the Executives of adjoining states for such ad-
ditional militia as might be required for the termination of the
war, but instead he levied an army from the people of Tennessee and
31 H. Y. Times
,
May 3, 1918.
3E Public No. 193, 65 Con?., in Wigmore, op. cit .. 587,600.

Kentucky by private circular letters, accepted the services of two
regiments of volunteers as well as a considerable body of friendly
Indians, organized and officered them on his own authority, and
placed at their disposition United States funds under his control.
Altogether he was reported to have raised an army of about 2500 men,
appointed 230 officers, end established rank from an Indian briga-
dier-general down to the lowest subaltern of a company. 33
Jackson's action was vigorously condemned in reports by
both Senate and House committees, as a violation of the Constitution
34
and a danperous infringement on the powers of Congress. Jackson
defended his action with equal vigor, claiming that he had been in
effect charged with the management of the war and vested with the
powers necessary to carry it to a "speedy and successful" termina-
tion; thft the call for volunteers was absolutely necessary to
avoid delay and disaster; and that "every measure touching the
raising and organizing this volunteer corps was regularly communi-
cated to the Secretary of T7ar, and received his unqualified appro-
35
bation". The records appear to sustain Jackson's contention.
Secretary of r.rar Calhoun, in reply to Jackson's announcement of
whet he had done, expressed to him the "entire approbation of the
President of all the measures which you have adopted to terminate
the rupture with the Indians." 3^ Responsibility for the violation
of the Constitution must therefore rest finally in this instance
with the Executive.
In 1845 occurred another instance of this exercise of
33^State Papers
.
Mil. Affairs
,
I, 740; II, 99-100.
34 See report of the Senate committee, Feb. 24, 1819; of the
House committee, Feb. 28, 1820. Ibid . . I, 739-741; II, 101.
35 Ibid
., I, 755, 758.
36 See letters of Jackson to Calhoun, Jan. 12 & Jan. 20, 1818;
and of Celhoun to Jackson, Jan. 29 & Feb. 6, 1818. Ibid. , I, 696-697
,
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power without statutory authority. Anticipating war with Mexico,
the Adjutant General, by direction of the Secretary of War, wrote
General Taylor on August 6, directing him to learn from the authori-
ties of Texas whet additional forces could, in case of need, be
pieced at his disposal, and giving him authority to call them into
eervice. "Such auxiliary volunteer force from Texas, when events,
not now revealed, may justify their employment, will be organized
end mustered under your orders , and be received into the service
of the United States when actually required in the field to repel
« 37invasion, actual or menaced, end not before. This order to Taylor
was entirely without authority of statute, though it was expected
that provision would be made to cover the case.
President Lincoln, immediately after the outbreak of the
Civil War, took it upon himself to raise a great army without await-
ing the sanction of Congress. By proclamation of May 3, 1861,
based on no authority except the "existing exigencies" and his own
position "as President and Commander-in-Chief", he ordered the in-
crease of the Regular Army by 22,714 officers and men and of the
Havy b^ 18, COO seamen, and in addition called for 42,034 volunteers
to serve for three years -- an aggregate increase in the armed
38
forces of 82,748 officers and men. By the time of the special
session of Congress, beginning Jul^ 4, the response to these calls
had brought forth a total of 220,000 men acoepted for service --
besides 80,000 militia for three months -- without any constitutional
or statutory authority . 39 The President further, without authority
37 House Ex. Doc. No. 60, 30 Cong., 1 Sess., 83,84, quoted in
Upton, Military Policy o^ the United Stetes . 195-196.
38 Riche'rdBon. op. cit ., VI, 15-16. See also Lincoln's execu-
tive order of May 7, 1861. Ibid . , 18-19.
39 Upton, Military Policy o^ the United States. 230.
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of lew, ordered a total o^ 19 vessels edded to the Navy, end direct-
ed the Secretary of the Treesury to advance, without security,
fE, 000, 000 to private individuals, to he used in meeting requisitions
made necessary by these military and naval measures. 4^
Rhodes characterized these acts of the President as "clear-
ly beyond the President's authority" 41 and Upton says of them that
"No usurpation could have been more complete."42 The President him-
self recognized end admitted that he had acted beyond his constitu-
tional or statutory powers, but justified himself on the grounds
of necessity, saying to Congress in his message of July 4, 1861:
nThe8^ measures, whether strictly legal or not, were ventured upon
under what appeared to be a popular demand end a public necessity,
trusting then, as now, that Congress would readily ratify them.
It is believed that nothing has been done beyond the const itu-
43
tional competency of Congress." To this Congress responded by
the Act of August 6, 1861, legalizing all the acts, proclamations,
and orders of the President after March 4, 1861, respecting the
Army and Navy and calling out militia end volunteers, "as if they
had been issued and done under the previous and express authority
44
end direction of the Congress of the United States."
It is not within the scope of this study to speculate
upon the question whether, in these instances of unauthorized exer-
cise of power, the President was justified by the necessities in
each case. It is sufficient to note that, when he considers the
emergency serious enough, the President has acted, end presumably
40 Richardson, op. eit .. VI, 78. The individuels wer<= John A.
Dix, George Opdyke, and Richard H. Blatchford.
41 History of the United Stales , III, 395.
42 Military Policy of the United States . £29.
43 Richardson, ov. cit .,VI^ 24. See also Lincoln's statement
in his message of May Jib, 1862. Ibid . , 78.
44 1 2 Stat . _at_TL5_,_ 3 P,fi_jgpg^3 ) -
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will again act, ss lie thinks the situation demands, and trust to
Congress to grant him the proper legal sanction afterwards. If
these steps appear necessary to save the government, as they were
said hy Lincoln to he necessary in 1861, popular opinion will un-
doubtedly sustain the President, as it did then.
In the matter of the organization of the armed forces,
the statutes have generally been careful to provide the details,
but the President has frequently been granted considerable power
in this respect also, especially in time of war or public emergency.
The Act of March 3, 1791, authorizing the President to employ
emergency "levies" at his discretion, empowered him also "to organizo
45
the said levies", apparently as he should see fit; while the Act
of March 5, 1792, prescribed in detail the organization of the en-
larged army, but with the distinct proviso, "That it shall be law-
ful for the President of the United States to organize the five
regiments of infantry and the said corps of horse and artillery
as he shall judge expedient
.
diminishing the number of corps, or
taking from one corps and adding to another, as shall appear to
him proper." 4 **
Under the authority of this act. President Washington,
on Decmeber 27, 1792, announced to Congress that the Legionary plan
of organization had been adopted for the troops, the whole force of
about 5,000 men being given the name of the Legion of the United
States, and divided into four Sub-Legions, each with its staff and
more detailed division into dragoons, artillery, infantry, and rifle-
47
men. The plan so adopted continued under executive authority un-
45 Annals of Cong
.
, 1 Cong., II, App. 2350 (Sec. 9).
46 Ibid., 2 Cong., App., 1543 (Sec. 2).
47 Am. State Papers
.
Ivlil. Affairs. I, 40-41.
"
!
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til 1795, when it was given definite statutory recognition, the Sub-
Legions still to be organized, however, "in such manner as the Pre-
4-fi
sident of the United States shall direct."
The Provisional Army provided for the expected war with
Prance was to be organized by the President into corps of artillery,
cevalry, and infantry, "as the exigencies of the service may re-
quire"; 49 the largest portion of the troops provided in view of the
threatening relations with England was to be organized by him into
battalions, squadrons, regiments, brigades, and divisions, as ex-
pedient;^^ while the forces raised particularly for the protection
of the frontier were to be armed, equipped, and organized "in such
manner ... as the nature of the service, in his opinion, may make
necessary."^
The organization of the forces raised for the prosecution
of the Mexican War wat prescribed in considerable det&il in the
statutes, leaving to the President very little discretionary autho-
rity. The same was true of those authorized during the Civil War,
except that the Act of July 17, 1862, empowered the President to
52
establish and organize army corps according to his discretion.
The organization of the forces raised by the proclamation of May 3,
1861, was, however, undertaken by the President without authority ,
as was the actual levying, end it was done in a most extraordinary
manner, in that it was entrusted by the President to the Secretary
48 Act of Mar. 3, 1795. Annals of Cong ., 3 Cong., App., 1515,
(Sec. 3).
49 Act of Key 26, 17*8. Ibid., 5 Cong., Ill, App. 2729,
(Sec. 2).
50 Acts of Feb. 24, 1807 & Feb. 6, 1812. Annals of Cong ., 9
Cong., 2 Sess., App., 1259 (Sec. 3); 12 Cong., II, App., 2235 (Sec.
3) .
,
51 Act of Jan. 2, 1812. Ibid ., 12 Cone., II, App., 2228 (Sec.l
52 12 Stat, at L . , 597 (Sec. 9). For en example of how Presi-
dent Lincoln organized the Army of the Potomac under this provision
see his General War Order No. 2, Mar .1,1862. Works of Abraham Lincolfji
(y oflo rnl e d . K Y t 4A3-4£4^_
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of the Treasury instead of to the Secretary of War. 53 Secretary
Chase was to be assissted by a board of three army officers (Colonel
Thomas, the Adjutant General, Major McDowell, the Assistant Adjutant
General, and Captain Franklin, of the Topographical Engineers),
who were free to make propositions, although their acceptance or
rejection rested wholly with the Secretary of the Treasury. The
scheme of organization agreed upon by this board and accepted by
Secretary Chase was adopted by the War Department and published to
54
the army in General Orders, later being incorporated by Congress
55into statute.
For the Spanish War, the Act of April 22, 1898, although
prescribing rather fully the organization of the volunteers into
brigades and divisions, again authorized the President to organize
the army corps . ^6 In the National Defense Act of 1916, the organi-
zation was likewise carefully prescribed up to and including bri-
gades 8nd divisions, but the President was empowered, "in time of
actual or threatened hostilities, or when in his opinion the in-
terests of the public service demand it", to organize the forces
into "such army corps or armies as may be necessary", with the
further provision that "nothing herein contained . . • shall prevent
the President from increasing or decreasing the number of organiza-
tions prescribed for the typical brigades, divisions, and army corps
53 "The Secretary of War is the regular constitutional organ
of the President for the administration of the military establish-
ment o* the nation." U. S. v. Eliason . 16 Pet., 291, 302 (1842).
54 NOB. 15 & 16, May 4, 1861. See also Special Order Ho. 218,
A. G. 0., Sept. 2, 1862, by which President Lincoln ordered all the
clerks and employees of the departments in Washington to be organize]!
into companies and supplied with arms and ammunition, "for the de-
fense o" the capital." Richardson, op. cit .. VI, 122.
55 See Upton, Military Policy o 4* the United States . 233-235;
Acts of July 22, 25 & 29, 1661. 12 Stat, at L. . 268. 274. 279.
56 30 Stat, at I.. 362 (Sec. 9T*
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or from prescribing new end different organizations and personnel
as the efficiency of the service may require."^ 7
This blanket authority was continued in almost identical
58language in the Selective Service Act of 1917, and made it pos-
sible for the President, upon the advice of the General Staff, to
so adjust the organization of the army and to add such new units
as the character of the war showed to be necessary. It was under
this authority, for example, that all distinctive appellations as
Regular Array, Rational Guard, and National Army, were discontinued,
and all the land forces merged into one United States Army." It
was likewise under this authority that such an organization as the
60
Students' Army Training Corps was added to the military forces;
that new services were added, such as the Motor Transport Corps,
Chemical Warfare Service, Air Service, and Tank Corps; and thet the
new plan of organization for the army, as recently announced by
General March, wes put into effect without any further action on
the part of Congress.
57 Sec. 3, Wigmore, op. cit .. 365.
58 S e c. 1, Ibid . , 461.
59 See Summary of Annual Report of Adjutant General of the
Army, in Official U. S. Bulletin . Jan. 8, 1919. The Selective Ser-
vice Act provided that the Nrtionel Guard organizations drafted into
the federal service should retain their State designations, "as far
as practicable."
60 See Official U. S. Bulletin . Oct. 1, 1918.
61 Ibid .. Mar. 29. 1919. The new Navy reorganization — that
of maintaining two separate major fleets instead of only one -- wes
likewise announced as going into effect Jurje 30, 1919. N. Y. Times
Current Hist. Mag.
.
I, £53 (Aug. 1919).
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Chapter VII.
Powe is of Command .
The Constitution makes the President the commander-in-
chief of the army and navy of the United St8tes and o^ the state
militia when called into the actual service of the United States. 1
Under this provision the President is vested with a function than
which, according to an eminent authority, there is none "more signi-
2ficant as indicating his independent and exalted position."
Strangely enough, in spite of this extraordinary grant of
power, this clause of the Constitution appears to have aroused very
little discussion and scprcely any serious opposition in the Con-
vention of 1787. Some objections were evidently made, hut rather
to the idea of the President's assuming active command in the field
than to his exercise of the general powers of command. The mem-
bers of the Convention probably had not forgotten the trouble and
embarrassment caused during the ^evolution by Congressional inter-
ference and th<» lack of a centralized control over the army. They
were very likely influenced also by the precedents in the practice
of European states, in former plans of union for the colonies, and
in the recently established state constitutions. As students of
political theory they were also undoubtedly impressed with the
notion that the inherent nature of the executive office made it the
1 Art. II, Sec. 2, CI. 1.
2 McClein, Constitutional Law in the United States . 210.
3 See Luther Martin's letter to the Maryland legislature.
Elliott's rebates
.
I, 378; Farrand's Records
.
Ill, 217-218.
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proper repository for the chief command of the military and naval
forces.
There was more discussion and more opposition in the state
ratifying conventions. Thus Mr. Miller, in the North Carolina con-
vention, expressed himself as fearful that the influence of the
President, particularly over the military, would be too great, that
he v:88 given extensive powers too easily liable of abuse. "He con-
sidered it as a defect in the Constitution, that it was not ex-
pressly provided that Congress should have the direction of the
motions of the ermy."^ On the whole, however, the propriety of
such a power in the President, so far as to give orders and exer-
cise a general supervision over military and navel movements, was
not seriously questioned even in the stc+e conventions, the opposi-
tion again being largely to the possibility of the President's as-
g
sumption of personal command of the forces.
The general feeling throughout the country was undoubted-
ly expressed by Hamilton when he wrote: "The propriety of this pro-
vision is so evident in itself, and so consonant to the precedents
of the State constitutions in general, that little need be said to
explain or enforce it. Even those of them which have, in other
respects, coupled the chief magistrate with a council, have for the
most part concentrated the military authority in him alone. Of all
4 This idea was stressed quite recently by Senator Bacon as
follows: "I want to give my idea 8s to why the constitution vests
in the President the office of commander in chief. The President is
an Executive. Upon him devolves the execution of the law and the
enforcement of the law; and the enforcement of the lew must neces-
sarily be, in its last analysis, through the military arm. Of cours
the President can not be the Supreme Executive unless he has the
supreme command of th8t through which the execution of the law must
be enforced." Cong. Record , XLITI, Pt. 3, (60 Cong., 2 Sess. ), 2542-2^43,
5 Elliot's Debates
.
IV, 114.
6 Story. Commentaries on the Constitution , II, 315; cf . remark^
of Patrick Henry! Elliot's Debates , III, 58-60.
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the cares or concerns of government, the direction of war most
peculiarly demands those qualities which distinguish the exercise
of power by a single hand. The direction of war implies the direc-
tion of the common strength; and the power of directing and employ-
ing the common strength forms a usual and essential part in the
7definition of executive authority."
Although there has been some contention that Congress, by
virtue of its power to declare war and to provide for the support
of the armed forces, is a superior body, and that the President,
as commander-in-chief, is "but the Executive arm, • • in every de-
tail and particular, subject to the commands of the lawmaking
power,"® practically all authorities agree that the President, as
commander-in-chief, occupies an entirely independent position, hav-
ing powers that are exclusively his, subject to no restriction or
9
control by either the legislative or judicial departments.
The line of demarcation between the war powers of the
President and those of Congress is not clearly drawn in the Consti-
tution,"^ nor are the President's powers as Commander-in-Chief
specifically described or defined by that instrument. Hence authori
ties in general hold that the President as commander-in-chief may
7 The Federalist , No. 73 ( 74 )
,
(Goldwin Smith ed., p. 409); cf.
alBO reply of Mr. Spaight to Mr. Miller. Elliot's Debates . IV. 114-115
8 Senator Bacon in U. S. Senate, Feb. 6, 1906. Cong. Record
.
XL, Pt. 3, (59 Cong., 1 Sess.), 2135. On a later occasion. Senator
Spooner replied very aptly to a similar suggestion, that such a
construction would mean that "the Constitution diu not constitute
the President Commander-in-Chief of the Army and Navy, but constitu-
ted him the Adjutant-General of the Congress." Cong. Record
,
XLI, Pt
2 (59 Cong., 2 Sess.), 1131.
9 Pomeroy, Constitutional Lav, ( Bennett ' s ed , ) . 71; Davis,
Treatise on the Military Lew o J the United States
.
323; Mississippi
v. Johnson
, 4 Wall., 475, 497 (1869); Ogg & Beard, National Govern-
ments and the World War
.
100-101; Secretary Seward in letter to Lord
Lyons, 1861, quoted in V, at son. On the Constitution, II, 917; J. W.
Garner, in Rev, de Droit Pub, et de la Sci. Pol .. XXXV. 10.
10 It was attempted by the Supreme Court in Ex parte Milligan
.
4 Wall., 2, 139 (1866); see supra , 11.
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const itutionally do what any military commander may do in accordance
with the usual practice of carrying on war among civilized nations;
that he must be guided in the exercise of such powers wholly by his
own judgment and discretion, subject to his general responsibility
under the Constitution. 11 According to the Supreme Court, the ex-
tent of these powers must be determined "by their nature and by
the principles of our institutions."1 ^ For a closer definition we
must therefore look to the law and usage of the military service,
to international law and custom, and to the general practice under
12the Constitution and statutes o^the United States.
Prom these sources we find that the first great power of
the President as commander-in-chief of the armed forces in time of
W8r is the gene ral direct ion of the military and naval operat ions .
It is the President who wages war. Congress declares war and pro-
vides the means *or carrying it on, but the President decides how
the war is to be conducted and directs the campaigns. This is "a
14despotic power", eays Burgess, but nevertheless must be confided
by e sound political science to the President. "The President must
have despotic power when he wages war. The safety, the life per-
haps, of the state requires it." Other authorities also hold that
in the field 0* military operations there are no limitations pre-
scribed by the Constitution and the President's power is therefore
exclusive. Thus Lieber says that the direction of military movemenl
"belongs to command, and neither the power of Congress to raise and
support armies, nor the power to make rulf-s for the government and
11 Finley & Sanderson, The American Executive and Executive
Methods
. 267; Whiting, gar Po-ers under the Constitution , 82-85T
12 Ex parte Killigan , 4 Wall., 2, 139-140 (1666).
13 Cf. J. V/. Garner, in Rev, de Droit Pub, et de la Sci. Pol
.
,
HIV, 13 (Jan-Mar., 1918).
14 Political Science and Comparative Constitutional Law, II. 26:..
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regulation of the lend and naval forces, nor the power to declare
war, gives it the command o^ the army. Here the const itut ional
power o^ the President as commander- in-chief is exclusive *"15
It is an interesting question whether the President, undei
this exclusive power, may assume active, personal command of the
army and navy, in time of war. Authorities do not ell agree on this
point. Some claim that the President is essentially a civil of-
ficer and that it is not intended that he shall take active commend
in time of hostilities;^ others sey outright that the President
"has all the powers of personal command"
;
x while still others ex-
press themselves as doubtful. Thus Watson thinks it by no meens
certain that the President has such power, since if he should under-
take to command the military and naval forces in time of war, he
would necessarily he prevented from executing other important duties!
required of him by the Constitution. Watson admits, however, that
if the President insisted on assuming personal command of the forces
it would be difficult and probably impossible to restrain him.^8
While the expediency of such set ion on the pert of the
President may be doubted, t^ere does not seem to be any ground for
questioning his power. The matter was specifically raised, dis-
cussed and determined in the Constitutional Convention of 1787.
Thus the New Jersey plan presented by Mr. Peterson on June 15
authorized the Executive to direct all military operations, "pro-
vided that none of the persons composing the federal Executive sh8ll
15 Lieber, Remarks on Arm;) Regulations , 18; see also Watson,
On the Constitution
.
II, 912-914; Von Hoist, Constitutional Law
of the United States , 194.
Vo llcClain. Constitutional Law . 210.
17 Finley & Sanderson, op. cit ., 267.
18 Watson, On the Constitution , II, 919; cf. Miller, On the
Constitutio n. 163: Von Hoist. Constitutional Law o p the Uni^elP
States
.
1977
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on any occasion take command of any troops, so as personally to
conduct any enterprise as General or in any other capacity. "19
Hamilton's plan likewise vested the chief command and direction of
war in the Executive, but with the proviso that "he s r all not take
the actual command, in the field, of an army, without the consent of
20
the Senate 8nd Assembly."
The action of the Convention in refusing to adopt any of
2ithese specific proposals, and the further attempts in the state
ratifying conventions to secure amendments expressly forbidding
22
such exercise o^ command by the President, certainly make it
clear that the framers of the Constitution understood and intended
that the President should have th8t right. Hamilton but reflected
the general interpretation of the Constitution when he referred to
the President in this connection as the "first general and admiral
of the Confederacy". 23
While there is therfore no doubt as to the constitutional
19 Elliot's Debates
.
I, 176.
20 Ibid
..
V. 587.
21 See Luther Martin's letter to the Maryland legislature:
"Objections were made to that part of the article, by which the
President is appointed Commander-in-Chief o 4* the army and navy of
the United States, and of the militia of the several States, and
it was wished to be so far restra ined
.
that he should not command
in person ; but this could not be obtained." Ibid . . I, 378; Far-
rand 's Records
.
Ill, 217-218.
2~2" Thus the New York convention -proposed an amendment, "That
the President or person exercising his powers for the time being,
shall not command an array in the field in person, without the
previous desire of Congress;" while in the Maryland convention a
similar amendment was submitted, but negatived in committee and
never reported. Elliot's rebates
.
I, 330; II, 553. In the 1st
Congress Mr. Tucker (S. C.) proposed an amendment striking out the
words "be Commander-in-Chief" from the article defining the Pre-
sident's powers and substituting the phrase "have power to direct
(agreeably to law) the operations." This was probfbly in line with
the New York amendment; but on a vote to refer to the Committee of
the Whole, it was negatived. Annals of Cong . , 1 Conp., I, 762,763.
23 The Federalist . No. 68, ( Goldwin Smith ed., p. 381).
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right of the President to assume personal command o* the armed
forces et his discretion, the sound construction of the constitu-
tional provision is that no such action on his part wes contem-
plated unless in an extraordinary emergency; that the power of per-
sonal command was vested in the President principally for the pur-
pose of giving him that control over military and naval operations
which is a necessary attribute o^ the executive hranch of the
24government
.
No President has yet seen fit to exercise his right to
take personal command of the forces in time of war, although Wash-
ington on one occasion during his administration did actually take
the field in command of militia forces called out to suppress an
25insurrection. President Polk also took a keen personal interest
in the military movements of the Mexican War, and at one time, in
order to carry his point against a refractory Adjutant-General,
insieted on his right as Commander-in-Chief to have his instructions
26
regarded as a military order to be promptly obeyed. President Lin-
coln, while nevr exercising actual personal command, frequently
visited his generals in the field, advised with them, drew up plans
of campaign, end issued among others his famous General War Order
No. 1 (January 27, 1862), and Special TYar Order No. 1 ( Janur ry 31,
1862), the -"ormer ordering a general movement of the land and naval
forces to be begun sgainst the insurgents on February £2, the lat-
24 Cf. opinion of Secretary of W8r Monroe, given to a com-
mittee of Congress, Feb. 11, 1815. Am. State Papers . Mil. Affairs ,
I, 606; see also Story, Commentaries on the Constitution
.
TT~, 315
;
Elliot's Debates
,
IT, 366.
25 Infra"T~149.
26 Pier;/ of James K. Polk , III, 31.
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ter ordering an expedition ageinst Manassas Junction.^ 7
Presidents McKin]ey and Wilson seem to have left the active
direction of military movements entirely to the military end naval
commanders, although with the modern means of communication the
President might, much rnor= easily then before, assume active charge
28
of military and neval operations. Modern war has, however, also
added such e heavy burden of civil duties upon the President es to
make it practically impossible for him to devote any time to the
purely military side, em] it is not likely that eny President will
ever in the future attempt to exercise his right of personal com-
mend.
As a necessary part of his power to direct the military
and naval operations, the President in time of war has entire con-
trol of the movements of the army end ne vy . Congress has, under
the Constitution, the sole power to raise end support armies and to
29
provide and maintain a navy; but after the forces have been pro-
vided and var has ben begun, the President may order them anywhere
he will for the purpose of carrying on the war to a successful con-
clusion.
An eminent euthority thinks that Congress could probably
by law forbid the troops being sent out of the jurisdiction of the
United States in time of peace ;^0 but in time of war the authority
of the President is recoe-nized as being absolute as to '/here the
27 Works of Abraham Lincoln ( Federal ed . ) ,V. 423.425; Rhodes,
History q-p the United States . ITI. 561. But cf. Lincoln's letter to
Gen. Grant, Apr. 30,1864: "Not expecting to see you before the sprirjj?
campaign opens, I wish to express, in this way, my entire satisfac-
tion with what you have done up to this time, so far 8s I understand
it. The particulars of your plans I nc ither know nor seek to know .
'
McPherson. History of the Rebellion . 425.
28 See description o^ how President LIcKinley kept in touch wit*
the military operations during the Spanish war. Beard, Readings in
American Politics end Government . 316.
Art. 1. Sec. 2, 01. 12, 13.
30 Root. Colonial and Military Policy of th e Unltftd state?' 151
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war is to "be conducted, - nether to await the onslaughts of the enemy!
and wage a purely defensive war within the boundaries of the United
States or to send the armed forces of the United States out of the
country to carry on an offensive war in the enemy territory, in the
territory of en ally, or perhaps even in the territory of a neutral.
"The power to use an army," says a distinguished ex- Justice of the
Supreme Court, "is co-extensive with the power to make war; and the
army may he used wherever war is carried on, here or elsewhere.
There is no limitation upon the authority of Congress to create an
army and It is for the President as Commander- in-Chief to direct the
camps igns of that army wherever he may think they should be carried
on."
31
As a matter of fact, there never has been any serious
doubt as to the President's constitutional povrer to order the regu-
lar forces wherever he may think best in the conduct of a war,
whether within or without the limits of the United States, nor has
any President hesitated to make use of that power in any foreign
war in which the United States has been engaged. Regular troops
were by order of the President sent to Canada in the War of 1812, 32
to Mexico in 1846, to Cuba, Porto Rico, and the Philippines during
the war with Spain, and to France, Italy, and Russia during the
31 Charles E. Hughes, "War Powers under the Constitution",
in Central Law Jour .
.
LXXXV, 206-214 (Sept. 21, 1917). See also
Fleming v. Page , 9 How., 602, 615 (1849).
32 The act o* Feb. 6, 1812, authorized the President to ac-
cept 50,000 volunteers to do duty vfaeneverne deemed proper, which
President Madison said was passed "with a view to enable the
Executive to step at once into Canada." Writings of Jam^s Madison ,
VIII, 176.
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recent war with Germany.
Just 8S the Fresident decides when and where troops shall
be employed in time of war, so he alone likewise determines how
the forces shall be used, for what purposes, the manner and extent
of their participation in campaigns, and the time of their withdrawal
Thus the troops ordered to France during the recent war were sent
for the general purpose of waging active war against the German
military forces end of bringing about their defeat; were with that
end in view instructed to cooperate with the Allies even to the ex-
tent of being intermingled on occasion with Allied troops and
placed under the command of superior Allied officers; and were with-
drawn from foreign soil as rapidly as possible after that purpose
hed been accomplished.
33 The constitutionality of the President's action in send-
ing troops to France was upheld by Federal Judge Speer in a case
decided Aug. 20, 1917. See also address by er-Sen. Root at Chicago,
Sept. 14, 1917, in The TTar . Russian and Political Addresses, 68.
For an opposite view, see a somewhat bombastic open letter to
the Secretary of War by Eannis Taylor, in which he says: "The un-
authorized transportation by the executive power of cur conscripted
National Militia to the battlefields of Europe, in defiance of
section 8, Article I, of the Constitution, will stand out in the
time to come as the most stupendous act of illegality in ell our
history." Con^. Record . 65 Cong., 3 Sess. (Jan. £0, 1919), 1728-
1729.
A House resolution (H. J. Res. 166) was introduced July 29,
1919, proposing an amendment to forbid Congress to conscript armies
to serve outside the United States to execute orders of any inter-
national body or tribunal. Ibid . , 6C Cong., 1 Sess., 3561.
34 "The policy to be followed by our troops in any country
is one to be determined by the Executive." Statement of Maj. Gen.
Graves in message to his troops in Russia, quoted in The flat ion .
CVTII, 853 (May 31, 1919). The Nation comments as follows : "TTo
much ^or Wilsonien Realpolitlk by comparison with the old-fashioned
theory that it is the business Congress to declare war."

154.
The Siberian expedition, while of course intended to aid
in e general way in bringing- about the defeat of the Central Powers,
had the more limited and particular purposes of saving the Czecho-
slovak armies in Russia from destruction, and of steadying the ef-
forts of the Russians at self-defense 8nd the establishment of law
and order. It was not withdrawn upon the defeat of the Central
Powers and the conclusion of the armistice, but was continued for
some time in order "that we, with the concurrence of the great al-
lied powers, may Veep open a necessary artery of trade and extend
to the vast population of Siberia the economic aid essential to it
in peace time, but indispensable under the conditions which have fol-
lowed the prolonged and exhausting participation by Russia in the
war against the Central Powers." To that end, Major General Graves,
in command of the Americ-n troops in Siberia, was instructed "not
to interfere in Russian affairs, but to support Mr. Stevens" (the
American director of the Russian Railway Service Corps) in keeping
35
open the Siberian railway* In contradiction to this policy of
continuing the American troops in Siberia, the smsll contingent sent
to Murmansk and Archangel in Russia proper was entirely withdrawn
by July 1, 1919. The action in every case was determined solely
by authority of the President, acting under his power as Commander-
in-Chief of the army and navy.
35 See statement of President Wilson, July 22, 1919, in re-
sponse to a Senate resolution of inquiry. Cong. Record . 66 Cong.,
1 Sess. (Sept. 3, 1919), 5075. The President's statement is also
printed as Senate Doc. No. 607. See also statement of the Acting
Secretary of State regarding the purposes of the Siberian expedi-
tion. Official Bulletin
.
Aug. 5, 1918. Secretary of War Baker
announced on Jan. 13, 1920, that the President had authorized the
withdrawal of the American forces from Siberia, and that the move-
ment o^ troops would begin at once.
36 See statement of Gen. March, Chief of Staff, June 16, 1919.
Hearings before the Subcommittee of the Committee on Military Affaire
66 Cong. , 1 Sess. , 50.
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There has been considerable bitter criticism in Congress
o p the President's Russian or Siberian policy; there has also been
come question as to his power to send and continue troops there,
especially since the signing of the armistice and the virtual end-
ing of the war; and there have even been some attempts to assert
for Congress the right to control the movements of the forces and
to compel their withdrawal. Senator Borah (Idaho) in a recent
speech declared the presence of American troops in Siberia an un-
lawful usurpation of power by the President and demanded their im-
mediate withdrawal. "We are utterly at sea," he said, "as to why
our armed forces are carrying on war in Russia, but whatever is
being done in thst country in the way of armed intervention is
without authority. . . There can be no plainer usurpation of power
than to conscript men to war against Germany and then to use them to
37
take care o^ internal conditions in Russia." Senator Ldge (Hew
Jersey) introduced a resolution June 23, 1919, not only declaring
the state of war terminated, but ordering "That all American soldier^
of the forces of the United States now in Europe shall be withdrawn
from such foreign service without loss o^ time and be returned to thfo
United States, except such soldiers of the United States Regular
Army as have enlisted specifically for service in Europe." Sena-
tor McCormick (Illinois) introduced a similar resolution September
8, expressing it as the sense of the Senate "th8t no additional
37 U. Y. Times
.
Sept. 6, 1919; cf. also statement of Chairman
Porter, the House Committee on Foreign Affairs, that the drafted
men were sent J o Siberia with "absolutely no justification in law."
Ibid
.
.
Aug. 24, 1919. But compare Senator Borah's remarks in the
Senate, Feb. 16, 1909: "Congress hrs not the power to say that an
army s^all be at a particular place 8t a particular time or shall
maneuver in a particular distance. That belongs exclusively to the
Commander-in-Chief of the Ar^.y". Cong. Record
.
XLIII. Pt. 3. T60
Cong., 2 Sess.), 2432". See also his speech of Nov. 4, 1919. Ibid. .
66 Cong., 1 Sess., esp. 8465, 8466.
38 Cong. Record, 66 C ong., 1 Sess., 1629.
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troops be sent oversees except by the express authority of Congress,
and "that fill troons serving in Europe and Siberia should be brought
home with the utmost dispatch.
Other similar resolutions have been proposed from time to
40time, but only one has been adopted, that by Senator Johnson
(California), which, however, wag merely a request for information
as to the general policy respecting Siberia and the maintenance of
troops there. 4^ It seems pretty clear, therefore, that even under
the stress bitter partisanship and despite all its mutterinp-s
end criticisms o^ executive policy, Congress will be slow to deny
the power o r the President as Commander-in-Chief to send and main-
tain troops o^ the army and navy abroad at his discretion, nr to
assert any definite claim 0* control for itself. On the other
hand, the Executive has not hesitated to define its policy or to
assert its intention of adhering to and exercising its powers under
the Constitution with respect to the movement of troops.^
39 Cong. Record
.
66 Conp., 1 Sess., 5£84.
40 By Senators Johnson and Poindexter, and Representatives
Rhodes, Wood, and Mason. Ibid
.
, 65 Cong., 3 Sess., 3188, 3410-3417,
3786; 66 Con/?., 1 Sess., 64, 4336, 4704, 4937.
41 Ibid
.
. 66 Cong., 1 Sess., 63, 1631, 1884, 1977.
42 President Wilson stated, in a letter to Fred McAver of
Chicago, that the drafted troops in Siberia were being withdrawn
as rapidly as they could be replaced by volunteers, but indicated
that there was no intention o* withdrawing the entire expedition
for some time. II. Y. Times, Aug. £7, 1919. Secretary Baker, in
a statement to the House Military Affairs Committee, Sept. 15,
1919, insisted that the American soldiers in Siberia could not be
withdrawn because of "real military and humanitarian reasons."
Ibid
.
,
Sept. 16, 1919. Representative Mason (111.) on this occap.ior.
questioned the right o* the President to send troops into a country
with which we are not at war, but was opposed by Representative
Kahn (Cal.), Chairman of the Committee, who cited as a precedent
the sending of marines into Haiti. Ibid . See also statement 0*
Gen. March, Chief of Staf^, before the Senate Subcommittee on
Military Affairs, June 16, 1919. Hearinrs before the Subcommittee ,
50, 51.
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In connpction with his control of military end naval
operations, the President possesses numerous other powers. In fact,
it is generally held that, as Commander- in-Chief , he may do practi-
cally anything calculated to weaken end destroy the fighting- power
of the pnemy end bring the war to a successful conclusion, subject
of course to the rules of civilized warfare prescribed by inter-
43
netionel law and custom. He may employ secret agents to obtain
information concerning the position, resources, and general condi-
44
tion o° the enemy; he may establish a blockade o p the e nemy's
ports, including those of insurgent states as well ae of a foreign
enemy
;
4^ he may order an invasion of the enemy's country and estab-
lish the authority of the United States over it, although he cannot
thereby enlarge the boundaries of the United States nor extend the
operation of our institutions and laws beyond the limits previously
46
assigned to them; he may even set up, on his own exclusive autho-
rity ae Commander-in-Chief, a temporary government in conquered
47territory.
The appoint ment and dismissal of officers for the army and
navy is another o"* the President's prerogatives as Commander-in-
Chief, but one which is subject to some control by Congress. 4 & jn
43 Fairlie, National Administration of the United States
.
33.
44 Totten v. U. S .. 92 U. S.. 105, 106 (1875).
45 Prize Cases
.
2 Black, 635 (1862). Ordinarily such a
blockade is established by proclamation of the President. It may,
however, be established without this action by the President, but
by the commander of naval forces as an adjunct to naval operations
Sfrainst other blockaded ports and the enemy's fleet. The Adula
.
176 U. S., 361, 306-367 (1900); President Lincoln established
the blockade of the ports of the South by proclamet iore of Apr. 19
& E7, 1861; President MoKinley the Cuban blockade by proclamations
of Apr. 22 8b June 27, 1898. Richardson, Messages and Papers of the
Presidents. VI, 14, 15; X, 20' -203, 206.
^6* Fleming v. Page . 9 How., 603, 615 (1849).
47 Infra. Ch. IX.
48 Cf. Burgess, Political Science and Comparative Constitu-
tional Law, II, 261-262.
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the first piece, no officer can be appointed by the President until
Congress hss created the grade end made provision for it. President
Polk complained bitterly because Congress refused to create the
grade of Lieutenant-General during the Mexican Way 8nd thus permit
him to appoint a commander to outrank Scott and Taylor. "My situa-
tion", he said, "is most embarrassing. I am held responsible for
the far, and I am required to entrust the chief command of the army
to a General in whom I have no confidence."^ 9 During the recent war,
however, Congress gave the President authority (with the consent of
the Senate) "to appoint for the period of the existing emergency
such general officers of appropriate grades as may he necessary . * .50
thus vesting the President with wide discretionary powers, not only
of eupointraent but also of determining what higher grades might be
necessary. Under this provision, Pershing, Bliss, and March were
each appointed to the rank of full General, a grade thus revived
by the President for the period of the war. 51
In the second place, the appointment of all officers of
the army and navy is subject to confirmation by the Senate, unless
otherwise provided by law.^ As a matter of fact, confirmation by
the Senate has penrrally been required only in the case of the
higher military and navsl officers, the rule during the recent war
being, "Th8t officers with rank not above that of Colonel shall be
appointed by the President alone, and officers above that grade by
the President by end with the advice and consent o^ the Senate." 53
49 Diary of James K. Polk
.
IT, .'593-394.
50 Selective Service let o* May 16, 1917 (Public No. 12, 65
Cone-. ) . See Sec . 8.
51 Gen. Pershinp hss since been commissioned permanent Generally
by authority o^ act of Congress. See II. Y. Times . Sept. 4, 1919.
52 Constitution , -^rt". II, Sec. 2, CI. 2.
53 Selective Service Act, Sec. 1.

Finally, Congress, under its power "to make rules for the
government and regulation of the lnnd and naval forces," 54 may pre-
scribe rules of eligibility governing the appointment and promotion
of officers, and in that way limit to a considerable extent the
President's power of appointment. It has been held, however, that
such rules can prescribe only the mode in which vacancies shsll be
filled, end hence do not confer upon the officer nert in the order
o-p succession any right to the vacant place, nor control the Presi-
dent in his discretionary power to appoint some other individual. 55
Congress can in no way dictate what appointments shall be made;
it can only determine how they shall be made and limit somewhat the
field o* selection by prescribing certain rules. Moreover, the
President is entirely free to select whom he will from among the
officers for any particular duty or command, without consulting the
Senate ! nd without regard to seniority in rank. General Pershing
was thus chosen to command the American Expeditionary Force in the
recent war, although he was not the ranking officer in the army at
the time. In fact, any question that may arise as to the relative
rank of officers in the various branches of the service is under-
stood to be within the power o r the President, as Commander-in-Chief
56
to settle without legislation by or consultation with Congress.
54 Constitution, ^rt. I, Sec. 8, CI. 14.
55 15 Op. Atty. Gen .. 13, 14; 29 ibid . . 254, 256. See also
message of President 1,'onroe, Apr. 13, 1622, and veto message of
President Harrison, Feb. 26, 1691. Richardson, op. cit . , II, 132,
133; II, 138. Cf. ?eft, Our Chief Magistrate and Ms Powers . 127-
128; and Story, Commentaries
,
II, 350, n. 2. During the recent war,
the rules roverring appointments, promotions, and assignments vere
announced by General Order. Official U. S. Bulletin
.
Sept. 20, 1916
56 Diary of James K. Polk
,
I, 264-2t5.
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The power to dismiss or remove military and naval officers
especially in time o? war, is likewise considered one o** the pre-
rogatives of the President as Commander-in-Chief, end a necessary
incident o^ his right to appoint them.^ 7 In fact, it has been held
by distinguished authority to be an rbsolute power, though one that
ought to be exercised with great discretion, and extends even to
the removal of officers appointed with the consent o^ the Senate."
From the very organization the government under the Constitution
till the Civil War, the r>ower to dismiss officers of the army and
navy from the service was regarded as vested in the President by
the Constitution, was not questioned, and came to be considered as
one of the inherent powers of the Txecutive office. 60 congress in
1862 specifically recognized this power of the President in an act 6 -1-
which the Attorney-General later characterized as "simply oeclara-
62tory of the long-established lew."
However, by the acts of March 3, 1865, and July 13, 1866,
Congress divested the President of his absolute power of removal
at all times, requiring that in time of prace an officer could be
dismissed only upon sentence o-* a court-martial or as commutation
63
such sentence. In 1867, Congress went further, and in the
Army Appropriation Act o^ that year provided that all army orders
should pass through the General of the army, who war required to
keep his headquarters at ' ashington and who should not be removed,
57 Burgess, op. cit .. II, 262; Blake v. IT. S .. 103 U. S., 227,
236 (1880).
58 Memoirs of John Quincy Adams
.
IV, 410.
59 Shurtleff v. U. S .. 189 U. S., 311, 314-315 (1903).
60 4 Op. Atty. Pen
., I, 609-613; 6 ibid . , 5-6; 6 ibid . , 230-
232; 12 ibid ., 424-426. cf. U.S. v. Guthrie-
,
17 How.
,
283, 30*6^307 (1854
61 "TcT of July 17, 1862. 12 Stat, at L. . 594, 596 (Sec. 17).
62 15 Op. Att:; . Gen. . 421.
63 13 Stat . at L.
,
489; 14 ibid., <2.
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suspended, relieved from his command, or assigned to duty elsewhere,
except at his own request or by the approval of the Senate. 64 Presi-
dent Johnson signed this act under protest, holding that it in ef-
fect deprived the President of the command of the army; and having
obviously been passed as a measure designed to control him in parti-
cular, its injustice and inexpediency were soon recognized and it
was soon repealed. ^5 The Supreme Court further held, with regard
to the act of 1866, that it was in effect only a declaration that
the power thereto exercised by the President of summerily dismissing
officers without the consent of the Senate, should not exist in
time of p^ace. "There was, we think, no intention to den^ or
restrict the power o^ the President, by and with the advice end con-
sent o* the Senate, to displace them by the appointment o^ others
in their places." 66
The right of the President to make removals at his dis-
cretion Ln t ime oJ we
r
remained unimpaired by these acts of Congress,
and was again specifically recognized during the recent war by the
67
Selective Service Act. Efficiency Boards for examining into the
qualifications of officers were provided for by that statute, but
it was held that these were to be convened merely as a matter of
administrative convenience for the information of the President,
and "do not impair or restrict the power of the President to dis-
charge for any caus c which, in the judgment of the President , would
promote the public service." It was further held that, even though
the President dismissed an officer because of the recommendation of
an illegally and irregularly constituted board, "the legality of an
64 Act of Mar. 2, 1867. 14 Stat, at L . . 486-487 (Sec. 2).
65 July 15, 1870.
66 Blake v. U. S .. 103 U. S., 227, 236 (i860).
67 Sees. 1, 9.
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executed discharge by the President cannot afterwards be questioned,
because of the full and summary powers conferred upon him by the
statute. n6e Other opinions have likewise upheld the inherent
, as
well as the statutory, power of the President to dismiss officers
in time of war, without the consent of the Senate, or the recommen-
69dation o+ a board, or trial by court-martial. Having once dismis-
sed an officer, however, or accepted his resignation, the President
cannot revoke that action and thereby restore the officer to his
rank and office, but must make a new nomination and secure a new
confirmation by the Senate, if confirmation was required in the firs
70instance
.
In spite of the restrictions that hare been noted, the
President's power to appoint 8nd dismiss officers is such as to
give him practically complete control of the 8rray and navy, especial
ly in time of war, and to add considerably to his powers and pres-
tige as Commander-in-Chief. It is a power that was feared greatly
71
at the beginning, and it is a power that needs to be exercised
with due caution lest political expediency rather than military
72
fitness become the criterion for selection. On the whole, it can
be said that the President has in his exercise of this tremendous
68 Opinions of Acting Judge Advocate General Li8yes, May 10 &
July 15, 1918, in Vipmore, Source-Book o^ Military Law and 7/ar-Time
Legislation
,
752-755, 790-794.
69 Cf. opinion of Acting Judge Advocate General Ansell, Apr.
9, 1918. Ibid . . 731-735.
70 Mimmack v. U. S ., 97 U. S., 426, 435, 437-438 (1878);
Memoirs of John ^uincy Adams
,
VII, 14.
71 See Luther Martin's letter to the Maryland legislature.
Elliot's rebates
,
I, 379.
72 For an interesting insight into the problem that sometimes
confronts the President in this connection, see Diary of James K .
Polk
.
I, 412-413. President Wilson has been accused o^ being guided
chiefly by political considerations in declining to give ex-Presi-
dent P.oosevelt a command during the recent war, and in refusing to
8csign G-en. Wood to overseas duty.
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power generally pieced the winning the war above any thought of
personal or political advantage to himself.
It might be well here to point out some distinctions be-
tween the President's control over the army end navy, and his con-
trol over the miliitia, ^or his powers of command with regard to
the latter are considerably more limited than those with respect to
the former. In the ^irst place, the President is not at all times
the commander-in-chief of the militia, as he is of the regular army
and navy. The report of the Committee on Detail in the Convention
of 1787 (on August 6) had made the President "commander in chief
of the Army and Navy o f the United States, and o 4* the militia of the
several Statee ." thus mmlrinp no distinction between the power of
command over the militia and that over the regulrr forces, but giv-
ing the President complete command of both at all times. When the
report came before the Convention, however (on August 27), objection
was immediately mede and Iv'r. Sherman's amendment giving the Executiv;
command o^ the militia only "waen cslled into the actual service
o-** the United States" was adopted with but two dissenting votes. 74
That change in language placed a very definite restriction on the
power of the President to command the militia only upon the stated
occasions, it beinp at other times under the command of the execu-
tive of each particular state.
In the second place, the President cannot order the militiu
into "the actual service of the United States" and thus become its
commander-in-chief, simply upon his own authorityl The Constitution
73 Madison's Journal ( Hunt e
d
. ) , II, 86.
74 Ibid . , IT, 255. The jealous cere with which the states wish-
ed to preserve *the militia as distinctively state troops under the
command of state authorities is shown further by the various amend-
ments proposed in the state ratifying conventions. See Elliot s De -
betes
,
I, 331 , 335 ; II , 545-546 , 552; III, 660; IV, 108, 245.
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gives the President no authority in that respect, hut vests in Con-
gress the power "to provide for calling forth the militia." 75 It is
true that Congress has carried out this constitutional provision by
giving the President in turn definite statutory authority to call
out the militia under certain circumstances; nevertheless it also
remains true th^t while the President's power to command the army
and navy is complete and exclusive, he has over the militia, in
the words of Hamilton, "only the occasional c omme nd of such part as
"by legislative provision may he called into the actual service of
the Union." 76
Thirdly, the President is very definitely limited in the
purposes for which he msy use the militia, even after it has been
lawfully called out and placed under his command. The Constitution
gives Congress the riffht to provide for calling forth the militia
only "to execute the laws of the Union, to suppress insurrections,
end to repel invasions," 77 and of course Congress cannot empower the
President tc use the militia for any other purposes.
The President has, however, been granted as wide powers
as this constitutional provision will permit. By the Act of Septem-
ber 29, 1769, Congress authorized the President 1o csll out the
militia to repel Indian invasions, 78 and the Act of May 2, 1792, ex-
tended that authority to include all the cases mentioned in the
Constitution. This act, as well as the Act of February 28, 1795,
broadened the power of the President still further by authorizing
75 Constitution . Art. I, Sec. 8, CI. 15.
76 The Federalist. ITo. 68 (69) (Goldwin Smith ed., p. 381).
See also Johnson v. Sayre , 158 U. S., 109, 115 (1695). Cf. President
Fillmore's discussion o* the distinction between the President's
powers in this respect in his message of Feb. 19, 1851. Richardson,
op. pit .. V, 104.
7"7 Constitulon
.
Art. I, Sec. 8, CI. 15.
78 Annals of Cong . , 1 Cong., II, App., 2199 (Sec. 5).

145.
him to cell out the militia not only in case of actual invasion,
hut also whenever there is " imminent danger of invasion from any
7 9foreign nation or Indian tribe," thus introducing for the first
time the element of discretion. By means of amendments and sup-
plementary acts, the powers of the President in this respect have
80
"been still further broadened and amplified.
Several important constitutional questions as to the power
of the President h8ve been raised under the provisions of these
acts. Thus, when President Madison called out the militia for
service in the War of 1812, the question immediately arose as to
where the power rested to determine when the emergency contemplated
by the Constitution existed. The governors of three states (iiassa-
chusetts, Connecticut, and Rhode Island) refused to respond to the
call, in part on the ground that it was within the power of the
executive of each state to determine whether the need for militia
was so great as to warrant its being called out, and that in their
opinion no such emergency existed at that time. In this opinion
they were supported by the Liassechusett s Supreme Court and the
Hartford Convention. Secretary of War Llonroe, however, dissented
vigorously from this view and held that it was within the discretion
of the President alone to determine the existence of a constitutional
exigency for calling out the militia. 82 He was supported at the
time by the committee of Congress chosen to investigate the situa-
79 Annals of Cong .. 2 Cong., App. , 1370 (Sec. 1); 3 Cong.,
App., 15C8 (Sec. 1).
80 Acts of July 29, 1861; Dick Lxilitia Act of 1903; National
Defense Act o* 1916. 12 Stat, at L . , 281; 32 ibid . . 775, 776;
39 ibid., 166, 201.
81 McMaster, History the People the United States . Ill,
544-546; IV, 251; Am. State Papers . Llil. Affairs , I, 605, 610-612;
8 Mass. 548 549.
^"2* Im. 'state Papers , i.:il. Affairs , I, 6C5-606.
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83 fi4
tion, and later by the Supreme Court, end it is now generally
recognized that the President has exclusively this discretionary
authority.
Another much-disputed question concerns the extent to which
the President may use the militia outside the limits of the United
States. In the V;ar of 1812, in the Seminole War of 1818, and in the
Mexican 7/ar of 1846, the militia was ordered out and actually used
85
across the border of the United States, the action in every case
being based on the authority for its use in repelling- invasions.
There was some attempt in Congress in 1812 to give the President
definite statutory authority to use the militia forces outside the
United States, but after a debate in which most of the members
seemed to think such use unconstitutional, the matter was left un-
8 6
settled. In the Seminole War of 1818, specific authority was
given to use the troops (consisting largely of militia) across the
87Florida border in ease of necessity, and in the Llexican War the
President was expressly authorized to cell out militia to s^rve dur-
ing the war, which it was known would be waged on enemy soil,
iiuite recently Congress again showed its inclination to permit the
use o* militia outside the limits o^ the United States when in the
83 See its report, Am. State Papers, Mil. Affairs
.
I, 604.
84 Martin v. L.ott
.
12 '.The at.. 19. 31-22 (1827); Luther v.Bordej
7 How*, i" 43 ( 1848 ) . The various occasions upon which the militia
has been called into the federal service are cited by Quincy Wright
in "Military Administration" , in Report of the Efficiency and Economi
Committee. State of Illinois. 1915 , 897-903.
8~E Monaster, op. cit ., Ill, 436; IV, 12-18; £uincy Wright,
op. cit
.. 898, 899.
ITS' Annals of Conp .. 12 Cong., I, 728-802; Elliot's Debates . IV
459-460; McKaster, op. cit .. Ill, 438.
87 See messee-e of President Monroe, Mar. 25, 1818, Am. State
Papers, Mil. Affairs
.
I, 681; letter of Sec. o* 7/ar Calhoun to Gen.
Gaines, Tec. 16, 1817, ibid . , 689.
88 Quincy Wright, op. cit ., 899; cf. Upton, Military Policy of
the United States. 196-197; Act of May 13, 1646, 9 Stat, at L . . 9.
(Sees. 1,2).

147.
amendment of 1908 to the Dick Militia Act of 1903, it was provided
that when called out, "the militie shall continue to serve during
the time so specified, either within or without the territory of
the United States unless sooner relieved by the order of the Presi-
OQ
dent." A similar provision was included in the Act of February
90
16, 1914, with regard to the naval militia.
The constitutionality of these provisions has been in dis-
pute. A portion of the militia ordered into Canada in 1812 refused,
on constitutional grounds, to cross the border, and a high authority
thinks it doubtful whether any military court could have vindicated
91its jurisdiction hs-d it attempted to punish this disobedience.
A portion did cross, however, and the precedents of the wars of 1612,
1818, and 1846, would seem to be authority for the view that militia
may be used outside the United States if necessary to repel invasion,
Attorney-General Wickersham took that view in an opinion rendered
in 1912: "If the militia were celled into the service of the Genera:,
government to repel an invasion, it would not be necessary to dis-
continue their use at the boundary line, but they might (within
certain limits, at least) pursue 8nd capture the invading force,
even beyond that line, and just as the Regular Army might be used
92for that purpose." Pomeroy, however, holds that "in no esse can
they be compelled to serve without the territory of the Union, The
laws must be executed where they have force, and that is only within
the country itself. Insurrections and invasions must be internal.
89 35 Stat, at L
., 399, 400 (See Sec. 3).
90 36 ibid .. 26'%. 284 (Sec. 4).
91 Ordronaux, Constitutional Legislation in the United States,
504. Monaster seems to think the refusal o p the militia to cross
was due to cowardice rather than to any const itu^ ional scruples.
History of the People o^ the United States . IV, 12.
92 29 Op. Atty. Gen ., 322, 524.
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We do not repel an invasion by attacking the invading nation upon
its orn soil." The furthest he is willing to go is to admit 4 hat
the militia may be celled out before the invaders have set foot upon
our territory. "It is a fair construction of language to say that
one means of 'repelling' an invasion is to have a force ready to
receive the threatened intruders when they arrive.
While there may thus be some doubt as to whether, or to
what extent, the militia may be used outside the United States in
the repelling of invasions, practically all authorities seem to
8gree that it cannot be used, as militia, for the purpose of invad-
ing a foreign country or carrying on an offensive war outside the
jurisdiction or the United States. Thus Attorney-General Wickersh8m
in the same opinion in which he held that militia might be taken
across the border to repel an invasion, held the act of 1908 un-
constitutional in so far as it authorized the use of the militia,
94
as such, for the purposes of 1 arfare in foreign countries. Judge
Advocate General Davis in 1908 had rendered an opinion to the con-
trary, arguing that a declaration of war is a law for the execution
of which the militia may be called out and sent wherever necessary
to carry out its purposes: 9 ^ but the weight authority is in sup-
port of the view that the militia cannot as such be sent out o^ the
96United States for the purposes of a foreign war."
Finally, with regard to the appointment of officers for
the command of the militia, the powers o+ the President are very
n
93 Pomeroy, Constitutional Law ( Bennett's ed . ) . 387.
94 89 Op. Atty. Gen
.
. 329.
95 See Gong. Record , XLII (60 Gong., 1 Sess.), 6943; cf. opini
of Asst. Atty. Gen. Boyd on the position the militia in the Spanish
War. 22 Op. Atty. Gen.
, 225, 227-228; 536, 540.
96 Pomeroy, Constitutional Law
.
387; Von Hoist, Const itut ional
Law, 170; Ordronaux, Constitutional Legislation , 501-502; Dig. Ops .
J. A. G. (ed. 1901) . 483.
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much limited. The Constitu"1 ion definitely reserves to the states
97
the appointment of such officers, hut the Constitution is not
clear 88 to whet authority may appoint the commanding- officers when
several different militia units, or militia from several different
states, ere called into the service of the United States.
There is no doubt '.hat the President hinself may take per-
sonal commsnd on such occasions, since he is made commander-in-chief
of the militia "when called into the service of the United States,"
as he is of the regular army and navy at all times. President Wash-
ington was not only clear as to his right to take personal command
of the militia forces upon such occasions, but, in the case o* the
Whiskey Rebellion in 1794, was also convinced o-4* the necessity
for exercising that right. He assumed active command o* the militia
forces assembled to crush the insurrection, visited the piece of
rendezvous, end personally directed the forward movement of the
troops, living end marching with them as ective commander in the
field from September 25 to October 20, when, as he informed Con-
gress in his message of November 20, "if the state of things had
afforded reason for the continuance of my presence with the array_, it
would not have been withholden. But every appearance assuring such
an issue as will redound to the reputation and strength of the
United States, I have judged it most proper to re sume my dut ies at
the seat of Government
,
leaving the chief command with the Governor
98
of Virginia (Ma jor-General Henry Lee)". There wee apparently some
criticism of .Vashingt on' s course at the time as be1n- unconst itutio-
99
nal, which the President denounced es "impertinence " , although he
was careful to say that "imperious circumstances I lone" could
97 Art. I, Sec. 8, CI. 16.
98 Am. State Papers
.
i^isc
.
, I, 64 ; See also letters of Weshington
to Mai .Gen.Ieniel Morgan, 0~ct78, 1794 , and to Ha J .Gen. Lee, Oct .20,1794.
Writings of George • asMngton,
X
I I, 469-470, 479-480;cf. Oliver, Alexandet
Ti?jmllton-7-546'^47. 99-TfYTt inw~o~*"~fte~Q"rge 'Vftshingt 65
,
XI T. 474 .
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justify his absence from the seat of government while Congress was
100
in session.
Washington's action in this case was not o r course a esse
of exercising personal command in time of actual war, hut of domestic
trouble. Nevertheless it is cignifioatnt as showing that Washington
did not hesitate to leave his civil duties to take active command
of troops in the field, even when Congress was in session, and it is
not at all unlikely that he would have done the same in case of more
serious difficulties with foreign powers.
As a matter of fact, it was seriously asserted during the
War o 4* 1812, that when the militia was called into the service of
the United States, the President could not delegate his right of
command to any officer in other words, thst he could under no
circumstances appoint any other officer to command militia forces —
;
hut that whenever different detachments of militia were called out,
or militia from different states, the President wat under the obli-
gat ion of assuming personal command. This was the contention of
the governors of the three states refusing to furnish militia, when,
in reply to President Madison's call upon the militia for service
during that war, they gave as one reason for objecting to letting
the militia out from their jurisdiction, "That when the militia
of a State should he called into the service of the United States,
no officer o^ the regular arm;; had a right to com-nand them, or other
person, not an officer of the militia, except the President of the
United States in person .
"
1Q1
100 Writings o* George Washington . XII, 469.
101 Am. State Papers . Kil. Affairs , I, 605, 610-6^1.
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This view of the governors was sustained at the time by
102
the Ivlassaohusett8 Supreme Court, hut was later vigorously con-
iemned hy Secretary of war Monroe, in an opinion given to a commit-
tee of Congress, February 11, 1815, in which he said that such a
construction was one "for which I can see nothing in the Constitu-
tion to afford the slightest pretext." He maintained that the
President was under no greater obligation to command the militia
in person than the regular troops; that the power to command both
was vested in him principally for the purpose of giving him that con-
trol over military and naval operations which is a necessary attri-
bute of the executive branch of the government; that his actual
presence with the troops, either militia or regular forces, was
under no c ireinstances necessarily contemplated by the Constitution;
thst "in construction of law he is commander-in-chief, though not
present."103
Monroe's position with regard to the meaning o" the Con-
stitution was eminently sound. It can hardly be imagined that the
framers o^ the Constitution intended anything else than that the
President should be the Judge as to the wisdom and necessity of his
personal presence with the troops; still less can it be imagined
that any distinction was intended between the President's obligations
in that respect toward the militia and the regular forces. The
general practice on all occasions upon which the militia has been
celled out, es well as authoritative opinion, would therefore in-
dicate that w^en the militia has been called into the service of
the United States, it comes under the control of the President as
102 Am. State Papers , i:il. Affairs , I, 611-612; 8 Llass . . 548,
550. Cf. also debate in Congress, Apr. 17, 1812. Annals of Cong .,
12 Cong., 1 Sess., II, 1324.
103 Am. State Papers, L:il. Affairs . I, 606.
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Commander-in-Chief, end may be commanded by him personally or by any
104
officer designated by him, whether of the regular or militia forces.
104 Ordronaux, Constitutional Legislation in the United States
.
505; 2 Op. Atty. Gen .. 711; Story. Commentaries
.
II, 316 n; Am. State
Papers
.
L'il. Affairs
.
II, 102.
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Chapter VIII.
Powers of Military Jurisdiction .
For the exercise of military jurisdiction, two principal
military tribunals have come into being — courts-martial , for the
;
trial of offenders against military law, and military commissions
,
for the trial of offenders against the laws of war and under martial
lew. The authority of the former is conferred and defined largely
by statute, under the power given to Congress "to make rules for
..2
the government and regulation of the land and naval forces; while
the authority of the latter is derived principally from the common
3law of war.
Although the authorization of courts-martial is thus in
the hands of Congress, their control afterwards rests almost ex-
clusively with the Executive branch of the government. They are
created, ija every case
.
by military order issued by commanding of-
ficers having euthority under the Articles of War to cell them into
4
being. "They are creatures of orders , the power to convene them,
as well as the power to act upon their proceedings, being an at-
tribute of command."^
The President is expressly authorized by statute to con-
1 For the distinction betv/een military law and martial law, seje
Manual ?or Courts-Martial. U. a. ^rmy (ed. 1917), 1-2; Davis, Treatise
on the Military Law o^ the United States (2nd ed.), 5; Birkhimer,
Uilitary Government end Llartiel Law ( 2n*a ed.). 271-391. See also an
excellent tabular statement in Levis, op. cit .. 12.
£ Constitution
.
Art . I, Sec .8, Cl.lTI The rules enacted by Con-
gress under this provision arc for the most part included in what
ere called the Articles of War. The latest revision of these may cdh
veniently be found in Manual for Courts-Mart ial . 305-329 (App.I); alsj
a concise history of the Articles in the same Manual, ix-xiii.
3 See Lieber's Instructions for the Government of Armies of th
United States in Time of War, G. 0.100, A. G.O. ,1863, in Birkhimer, op_,
cit., 635. . ljL4 Davis, Treatise on, Military Law . 16.
B D ig. Op s. J .A. P.. (' eu .1^11 j r~ZF3.
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vene general courts-mart ial under certain circumstances. He is by
no means, however, limited to the! specific case, nor dependent
upon statutory authority, but is empowered to convene such courts-
martial "generally and in any case", by virtue of his constitutional
7
authority as commander-in-chief. In an opinion rendered June 6,
1877, Attorney General Devens, after reviewing the law and precedent^
on this subject, said: "The authority 0* the President to appoint
general courts-martial, in cases wherein he is not expressly
authorized so to do by Congress, may therefore be regarded as well
established. It rests directly upon the provision of the constitu-
tion which makes him Commander- in-Chie^, as interpreted by the law
and usage 0^ the military service existing when that instrument was
-"ramed; it is sustained by the doctrine laid down in American works
0^ authority on courts-martial, the views expressed by one of the
standing committees of the House (that on Military Affairs) whose
special business it is to make itself conversant with subjects of
this character, and an official opinion of the lite distinguished
head 0^ the Bureau of Military Justice, Judge Holt; and, moreover,
it is confirmed by long-continued practice, extending back nearly
Q
to the beginning 0^ the Government."
That power of the President has further been supported by
the Judiciary Committee of the Senate; 9 and it has been exercised
on numerous occasions, both before and after the passage of the
statute in question, notably in the cases of Brigadier General Hull
(1813), Major General Wilkinson (1814), Major General Gaines (181Q),
6 Act of May 29, 1820. 4 Stat, at L .. 417.
7 Swaim v. U. S. t 165 U. S., 553, 558 (1897); Dip. Ops. J.A.G
568; Davis, op. cit. , 17.
8 15 Op. Atty. Gen ., 302-303. See also ibid . , 297-301.
9 Report No. 868, Mar. 3, 1879, 45 Cong., 3 Sess., cited in
Davis, op. cit .. 17, n.

155
Major General Twiggs (1858), Brigadier Genpral Paine (1865), and
many others. 1^1 The power so exercised is "a striking- illustration",
es was said by one authority, "of en undefined constitutional power,
for it is nothing less then the power to constitute tribunals with
judicial jurisdiction extending even to trials for capital offen-
ses."
11
The fact that military commanders subordinate to the
President may also upon occasion convene courts-martial, can in no
sense be understood as a limitation upon the President's constitu-
tional power to summon these courts at his discretion. "A military
officer cannot be invested with greater authority by Congress than
the commander-in-chief, and e power of command devolved, by statute,
on an officer of the Army or Navy is necessarily shared by the
President. . • Since the earliest legislation of our Government
it has undoubtedly been understood and intended that whatever
powers were granted to general officers were, at the same time,
granted and intended to be shared by the President • . . whose name
is understood as written in every statute which confers upon a
..12
military officer military authority."
The President may, however, act through his subordinates.
Thus, a convening of a general court-martial by the Secretary of
War is held to be in law a convening by the President, and as legal
as if the President himself had signed the order, such act of the
Secretary being y^urely administrative end in law the act of the
President whom he represents. ^
10 See list of courts-martial convened by order of the Presi-
dent in 15 Op. Atty. Gen ., 3C1-302.
11 Lieber. Remarks' on A rmy ^Regulations . 25.
12 Davis, op. cit ., 17, n; cf. 8th Article of \7er, in Manuel
for Courts-I.'.ertial
.
309-310.
13
_
Dig. Ops. J. A. G., 290, 568, 644-645.
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The constitution of general courts-mart ials is also sub-
ject to the control of the Executive. The appointing authority,
whether it he the President or e subordinate commencing' officer,
designates the number of officers, between the statutory maximum
(13) and minimum (5), that are to constitute any particular court
14in any case, and his decision is final. Even during a trial,
members of a court may be relieved from duty with the court and
! ordered to other service, or new members may be added, without af-
fecting the functioning of the court or the validity of its pro-
ceedings, provided merely that the membership is not reduced below
15the minimum nor increased beyond the maximum. Even the reduc-
tion o* a court belov/ the minimum does not dissolve it, its sit-
tings be in? merely interrupted until sufficient new members are
added, and the validity 0"" its proceedings being unaffected. "Thus
the membership of the court, both as to numbers within statutory
limits and as to personnel, is entirely within the control of the
appointment or superior military authority at all times.""'"
The President also has entire control over the methods
17
end procedure of courts-martial. The procedure for preferring
charges and bringing the accused to trial is prescribed almost ex-
clusively by regulations end the customs of the service, while the
rules of evidence are those of the Federal courts as modified by
Executive regulations.
Likewise, the President may to e large extent control the
findings and sentence of courts-martial. The Articles of War ex-
14 Martin v. Mott
.
IE V/heat., 19, 34-35 (1827).
15 Of course there are certain rules requirinp the reading
of the previous record to the new members, etc., but there is in
no sense a retrial.
16 E. II. Morgen, in Yale Law Jour . , XXIX, 60-61.
17 See 38th Article of V.ar, in Manual for Courts-Ma rt ial . 314
.
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pressly provide that the approval of the appointing- officer or of
his successor in command is 8 condition precedent to the execution
of any sentence, and that the appointing authority may approve or
disapprove the finding, or approve or disapprove the whole or any
18
part of the sentence. The President acts as the reviewing autho-
rity in all cases tried by courts-martial convened by himself,
either under his general authority as Commander-in-Chief, or as
expressly provided by statute; in cases of sentences respecting
general officers; in cases of sentences of death or dismissal ad-
judged in time of peace; and in all cases submitted to him for
action in time of war. He may approve or disapprove in whole or in
part the findings or the sentence, or he may mitigate the punish-
ment.^^
Also, by custom of the service, the President or other
appointing authority may return the record in any case for recon-
sideration and revision, whether the finding is guilty or not guil-
ty. A rule of procedure prescribed by President Wilson, effective
August 10, 1919, modified this in so far as it abolished the power
to return a finding o^ acquittal for reconsideration or any sentence
for revision upward, but of course another President or President
Wilson himself mifrht revoke this order and thus restore the former
practice. While the Executive has thus almost complete control
over the findings and sentences of courts-martial, Congress has no
21power whatever either to revise or reverse their judgments.
18 46th & 47th Articles of War. Manual -**or Courts-Mart ial . Z15-$l&.
19 Dig. Ops. J. A. G. t 568-569. But when such approval or
disapprovpl has once been given and the accused duly notified, it
is beyond the power the President to change his decision, even
though his action may afterwards be found to have worked an injus-
tice. 15 Op. Atty. Gen .. 290, 297. 0^ course the President may
still pardon the accused, if punishment is unexecuted.
20 G.0.88,W.D. , sec.l, July 14 , 1919, quoted in Yale Law Jour .XXLC,
21 Am. State Papers , lIH. Affairs , V, 17-18. ' 63, n,
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As in the case of the convening- of courts-msrti&l, so the
action of the President respecting their procedure, findings, and
22
sentence, while it should he the result of his own judgment, need
£3
not be under his own hand, any action of authorized subordinates,
such a? the Secretary of War and the Secretary of the Wavy, being
presumed in law to be the act of the President. But confirmation
of findings end sentence by some Executive authority being require
in all esses before execution of sentence, courts-martial can hard-
ly be considered as anything but advisory bodies, with the power of
making recommendations or of reporting findings of fact and con-
clusions of law to a non- judicial superior, whose principal func-
tion is that o^ en executive. "The system then is clearly one
of review by superior military authority, which may, but need not,
ask or follow the opinion of legal advisers, and is in no respect
judicial. . . The principle at the foundation of the existing
system is the supremacy of military c ommand . To maintain that prin-
ciple, military command dominates and controls the proceeding from
its initiation to the final execution of the sentence."
Courts-martial differ widely, therefore, from civil
courts. The latter are created by statute, which also describe
their composition, define their jurisdiction and procedure, 8nd de-
termine the times end places of their sessions. Courts-martial,
though authorized by statute, are created end dissolved in every
case by executive authority; the Executive likewise determines their
E2 Hunkle v. U. S. . 122 U. S., 543, 557 (l8e7).
23 U. S. v. ?letcher . 148 U. S., 84, 88-89 (1893).
24 Ibid
.
,
91; U.S. v. Page
,
137 U. S'.~, 673, r 679-680 (1891);
Bishop v. U. 3 ., 197 U. S. f 334, 341-342 (1905).
2"E Glenn, The Array and the Law . 35-42.
26 E. M. Morgan, op. cit ., 65, 66. The opinion of the Judge
Advocate General is in some c r ses required before execution o" sen-
tence, but only by Gen? ral Order. His advice is generally followed
by the rcviewjjqg-^uJ;h#j?j^^-^ h n n hfpji-dia--
regarded.
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composition, defines their procedure, and controls their ^ind ings
end sentence. It therefore seems correct to say, as do most authori
ties, that courts-martial rre no part of the judiciary of the United
27
States, but simply ape ncies or instrumental it ies of the Executive .
Military commissions
, as contrasted with courts-martial,
are of comparatively recent origin in the United States, having been
initiated by General Scott in Mexico in 1847. 2® Courts -martial, as
has already been noted, are instituted for the trial of offenders
against military law , th8t is, their jurisdiction is restricted by
statute to military persons and to certain specific offences defined
by l8w. Hence other tribunals have be^n found necessary for the
trial of civilians as well 8S military persons, who are accused of
criminal acts contrary to the common laws of war and under martial
27 Davis, op. cit .. 15; Dip. Q-ps. J. A. G. , 283; 7/illoughby,
On the Constitution. II. 1197. S. T. Ansell, recently Acting Judge
Advocate General, admits this conclusion, but criticizes severely
the system that makes such a conclusion necessary. See his article,
"l.'ilitary Justice," in Cornell Law Quar .
.
V, 11-17 (Nov. 1919), esp.
5-7. But compare the Supremo Court opinion approving the follow-
ing statement by Attorney General Bates: nmhe whole proceeding
from its inception is judicial. The trial, findings, and sentence
are the solemn acts of a court organized and conducted according
to the prescribed forms o^ law. It sits to pass upon the most
Becred questions o" human rights that are ever placed on trial in
a court of justice; rights which, in the very nature of things, can
never be exposed to danger nor subjected to the uncontrolled will
o^ any man, but which nust be adjudged according to law." Rankle v.
U. s.. 122 U. S., 543, 558 (1887). For an excellent review and
criticism of the present court-martial system, see an article, al-
ready occasionally referred to, by E. H. korgan, "The Existing Court
Hertial System and the Ansell articles", Ysle Law Jour . , XXIX, 52-
74 (IIov., 1919). For a defense of the present system, see an arti-
cle by G. G. 3ogert, professor of law in Cornell University and
recently Judge Advocate o^ the 78th Division, "Courts-Mart i8l
:
Criticisms and Proposed Reforms," in Cornell Law Quar .. V, 18-47
(Nov., 1919)
.
28 See Gen. Scott's G. 0. No. 287, Sept. 17, 1847, in Birk-
himer, or), cit.. 581-583 (Appendix I, Par. 10, 11.).
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lew, and for this purpose the military commissions have been es-
tablished. Thus the military commission initiated by General Scott
was mainly for the punishment of murder, robbery, and other violent
crimes, committed either b^ civilians or military persons, and not
at that time cognizable by a court-martial. At the same time ano-
ther tribunal, called the "council of war", was inaugurated for the
punishment of offences peculiar to war, and especially crimes by
members guerilla bands. Early in the Civil War these two tri-
bunals wre, by practice of the military commanders and sanctioned bj
the War Department, united into the one court called the "military
29
commission"
.
The authority for the creation of military commissions
may therefore be S8id to be the same as that for the prosecution of
war and for the exercise of military government and martial law —
they are "merely an instrumentality for the more efficient execu-
30
tion of the laws of war, and as such are but another agency of
the Executive. Though derived from the common law of war, the
31
ST:t>ority of military commissions has been recognized in statutes,
32 33in executive proclamations, in opinions of Attorneys- General,
34
and in rulings of the Supreme Court, so that it is now "as well
known and recognized in the laws of the United States as a court-
35
martial"
.
29 V/inthrop, Abridgment of Military Law ( 2nd ed . ) . 331-332.
30 Ibid., 331.
31 IcTi" of Mar. 3, 1863 (sec. 30).; July 2 1864 (sec. 1);
July 4, 1664 (sees. 6, 6); Liar. 2, 1867 (sec. 3); and several later
appropriation acts.
32 Proclamations af Sept. £4, 1862 & Apr. 2, 1866. Richard-
son, Messages and Papers the Presidents . VI, 98-99, 429-432.
75 5 Op. Atty. Gen .. 55; 11 ibid .. 297; 12 ibid .. 332; 13
ibid
.
.
59; 14 ibid'. .~249.
34 Ex parte Valla ndigham , 1 Wall., 243 (1863); Ex parte LitHi -
gan, 4 '.Vail., 2 (1866).
35 Davis, Treatise on military Law. 308, n.
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The President has practically complete control over the
military commissions. There is no statute prescribing how or by
whom they ere to be constituted, or how they are to be composed. In
practice, however, they have been created by the same authorities
as are empowered to order courts -martial , which means the President
himself at his discretion or his military commanders acting under
his authority. Attorney -General Speed in 1865 upheld the right of
the President to create such military tribunals evrn for the trial
of non-military persons — in this case the assassins of President
Lincoln: "I do not think", he said, "that Congress can, in time of
war or peace, . . create military tribunals for the adjudication
o
-p offences committed by persons not engaged in, or belonging to,
such forces. • . But it does not follow that because such mili-
tary tribunals cannot be created by Congress, . . that they cannot
be created at all." The Attorney-General held that under the laws
of war, which constitute the greater part of the law of nations
and therefore are a part of the law of the land, military commanders
are authorized to create and establish military commissions or
other tribunals for the trial of offenders against the laws of war,
whether these offenders are active or secret participants, that
"obedience to the Constitution requires that the military should
do their whole duty; they must not only meet and fight the enemies
o^ the country, In open battle, but they must kill 6r take the
secret enemies of the country, and try and execute them according
to the lews o-p war." 36
The composition 0* military commissions is entirely within
the authority of the President to determine. There being no statu-
36 11 Op. Atty. Gen ., 297, 29b, 299, 308, 316.
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tory maximum or minimum cs to the number of members, as in the esse
of courts-martial, the discretion of the President is even wider
than for those tribunals. Military commissions heve, however, usual
ly been composed of five members; less then three would be contrary
37to precedent; but any number would be legal.
The jurisdiction of military commissions is not defined
by statute, but extends in practice to violations of the lews of war
whether by civilians or military persons, in occupied enemy terri-
38
tory or in territory under mertial lew. The power of the Presiden
to institute military government over occupied territory is exclu-
39
sive, and in that respect he controls the jurisdiction of military
commissions. The power to institute martial law, while more doubt-
ful, is generally held to belong properly, in time of war, to the
Executive, as Commander-in-Chief. "The power of the Executive to
prosecute a war precipitated upon the country carries with it by
necessary implication", says one authority, "the incidental power
to make use o^ the necessary and customary means of carrying it on
successfully. If he deems the placing any district under martial
law a proper measure, it is difficult logically to deny him the
40
right to do it." In practice, mertial law is always instituted
37 finthrop, op. cit .. 333; Dip, ops. J. A. G. , 463. The mili
t8ry commission convened by oroer of President Johnson for the trial
of Lincoln's assassins was composed of 9 members. See Special Or-
ders Ho. Ell Sr. 216, May 6 & May 9, 1865, in Richardson, op. cit .,
VI, 335-336, 336-337.
38 Winthrop, op. cit ., 333; Dip. Ops. J. A. G . , 464.
39 Infra, Ch. IX.
40 Birkhimer, op. cit ., 376. He admits, however, that martial
law may be invoked "either by the executive or the law-making- power,
although the former generally will be the case." Ibid . , 390. But
Pomeroy criticizes the position o p the dissenting justices in &x
parte Mill i pan (4 Wall., 2) that Congress may, under certain cTrcunH
stances, declare martial law, as "utterly indefensible". Const itu -
tlonel Lew. 594. Cf. Glenn, The Army and the Lav: , 185.

163.
by Executive authority, and hence military commissions ere depen-
dent upon the fiction of the President -p or their jurisdiction in
that respect also. The violations of thelews of war that come under
the jurisdiction of the military commissions in these cases have
been held to include all cases which do not come within the juris-
42diction conferred by statute on courts-martial, and in practice
have extended to cover almost every conceivable offence, from the
sligv test sort of intercourse with the enemy to espionage and raur-
In addition to the jurisdiction conferred under the com-
mon law of war and martial law, military commissions may be used as
a temporary substitute for the local civil courts, when those courts
under the stress of circumstances, have ceased to function, though
in such cases their jurisdiction should properly be regulated by
the local statutes governing the courts for which they are substi-
44
tutes. But whether exercising jurisdiction under the laws of war
or as a substitute for the local courts, there is practically no
linit to that of the military commissions -- if they have jurisdic-
tion o* the person and the offence, they may proceed with the trial
of offences committed even before the initiation of military govern-
45
ment or martial law.
The procedure of military commissions, not being pre-
scribed by statute, is likewise under the control of the Executive.
41 Instances o^ the proclamation of martial law by Executive
authority are f?iven in '.Vinthrop, op. cit .. 329-330.
42 Ex parte Vallandigham . 1 Wall., 243, 249 (16 63).
43 See list o^ offences charged as "violations the laws of
war" during the Civil V.ar, in Dig. Ops. J. A. G. , 465; also in
Davis, or,, cit*
.
310, n.
44 ' Dir. "Ops. J . A. G . . 468.
45 Ibid., 464; Birkhimer, op. cit ., 533. But violations of
the laws o" war cannot legally be tried a^ter the war or emergency
has terminated. 77inthrop, op. cit .. 334.
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In practice, the rules of procedure laid down for courts-martial
pre generally observed, and authorities hold that these rules should
apply as consistently as possible. That is not obligatory, however,
end the powers of military commissions not being defined by law,
their proceedings are legal even if details that are required in
courts-martial or in civil courts are omitted, such as the adminis-
tering of a specific oath to members of the court, or giving the ac-
46
cused the opportunity of challenge.
There are likewise no statutes governing the power of the
militery commissions to inflict punishments, hence it is a power
practically without restriction. These tribunals are not limited
to the penalties known to courts-martial, nor are the strictly
military renalties — dismissal from the service, dishonorable dis-
charge, and the like -- generally appropriate, since the persons
to be punished, are usually civilians. The punishments of death,
imprisonment, or fine ere those usually inflicted by military com-
missions, but, especially duri g the Civil V/ar, h^ve included also
confiscation o^ property, forfeiture of licenses to trade, expulsion
from certain sections of the country, furnishing bonds for good
47behsvior, and taking the oath of allegiance. In no case ere the
proceedings or sentences of military commissions subject to appeal
to, or reversal by, any civil court.
48
Military commissions, deriving their authority and juris-
diction from military usage and the common law of war, and their
creetion, composition, procedure, end decisions being* subject to
the complete control o^ the Executive, are therefore, even rcore than
46 Birkhimer, op. cit ., 533-534; Winthrop, op. cit ., 334.
47 7/inthrop, op. cit. , 335.
48 Ex parte Vallendigham, 1 "-Veil., 243, 251-252 (1863).
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courts-martial f merely agencies the Executive in his cspacity
bs Commander-in-Chief. Through the courts-martial, as has been noted,
the President is enabled to control the discipline of the armed
forces and enforce military Ipw. Throuph the military commissions
he controls the administration of justice in war time, not only in
the theater of active operations, but also in places declared by_ him
to require the institution of martial lew, and extending to all
49
classes of civilians as well 8s to militor., persons. By means of
these tribunals, the President's powers to carry on the vigorous
prosecution of a war ere considerably extended; he is through them
enabled to deal effectively with that class of persons who, while
not eng^e-ed in open acts of hostility, may in one way or another be
interfering with the success of the military operations.
Another power of the President, which should be noted as
of some importance in this connection, is hit power to grrnt re -
prieves end pardons . Though finally vested in the President without
50
lir.itation, except in cases of Impeachment, the debates over the
adoption of the Constitution reveal considerable fear of the war-
time use of this power, that is, its use especially in cases of
treason. Luther Llartin expressed this fear when he said to the
Maryland legislature: "The power given to these persons (i. e., the
President and Vice-President) over the Array and ITavy is in truth
formidable, but the power of Pardon is still more dangerous, as
in all acts of Treason, the very offence on which the prosecution
would possibly arise, would most likely be in favour of the Presi-
dent's own power. The Hew York ratifying convention of 1788 also
49 There are said to have been nearly 150 cases of women tried
by military commissions during the Civil ,/ar. Davis, op. cit . ,309.n.
50 Constitution
.
Art. II, Sec. 2, CI. 1.
51 ffsrrand's Records
,
III, 158; see also ibid
.
, E18.
— r=L — ZZZ^! j

showed its fear of this Executive power by proposing the -following
amendment: "That the executive shall not grant pardons fw treason,
aniess with the consent the Congress; but may, at his discretion,
grant reprieves to persons convicted of treason until their cases
can be laid before the Congress." 5^
The reaaon for vesting this power in the President was,
however, well stated by Hamilton when he wrote: "But the principal
argument for reposing the power of pardoning in this case (i. e., in
case of treason) in the chief magistrate is this: in seasons of
insurrection or lebellion there are often critical moments when a
well-timec offer of pardon to the insurgents or rebels may restore
the tranquillity of the commonwealth, and which, if suffered to
pass unimproved, it may never be possible afterward to recall. The
dilatory process of convening the legislature, or one of its
branches, for the purpose of obtaining its sanction to the measure
would frequently be the occasion of letting slip the golden op-
portunity." 63
Though Congress has on occasion attempted to assert some
authority and to exercise some control with respect to the granting
of pardons, particularly in cases of rebellion and treason, 6^ the
courts have uniformly held that the power of the President is com-
plete and exclusive, and can in no way be restricted or limited in
52 Elliot's Estates
.
I, 330.
53 The Federalist
.
No. 73 (74) (Goldwin Smith ed., p. 411).
But Hamilton's own draft of a constitution contained this clause:
"He shall have power to pardon all offences, except treason , for
which he may grant reprieves, until the opinion o 4* the Senate and
Assembly can be had; and, with their concurrence . may pare on the
seme."
"
>-lliotTs lebrtes
,
V, 56 7.
54 See Acts of July 17, 1662 & July 12, 1870. 12 Stat, et L ..
589, 592 (Sec. 13); 16 ibid .. 230, 235.

167,
its effects by Congress.^ A pardon may thus be granted by the
President before or after conviction, absolutely or upon conditions,
and the ground for its exercise is wholly within the discretion of
56
the President.
Pardon may 8lso be granted, in the form of a proclamation
of amnesty, to a whole class of cffenders, without any special Con-
57gressional authority. President Washington in this way pardoned
58
the participants in the Whiskey Rebellion of 1794; President Adams
59
the Pennsylvania insurgents of 1799 ;° President Madison the so-
called B8ratari8 pirates who operated during the War of 1812.
60
President Lincoln also used this means of offering conditional par-
don to the rebels in the Civil War; while President Johnson is-
sued four separate proclamations of amnesty and pardon, at first ex-
55 Sx parte Garland , 4 Wall., 333, 380 (1866); U. S. v. Klein
.
13 '.Veil., 126, 139-140 (1871). See also Taft, Our Chief Magistrate
and His Powers
.
119-120; Bescora, Growth of nationality
.
120-122;
Glenn. The Army and the Lew
.
111.
56 A striking instance of pardon before conviction is the
case of Maj. Gen. Gaines in 1846. Although found guilty by a Court
of Enquiry of having violated orders and acted illegally in calling
out large bodies of militia and volunteers without authority, and
by these acts having greatly embarrassed the government and cost the
treasury "many hundreds of thousands of dollars", as the President
himself said, nevertheless President Polk refused to convene a court
martial but ordered all further prosecution stopped. Diary of James
K. Polk
.
I, 450, 480; II, 82-83. The President has also frequently
used his power of pardoning before conviction as a means of secur-
ing the return to duty of deserters from the military service. See,
for example, General Orders Hob. 43 & 102, July 3, 1866, & Oct. 10
1873, issued by direction of the President, cited in 20 Op.Atty . Gen .
345; also executive proclamations in Richardson. op. c it . , VI . 163, 164.
233,278. For instances of the exercise of the pardoning power after
conviction for treason, see MoKinney, "Treason under the Constitu-
tion of the United States", Illinois Law Rev .
,
XII, 361-402 (Jan.lSIB).
57 20 Op. Atty. Gen .. 330.
58 Proclamation of July 10,1795. Richardson. op. c it . , 1.181.
59 Proclamation iley 21, 18( 0. Ibid . , 303.
60 Proclamation of Feb. 6, 1615. Ibid. . 558-560.
61 Proclamations o^ v ec. 8, 1863 & Liar. 26, 1864. Ibid . , VI,
213-215, 218.
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eluding a large number of classes, and finally granting a full and
6 2general pardon to all participants in the Rebellion.
The chief significance of the power of pardon lies not
only in this that it permits the President to offer clemency at his
discretion and to correct acts of injustice done under the stress
of war, 63 but that it 8lso enables h-'ra practically to neutralize
the effect of statutes passed b^ Congress for a very definite pur-
64
pose. Thus the Confiscation Acts of the Civil War provided for
the confiscation of all property used in aid of the rebellion, and
of the property of certain classes in the Confederacy, whether used
in aid of the rebellion or not; v/hile the Captured and Abandoned
Property Act turned over to the Treasury the proceeds of all
property picked up by Federal troops, leaving it to the owner to
assert his claim in the Court of Claims on establishing his loyalty.
For all these Acts, the Supreme Court held that a pardon operated
re
to purge the claimant of disloyalty, and hence by granting a
general pardon the President was enabled to overrule completely
the intent of Congress in passing these acts.
62 Proclamations of May 29, 1865; Sept. 7, 1867; July 4, 1868;
and Dec. 25, 1868. Richardson, op. git
., VI, 310-312, 547-549,
655-656, 708.
63 The Clemency Board appointed by the President to review
court-mart lal cases adjudged during the recent war passed upon
2,857 cases from Feb. 25 to Apr. 25, 1919, and made a partial or
complete remission of the sentences in 91 per cent of the cases con-
sidered. IT. Y . Times Current Kist. Llag .
.
X, 62 (July, 1919).
President Lincoln's generous use of the pardon toward soldiers
convicted of purely military offenses is well Trnown.
64 Acts of lug. 6, 1861 and July 17, 1862. 12 Stat, at I .
.
319, 569.
65 Act of Mar. 12, 1863. Ibid . . 820.
66 U. S. v. Padelford , 9 Wall., 531, 542-543 (1869); U. S. v .
Klein, 13 Sell., 128, 142 (1671).
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Likewise with respect to such sets as the Espionage i ct,
passed during the recent wer with Germany, the President raic-ht
,
by
a general perdon, overcome the purpose of Congress end restore those
convicted of disloyalty and obstruction to their full rights as
loyal citizens.
67 Shortly after the signing of the armistice, a strong move-
ment developed for the pardon of the so-called "political prisoners"
convicted during the war. See, for example, a pamphlet, "Political
Prisoners in Federal Military Prisons", published by the National
Civil Liberties Bureau, IJov. 81, 1918. See also The Dial . Jan. 11,
1919, and IT. Y. Times. Lec. 26, 1919. In March, 1920, Senator
France (MdTT introduced 8 joint resolution asking that these politi-
cal prisoners be pardoned. United States Bulletin. Mar. 15, 1920.
President Wilson has not yet (April, 1920) issued any such general
pardon.
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Chapter IX.
Powe rs of Military Government .
Military government, or the government of occupied terri-
tory, is defined as "that dominion exercised in war by s belligerent
power over territory invaded and occupied by him and over the in-
habitants thereof. Military government in this sense must be
carefully distinguished from martial law, in that the former is
exercised onl;: in time of war over the inhabitants of 8n occupied
enemy country; while the letter may be instituted during any emer-
gency, whether in. time of war or peace
.
over the citizens at home.
Martial law also requires a formal proclamation or declaration
before it can be put into effect, while military government exists
"simply as 8 consequence o* conquest and occupation."
The authority to institute end exercise military govern-
ment arises :prom the right and obligation of the invading belli-
gerent, under the laws of war, to protect his own forces and to
guarantee order 8nd security to the inhabitants of the conquered
territory. In the United States, that right and that obligation
are vested in the President, as Commander- in-Chief , end ere exer-
cised under his direction and by his subordinates. 4 "The efficient
1 T.inthrop, Abridgment o^ Military Law (2nd ed. j . 322 ; Cf.
Birkhimer, Military Government and Martial Law ( 2nd ed .). 45; Pome-
roy , Const itut ional Lew in the United States TBennett ed. ) , 595.
Mago on's Reports
.
iT".
2 Winthrop,
p T
. oil.
.
322-323.
3 See Regulations of Hague Convention respecting the Laws rnd
Customs of War on Land, Art. 43, in Scott, Texts of the Peace Con-
ferences at The Hague
.
225.
4 "Acts of military commanders in conducting the operations
of war, and especially in territory in military occupation are by
the presumed authority of the commander-in-chief." Finley & Sander-
son, The American Executive and Executive Methods, 192; cf. Me -
chanlclTBank V. Union bank , 22 •'/all., 276, 297 (1874 )
.
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prosecution of hostilities in wsr being- devolved upon the President
as Commander-in-Chief", says V.'inthrop, "it will become his right and
duty (unless Congress otherwise provide) to exercise military
government over such portion of the country of the enemy as may
pass into the possession of his army by the right of conquest."^
Chief-Just ice Chase hat likewise defined military govern-
ment as military jurisdiction "to be exercised in time of foreign
wer without the boundaries of the United States, or in time of re-
bellion and civil war within states and districts occupied by rebels
treated as belligerents ; ... by the military commander und er the
6 irect ion of the President
.
with the express or implied sanction
o-r Congress.
"
6
The powers of the President with respect to military gov-
ernment are practically absolute, being limited, neither by the
Constitution and laws o^ the United States nor by the laws of the
country under occupation, but solely by the laws end usages of war.
"It is not the civil law of the invr-ded country; it is not the
civil law of the conquering country; it is military law -- the law
of war" — that governs a military occupant. As Commander-in-Chief
it is within the jurisdiction of the President to determine when
5 Abridgment of llilitrry Lev . 324.
6 Ex parte Lilligan
.
4 Wall., 2, 141-142 (1866).
7 T^ow y. Johnson
.
100 U. 3., 158, 170 (1879). "In such cases
the laws of war tske the place of the Constitution and laws of the
United States as applied in ti^.e of peace." Jew Orleans v. The
Steamship Company
.
20 Wall., 387, 394 (1874). "The right of one
belligerent to occupy and pov^rn the territory of the enemy while
in its rilitsry possession, is one of the incidents of war, and
flows directly from the right to conquer, ft, therefore, do not
look to the Constitution or political institutions of the conqueror
for authority to establish a government for the territory of the
enemy in his' possession, during its military occupation, nor for
the rules by which the powers of such government are regulated ^nd
limited. Such authority and such rules are derived directly from
the laws of war . . ." Dooley v. U. S . t 182 U. S., 222, 230-231,
(1901) .
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the conquest an enemy territory h^s been sufficiently completed
to warrant or require the institution of e military government; end
in the absence of Congressional action, he may likewise determine
the duration of such military occupation and government
The President may also determine the character o^ the
government to be established over occupied territory; that is, he
may, uncier the lews of war, set up such political institutions and
create a government with such powers as he thinks best suited for
carrying out the purposes of the military occupation. Thus, during
the war with Mexico, President Polk, although he had instructed
General Kearney to establish temporary civil governments in the
regions conquered by him, disapproved and repudiated his action in
organizing a government for Hew Mexico which gave to that region
the status of a permanent territory of the United States and which
recognized the inhabitants 8S United States citizens.
1 "^"
8 Hornsby v. U. S .. 10 ..all., 224, 239 (1869). Occasionally
attempts were mtde to set up a military government over territory
not actus lly uiCer occupation end control. For example, Andrew
Johnson was appointed military governor o^ Tennessee in March, 1862,
when a considerable portion o -" the state vas still unconquered by
the Union ^orces; and General Banks, remarking that "the city of New
Orleans is in reality the State of Louisiana", ordered an election
held in January, 1864, for governor and other officers ^or the en-
tire state. See A. II. Carpenter, "Military Government of Southern
Territory, 1861-1665," in Report. Am. Hist. Assn. 1900 , I, 465-496,
esp. 477, 476. President LcKinley took for granted that the capture
of Manila and the surrender the Spanish forces there "practically
effected the conquest o^ the Philippine Islands*, and therefore, on
Dec. 21, 1896, ordered the extension of the military government
theretofore maintained only in the city o^ Manila to the entire
archipelago. Richardson, op. cit . t X, 219.
9 Neely v. iienkel , 160 U. S., 109, 124 (1901); Birkhimer,
op. cit.
,
f:l, 366.
10 Thomas, History of Military Government in Newly Acquired
Territory q-'? the United States , 101-102.
11 Message to Congress, Deo. 22, 1846. Richardson, Messages
and Papers o^ the Presidents
,
IV, 507; see also liary o^ James K .
Polk
,
II, 282. For description of the government set up by Gen.
Kearney in New Mexico, see Thomas, op. cit. , 103-105.
1
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However, in spite this expressed disapproval o* the
principle upon which the military government hed heen organized in
Sew Hexico, the President apparently made no change In the machinery
or institutions set up there by General Kearney. Moreover, he ex-
pressed no disapproval of the similar territorial government organize
in California by Commodores Sloat a no Stockton;-1-^ and certa inly-
approved that established in Kerch, 1847, by General Kearney, which,
although not a territorial government in name, in fact practically
annexed California to the United States as permanent territory, the
inhabitants having been absolved from ell allegiance to kexico and
IS
considered as citizens of the United States.
During the Civil War, military governments were also es-
tablished by the President in the occupied portions of the South, an<|
his right to do so was upheld by the Supreme Court on the ground
that the conflict, "though not between independent nations, but be-
tween different portions o+ the same nation, was accompanied by the
general incidents of an international war."-'-4 In fact, one writer
has well described the Civil 7<ar as "a broadening drama of military
occupation, successive governments being established as the Con-
federacy gave way.""*"
The governments established were o* a peculiar character,
however, in that they were not strictly military governments in the
IE Thomas, op. cit
.
,
160-162, 165, 161. However, the Presi-
dent was not aware Of the action taken in California when he sent hii£
message to Congress; and ^is disapproval of the Stockton government
may be assumed from his ignoring that regime in Ms later instruc-
tions to Gen. Kearney to take charge in California.
13 Ibid
.
, 193-195. In October, 1847, the President expressed
himself as favoring an open avowal that Hew Mexico and California
should be retained by the United States, and that permanent terri-
torial governments should be established. Diary o^ James K. Polk .
ITI, 190. 97 U.S., 509, £17 (1676).
14 Dow v. Johnson . 100 U.S. ,158,164 ( 1879 ) ;c J . Coleman v.Ten .^
15 Glenn, The Army and the Law , 97.
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sense in which thet term is used in international lew, instituted
to afford protection for the occupying- forces rnd e temporary autho-
rity for the enemy inhabitants. -hey involved the creation o^ an
office not hitherto knovm in American constitution law -- that of
military governor; end they were instituted not for the ordinary
purposes of a military occupation, but with the avowed purpose "to
re-establish the authority of the Federal Government . . , and to
provide the means of ma intaininr the peace and security to loyal
inhabitants . . . until they shall be able to establish e civil
government." 17 With this end in view, the old state governmental
machinery ves gradually restored and placed in the hands of the
loyal inhabitants of the occupied districts, new institutions were
created where thought necessary, and new state constitutions, de-
signed to be permanent, were required to be framed and adopted —
all of which was upheld by the Supreme Court as a legitimate exer-
cise of the President's power, under the laws of war, to institute
military governments .
^
During- the Spanish-American War, military governments
were, by order of President KcEinley, established in the -Philippines
16 The "military governors" appointed during the Civil V/er
were commissioned as such, and •. ere distinct from the commanding
officer of the occupying forces. They were generally selected from
civil li^e, but ^or the occasion rere given military rank, com .only
that o" Brigadier General. Previous to this, no "military governor"
had ever been appointed, the commanding officer of the occupying
forces merely assuming the duties of governor by virtue of his rank
as the superior officer in the territory concerned.
17 Statement of Secretary o^ War Stanton, quoted by A. H.
Carpenter, op. cit ., 476.
18 "So long as the war continued it cannot be denied that he
Bight institute temporary governments within insurgent districts,
occupied by the national forces, or take measures, in any state, foi
the restoration o* State governments faithful to the Uni-^n, employ-
ing, however, in such efforts, only such means and such agents as
were authorized by constitutional laws." Texas v. .Vhite . 7 Wall*,
700, 730 (1868).
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in Porto Rico, end in Cuba, et first pretty strictly o* thi charac-
ter contemplated by the laws and usages of military occupation; that
is, merely temporary governments set up by the military commander
for the protection of the occupying- forces and the security of the
inhabitants. 19 In Porto Rico, however, some changes were made in
the political and judicial system that were not required by military
necessity, and the government is said to have been administered,
even before the treaty of peace was eigned, "as though the island
20
were a permanent possession of the United States"; while the later
anomalous government for the Philippines was presaged by the send-
ing of a commission to the islands, appointed after the signing
but before the final ratification of the treaty, with instructions
to "study attentively the existing social and political state of
the various populations, particularly as regards the forms of local
government, the administration of justice, the collection of customs!
end other taxes, the means of transportation, and the need of public
improvements ."
Having therefore the power, as Commander-in-Chief, to in-
stitute such 8 temporary government for occupied territory as he may
see fit, the President may also perform all the necessary functions
of that government, whether executive, legislative, or judicial.
^
He has, in the ^irst place, complete control over the appointment
19 See instructions of President LicKinley to the Secretary of
V/ar, issued May 19, July 13, & Bee. 21, 1898. Richardson, op. cit ..
X, 208-211, 214-216, 219-221.
20 Thomas, op. cit .. 307.
21 The commission consisted of Jacob G. Schurman, Admiral
Dewey, Maj. Gen. Otis, Charles Penby, and Dean C. Worcester. See
the President's instructions to the Secretary of State, Jan. 20,
1899. Richardson, op. cit.
,
X, 22£T 223.
22 Cross v. Harrison , 16 How., 164, 190 (1853); Le it ensdorfer
v.
' ebb , 20 How., 176, 177-178 (1857); The Grapeshot . 9 Wall., 129,
133 ( 1869 ) ; Root, Military and ColonlslTolicy of The United States ,
252.
:
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and removal of officers for that government. He may continue in
office such of the local officials t s he sees fit, or he may remove
them at his discretion end appoint a new set of officials, who, upon
the sole authority o* the President, supersede the exist in? officials
end administer the government under his direction.
Thus, President Polk, in his instructions to General
Kearney with regard to the governments to be established by him in
New Mexico end Californie, urged him "to continue in their employ-
ment all such of the existing officers as are known to be friendly
to the United States, and will take the oath of allegiance to
them"; 23 and President McKinley similarly instructed the Secretary
of War in 189G, that judges and other officials of justice in the
occupied territories should continue in office, if they accepted
the euthority of the United States and the supervision of the Ameri-
can commander. He reminded the Secretary, however, that under the
laws of war, "if the course of the people should render such mea-
sures indispensable to the maintenance of law and order", the com-
mander of the occupying forces had the power "to replace or expel
the native officials in part or altogether, to substitute new
courts 0° his own constitution for those that now exist, or to
create such new or supplementary tribunals as may be necessary."
In the military governments established during the Civil
War, on the other hand, the power of removal was exercised exten-
sively, beinp applied not only to public officials of low and high
degree, such as state officers, judges, and mayors; but also to
o*-"icers of semi-public and even private concerns, such as library
officials, o^icers and professors at state universities, and of-
23 Instructions of June 3, 1846. Thomas, Op. Pit .. 102.
24 Richardson, op. cit ., X, 209-210, 215, 220.
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ficers of chambers of commerce. "where they were not removed, the
offici8ls were "little more than f igureheads"
,
strictly subordinate
to the military commender, end holding- their positions only by
his permission. v
The officials appointed may be either civilians or mili-
tary persons, within the discretion of the appointing authority.
Thus, the principal officials appointed by General Kearney in New
Mexico were all civilians, including a governor, secretary, and
three members the supreme court, although the duties of governor
26
were later performed by military officers; while in California,
under similer conditions, the principal officials were military men
under both the Stockton and Kearney regimes. The "military
p-overnors" appointed by President Lincoln were all civilians, given
op
military rank for the occasion, and there seemed to be a conscious
effort to fill most ofthe subordinate offices also with civilians.
However, many o^ the commanding officers exercised the functions of
8 military governor, by virtue o^ their rank, in the territory oc-
25 A. H. Carpenter, op. cit ., 461.
26 Charles Bent, appointed governor by Gen. Kearney, was killqd
in an insurrection, Jan. 19, 1847. Secretary Vigil, who thereupon
became acting governor, was appointed governor Tec. 17, 1847, by
the military commander, Col. Trice, end served till Pec. 11, 1848,
when the duties of "civil and military pov^rnor" were assumed by
Col. J. M. Washington, by virtue of his rank as commanding officer.
He was in turn succeeded Oct. 23, 1849, by Col. John Munroe, who
Berved till the end of the military regime. Thomas, op. cit ., 115-
116, 128.
27 Col. John C. Fremont acted as rovernor for a short time
tinder appointment from Stockton; while under Kearney the principel
offices were filled as follows: governor, Col. P. B. Llason; secre-
tary of state, Lt. H. W. Hslleck filter famous as a Civil War g-ene-
rel'end as a writer on internat ionel lew); collector o^ customs,
Cart. J. L. Folsom. Col. Lies on was succeeded by Brig. Gen. Riley,
who served till the organization of the State government. Thomas,
op. cit ., 181; Winthrop, op. cit ., 324-325.
2~8 Andrew Johnson was commissioned military governor of Ten-
nessee, with rank of Brigadier General; likewise John S. Thelps of
Arkansas; Edward Stanly of llorth Carolina; end George F . Shepley
of "Louisiana.
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cupied by the forces under their command. During the period of the
war with Spain, President I.TcKinley pieced the military governments
established by him in charge of the commanding officers and their
military subordinates, gradually supplanting them with civilians
after the United States h8d acquired permanent possession.
Ihese powers of appointment end removal may be exercised,
as has been noted, either by the President directly, or through the
commanding officer or other subordinate with due authority in the
occupied district. Usually the commanding officer assumes the du-
ties of a military governor by virtue o^ his rank, without any
special appointment as such. In other crses, as in the military
governments established, in the South, a military governor was ap-
pointed by the President for each particular occupied district, dis-
tinct from the commanding officer in that region; while again, as
in Uew Mexico and California, the functions of commanding officer
end military governor have been performed, sometimes b^, different
persons, sometimes by the same person. As a general rule, where the
government is presumed to be strictly military in character, the
President has le^t the appointment of the officials in active charge
29 llaj. Gen. Wesley L. foerritt set ut a military government ir
the city of Manila immediately upon its capture and occupation on
Aug. 12, 189b, which military government was later extended to the
whole archipelago by his successor, Mjrjt Gen. E. S. Otis, acting
under the direct order of the President. Gen. Otis was succeeded
on May 5, 1900, by Maj. Gen. Arthur Maclrthur, who was in turn suc-
ceeded on July 4, 1901, by Maj. Gen. A. R. Chaffee. Porto Rico was
occupied by forces under Gen. ITelson A. i^iles, July 25, 1896, but
a military government was first formally established Oct. 18, by Mo J.
Gen. John R. Brooke. He was succeeded on Dec. 9, 1898, by llaj. Gen.
G. V. Henry, and on May 9, 1899, by jdrig. Gen. G • W. Davis. In Cub?i|,
a formal military government for the whole island does not appear t<i
have been s«t up till Tec. 13, 1896, when a Division of Cuba was
created, with l£aj. Gen. Brooke as commander and military governor.
He was succeeded in Dec, 189V, by Ifej* Gen. Leonard Wood.
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to the commending officer, who may even then select either civilians
or military persons. Thus, when Secretary Vigil became acting
governor in New Mexico after the death of Governor Bent, and be-
sought the Washington authorities to appoint a successor, Secretary
of V/ar Marcy replied thet the government being purely military, the
appointment of a governor would be left to the commanding officer
(Colonel Price). 30
V/hile the President's power with regard to the government
of occupied territory is therefore justly said to be "necessarily
despotic", it has been held that this applied onlv to his executive
or administrative power, and not to his power to legislate for that
territory. "His power to administer would be absolute", says the
Supreme Court, "but his power to legislate would not be without
certain restrictions in other words, they would not extend beyond
the necessities the case."^- However, it seems to be within
the power 0* the President, as Commander-in-Chief, to judge of the
"necessities the case", hence the restriction amounts in practice
to very little.
The President has the power, directly or through his sub-
ordinates, to issue orders ^or the government 0^ a. conquered terri-
tory, at least until Congress hes acted, and these orders have the
force of lew,"' Although definite affirmative action on the part
of the President or the military commander is required in order to
change the local municipal law 0" the conquered territory, he may,
if he thinks necessity demands such a step, abolish entirely the
laws of that territory and substitute laws and regulations of his
30 Thomas, op. alt *, 123.
31 Jooley v. ' U. |T, 182 U. S., 222, 234 (1901); cf. Moore'
s
Digest
.
271; Raymond v. Thomas , 91 U. S., 712, 716 (1675).
32 Cross v. Harrison, 16 How., 164, 190 (1853).
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own making, or he may supplement the local municipal lew with such
regulations as he may deem necessary and proper. 33
President Polk in 1846 thus defined the principles to
which the laws adopted for a conquered territory should conform,
when he declared to Congress that "such organized regulations as
heve "been established in any of the conquered territories for the
security of our conquest, for the preservation o^ order, for the
protection of the rights of the inhabitants, and for depriving the
enemy of the advantages of these territories while the military pos-
session of them by the forces of the United. Ststes continues, will
rzA
be recognized and approved." Accordingly, although at that time
he disapproved the attempt to p-ive Hew Mexico the status of a perma-
nent territory of the United States, as has been noted, the Presi-
dent apparently accepted and approved the action of General Kearney
in adopting an organic law for that region, copied from the organic
18W of Missouri Territory, ^ and in putting into effect numerous
other lews, compiled from neighboring state and territorial laws and
36from the laws of Mexico.* In California, on the other hand, the
legislative council established under the Stockton government was
ignored and omitted in the government set up by General Kearney un-
33 "Until he acts, it is presumed that he intends to leave it
of full effect." Glenn, The Army and the Lew
.
101, n. ; Coler.rn v.
Tennessee
.
97 U. S., 509, 517 (1878); President McKinley, in 18^
,
ordered that the rule of international law which required that the
municipal law o^ the conquered territory should be considered as
remaining in force, so far as compatible with the new order and un-
til suspended or superseded by the occupying belligerent, be ad-
hered to as far as -possible. Richrrdson, op. cit .. X, 209. Cf
.
7/inthrop, op. cit.
.
323; Davis, Treetise on the Ijlitary Lav: of the
United Ste J es. 300-301.
34 Message of Lee. 22, 1846. Richerdson, op. cit *. IV, 507.
35 It tos, ^or example, under the provisions o^ this "orp-anic
law" that Secretary Vigil Vceme acting governor o^ Hew Mexico upon
the death of Governor Bent in January, 1847.
36 Thomas, op. cit ., 103-105.
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der instructions from the President ,
^
7 en£ the orders o* the mili-
tary governor therefore continued there to be the only source of lew.
In the occupied districts o 4* the South, elections were con-
ducted under regulations prescribed by the military governor, con-
ventions were held under his supervision, and the const itvt ions and
governments created thereby were inaugurated under his authority.
For example, General Banks ordered an election held in Louisiana
in January, 1864, for governor and other officers, with the regula-
tion that those entitled to the rights of United States citizens
would be required to ve rt icipate , "indifference" to be treated as
a crime and "faction" as treason. Governor Shepley, in the same
state, later ordered an election for delegates to a constitutional
convention, for which he decreed the registration of all loyal citi-
zens, determined the ratio of representation in the convention, and
supervised the registration and election officers in their work. In
Arkansas, elections held under the revised constitution were set
aside under authority from President Lincoln, new elections were
held, and new officers inaugurated; while in Tennessee also, the
confirmation and approval of the military governor was apparently
necessary, not only for the holding of elections, but in order that
38
persons duly chosen might act.
This military supervision and control elections extendei.
durinr the Civil '.iar even to the occupied districts in the border
states which were, strictly speaking, not subject to military govern
ment and whose constitutional rights were pronounced as "theoretical
ly equal to the rest o* the Union". Thus, in various places in
Kentucky orders and proclamations were issued by the military autho-
37 Thomas, op. cit. , 181.
38 km H. Carpenter, op. cit ., 478, 462.
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rities, by which army officers were required to see that none but
i
loyal persons voted or were candidates at the elections, or acted
as election officers: in Missouri "voting contrary to orders" was de-
clared to be a military offense: and in Maryland provost-marshals
were ordered to "assist" election judges in administering the oath
of allegiance 8nd in reporting those who failed to carry out the
regulations. "In this way the military became the judge and in-
^1 k AM I
terpreter of the civil authorities and even o^ the laws themselves?
The President may likewise exercise complete control over
the municipalities within the occupied territory. He may, through
the proper subordinates, "change or modify either the form or the
constituents of the municipal establishments; may, in pl^ce of the
Bystem and regulations that formerly prevailed, substitute new and
40
different ones." Thus, during the Civil Y*er, this municipal
control extended to the founding of courts, legislation concerning
property, the establishment of bureaus in charge of various city
activities, the enforcement of a system of licenses, the appoint-
ment and removal of officials, the creation of police forces, and
the censorship o -" newspapers .
^
Numerous other powers with regard to the government of
occupied territory that are legislative in character may also be
exercised by the President. He may provide the finances necessary
for the support of the occupying forces and the expenses of the ad-
ministration of the territory by the levying of military contribu-
tions, the collection of the regular taxes, end the imposition of
39 A. H. Carpenter, op. cit ., 482-483.
40 Attorney-General Gripes to the Secretary of 7/er, July 10,
1898. £2 Op. Atty . Gen
.
.
527, 528.
41 A. F. Carpenter, op. cit ., 493-496; cf. Garner, Reconstruc -
tion in Mississippi. 38.
J
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42
customs duties, his judgment as to the propriety of such measures
43being necessarily arbitrary end absolute. He may likewise pro-
mulgate measures for the regulation of trade and intercourse with
44the occupied territory; establish and maintain telegraph and
railroad lines, evn though their business conflict with the vested
45
riphts of private companies; grant licenses and enter into contracts
whose provisions are binding even after the termination the
46 47
military occupation; and restrict the right of private ownership.
The judicial powers o^ the President in occupied territory
are also extensive. He has complete control over the establishment,
jurisdiction, and functioning of the military courts, such as
48
courts-martial, provost courts, and military commissions. In ad-
dition, the President may exercise supervision over civil courts
49
already in existence, or he may create such civil courts as he
deems necessary, displacing or supplementing those already existing.
Thus, in New Mexico General Kearney established a complete judicial
system, consisting of a superior or appellate court and district
42 Lawrence, Principles o e International Law
.
445; Pachardson,
op. cit .. IV, 5^0-572. 672-676; Winthrop. op. cit ., 326; Dooley v .
U. S.. 182 U. S., 222, 231-233 (1901). For view that the President
does not have these powers, see Kent's Commentaries. I, 292, quoted
in 1'oore's Digest
.
VII, 270.
43 Dow v, Johnson. 100 U. S., 158, 165 (1879); Herrera v. U.S.
,
222 U.S., 558, 571 (1912). Luring the Mexican '.Var, President Polk
st first rave Scott and Taylor discretionary authority to exact
contributions, but neither having done so, he later made his orders
"peremptory and stringent" that such exactions should be made
.
Liary
of James K. Polk
,
III, 156. Gen. Scott is said to hrve collected
contributi6ns about $22,000 from 19 Mexican states. Winthrop, op .
cit. . 326.
44 Birkhimer, op. cit ., 272; riemin^ v. Page , 9 How., 603, 615
(1849); cf. A. H • Carpenter, op. cit .. 489-493.
45 23 Op. Atty. Gen ., 425; Llagoon's Reports . 391-407.
46 New Orleans v. Steamship Company , 20 all., 387, 394-395
(1874); 23 Op. Atty. Gen.
,
551, fcbtf-&63.
47 Moore's Digest
,
VII, 264; For. 3el. 1901 . App., 97.
48 Supra , ch. VITI.
49 See A. II . Carpenter, op. cit .. 484-485.

184.
courts, and defined their jurisdiction.
During the Civil 7Var, provost courts "-ere established by
the military commanders in New Orleans end elsewhere, with civil
end criminal, as well fs military jurisdiction, and supplanting- in
many esses the lower state courts snd the local police courts.
President Lincoln himself, by executive order of October 20, 1862,
created a provisional court for Louisiana, which has been described
as "the Alphe and Omeg-a o^ justice f or Louisiana". In this order
the President appointed the judge (Charles A. Peabody), and gave
the court jurisdiction over "all causes, civil and criminal, includ-
ing cases in law, equity, revenue, and admiralty, and particularly
ell such powers and jurisdictions as belong to the district snd
circuit courts of the United States". He also prescribed the rules
procedure; mace the decisions o 41 the court "^insl and conclu-
sive", with appeals forbidden; f~nd vested in it the power to ap-
point the prosecuting attorney, marshal, and clerk. while the state
lews in force were to be administered by this court "8S far as pos-
sible", the orders o^ the military commanders were recognized as
51
of "paramount authority".
All of these acts of the President were upheld by the
Supreme Court in several decisions,*" snd his power, as Commander-
in-Chief, to orpanize and practically to control the judiciary in
.. 50 *Vinthrop, op. cit .. 525.
51 A. H. Carpent er
,
p. c it . , 485-466.
52 Leitensdorfer v. 7. ebb
,
20 How., 176 (1857); The Grspeshot
.
9 Well., 129 (18 69) ; Burke TTlait enb°rge r . 19 Wall., 519 (1873);
Mechanics Bank v. Union Bank
,
22 .all., 276 (1174).
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territory under military occupation, was clearly affirmed," with
only the limitation thst neither the President nor eny military corn-
mender can establish a court in such occupied territory to adjudi-
54
cate prize esses or to administer the law of nations.
Since all the powers and functions of military government
are therefore concentrated in the hands of the President, with
scarcely any limitation, it would not seem to be an exaggerst ion to
characterize such government as "an absolutism of the most complete
sort." 65
55 "Yn'hen enemies' territory is occupied, or territory to
which the rules of law assign th.^t name, though it be that of a
State of the Union, the President can replace its courts by courts
of his own, exercising both civil and criminal jurisdiction, and
disposing of life, liberty, end property, not as instruments of the
judicial authority of the United States, but as instruments of the
executive authority." Baldwin, Updern Political Institutions , 103.
54 Jeoker v. Montgomery
.
13 How. , 498 , 515 ( 1851 )
.
55 A. H. Carpenter, o-p. cit .. 496; V. illoughby , On the Consti -
tution
.
I, 390.

III. CIVIL POWERS IN TIME OF WAR.
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Chapter X.
Control of Administration *
It has been pointed out by a distinguished authority how
the original American conception of executive power was to the ef-
j fect that the President had been vested with military and political,
rather then administrative power; and further, how that conception
has changed, so that now the President is generally recognized,
through powers conferred by statute and derived from the Constitu-
tion itself, as "not merely the political head of the United States
national government but as well the head of its administrative
„1
syst em.
This position of the President naturally becomes especial-
ly important in time of war, when the exigencies of the situation
require the creation of additional governmental agencies and a
vast expansion in the general field of administration. Through
his constitutional powers of appointment, removal, supervision, and
direction, the scope of the President's administrative authority
is at such a time automatically extended, if his specific powers
are not actually increased.
In addition, Congress at such a time is inclined to recog-
nize the wisdom of Hamilton's arguments for a vigorous and unified
2
Executive, and to entrust exceptional administrative control to
the President. That is particularly true with regard to adminis-
trative agencies created to meet the special military needs of the
country. Thus the actual administration of the Lraft Acts of the
1 Goodnow, Principles of the Administrative Law in the United
States , 73-82.
2 See The Federalist, Ho. 69 ( 70 ) , ( Goldwin Smith ed. ,p. 386ff .
)

Civil War was given over to the President, although hedged about
with such an amount of statutory detail as to leave him with lit-
tle discretionary authority. The work of administering the pro-
visions of the draft was carried out through a Provost Marshal Gene-
ral, and through enrollment hoards, one for each district into which
the United States was divided. Each such board was to be composed
of the provost-marshal for the district, a licensed physician, and
one other person, to be appointed by the President. Their duties,
horever, were definitely defined by statute, hence the President's
authority was principally such as resulted from his control over
the personnel of the administrative machinery and from his general
powers of supervision.
4
The Selective Service Act of the recent war went much
further in entrusting the President with large powers of administra-
tion. The act provided for the registration of all male persons
between the ages of 21 and 30 (later extended to include all between
the ages of 18 and 45^), but geve the President complete authority
to designate the time and place for such registration, and to pre-
scribe the rul<=s and regulations in accordance with which it should
be held. Under this provision, President Wilson issued no less
than thirteen separate proclamations, designating the various times
end places for the registration. He likewise issued detailed regu-
3 Acts of Mar. 3, 1863, Feb. 24, 1864, & July 4, 1864. 12
Stat, at L.
.
731; 13 ibid ., 6, 390.
4 Act of May 18, 1917. Public No. 12, 65 Gong., in Wigmore,
Source-Book of Military Law and War-time Legislation , 460-468.
5 Act of Aug. 31. 1918. Public No. 210. 65 Cong.
.
Ibid
.
, 471-474.
6 Proclamations of May 18, June 27, June 30, July 2, 1917; May
20, June 11, June 17, June 18, Aug. 13, -Aug. 31, Sept. 18, Oct. 10
(2). U.S. Stats . .65 Cong. , lSess ., Proclamations , 20 , 30, 35, 36 ; ibid. ,
2
Sess., 137, 149, 152, 155, 190, 196, 207, 212, 216. So many proclamations
were issued for the reason that different registration dates were
designated for the various parts of the territory of the United
States. Thus June 5, 1917, was named as the first registration day
in continental United States (except Alaska), July 5 in Porto Rico,
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lations for the execution of the registration provisions of the act.
These regulations created an administrative system, con-
sisting of the Provost Marshal General as the chief administrative
officer; the governor and adjutant general of each state as his
principal assistants; a board of registration for each county or
corresponding subdivision, consisting of three members named by the
governor (or by the mayor in cities of over 30,000 population), none
of whom were to be in any way connected with the military establish-
ment; and one or more registrars for each voting precinct. These
Presidential regulations further defined the jurisdiction and duties
of these various officials in connection with the registration;
prescribed the compensation of the registrars; and outlined in detai!
i
the forms and methods under which the registration should take
7place
.
The local administration of the conscription provisions of
the Selective Service Act was carried out through local and district
boards, appointed by the President; the former, one for each county
or corresponding subdivision, consisting of three or more members,
none of whom was to be connected with the military establishment;
the latter, one or more for each Federal judicial district, com-
posed of such number of members, likewise civilians, as the Presi-
dent might determine. The duties of these boards were outlined in
the act; but the President was authorized to prescribe the rules
and regulations under which the boards should operate, to make
rules and regulations governing their organization and procedure,
July 2 - Sept. 2 in Alaska, and July 31 in Hawaii; similarly with re
SDect to the days later named under the amendatory acts of 1918.
7 See Registration Regulations , issued as a separate pamphlet
by the Government Printing Office, 1917.
8 As a general rule, the Registration Boards were reconstitu-
ted the Local Boards.

190.
and to make "all other rules and regulations necessary to carry
9
out the terms and provisions of this section."
Accordingly, President Wilson j on June 30, 1917, issued
(regulations, describing in detail the organization, duties, and
llprocedure of the local and district boards; 10 and on November 8,
1917, further regulations, covering in detail the jurisdiction of
the o^icial boards and auxiliary organizations, the rules and
principles governing the classification of the men, the process of
selection, the procedure of induction and mobilization, forms to be
observed, and the like. 1 "*" The boards were subject to the immediate
supervision of the Provost Marshal General and, finally, of the
President, who was empowered to "affirm, modify or reverse" any
decisions made by them. It is thus clear that while the adminis-
trative machinery of conscription was provided for and barely out-
lined by statute, its creation, supervision, method of operation,
and control were in the hands of the President.
With regard to the field of general administration, no
additional powers of importance were given to the President in pre-
vious wars, beyond his ordinary powers of supervision and direction
over the various executive departments and agencies. On the other
hand, something was done during the Civil War to provide a Congres-
9 Selective Service Act, Sec. 4, Wigmore
,
op.cit
.
,463-465.
10 Rales end Regulations Prescribed by the President for Local
i
and District Boards
, issued by the Government Printing Office, 1917
.
11 Selective Service Regulations . A second edition of these,
I
revised and enlarged, W8S issued Sept. 16, 1918, in which wae in-
cluded, for example, the famous "work or fight" rules. It is worthy
of note that the Selective Service Act itself covers only 8 pages;
while the Registration Regulations constitute a pamphlet of 30
pages, the Rules and Regulations for Local and District Boards one
of 84 prges, and the two editions of the Selective Service Regula-
tions booklets of 254 and 432 pages, respectively.
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sionel check on the President's administration of the war through
the committee of Congress known as the Joint Committee on the Con-
IE
duct of the War.
The nature and extent o^ the recent world war, however,
called for the creation of numerous new administrative agencies,
and it is worthy of note that Congress, in providing for these, in
almost every instance gave the President blanket authority to work
out the administrative details -- to create the necessary offices,
,
to prescribe the character of their organization, and to determine
upon the administrative methods to be used. Thus, the Espionage
Act, although providing for the control of exports from the United
States, created no administrative agency to exercise suoh control,
but merely specified that the export trade be carried on "under
such regulations find orders, and subject to such limitations and
exceptions as the President shall prescribe."
Likewise, the Food and Fuel Control Act set up no adminis-
trative machinery, but authorised the President "to make such regu-
lations and to issue such orders as are essential effectively to
carry out the provisions of this Act", and further, "to create and
use any apency or agencies, . ."for the same purpose."1"4 The Trad-
ing with the Enemy Act provided for the regulation and control of
trading with an enemy or ally of enemy and of the import trade, and
for the censorship of foreign communications and foreign-language
IE Hosmer, The Appeal to Arms , 80. During the recent war, an
attempt was made to set up a similar committee. The Senate 8dded a
provision to the Food and Fuel Control bill, establishing a joint
committee on war expenditures to be composed of 5 Senators and 5
Representatives, "to safeguard the expenditure the appropriations
bearing upon the war as made by Congress". The vigorous protest of
President Wilson against the embarrassment of such a committee force!
its abandonment in conference. Pol. Sc i . Qua r. , XXXII , Supp.,37,38.
13 Act o^ June 15, 1917 (Title VII, Sec. 1). Wigmore , op. cit . ,4f|3
14 Act of Aug. 10, 1917 (Sees. 1 & 2). Ibid . , 504.
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publications, but empowered the President to "exercise any power or
authority conferred by this Act through such officer or officers as
he shall direct"; 15 while the Railway Control *ct provided, "That
the President may execute any of the rowers herein end heretofore
granted him with relation to Federal control through such agencies
as he may determine . . ," 16
By virtue of these provisions, President Wilson vested the
executive administration of his instructions end proclamations con-
cerning the export trad« in the Secretary of Commerce, and estab-
lished an Exports Council, composed of the Secretaries of State,
Agriculture, end Commerce, and the Food Administrator, 1 ? "to direct
exports in such a way th8t they will go -^irst and by preference
where they are most needed end most immediately needed, and tem-
porarily to withhold them, if necessary, where they can best be
spared. nl ° As the administrative agencies for carrying out the pur-
poses of food and fuel control, the President created the Food and
the Fuel Administrations and the United States Grain Corporation;
to administer the provisions of the Trading with the Enemy -^ct con-
cerning censorship and the regulation of imports, he set up the Cen-
sorship Board and the .Ver Trade Board; 20 while for the administra-
15 Act of Oct. 6, 1917 (Sec. 5a). Wlgmore. op. olt . , 548.
16 Act 0* Mar. 21, 1918 (Sec. 8). Ibid . . 56TT.
17 Executive order of June 22, 1917. Official Bulletin
.
June 26, 1917.
18 Statement of President Wilson. Ibid . By executive order
of Aug. 21, 1917, the Exports Council fti enlarged by adding the
Chairman o** the Shipping r=oard, and continued as an advisory body;
but superseded in its control of exports by the Exports Administra-
tive Board, composed of representatives of the Secretaries of State,
Agriculture, and Commerce, the Food Administrator, and the Shipping
Board. 7/illoughby, Government Organization in far Time and After,
128 ; V/er Cyclopedia (1st ed. ), 90.
T3 Infra , 222-257.
20 Infra
.
228, 239.

tion of the railroads, he established the Railroad Administration,
with Secretary the Treasury iicAdoo as Director General of Rail-
roads. 21
Of all the important administrative agencies established
during the recent war to carry on some phase Of v/ar activity, very
22few were expressly created by statute, Congress thus apparently
recognizing the importance of entrusting the details of war adminis-
tration to the President. On the other hand, several war agencies,
such as the Committee on Public Information and the V/er Industries
Board, were created by the President without authority of statute, bu
23by virtue of his powers as Chief Executive and Commander-in-Chief.
The establishment o -0, all these new administrative agencies
for the carrying on of particular war activities, as well as the
tremendous expansion in functions and personnel of the departments
and agencies already in existence, soon raised the problem of how to
avoid duplication and waste and provide for the proper coordination
of effort. It finally came to a point where, in the words of Sena-
tor V.'adsworth (Uew York), "It must be apparent to every sensible
man that it is utterly impossible to get any teamwork out of this
conglomeration of ambitious and scattered agencies, official and
unofficial, unless we create some agency that shell guide and con-
21 Infra
.
245-247.
22 The Alien Property Custodian was thus created by law. See
Trading with the Lnemy Act (Sec. 6). Wigraore, op. cit. . 546-549.
See infra
,
242-243. Other administrative agencies of particular
importance during the war, such as the Council of National Defense,
the iVar Risk Insurance Bureau, and the Shipping Board, were ex-
pressly created by statute, but before the United States entered
the war and not anticipating that event. For an account o^ the
work of the first two o^ these, see Willoughb,, , G-ovornment Organi -
zation in V/ar Time and After. 9-21, 339-351; for that of the Ship-
ping Board in relation to this study, infra . 247-246.
23 Infra
.
223-224, 240-241.
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trol them ell in those matters in which teamwork is essential for
24
the accomplishment of greet results."
This general feeling culminated in a proposal by Senator
Chamberlein (Oregon), approved by the Senate Committee on Military
Affairs, for a war cabinet
,
to be composed of "three distinguished
citizens of demonstrated ability," who were to be appointed by the
President with the consent of the Senate, and through whom the Pre-
sident was to exercise "such of the powers conferred upon him by
the Constitution and the laws of the United States, as are herein-
after mentioned and described." This war cabinet was to have com-
plete jurisdiction and authority to initiate pl8ns and policies for
the prosecution of the war; to direct and procure the execution of
these plans and policies; and "to supervise, coordinate, direct, and
control the functions and agencies of the Government, in so far as,
in the judgment of the war cabinet, it may be necessary or advisable
so to do for the effectual conduct and vigorous prosecution of the
exist in? war." The war cabinet was further to be authorized to make
the rules and regulations governing its own procedure; to require
information from and utilize the services of any or all executive dej
partments, agencies, and officials of the United States and of the
several states; and to make all the orders and decisions necessary
to carry out these provisions. Besides the right to name its mem-
bers, the President was to be given over this war cebinet, only e
25
very limited power of review.
The bill thus proposed to confer powers under which this
24 Speech in U. S. Senate, Feb. 5, 1918. Cong. Record , 65
Con?., 2 Sess., 1869. See also charts, included in the eddress,
showing the orgenizetion and proposed reorgenizat ion of the war-
me Vine- machinery. Ibid . , 180e-1610.
25 The war cabinet bill was introduced by Senator Chamberlain,,
Jan. 21 1918. See text of bill in Cong. Record , 65 Cong. ,2 Sess . , 1077-1$ 78
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new war cabinet, as one Senator said, "could take absolute charge
of the conduct of the war. The President would not have the autho-
rity to initiate or formulate any plans or policies for its prose-
cution. His power as Commander- in-Chief would be destroyed. He
2 6
would be subject to the orders of the War Cabinet'.' President
Wilson therefore vigorously opposed this proposal, saying that it
"would involve long additional delays and turn our experience into
27
mere lost motion", and instead he secured the introduction, and
finally the paesage, of a bill containing his ideas for meeting the
situation. 28
This so-called Overman Act authorized the President "for
the national security and defense, for the successful prosecution
of the war, for the better utilization of resources and industries,
for for the more effective administration by the President of his
powers as Commander-in-Chief of the lend and naval forces", to make
such redistribution of functions among the executive agencies as
he might deem necessary; to utilize, coordinate, or consolidate any
existing executive or administrative agencies; to transfer any
duties or powers, together with any portion of the personnel and
equipment, from one such agency to another; and to make whatever
regulations and issue whatever orders might be necessary to carry
out these provisions. The President was further authorized to es-
26 Senator Shields, in U.S. Senate, Apr. 22, 1918. Cong. Record
.
65 Cong., 2 Sess., 5836.
27 Statement of Jan. 21, 1918, quoted in Am. Pol. Sci. Rev .
.
XII, 377 (Aug. 1918).
28 The administration bill was introduced by Senator Overman,
Feb. 6, 1918, and became law May 20, 1918. Senator Overman stated
very frankly: "The bill was advocated by the President and sent to
me by the President, and I have no hesitation in saying so." Cong .
Record
.
65 Conp.,2 Sess. , (Apr. 3, 1918) ,4883. The fight between the
ad^ocptes of the Overman Bill and Senator Chamberlain's War-Cabinet
bill, and the probable motives behind the latter, are described by
J.M.Leake.
"
Th e Conflict over Coordination? in Am. Pol. Sci. Rev. XII
368-380 (AuT.~19l8T. = —
=
*=
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tablish an executive fluency for exercising- such control over the
production of aeroplanes and aircraft equipment as he might con-
sider advantageous. He had. no power, however, to abolish any
"bureau or eliminate its functions altogether, but was authorized to
make such recommendations to Congress in that regard as he might
deem proper. Moreover, the act was strictly a war measure, in that
it was expressly provided that the authority granted was to be exer-
cised "only in matters relating to the conduct of the present war";
and further, that the act was to remain in force no longer than "six
months after the termination of the war by the proclamation of the
treaty of peace", all executive agencies and functions at that time
29
reverting to their former status under existing law.
The President was thus, by the terras of this act, given
complete control over the administrative machinery of the nation as
rzr\
used for the purposes of the war. The act met with considerable
opposition as an unwarranted and dangerous extension of the Presi-
31dent's power; while at least one distinguished authority held
th8t it was entirely unnecessary, claiming that the President already
had full constitutional power to make such transfers of functions
end consolidations of agencies on his own initiative. "I think,"
said this former Attorney-General and Secretary of St8te, "the
President has the authority to require <^very executive officer and
every department o 47 the Government to do anything tnat ne airecoa
to be done in order to prosecute this war. to a successful conclu-
sion. I think he has the power to delegate from one Cabinet officer
29 See text o^ act in Wigmore, oio. cit ., 586-587.
30 See 8n excellent summary by Senator Fletcher of whet might
be accomplished under this act. Cong. Record , 65 Cong., 2 Sess.
(Apr. 22, 1918), 5842.
31 Especially from Senators Cummins (Rep.), 8nd Reed and Hoke
Smith (Dems. )
.
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to enother the discharge o-f any particular duty that he thinks such
a Cabinet officer can discharge better than the one upon whom it
would normally be incumbent. I do certainly think that the President
has all those powers. . . As I have read the Overman bill, in so
far as it proposes to authorize the President to utilize end coordi-
nate executive agencies, . . I would not hesitate a second to ad-
vise the President of the United States that he now possesses that
power." 32
The majority in Congress felt, however, that the act was
not only justified in order to avoid the suspicion or necessity of
the President setting himself up as a dictator and doing the same
33things without definite authority o^ law, but also that it was
necessary to secure the proper coordination of effort on the part
of the agencies entrusted with carrying on the various war activi-
ties of the government, and was not to be considered as warranting
^ 34
any abuse of power by tie President.
32 Senator Knox (Rep.), in U. S. Senate, Apr. 3, 1918. Cong .
Record, 65 Cong., 2 Sess., 4898; see also ibid
. , 4903, A leading
journal also held that the President's power over administration was
practically absolute, and that if he had exercised this power, it
would probably not have been questioned in Congress or by public
opinion. It said, however, that the Overman Act "would dramatize
the President's powers so effectively that no one could question
them." The IJation
,
May 4, 1918.
33 See Senator Harding's suggestion concerning the need of a
dictator. Supra , ch. I, note 29. Senator Overman frequently empha-
sized the point that instead of exercising questionable powers with-
out authority of law, as was done by President Lincoln, President
Wilson had been careful to ask Congress for specific authority to
exercise such necessar; powers.
34 Senator Nelson (Rep.) probably best expressed the sentiment
of the majority when he said: "This opposition is founded on the
assumption that the President from first to last will do nothing but
wrong; that he/will discontinue and dismantle all the departments in-
stead of the proper assumption that he will utilize them to t ie best
of his ability to carry on the war successfully. . . In order to car-
ry on the transportation of food and supplies to Euro-ne it is neces-
sary to have all these branches of the Government function and work
together. That is ell there is in this bill, and there is no use of
slandering it." Cong. Record, 65 Cong., 2 Sess. (Apr. 3, 1918 ) ,4886 .
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Moreover, there were several precedents for granting- such
authority as was done by the Overman Act. An act of February 14,
35
1903, had authorized the President "to transfer at any time the
whole or any part of any office, bureau, division, or other branch
of the public service engaged in statistical or scientific work from
the Department of State, the Department of the Treasury, the Depart-
ment of War, the Department of Justice, the Post Office Department,
the Department of the Navy, or the Department of the Interior, to
36
the Department of Commerce and Labor". The Act of April 28, 1908,
authorized the President "for any special occasion" to transfer to
the head of another department certain authority conferred upon the
an
Secretary of Commerce; the Act June 24, 1910, ' authorized the
Secretary of the Navy, with the approval of the President, to trans-
fer the duties of the Bureau of Equipment to the other bureaus
and offices of the Navy Department "in such manner as the Secretary
of the Navy shall consider expedient and proper"; while by the Act
of March 3, 1917,^® the Bureau of Efficiency was required to inves-
tigate duplication 0* service in the various executive departments
and establishments of the Government and make a report to the Presi-
dent, who was authorized, "after such report shell have been made
to him, whenever he finds such duplications do exist, to abolish
the same." Apparently there was no exercise of the power authorized
by this last-mentioned act, for the reason that the Bureau of Ef-
ficiency was employed during the war to devise a system for the worl:
o^ the 7/ar-Risk Insurance Bureau and hence had never been able to
35 32 Stat, at L
.
, 830 (Sec. 12).
36 35 ibid
.
, 69 (sec. 3)
.
37 36 ibid. , 613.
38 39 ibid
. , 1122 (sec. 8).
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29
make the required report to the President.
In addition to the statutes above mentioned, others have
been passed applicable to emergencies only, under which the Presi-
dent is authorized at such times to transfer important functions
and services. Thus he is empowered, in time of threatened or actual
a
war, to utilize the Public Health and Marine hospital Service to
such extent and in such manner as shall, in his judgment, promote
the public interest"; the Coast Guard, ordinarily a branch of the
Treasury Department, may be transferred to the Navy, "in time of
war or when the President shall so direct"; and the vessels, equip-
ment, stations, and personnel of the Lighthouse Service and the
Coast and Geodetic Survey are subject to transfer by the President
to either the War or Wavy Department, "whenever in his judgment a
sufficient national emergency exists." Numerous acts relating to
transfers of employees and officials within the Civil Service have
long been on t"r e statute-books; so also regarding the detail of
military and naval officers to service with other departments or
40
agencies.
The Overman Act, while going considerably further in its
grant of power than anything before enacted, was therefore not en-
tirely novel in its essential principles, especially when considered
as a purely war-time measure. Its rassage, however, aroused con-
siderable speculation as to the probable action of the President
under its authority. Suggestions were thrown out of possible radi-
cal changes, such as the setting up of a "War Super-Cabinet" or war
council, to consift of such Cabinet members and heads of newly es-
39 See Conp. Record
.
65 Cong., 2 Sess.Upr. 3, 1918), 4891.
40 See complete list o° such acts in ibid. . 4901.
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tablished bureaus as were more immediately concerned with the con-
duct of the war. Others did not look for any great changes, hold-
ing that the Overman Act was to he considered "more as a resource,
to be ready at hand as need arises, . . . more as a club than any-
thing else, to bring about better team work, and thus to increase
efficiency .
"
4^
As a matter of fact, no startling changes, transfers, or
consolidations were made by the President as a result of the Over-
men Act, and in no way was the regular Cabinet superseded, or the
position of any of the executive departments in the field of adminis
tration impaired. President Wilsoon's first order under the autho-
rity of this act, issued on the very day the act- went into effect,
was perhaps one of the most important. This order provided for the
reorganization of the Air Service, which, as a part of the Signal
Corps of the Army, had up to this time been under the direction
of the Chief Signal Officer.
The powers and functions of that officer were now redis-
tributed as follows: (l) The Chief Signal Officer was left in
charge of telegraph and telephone operations. (2) A Director of
Military Aeronautics was created and placed in charge of the Avia-
tion Section of the Signal Corps, with the duty of "operating and
maintaining or supervising the operation and maintenance of all
military aircraft, . . . and of training officers, enlisted men,
and candidates for aviation service in matters pertaining to mili-
tary aviation;" and to that end there was transferred to his juris-
diction evry function, power, and duty of the Chief Signal Offi-
cer in reference to such military aviation, as also all property
41 See article in N. Y. Tines, May 5, 1918
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and personnel used in connection with that service. (3) A Bureau
of Aircraft Production ,r,8s established as an executive agency to
exercise complete jurisdiction and control over the production of
aircraft and aircraft equipment, with the Chairman of the Aircraft
Board (which had been created by the Act of October 1, 1917) as its
executive officer. He was now designated the Director of Aircraft
Production, and was to have complete charge of the activities,
42
personnel, and properties of the said Bureau.
By another executive order of May 28, 1918, the War In-
dustries Board, which had been originally formed as one of the ad-
43
visory committees of the Council of national Defense, was es-
tablished as a separate administrative agency to act for the Presi-
dent and under his direction. The functions, duties, and powers of
the board were by this order continued as they had been outlined by
the President in his letter of March 4, 1918, to the chairman, Ber-
44
nard M. Baruch; and in its new capacity the War Industries Board
became one of the most important factors in coordinating the in-
dustrial resources of the nation and thus contributing to the suc-
cessful conclusion of the war.
The war having been won, President Wilson ordered the War
Industries Board to be dissolved January 1, 1919, and certain of
its functions transferred to other executive agencies. Thus the
powers and functions of the Division of Planning and Statistics
were transferred to the War Trade Boar-, 8s also the powers of the
War Industries Board with respect to any orders, directions, regula-
42 Executive Order o^ May 20, 1918. Official Bulletin, May
21, 1918.
43 Under authority of the Army Appropriations Act of Aug. 29,
1916. U. S. Stats ., 64 Con?., 1 Sess., 619, 650.
44 Officiel Bulletin. May 31, 1916. For the letter referred tji
as outlining the functions of the board, see ibid.
,
Mar. 31, 1918.
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tions, or functions that oould not, in the opinion of the chairman,
be ebrogeted, complied with, or fulfilled by the 1st of January;
while those of the Wool Division were transferred to the Bureau of
Markets in the Department of Agriculture. The powers and functions
of the Price Fixing Committee were ordered to continue until the
prices fixed by the committee should have expired, whereupon all
the papers and records should be delivered to the liquidating of-
ficer of the War Industries Board, and the committee should stand
dissolved. The order further specified that the War Industries
Board, or any number of its members and officials might be continued
for a limited period after January 1st, if the chairman found that
to be necessary for the proper performance of any duty entrusted to
him or to the board, but only for the purpose of performing that
45
duty and liquidating the affairs of the board.
Other particularly important orders issued under the
Overman Act were those affecting the natural resources of the coun-
try. Thus, by executive order of July 3, 1918, the records, person-
nel, and powers of the Federal Trade Commission relating to the pro-
duction and distribution of coal and coke were taken from that body
and transferred to the Fuel Administration. 46 By another order of
July 31, 1918, the President likewise placed the control of the
petroleum supply in the hands of the Fuel Administrator, directing,
45 Executive Order of Dec. 31, 1918. Official U. S. Bulletin
.
Jan. 89, 1919. While this executive order dissolving the War In-
dustries Board was specifically based on the Overman Act, the order
of May 28, 1918, establishing that board as an administrative agency
contained no reference to that act or any other statute, though th8t
authority was evidently presumed. Another executive order apparent-
ly issued under authority of the Overman Act, but making no specific
reference to it, was th8t of June 25, 1918, transferring the gas ex-
periment station 8t American University (Washington, D. C.) from the
jurisdiction of the Bureau of Mines to that of the V/ar Department.
Official Bulletin. June 28, 1918.
46 Ibid.. July 10, 1918.
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however, that such control should be exercised through a Committee
on Standardization of Petroleum Specifications, the composition of
47
which was prescribed in the order. Of a similar nature was a
later order conferring the control of the mineral resources of the
48
country upon the Secretary o^ the Interior.
Numerous other executive orders were issued under the
authority of the Overman Act, transferring and coordinating various
functions and services. On May 31st, all the law officers of the
government were ordered to "exercise their functions under the su-
pervision and control of the head of the Department of Justice", ex-
cept ing only those officers in the Philippines, the Comptroller of
49
the Treasury, and the Judge Advocates General of the Army and Navy;*1
on June 18th, the war housing activities were placed under the con-
50trol of the Secretary of Labor; and on July 1st, all the sanitary
and public health services were concentrated under the supervision
of the Secretary of the Treasury, excepting those health functions
military in character, exercised by the Surgeons General of the
Army and Navy and by the Provost Marshal General. ^1
Finally, to show the great variety in the actions trken
under the Overman Act, mention may be made of the executive order
of October 3, 1916, transferring $120,000 from the appropriation of
|l, 620,000 for the censorship of ^oreign mails under the Post Of-
fice Department, and allotting that amount to the Secretary of War
47 Official Bulletin
.
Aug. 7, 1918. This committee was to be
composed of 7 members, as follows: a chairman appointed by the Fuel
Administrator, one member appointed by th e Secretary of War, one by
the Secretary of the Navy, one by the chairman of the Shipping Boarc
one by the Director General o^ Railroads, one by trie Director of the
Bureau of Mines, and one by the Director of the Bureau of Standards.
48 Ibid
. , Nov. 18, 1918.
49 TbTd" . t June 4, 1918.
50 Ibid
.
, June 20, 1918.
51 Ibid.
,
July 2, 1918.
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for the censorship of the mails in the Panama Canal Zone; end of
the executive order of October 22, 1918, by which the President
transferred a single individual (W. F. Sloan, of the Division of
Program and Statistics) from the Bureau of Aircraft Production to
the Post Office Department for such duties as might be assigned to
him by the Postmaster General in connection with the control and
53
operation of the telegraph and telephone services.
The excellent results of the "blanket authority" thus
conferred on the President with regard to administration in time of
war, may be considered to have set a precedent for the future,
which will undoubtedly be followed in case of another emergency.
As a result, therefore, of his duty to administer and enforce the
laws, of his power to nominate, appoint, and dismiss the chief ad-
ministrative officers, and o^ the administrative powers conferred
by statute, it may fairly be said that the President, in time of
war esrecielly, "has become in effect the administrator- in-chief of
the Government."
52 Official Bulletin , Oct. 10, 1918.
53 Ibid ., ^ov. 13, 1918.
54 Cf. Y/illouehby, Government Organization in V-ar Time and
After. 5-6.
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Chapter XI.
Powers of Police Control.
The Bill of Rights is generally considered the most
sacred part of the Constitution, especially those portions of it
guaranteeing freedom of speech, o* the press, and of assembly;
security from arbitrary arrest and deprivation of property; and a
speedy trial by jury. 1 One of the most important, as well as one
of the most perplexing questions that arise in time of war is that
of the extent to which these ordinary civil rights of the individual
may be restricted in the interest of the public safety and the
national defenie. Clearly the Constitution is not merely a peace
instrument, but was intended to protect the individual in time of
war as in time of peace. The doctrine of inter armas leges silent
2
can have no place in a constitutional government; nevertheless it
must also be recognized that the guaranty of civil rights cannot
a^r-ly in the same fashion, nor to the same extent, in time of war
as under normal conditions.
One distinguished authority says that "war is a negation
1 Amendments . Arts. I, IV, V, VI.
2 "The Constitution of the United States is a law for rulers
and people, equally in war and in peace, and covers with the shield
of its protection all classes of men, at all times, and under 811
circumstances. No doctrine, involving more pernicious consequences,
was ever invented by the wit of man than that any of its provisions
can be suspended during any of the great exigencies of government."
Ex parte Milligan , 4 Wall., 2, 120-121 (1866). However, a commit-
tee o-" the N. Y. B8r Association, at its meeting in Jan., 1917,
reported as follows: "In time of war the laws are silent; during
the war civil riphts may be suspended at the will of the Commander-
in-Chief. The Constitution does not inure to the benefit o^ the
public enemy, of spies, or of enemy sympathizers." This position
was severely criticized by Dean H. W. Ballentine, the College
o^ Law in the University of Illinois, in an article, "The Effect of
Wn r on Constitutional Liberty", in Case and Comment , XXIV, 3 (June,
1917)
.
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of civil rights", and holds that in its control over the life,
liberty, and property of those whom it recognizes as public enemies,
Congress is limited "only by the dictates of humanity and a respect
for the practice of nations." Another writer contends that the
amendments guaranteeing these rights were intended "as declarations
of the rights of peaceful and loyal citizens, and safeguards in the
administration of justice by the civil tribunals; but it was neces-
sary, in order to give the government the means of defending itself
against domestic or foreign enemies, to maintain its authority and
dignity, and to enforce obedience to its laws, that it should have
unlimited war powers ; and it must not be forgotten that the same
authority which provides those safeguards, and guarantees those
rights, also imposes upon the President and Congress the duty of
so carrying on war as of necessity to_ supersede and hold in tem-
porary suspense such civil rights as may prove inconsistent with
the complete and effectual exercise of such war powers and of the
belligerent rights resulting from them. . . The rights enjoyed
under the constitution in time of peace are different from those to
which he is entitled in time of war.""*
Even if we do not fully accept the contention of these
writers that civil rights may be suspended in time of war, still
it would seem to be apparent that at such a time these rights must
be subject to some modification, restriction, or at least, very
3 W. A. Dunning, in Pol. Sci. Quar .
,
I, 176.
4 Whiting, War Powers under the Constitution . 51. But in his
dissenting- opinion in the recent case of Abrems v. U. S. (40 Sup.
Ct., 17), Justice Holmes declared that the right of free speech is
the same in war 8S in peace, saying, "It is only the present dan-
gers of immediate evil or an intent to bring it about that warrants
Congress in setting a limit to the expression of opinion where
private rights are not concerned." Cited in Central Law Jour .,
LXXXIX, 444 (Dec. 19, 1919).
p
207
careful supervision, in order thst the government may contend suc-
cessfully with sedition and disloyalty from within as well as
against the enemy without; the principle justifying this view being
that the rights of the individual must yield to those of the state
5in the time of the state's peril from a public enemy. Hence
there have been developed what may be called the police powers of
the President in time of war, that is, the powers exercised by
him in restraining and controlling the actions of individuals,
whether they be citizens or aliens, within the limits of the
country, during a period of war or similar emergency.
The relation of this war power to the rights of enemy
aliens who are fonnd within the country after the outbreak of a war
is comparatively simple. International law from its very begin-
ning recognized the right of a state to arrest such enemy aliens
immediately upon the outbreak of"war and detain them as captives
during the period of hostilites. later long-continued practice
brought about the rule that a reasonable time for departure should
be given before arrest, developing finally into the rule that such
aliens should be permitted to remain during the entire period of
the war, unless military considerations required their expulsion.
The rifrht to arrest or otherwise restrict and govern the conduct of
enemy aliens, has, however, never been formally abandoned, and was
indeed revived on a wholesale scale by each belligerent during the
recent world war.
In the United States, the right o^ a state under inter-
national law thus to regulate and restrict the conduct and move-
5 Cf. Glenn, The Army and the Law , 144.
6 Lawrence, Principles of International Law , 387-369; Hershey,
Essentials of International Public Law, 362.
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ments of enemy aliens has been definitely vested in the President.
An set of Congress passed nearly a century and a quarter ago,
designated as alien enemies all male natives, citizens, denizens,
or subjects of a hostile nation or government, who were at least
fourteen- years of age and not actually naturalized; and in 1918
Q
the scope of this 8ct was enlarged so as to include women. The
President, by virtue of these acts, is authorized to direct the
conduct to be observed on the part of the United States towards
these en<~my aliens, the manner and degree of the restraint to which
they shall be subject, and in what cases and upon what security
their continued residence in the United States may be permitted;
to provide for the removal of those who are not to be permitted to
remain; and "to establish any other regulations which shall be
Pound necessary in the premises for the public safety." In case
of removal being ordered, the President is further authorized, at
his discretion, to give such reasonable time for departure "as may
be consistent with the public safety, end according to the dictates
of humanity and national hospitality."
In other words, the President is, impliedly by the rules
of international law and expressly by statute, vested with full
power to restrict 8nd control the conduct and movements of alien
enemies as he may see fit. He may permit them to stay in the United
St8tes during the course of a war, with such restrictions upon
their conduct as he may deem proper, or with no restrictions; he
may order them to depart from the country, and if they refuse or
neglect to go, may compel their removal; or he may arrest and intern
7 Act of July 6, 1798. Annals of Cong-. , 5 Cong., Ill, App.,
3753; U. S. Rev. Stats ., sees. 4067-4070.
8 Act 0? Apr. 16, 1918. U. S. Stats ., 65 Cong., 2 Sess., 531.
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thei- for the period of the war. His actions under these powers ere
9final, end in no way subject to judicial review.
Until recently little use seems to have been made of this
power. During the war of 1812, aliens were ordered to report their
names and obtsin "certificates" once a month.^ Otherwise they
have apparently been permitted to remain in the United States with
no harrassing regulations governing their conduct and movements.
During the recent war with Germany and Austria-Hungary, however, the
magnitude of the struggle, involving as it did practically every
resource and industry of the nation, and the great number of citi-
zens or subjects o^ those countries resident in the United States,
made the danger from such enemy aliens considerably more serious
than ever before.
President Wilson, acting under the authority of the Act
of 1798, therefore took precautionary measures immediately upon the
entry of the United States into the war, and in the very same pro-
clamation announcing the existence of a stale of war, 1 '1' he estab-
lished 8 set of twelve regulations governing the conduct of such
enemy aliens within the United States. Under these regulations,
the possession by enemy aliens of any sort of fire-arm or signal
apparatus was prohibited; a barred zone was created around every
fort, arsenal, and other government property; attacks or threats
o f any sort apainst the government, its measures, policies, or per-
sonnel, were not allowed; their residence within any prohibited
erea that might be designated by the President was not permitted;
their departure from and entry into the United States was allowed
9 Glenn, The Army end the Law , 87.
10 Life and Works of John Adams , X, 42.
11 Proclametion o^ Apr. 6, 1917. U. S. Stats ., 65 Cong., 1
Sess., Procs., 6.
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only Tinder such restrictions as the President might prescribe; hos-
tile acts, or sets giving "information, aid, or comfort" to the
enemy were of course forbidden; and they were subject, upon suspi-
cion, to summary arrest and internment.
These regulations of April 6. were supplemented by eight
additional regulations established in the proclamation of November
12
16, 1917, which absolutely excluded enemy aliens from such regions
as the territorial waters of the United States, the District of
Columbia, end the Panama Canal Zone; required them to register;
and ordered them to obey such restrictions and regulations upon
their residence, occupation, and travel, as the Attorney General
might ma>e from time to time. Upon the declaration of war against
Aust ria -Hungary , the scope of these regulations was extended to in-
clude the citizens and subjects of that country; 1^ and finally,
to include the alien women of both Germany and Austria-Hungary.
While the Act of July 6, 1798, supplemented by the Act
of April 16, 1918, therefore conferred extensive powers of police
control upon the President, there can be no question but that such
powers are strictly in line with the accepted rules of international
practice, and even without these statutes, might be said to hr>ve
been vested in the President as the Chief Executive and as Comman-
der-in-Chief.
Somewhat more doubtful are the powers conferred by the
12 U. S. Stats ., 65 Cong., 1 Sess., Procs., 72.
13 Proclamation of Dec. 11, 1917. Ibid . , 2 Sess., 85.
14 Proclamation of Apr. 19, 1918. Ibid . , 128. On Christmas
Day of 1918, these regulations were rescinded, in their entirety
as extended to women, and also as applied to men, excepting only
the rpstrictions as to departure from and entry into the United
States. Proclamation of Dec. 23, 1918. Ibid. , 3 Sess., 274. Thi
proclamation is unique in being done "at the city of Paris, in the
Republic of Prance."
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famous Alien Act of 1798, which was passed during the stress of
the expected war with France and applied to all aliens, whether
from an en^my or a friendly country. By the provisions of this act,
the President was authorized to order out of the country "such
aliens as he shall judge dangerous to the peace and safety of the
United States, or shall have reasonable ground to suspect are con-
cerned in any treasonable or secret machinations against the Govern-
ment thereof." A license to reside within the United States at any
place designated by the President might be secured, if the alien
concerned could prove, "to the satisfaction of the President",
that he was not dangerous to the public safety; but any alien re-
turning to the United States after his removal, unless by permission
of the President, was to be imprisoned "so long as, in the opinion
of the President, the public safety may require."
This measure thus gave the President practically unlimited
police control over ell aliens within the United States. Though
enacted during a time of technical peace, the Alien Act was de-
signed (together with the Sedition Act) as a war measure, "to af-
ford the President of the United States an effective weapon against
what seemed sn especially pernicious and dangerous form of domestic
opposition in time of war." 1^ A great many of the recently admitted
foreigners were extreme radicals who "expressed their opinions by
speech or ven with a venomous facility that has few counterparts in
15 Act o* June 25, 1798. Annals o* Cong . . 5Cong. . Ill .App. 5744.
16 F. H. Anderson, in Report. Am. Hist. Assn. 1912 , 115.
"French spies then swarmed in our cities and in our country; some
of them v;-ere intolerably impudent, turbulent, and seditious. To
check them, res the design of the law." Adams to Jefferson, June
14, 1813. Life and Works of John Adams, X, 42. The limitation of
the act to two years is also an indication that it W8S designed
purely as a war measure.
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these milder times," condemned every magistrate in power in the
United States, and whose outpourings could not he looked upon as
17
altogether harmless. There might even be said to have been a
precedent for the Alien Act in a similar act passed in Virginia in
1785 and reenacted in 1792, but which, as Madison pointed out, dif-
fered in that the Virginia act expressly applied only to enemy
aliens in time of actual war. 1 ®
The powers conferred by the Alien Act were upheld as a
legitimate exercise of the war power, in the report of a House com-
mittee submitted February 21, 1799, as follows: "The right of re-
moving aliens, a_s an incident to t :e power of war and peace
,
accord-
ing to the theory of the Constitution, belongs to the government of
the United States. . . Congress is required to protect each state
from invasion; and it is vested • . . with powers to make all laws
which shall be proper to carry into effect all powers vested by the
Constitution in the government of the United States, or in any de-
partment or officer thereof; and to_ remove from the country , in
times of hostility, dangerous aliens, who may be employed in pre-
paring the way for invasion, is & measure necessary for the purpose
of prevent ing invasion
,
snd, of course, a measure that Congress is
empowered to adopt. . . Although the committee believe that each
of the measures adopted by Congress (referring also to the Sedition
Act) is susceptible of an analytical Justification, on the princi-
ples of the Constitution and national policy, yet they prefer to
rest their vindication on the true ground of considering them as
parts of a general system of defence adapted to a crisis of extra-
17 Chenning, History o^ the United States , IV, 220.
18 Writings of James Madison, VI, 369.
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ordinary difficulty and denger."-1 ^ Even the bitterest critics of
the Alien Act questioned its constitutionality only as it applied
to friendly aliens, admitting frankly that "the removal of aliens
20is an incident to the power of war."
Apparently the rower given to the President by the Alien
21
Act was not actually exercised in a single instance; although
in a courle of cases final action by the President was probably
forestalled only by the voluntary departure of the person concerned,
and a considerable number of foreigners are said to have left the
22
country, anticipating the enforcement of the act. On the whole,
it is probably correct to say that this law was "neither unjusti-
fiable in purpose nor administered with special harshness."^
The power of the President to deal summarily with citizens
whom he may consider dangerous to the public safety is not so clear.
The provision in the Constitution permitting the suspension of the
privilege o^ the writ of habeas corpus "when in cases of rebellion
24
or invasion the public safety may require it", shows that the tak-
ing of extraordinary mea: ures in cases of such emergency was clearly
19 Am. State Papers
,
Misc., I, 182, 183; Elliot's Debates
.
IV, 441.
20 See Madison's famous Report of 1800 on the Virginia Reso-
lutions. Writings of James Lfedison
.
VI, 366-367.
21 Life end Works of John Adams
.
X, 42. President Adams, in
at least one instance, expressed a willingness to apply the act.
Ibid
.
,
IX, 5.
22 See article by F. LI. Anderson, "The Enforcement of the
Alien end Sedition Lews," in Report . Am. Hist. Assn. 1912
.
115-126,
esp. 116-117.
23 Bescom, Growth o^ Nationality in the United States
. 24}
Chenning, op. cit .. IV, 223-224.
24 Art. I, Sec. 9, Gl. 2.
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recognized as necessary end proper. Although the Constitution
itself does not expressly stete by what authority the privilege of
the writ may be suspended, it had been the general opinion, up to
the time of the Civil far, that Congress alone had the power to
judge of the exigency requiring that action. This opinion had been
induced, not only by the position of the habeas corpus clause in
2
that pert of the Constitution devoted to the legislative department,
£ 7 28
but elso by precedent, by the practice under the Constitution,
29
and by the weight of authority.
25 There was some objection to this clause at the time. Thus
Jefferson in a letter to Madison, July 31, 1788, protested as fol-
lows: "Why suspend the Hab. Corp. in insurrections & rebellions?. .
If publick safety requires that the government should have a man
imprisoned on less probable testimony in those than in other emer-
gencies; let him be taken and tried, retaken & retried, while the
necessity continues, only giving him redress against the government
for damages. Examine the history of England. See how few of the
cases of the suspension of the Habeas Corpus law have been worthy of
that suspension. They have been either real treasons wherein the
parties might as well have been charged at once, or shsm plots where
it W8s shameful they should ever have been suspected. Yet for the
few cases wherein the suspension of the hab. corp. has done real
good, that operation is now become habitual, & the minds of the na-
tion 8lmost prepared to live under its constant suspension." Writ -
ings of Thomas Jefferson
.
V, 46-47.
26" In the state ratifying conventions it was taken for granted
thet Congress alone could suspend the writ. The following amendment,
for example, was proposed by the New York convention of 1788: "That
the privilege of the habeas corpus shall not, by any law , be suspend-
ed for a longer term than six months, or until twenty days after the
meeting of the Congress next following the passing of the act for
such suspension ." Elliot's Debates , I, 330.
27 In England, Parliament, not the Crown, suspends the writ.
28 President Jefferson's message of Jan. 22, 1807, on Burr's
conspiracy, was followed by the passage in the Senate of e bill
suspending the writ of habeas corpus in certain cases ^or three
months. In the House the bill was rejected by an overwhelming
msjority. Neither in the message o^ the President nor in the dis-
cussion in Congress was there any suggestion o^ the President's
rie-ht to exercise that power. Annals of Cong ., 9 Cong., 2 Sess.,
39-43, 44, 402-425.
29 Ex parte Bollman , 4 Cr. , 75, 101 (1807); Story, Commentariei i
on the Constitution
.
II, 208. Cf. Chambruri, The Executive Power ,
241; Winthrop, Abridgment o^ Military Law ( 2nd ed . ) , 330-531.
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With the outbreak of the Civil War, this settled opinion
was disregarded by President Lincoln, acting- on his own initiative.
or through his subordinates, and upon the advice of his Attorney
30General. On April 27, 1861, he authorized General Scott to sus-
pend the writ of habeas corpus by the following order: "You are
engaged in suppressing an insurrection against the laws of the Unite<
States. If at any point on or in the vicinity of any military line
which is now or which shell be used between the city of Philadelphia
end the city of Washington, you find resistance which renders it
necessary to suspend the writ of habeas corpus for the public safe-
ty, you personally, or through the officer in command at the point
at which resistance occurs, are authorized to suspend that writ."^1
On May 10, the President by proclamation also authorized
the commander of the United States forces on the coast of Florida,
.
"if he shall find it necessary, to suspend the writ of habeas cor-
pus and to remove from the vicinity of the United States fortres-
ses all dangerous or suspected persons", on June 20, he directed
General Scott to suspend the writ in the case of a single officer
charged with treason;^ on July 2 and October 14, he extended his
order of April 27 to cover the military line from Washington to
54Bangor, Maine; ana on December 2, he empowered General Halleck
35
to suspend the writ Ft his discretion in the state of Missouri.
36
Finally, by proclamat ion of September 24, 1862, the President de-
30 Attorney General Bates, July 5, 1861. 10 Op.^tty .Gen . . 74.
31 Hichardson, Messages and Papers of the Presidents
,
VT, 1%»
Only two days before, Lincoln declined to permit Gen. Scott to ar-
rest or disperse members of the Maryland legislature suspected of
favoring secession, before the legislature should meet. Ibid . . 17.
32 Ibid., 17.
33 Ibid
.
, 19.
34 Ibid
.
,
19, 39.
35 Ibid. , 99.
36 Ibid., 98-99.
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clered that all persons siding or abetting the rebellion, discourag-
ing enlistments, resisting- drafts, or guilty of "disloyal practices','
should be subject to trial by court-martial or military commission,
and ordered the suspension of the writ of habeas corpus in their
cases -- a proclamation which an eminent authority has characterized
j
37
as "a perfect platform for a military despotism."
While the suspension of the privilege of the writ of
habeas corpus does not of itself authorize arbitrary arrests or any
unusual procedure in trial, it has that practical effect, since
those suffering arbitrary arrest would have no remedy to prevent
the continuance of their confinement during the suspension of the
38
writ. Arbitrary arrests were made from the very beginning of the
war, Members of the Maryland legislature, the mayor of Baltimore,
and several other prominent citizens were arrested by order of the
Secretary of War, in order to prevent the passage of an ordinance of
secession. Later, wholesale arrests were made all over the country,
39
especially in the West, some by direct authority of the President,
some by order of the Secretary of State, some by that of the Secre-
tary of War, sometimes merely by virtue of a simple telegram, and
37 W. A. Dunning, in Pol. Sci. Quar .. I, 188. "Discouraging
enlistments and disloyal practices were offences unknown to the law,
and the phr-se disloyal practice was large enough to include any-
thing." S. G. Fisher, in Pol. Sci. Quar . . 111,457. The elastic inter-
pretation of the latter term is indicated by the following contem-
porary definition: "He is a public enemy who seeks falsely to exalt
;he motives, character, and capacity of armed traitors, to magnify
their resources, to encourage their efforts by sowing dissension at
lome, or by inviting intervention of foreign powers in our affairs.
'Ie who overrates the success, increases the confidence, and encoura-
ges the hopes of our adversaries, or underrates, diminishes, or weak-
ens our own, and he who seeks false causes of complaint against the
officers of our government, or inflames party spirit among ourselves,
. . . gives to our enemies that moral support v/hich is more valuable
to them than regiments of soldiers, or millions of dollars." Whit-
ing, War Pov:ers'under the Constitution , 197-198.
38 Cf. Burgess, The Civil War and the Constitution . II, 216.
39 See Erecutive Order of Aug. 8, 1862. Richardson, op. c it . ,VI,l2j|.
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in no case with the warrant required by the Constitution, the only-
justification being that the persons so arrested were, by treason-
able sueekinp- and writing, giving aid and comfort to the enemy,
and that their imprisonment was necessary for the public safety.
In March, 1863, Congress expressly authorized the President
to suspend the writ of habeas corpus and legalized his past acts, 41
but for two years Lincoln had suspended the writ of his own accord,
and had made arrests without warrant, holding the suspects as long
42
as he pleased, not only without express authority and contrary to
the prevailing opinion of his power up to the time of the Civil War,
but in direct opposition to the authoritative ruling of gjfeXtjJ^ ' 4**m
Ift/iu*^^ He vas, however, clearly supported by public opinion,
and if any constitutional principle can be deduced, it is "that the
President may in en emergency exercise the right to arrest and de-
tain individuals until Congress acts." 4^ There is scarcely any doubt
as is asserted by an eminent authority, that the practices of the
40 Rhodes, History of the United States
,
III, 553-556; S. G.
Fisher, "The Suspension of Habeas Corpus during the 'War of the Re-
bellion," in Pol. Sci. Quar.
.
Ill, 454-468, est). 457.
41 Act of Mar. 3, 1863. 12 Stat, at L. , 755.
42 By executive order of Feb. 14, 1862, he ordered the release
of all political prisoners on their parole to render no aid or com-
fort to the enemies of the United States, granting amnesty for their
past disloyalty to those who should keep their parole, and declaring
that "extraordinary arrests will hereafter be made under the direc-
tion of the military authorities alone." Richardson, otp. cit
. ,
VI,
102-104,
43 Ex parte Merryman , Fed. Cases No. 9487 (1861).
44 Cf. S. G. Fisher, op. cit ., 483.
45 See W. A. Dunning, "The Constitution in Civil War", in Pol .
Sci. Quar .. I, 163-198, esp.189; cf. Bascom, Growth of Nationality
.
112-114. The most notable assertion of the President's power was
the pamphlet by Horace Binney, "The Privilege of the Writ of Habeas
Corpus under the Constitution", well summarized by S. G. Fisher,
op. cit.. 459-465. For Lincoln's own defense of his actions, see
his message to Congress, July 4, 1861, and his replies to communica-
tions from Nev York and Ohio Democrats, June 12 & June 29, 1863.
Richardson, op. cit
..
VI, 25; McPherson, History of the Rebellion .
163-167, 170-172.
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administration in the Civil War would be repeated under like circum-
stances, and that they are to be considered as the precedent of
46the Constitution rether then the opinion of the Supreme Court.
With regard to the freedom of speech and press , some re-
strictions on both have always been considered warranted in spite
47
of the constitutional guaranties, even in time of peace. In time
of war, these may be considerably extended so as to prevent inter-
ference with the successful prosecution of the war by stirring up
disloyalty or sedition, by encouraging disobedience to the laws or
48by giving 8 id or comfort to the enemy in any way. In fact, it has
been authoritatively asserted that the freedom of the press in war
49time rests largely with the discretion of Congress.
46 "It may therefore be claimed that it is the precedent of
the Constitution in Civil war that the President may suspend all
the safeguards of the Constitution in behalf of personal liberty
anywhere within the country, taking upon himself the responsibility
therefor to Congrese, and that subsequent authorization by Congress
to do the like things in future works indemnification, and makes
the preceding Presidential assumptions legitimate and lawful, if
they lscked anything of being so before." Burgess, The Civil War
and the Constitution
.
II, 217.
47 "Whet is the liberty of the press? Who can give it any
definition which would not leave the utmost latitude for evasion?
I hold it to be impracticable; and from this, I infer that its
security, whatevpr fine declarations may be inserted in any consti-
tution respecting it, must altogether depend on public opinion and
on the general spirit of the people and of the government." The
Federalist
, No. 84 (Goldwin Smith ed., p. 476).
48 In its decisions upholding the constitutionality of the
Espionage Act of 1917, the Supreme Court declared that the first
amendment affords no protection to an individual convicted under
that act for printing and distributing in time of war a document
calculated to cause insubordination in the military and naval forces
and obstruction to recruiting; that it likewise is no protection
ae-ainst conviction for publishing and circulating newspapers or
articles attempting to cause disloyalty and mutiny; and that it is
no valid defense against conviction for delivering a speech oppos-
ing the war, so expressed that the natural effect is to obstruct
recruiting. Schenck v. U. S . , 39 Sup. Ct. Rep., 247; Frohwerk v .
U. S.
,
ibid., 249; Debs y. U. 3 . . ibid., 252.
49 War Cyclopedia (1st ed.), 101.
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Such wsr time restrictions may take the form of penaliz-
ing certain kinds of speech or writing. This was the nature of the
50famous Sedition Act of 1798, which, designed, like the Alien Act
already referred to, as a war measure, attempted to curb the
spread of sedition during the crisis with France by punishing false,
scandalous, and malicious writings against the Government, either
house of Congress, or the President, written with intent to stir up
sedition. Of 8 similar nature, but even more clearly designed as a
52
war measure, is the Espionage Act of 1917, of which it has been
said that "few more sweeping measures have ever found their way to
53
the national statute book."
54As amended in 1918, this act is especially stringent,
making it a penal offense, not only to hinder the success of the
United States and promote that of the enemy by making false reports,
by inciting or attempting to incite disloyalty or mutiny, or by ob-
structing recruiting and enlistment, but also to "willfully utter,
print, write, or publish any disloyal, profane, scurrilous, or
abusive language about the form of government . . , or the Consti-
tution . .
,
or the military or naval forces . . , or the flag . .
,
or the uniform of the Army and Navy of the United States", or any
language intended to bring these into "contempt, scorn, contumely,
50 Act of July 14,1798. Annals of Cong . . 5 Cong. , III, App. , 3776.
51 See report of House Committee, Feb. 21, 1799. Am. State
Papers, Mi sc .. I, 182, 163. That the act was designed purely as an
emergency measure is further indicated by the fact that it was to
continue in effect only until Mar. 3, 1801.
52 Act of June 15, 1917. Public Ho. 24, 65 Cong., in Wigmore,
Source-Book of I.lilitary Law and War-Time Legislation. 484-500.
53 War Cyclopedia (1st ed.), 68.
54 Act of May 16, 1918. Public No. 150, 65 Cong., in Wigmore,
op. cit .. 500-501.
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or disrespect". Through his constitutional power to "take care that
the lews be faithfully executed", it was of course largely within
the discretion of the President to interpret these provisions in
such a way as to make them instruments of oppression or geniune
55
attempts to suppress disloyalty and sedition.
Another method of placing war time restrictions on the
press is through censorship in advance of publication. This method
is largely execut ive . The President, as Commander-in-Chief, has the
undoubted power to suppress or censor such newspapers or other
publications in occupied territory as he may deem injurious to the
56public interests. At le8st one writer asserts that the President
also has this power within the United States as well. He says that
the power necessarily exists somewhere to prevent disclosures use-
ful to the enemy, should such disclosures be threatened or under-
taken, and maintains that "it is of the very essence of all things
which lie between success and failure in war that this power should
be reposed where it can be exercised instantly, as the exigencies
of the situation may develop the need", and that therefore the
President is not dependent upon Congress in order to exercise the
power of censorship, but has the right, as Commander-in-Chief, to
prevent and suppress such publications. "To deny the power is
to deny the right of the commander-in-chief to protect his armies
against a danger as obvious as would be the danger o^ allowing armie
to organize and drill and accumulate arms and ammunition behind
the lines." 67
55 For the enforcement of the Sedition Act of 1798, see F. M.
Anderson, ox>. cit., in Report , Am. Hist. Assn. 1912 . 118-122. For
opinion as to its constitutionality, see Story, Commentari es on the
Const itut ion
,
II, 619, n.
56 Mg. Ops. J. A. G. , (ed.1901), 426.
57 T. J. 0* Donne 11, "military Censorship and the Freedom of the

This power of censorship was both asserted end exercised
during the Civil War. Postmaster General Blair stated it as his
opinion "that a power and duty to prevent hostile printed matter
from reaching the enemy, and to prevent such matter from instigating
others to cooperate with the enemy, by the aid of the United States
mails, exist in time of war , and in the presence of treasonable and
armed enemies of the United States, which do not exist in time of
58peace
,
and in the absence of criminal organizations;" which view
was sustained in a report of a committee of Congress,^ and a way
thus opened for nlacing the press "at the mercy of the Government
in time of war".
In accordance with these views, a censorship of some sort
existed from the outset of the war, though it was apparently never
very effective. Government control of the telegraph lines was
established as early as April, 1861, and a censor (H. E, Thayer)
was appointed, with instructions from Secretary Seward to prevent
the issue from Washington of telegraphic messages relating to the
civil or military operations of the government, containing anything
more than a bare statement of essential facts. In August of the
serr.e year, an attempt was made to reach a "gentlemen's agreement"
between the government and the press, whereby the newspapers were
to refrain from publishing information giving aid or comfort to the
enemy, while the government was to afford facilities for the trans-
58 Quoted in Burgess, op. cit ., II, 222-223.
59 Report of House Judiciary Committee, Jan. 20,1863. Ibid
.
, 223
60 For example, no mention was permitted of the criticism of
Gen. Stone for the Ball's Bluff disapter; nor o^ the fact that
some senators hed urged the removal of Gen. Sherman; nor of the
Cebinet's objections to Secretary Cameron's report. See J. G. Ran-
dall, "The Uewspsper Problem in Its Bearing upon Military Secrecy
during the Civil War", in Am. Hist. Rev ., XXIII, 303-323, esr. 303-
304 (Jan., 1918).
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mission of suitable information.
This proved to be a failure, due to the unscrupulous
character some correspondents and newspapers, and finally resort
was had to an adrainistrat ive policy of news control. The censoring
function was transferred from the State to the War Department;
military supervision of tr.e teiegrapn lines was ordered by authority
o^ Congress, beginning in February, 1862; end a special officer was
appointed ^or the general supervision of the telegraph business, wit:
the title of Assistant Secretary of War 8nd General Manager of Mili-
61
tary Telegraphs. Under the direction of this officer, regulations
were drawn up governing the transmission of news over the telegraph
62
wires, and a general policy of nett-s control was instituted,
though the fact that the mails remained open and uncensored made
these but half-way measures towards effectively closing the news
channels
.
There were also some attempts at suppression of news-
papers and discipline of correspondents. In August, 1861, Postmas-
ter General Blair ordered certain New York and Brooklyn papers ex-
cluded from the mails, and the United States marsn^l seized copies
of one of them -- these papers having been indicted for rebellious
63
utterances; the Baltimore Transcript , the Metropolitan Record . and
61 See order of Feb. 25, 1862, taking possession of the tele-
graph lines and naming Edward S. Sanford as military supervisor of
telegraphic messages. The same order specifically forbade tele-
graphic communications concerning military operations not expressly
authorized by the War Department, the commanding General, or the
generals commanding in the several departments; newspapers publish-
ing such military news without authority to be excluded ^rom the
telegraph service and from the railroads. Richardson, op. cit.
,
VI, 108-109.
62 For these regulations, see J. G. Randall, op. cit .. 305.
63 These re re the Journal of Commerc e , the Da ily News, the
Freeman' s Journal , and the Brooklyn &8gle . Burgess, op. cit .. II,
^22T' Cong. Record . 65 Conp., 2 Sess., (Feb. 19, 1918 ) , 2557.
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the Cincinnati Enquirer were each suppressed for short periods by
generals commanding- in the departments in which they circulated;
while the New York World and the Journal of Commerce were seized and
suppressed for three days in May, 1864, under orders of President
Lincoln, for publishing a bogus proclamation implying the admission
of a Union disaster. The editor of the Baltimore Exchange
.
orenly
sympathetic with secession, was arrested and confined in Fort La-
Fayette, but released after some months by order of the War Depart-
ment; the Chicago Times was suppressed in 1863 by General Burnside,
but his action was revoked by the President. Several of the gene-
rals, particularly Grant and Sherman, attempted at various times to
discipline newspaper correspondents within their lines with varying
degree of success. 5 ^
While the actual governmental interference with the free-
dom of the press during the Civil War was, on the whole, compara-
tively slight, ^ the precedent was established that "this part of
the Constitution (the first amendment) may be suspended by order of
the Administration, when in the judgment of the President the public
safety demands it". 65
V, ith the entry of the United States into the recent world
war, the problem of news control again became acute, 8nd on April
13, 1917, Secretary of State Lansing, Secretary of War Baker, and
Secretary of the Navy Daniels addressed a joint communication to
the President, setting forth their views on the subject. They
pointed out the danger in premature or ill-advised announcements of
policies, plans, and specific activities, and suggested the need for
64 Cong. Record . 65 Cong., 2 Sess., (Feb. 19, 1918), 2557;
J. G. Randall, op. cit .. 318-321.
65 Ibid
.
, 322-323.
66 Burgess, op. cit . 1,1,223.
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some authoritative agency to assume the publication of all the vital
facts of national defense. "While there is much that is properly
secret in connection with the departments of the Government, the
total is small compared to the vast amount o^ information that it is
right and proper for the people to have. . . It is our opinion
that the two functions — censorship and publicity — can be joined
in honesty and with profit, and we recommend the creation of a Com-
mittee on Public Information. . . We believe you have the undoubted
euthority to create this Committee on Public Information without
wa it ing for further legislation , and because of the importance of
the task, and its pressing necessity, we trust that you will see
fit t o do so. The committee, upon appointment, can proceed to the
framing of regulations and the creation of machinery that will safe-
guard all information of value to an enemy, and at the same time
open every department of government to the inspection of the people
67
as far as possible."
In accordance with this recommendation and this opinion
as to his powers with regard to censorship, President Wilson, by
68
executive order of April 14, 1917, created such a Committee on
Public Information, "to be composed of the Secretary of State, the
Secretary of War, the Secretary of the Navy, and a civilian who
shall be charged with the executive direction of the committee."
George Creel was appointed as the civilian chairman, and the Secre-
taries were authorized to detail an officer or officers to the work
of the committee.
Under the direction of the committee so created, a system
of voluntary censorship was established. The committee at various
67 See text of letter in Official Bulletin , May 10, 1917.
68 Official Bulletin
,
May 10, 1917.

times issued "requests" to the press to suppress news with respect
69
to certain matters of military and navel value. These were sup-
plemented from time to time by similar "requests" to the press from
the Secretary of War and the Secretary of the ttavy, 7 ^ to all of
which the press of the country apparently responded to the general
71
satisfaction of the government officials.
In addition to its direction of this voluntary censorship,
the policy of news control was further carried out by the Committee
on Public Information through its organization of various kinds of
publicity services. A daily p8per was published, beginning May 10,
1917, in no sense in competition with the regular news journals,
but containing "all proclamations and Executive orders issued by
the President; rules and regulations promulgated by the Federal
departments; official bulletins and statements; statutes bearing
on the war end tiieir construction; and all other subjects related to
the prosecution o c the war, to which publicity may properly be gi-
72
ven. Other pamphlets were compiled and issued uxider the direc-
tion of this committee, giving information as to the causes and pur-
69 Especially information concerning the train and boat move-
ments of troops, the assembling of transports and convoys, or any
information from which inference might be drawn of embarkation for
over-seas service. The suppression of the names of armed merchant
ships which hed engaged U-boats was also requested, in order to
save the captains, if later captured, from the fate of Capt. Fryatt.
Official Bulletin
.
June 14, June 15, 1917; May 10, June 10, 1918.
On July 3C, 1917, the committee published an extended list of mat-
ters concerning which it requested secrecy, which list was revised
and again strongly urged upon the press on Dec. 31, 1917. Ibid .
,
July 31, Dec. 31, 1917.
70 Ibid
.
,
Apr. 3, May 27, Aug. 2, 1918.
71 See statements of Secretary Daniels praising the spirit
o^ the Ara^ric^n press in adhering to the voluntary censorship. Ibid
Feb. 12, Aug. 2, 1918.
72 See statement in first number, May 10, 1917. The paper was
named the Official Bulletin , later changed to Official U. S. Bulle -
tin . It was suspended as a government publication Mar. 31, 1919, bu
was continued as a private enterprise, under the name United States
Bulletin, published bi-weekly by Roger V/. Babson.
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73
poses of the war; news was gathered and disseminated to the news-
papers of the country; motion pictures were made end distributed
under its supervision; staffs of lecturers were organized; and
agencies of various sorts were used to stimulate public opinion
and spread information on the issues of the war. All this was done
on the sole authority of the President, the committee even operat-
ing for a considerable time on the executive budget, but later
74
securing some appropriations from Congress.
Besides this system of voluntary censorship and news
control under the direction of the Committee on Public Information,
a rigid censorship of letters and other matter sent out from the
camps and fields was maintained by the military authorities. In
January, 1918, this censorship was by General Order lightened so
8S to permit soldiers in camp in this country to write freely for
publication, subject to censorship by designated officers who were
to "delete all references capable of furnishing important informa-
tion to the enemy." Attention was, however, called to the fact that
"criticism of superiors and the spreading of false reports which
would tend to injure the military service constitute breaches of
military discipline." Matter written by regular newspaper corres-
pondents not in the military service was not subject to any sort of
censorship, but the order directed camp commanders to instruct
these correspondents "that they must rigidly adhere to the requests
73 The so-called 7/a r Information and Red
,
White, and Blue serijf!
74 The work and organization of the Committee on Public Infor-
mation are outlined in Willoughby, Government Orgenizaticn in War
Time and After, 35-39; also in a pamphlet compiled under the direc-
tion of H. H. B. Meyer, Chief Bibliographer of the Library of Con-
gress, The United States at We r : Organizations end Literature
.
79-81
According to a statement by Mr. Creel, the committee received from
the President $5,600,000, while from Congress it received but
$1,250,000. IT. Y. Times . Nov. 1, 1919.
s.
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for secrecy with respect to information of value to the enemy, as
defined ... by the Committee on Public Informat ion"
f
violations
of these instructions to cause a denial of the privileges of the
75
camp.
In addition to the voluntary and military censorship of
newspapers and other publications thus established within the United
States on the sole authority of the President, steps were taken
early in the war to establish a rigid censorship over the telephone,
telegraph, and cable systems. By executive order of April 28, 1917,
President Wilson prohibited all companies operating telegraph and
telephone lines and submarine cables from transmitting messages to
points without the United States and from delivering messages re-
ceived from such points, except such messages as might be permitted
under regulations established by the Secretary of War and the Secre-
76tary of the Navy. This sweeping order was based on no other
authority than the power vested in the President "under the Consti-
tution and by the joint resolution of April 6, 1917, declaring the
existence of a state of war"; -in other words, solely upon his
authority as Commander-in-Chief.
Under this order, a particularly stringent cable censor-
ship was established. The office of Director of Naval Communica-
tions and Chief Cable Censor wag created, under whose direction a
number of cable censorship regulations were issued May 1, and amend-
ed May 31, 1917, with the avowed intention "to ease the situation
of the American trader and correspondent abroad, consistent with
75 Official Bulletin , Jan. 31, 1918.
76 Ibid .. July 18. 1917. This order was supplemented by a
similar order of Sept. 26, 1918, extending the restrictions to mes-
sages on or near the Mexican border. Ibid . , Sept. 27, 1918.
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the objects of military censorship." On July 18, the censorship
wes extended to all Atlantic cables, and new regulations were pro-
mulgated, effective on thst date. 7 ®
Thus far the censorship was carried on solely by virtue
of the President's orders. However, the Trading with the Enemy
Act of October 6, 1917, included among its provisions one authoriz
ing the President to cause all communications to and from foreign
countries by mail, cable, radio, or any other means, to be censored
80
under such rules and regulations as he might establish. President
Wilson thereupon, by executive order based upon this act, created
s Censorship Board, composed of representatives of the Secretaries
of War and Navy, the Postmaster General, the War Trade Board, and
the chairman of the Committee on Public Information, to control
81
ell such communications.
Under the direction of this board, the cable censorship
wes tightened, and a great many persons, including some American
citizens, were denied the use of the cables altogether.®^ The
censorship thus exercised seemed to be based Ln part on statutory
authority, but chiefly on the authority of the President alone,
acting in pursuance of his powers as Commander-in-Chief.
In addition to giving the President complete rover to cen-
sor all communications of every sort between this country and a
77 Official Bulletin , June 5, 1917.
78 Ibid
. ,
July 18, Jul;/ 25, 1917. Up to that time, the cable
censorship had extended only to South and Central America, llexico,
and the Orient.
79 Public No- 91, 65 Cone-., in Wigmore, op. cit .. 543-561.
80 Sec. 3, CI. (d).
81 Executive order o-f Oct. 12, 1917. Official Bulletin , Oct.
15, 1917.
82 See a. i. Times
.
Nov. 9, 1917.
83 Official Bulletin
.
May 21, 1918. The cable censorship
ceased July 23, 1919, by order o^ the President. IT. Y. Times Cur-
rent Hist. Mag.
,
X, 410 (Sept. 1919).
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foreign country, the Trading with the Enemy Act vested him with con-
siderable power over the foreign language press of the United States
requiring these newspapers, except by license from the President
,
to
file before publication a "true and complete" translation of "any
news item, editorial, or other printed matter, respecting the
Government of the United States, or of any nation engaged in the
present war, its policies, international relations, the state or
conduct o* the war, or any matter relating thereto." 84 Provisions
of the Espionage Act had likewise declared non-mailable every sort
of publication "containing any matter advocating or urging treason,
insurrection, or forcible resistance to any law of the United
States." 86
To the executive authorities charged with the enforcement
of these provisions was left the exact determination of what was to
constitute such non-mailable matter, and Postmaster General Burleson
in a public statement, defined the position of the Administration
as follows: "We shall take care not to let criticism which is per-
sonally or politically offensive to the administration affect our
action. But if newspapers go so far as to impugn the motives of
the Government and thus encourage insubordination, they will be
dealt with severely. For instance, papers ra8y not say that the
Government is controlled by Wall Street or munition manufacturers,
or any other special interests. Publications of any news calculated
to urge the people to violate law would be considered grounds for
drastic action. We will not tolerate campaigns against conscription
enlistments, S8le o^ securities, or revenue collections t We will
not permit the publication or" circulation of anything hampering the
84 Sec. 19.
85 Act of June 15, 1917 (Title XII, Sec. 2)
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war's prosecution or attacking improperly our allies."
The President's powers of censorship appear therefore
to he hased in part on his constitutional position as Chief Execu-
tive and Commander-in-Chief, in part on definite statutory authority.
Through his power to interpret and enforce the statute law, the
President is enabled to exercise a considerable measure of control
over the expression of opinion in time of war. When to this is
added the powers of censorship and control exercised by the authori-
ty of the President alone, not only during the recent war but pre-
viously as well, the President's power in this regard would seem
to be limited in practice only by the extent of the necessity, as
Judged by him.
86 Statement of Oct. 9, 1917, quoted in War Cyclopedia (1st ed.)
L63. This was supplemented by another statement to the seme ef-
pect, issued in a letter of Oct. 22, 1917. See text in Willoughby,
jpyernment Organization in Var Time and After . 48-49.
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Chapter XII.
Powers of Economic Control .
"This is a war of resources no less then of men, perhaps
even more than of men", said President Wilson during the course of
the recent war;"*" and the extent to which the economic resources of
the belligerent nations were placed under government control i&
one of the most striking snd unprecedented features of the world
war.
In the United States, it has become a well-established
principle o^ constitutional law that businesses affected with a
public interest ere subject to government regulation, even in time
of peace. It hes likewise been long recognized that the property
rights of private individuals must yield in time of war to the mili-
tery needs of the nation. Thus, during the Revolution, dictatorial
powers were et various times conferred upon General Washington "to
take, wherever he may be, rhatever he may want for the use of the
army, if the inhabitents will not sell it, allowing a reasoneble
price -Por the seme." There was some attempt at price-fixing dur-
4
ing the same war, and there were many resolutions recommending and
1 Statement on taking over the railroads, Dec. 26, 1917. Of
-
ficiel Bulletin, Dec. 27, 1917
2 German Alliance Ine . Co. v. Lewis , 233 U.S., 389,411 (1914).
3 Resolve of Dec. 27, 1776. See also resolves of Sept. 17 &
Nov. 14, 1777. Jour. Cont. Cong. , VI, 1045; VIII, 752; IX, 905.
4 A resolution of llov. 22, 1777, recommended that the states
enact price-fixing legislation, "in order to introduce immediate
economy in the public expence, the spirit of sharping and extortion,
and the rapid and excessive rise of every commodity being confined
within no bounds"; and a resolution of Jan. 15, 1778, empowered the
Board o-p War to limit the prices to be given for wheat and flour. The
repeal of all such price-fixing legislation was recommended June 4,
1778, the resolution declaring that "it hath been found by Experience
that Limitations u^on the Prices of Commodities ere not only ineffec-
tual for the Purposes proposed, but likewise productive of very evil
Consequences to the great Detriment of the public Service and grievoif|B
Oppression of Individuals." Ibid . , IX, 957 ;X, 55; XI, 569, 570.

authorizing the "impressment" supplies of all kinds needed for
5
the army, including "wheat in the sheaf".
The entry of the United States into the world war, requir-
ing the mobilization, not only of the military and naval forces of
the nation, but of its every economic resource as well, emphasized
the fact that in time of war the constitutional principle of govern-
ment regulation and control may be extended to cover practically
every enterprise and activity within the country; that "the extra-
ordinary circumstances of war may bring particular businesses and
enterprises clearly into the category of those which are affected
with a public interest and which demand immediate and thoroughgoing
public regulation."^
Control of Food and Fuel . From the first, it was recog-
nized that the great contribution of the United States to the winning
of the war must be the supplying of food for itself and the Allies.
Hence a policy of food control '?as entered upon, centered almost en-
tire ly in the hands o^ the President . Immediately after the decla-
ration of a state of war with Germany, Herbert Hoover was selected
(on April 7) by the Council of National Defense as chairman of its
1 7
comr.ittee on food supply and prices, and on May 19 his appointment
as Food Administrator and a program of food administration were an-
nounced by President Wilson, even though the administration bills
vesting the President with powers of food end fuel control had not
yet been acted upon by Congress. ^ President Wilson followed this
5 Jour. Cont. Cong.
,
Ill, 323; VI, 10C1; VIII, 741; IX, 774-
775, 962, 1043; XX, 516, 598.
6 Statement of ex-Justice Hughes, quoted in War Cyclopedia
(1st ed. ) , 96.
7 Pol. Sci. Quar .. XXXII, Supp. , 25.
8 N. Y. Times. May 20, 1917.
9 These administration bills were introduced into Congress the
latter part of April.
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action with p letter to Mr. Hoover on June 12, 1917, in which he
stated that the saving of food and the elimination of waste admitted
of no further delay, and therefore, without waiting- for the legis-
lation which he considered desirable, he vested Mr. Hoover with
"full authority to undertake any steps necessary" for the proper
organization and stimulation of efforts along these lines. 10 Ac-
cordingly, conservation campaigns were organized throughout the
country, voluntary workers were enrolled, and a set of food rules
were promulgated and issued, 11 all on the authority of the President
alone.
Finally, in August, 1917, Congress passed the Food and
12Fuel Control Act, vesting the President with complete control over
the food and fuel resources of the nation. He was empowered, when-
ever he should deem it essential, to license the importation, ex-
portation, manufacture, storage, and distribution of food, feed,
fertilizer, and fuel, and to prescribe regulations governing the
businesses so licensed; to fix prices of such food and fuel; to
requisition such food, fuel, and other supplies, or factories or
mines in which these are produced, "whenever he shall find it neces-
sary"; to buy and sell wheat, flour, meal, beans, and potatoes, at
prices to be fixed by him; to set a minimum guaranteed price for
wheat (to be not less than $2 per bushel); to regulate the opera-
tions of boards of trade; to limit, regulate, or prohibit the use of
foodstuffs in the production of beverages, whether alcoholic or non-
alcoholic; and, finally, "to make such regulations and to issue such
10 Official Bulletin, June 16,1917. For statement by Mr. Hoove
concerning the aims of the Food Administration, see ibid . , June 20,191
11 Ibid
. ,
Jul:" 7, 1917. These were as yet, however, only for
voluntary observance.
12 Act of Aujr. 10, 1917. Public No. 41, 65 Cong., in Wigmore,
Source-Book of Military Lew and War-Time Legislation . 504-516.
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orders as are essential effectively to carry out the provisions of
this Act."
Under authority of these provisions, President Wilson on
August 10, 1917 (the day of the passage of the act), again formally
announced the appointment of Herbert Hoover as Food Administrator13
(although Mr. Hoover had been acting as such by executive authority
since May 19), and turned over to him the immediate administration
of the act. Steps were also taken at once to exercise tne powers
conferred by the act and to place the food resources of the country
under e more thorough system of control. Through a series of pro-
clamations, the President required licenses of practically every
sort of business connected with the production and distribution of
*ood, including- elevators and mills for the storage or distribution
of wheat and rye; the importation, manufacture, and refining of
sugar, sirups, and molasses; the importation, manufacture, storage,
and distribution of more than twenty staple foods; the dealing in
bread, bakery products, and green coffee; the arsenic, ammonia,
and fertilizer industries; the trading in farm equipment; stockyards
and connected businesses. 1^
Besides inaugurating this system of regulation through
licensing, the President empowered the Food administrator to limit
15profits, and to requisition such foods and feeds, with their
storage facilities, as he might deem necessary "for any public use
connected with the common defense, other than the support of the
Army or the maintenance o-" the Navy. He guaranteed a minimum
13 Official Bulletin
,
Aug. 11, 1917.
14 U.S. Stats
.
. 65 Cong.,1 Sess. ,Procs. ,45, 52; ibid. ,2 Sess.,69,
92,96,107,131,133,158,202,222; Official Bulletin. Oct. 11, 1917,
Jan. 14, May 15, 1918; N. Y. Times , Oct. 10, Nov. 13, 1917.
15 Executive order of Nov. 23, 1917. N. Y. Times
.
Dec. 1,1917,
16 Executive order of Oct. 23, 1917. Official Bullet in . Nov. 1.1$|17
fit
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price for the wheat crops of 1918 end 1919, and ordered the organi-
zation of a Grain Corporation to purchase, store, and sell this
wheat, end m8ke the guarantee effective. 16 He limited the alcoholic
content of malt and vinous liquors to 2.75 per cent, and finally
brought about total prohibition by forbidding the use of any food-
stuffs in the product ion of such malt liquors, whether alcoholic or
nonalcoholic
.
Although most of these war-time restrictions were removed
20
within a few months after the signing of the armistice, some of
them were again revived and enforced about a year after that event,
when the powers of the Food Administration were transferred by
executive order to the Attorney General in an attempt to avert the
21
sugar famine and to lower the high cost of living.
Similar ste-os to control the fuel resources of the nation
were taken by the President under the provisions of the Food and
Fuel Control Act. Doctor Harry A. Garfield was appointed Fuel Ad-
22
ministrator by executive order of August £3, 1917, and empowered
to carry out the fuel provisions of the act. He explained the pur-
poses of the Fuel Administration to be "to secure the largest pos-
sible production of fuel at prices just to the producer end reason-
17 Proclamations of Feb. 21 & SeiDt . 2, 1918. U. S. Stats .. 65
Cong., 2 Ses^., Procs., 105, 200.
18 Executive orders of Au?. 14, 1917 & June 23, 1918. Emer-
gency Legislation
.
174-176; Official Bulletin , June 24, 1918.
19 Proclamations of Dec 8, 1917 & Sept. 16, 1918. U. S. Stat s .
,
65 Cong., 2 Sess., Procs., 84, 204. These must, of course, be dis-"
tinguished ^rom the "ar-Time Prohibition Act, passed by Congress.
20 Most of the licensing requirements were canceled by the
proclamations of Jan. 7, Jan. 25, & Feb. 11, 1919. U. S. Stats ..
65 Cong., 3 Sess., Procs., 275, 285, 287. The prohibition regula-
tions were modified so as to permit the manufacture of near-beer
and other non- intoxicating beverages, by the proclamations of Jan.
30 & Mar. 4, 1919. Ibid .
,
286, 293.
21 N. Y. Times
.
Bov. 22, 1919.
22 Official Bulletin
.
Aue% 24, 1917.
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able to the consumer." °
As with regard to the food resources, so the President
likewise inaugurated a system of licenses for controlling the dis-
tribution of coal snd coke and the various other fuel products, such
OA pc
as fuel oil end natural gas; and fixed the prices to be charged.
The Fuel Administrator, with the approval of the President, issued
several very drastic orders for the purpose of conserving fuel, such
as those for the elimination of electric advertising signs and for
certain "lightless nights"; and the sensational order of January
17, 1918, suspending the operation of practically all industry east
o* the Mississippi River for a period of ^ive days beginning January
18, and making the following- nine Mondays "heatless days". This
order was promulgated in s-pite of protests from every part of the
country, opinions that the order exceeded the authority of the Exe-
cutive, and an official resolution of the Senate asking for delay
and an explanation, ' — all of which illustrates clearly the V8st
war-time power of the President.
As with regard to the powers of the Food Administration, sc
those of the Fuel Administration were revived by the President after
the signing of the armistice and the virtual ending of the war, in
order to meet a particulpr situation. After having pronounced the
coal strike called for November 1, 1919, unjustifiable and unlawful,
I
and having requested, without success, thst the strike be called off,
President Wilson, by executive order of October 30, restored the war-
23 Official Bulletin
,
Aug. 24, 1917.
24 Proclametions of Jan. 31, liar. 15, & Sept. 16, 1918. U. S.
Stats.
.
65 Cong., 2 Sess., Procs., 99, 113, 205.
25 Official Bulletin
.
Aug. 24, Sept. 6, Oct. 29, 1917.
26 Ibid.
,
Kpy. 14. Dec. 15, 1917.
27 See II. Y. Times, Jan. 17, Jan. 18, 1918.
28 See President Wilson's st- tement concerning the strike.
Ibid., Oct. 26, 1919.
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time powers of Fuel Administrator Garfield and gave him full autho-
rity to use these powers in applying such regulations as he should
deem necessary to avert a coal famine. Accordingly, the priority
list of May 25, 1918, was restored, the Railroad Administration was
vested with power to divert co8l shipments, the Department of Jus-
tice was charged with the enforcement of the maximum price list,
drastic restrictions on the use o^coal by "nonessential" industries
were put into effect, railroad service was curtailed, and rigid
regulations were applied concerning the distribution of coal to
29
consumers, until the strike was called off December 10.
It should be noted thst all these restrictions and regu-
lations concerning both the food and fuel resources, were estab-
lished by order of the President, even after the signing of the
armistice, by virtue of the "war powers" conferred upon him by the
Food and Fuel Control Act, a war measure which had not yet exrired.
Control of Trade end Industry * Congress, by virtue of
its power over interstate and foreign commerce , may make such
regulations with regard to both foreign and domestic commerce as
it may deem necessary or helpful towards the crippling of an enemy
and the success of a war. It chose to exercise this power during
the events leading up to the W8r of 1812 and during the war itself
31
by passing several embargo and non- intercourse acts. During the
Civil «^ar, Congress exercised the same power by forbidding all in-
29 N. Y. Times. Nov. 1, Dec. 2, Dec. 9, Dec. 11, 1919. The
restrictions were only gradually lifted pfter the calling off of
the strike.
30 Constitution . Art- I, Sec. 8, CI. 3.
31 Acts of Mar. 1 & June 28, 1809; Apr. 4, Apr. 14, & July 6,
1612; Dec. 17, 1613; Feb. 4, 1615. Annals of Cong . , 10 Cong., 2
Sess., App., 1824; 11 Cong., II, App., 2508; 12 Cong., II, App.
,
2262, 2269, 2354; 13 Cong., II, App., 2761; 13 Cong., 3 Sess., App.,
1899. Regarding the purpose of these as war measures, see Writings
of James Madison, VIII, 185-166, n., 188.
r
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tercourse between citizens of the loyal states and of those in re-
cto
bellion, except by license from the President.
~
Even without authority from Congress, however, the Presi-
dent is also vested with considerable power in regsrd to the con-
trol of trade in time of war. By virtue of his position as Commande
33in-Chief, he may declare a blockade of the enemy's ports, and
thus cut off completely both the import and export trade with the
enemy nation. President Polk exercised this power by ordering a
blockade of the Mexican ports in 1846, 34 President Lincoln of the
Southern ports in 1861, and President McKinley of certain Cuban
ports in 1898. 26 It has also been held that the President may, at
least in the absence of Congressional action. to the contrary, per-
mit a limited commercial intercourse with the enemy in time of war,
37
and impose such conditions as he sees fit.
During the recent war with Germany and Austria-Hungary,
President V/ilson never declared a blockade of those countries, as
he might h8ve done, for the reason that such action would not have
cut o^f the supplies slipping through neutral countries. Since the
United States was practically the only source of supply for these
neutral countries, the problem was more effectively solved by giving
the President blanket authority to regulate the foreign trade of
32 Act of July 13, 1861. 12 Stat, at L .. 255, 257 (Sec. 5).
President Lincoln, by order of Feb. 28, 1862, permitted such inter-
course under rules and regulations prescribed by the Secretary of
the Treasury. Works of Abraham Lincoln ( Federal ed. ) , V, 43b. The
removal of the restrictions so placed was begun immediately after
the cessation of hostilities (Apr. 29, 1865), and completed by June
24, 1865. Dunning-, Reconstruction: Political and Economic , 27.
33 Prize Cases . 2 Elack, 635 (1862).
34 Richardson, Messages and Papers of the Presidents
.
IV,
492, 493.
35 Proclamations of Apr. 19 & 27, 1861. Ibid . , VI, 14, 15.
36 Proclamations of Apr. 22 & June 27, 1898. Ibid .
,
X,202,206
37 Hamilton v. Dillin , 21 Well., 73, 87 (1874)T~c7. Glenn,
The Army and the Law, 69-70.
Iot
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the United States. Under the provisions of the Espionage Act, the
President was empowered, whenever in his opinion the public safety
should require, to -forbid the exportation of any articles to any
38
country excert under such regulations as he might choose to make.
Under the Trading with the Enemy Act, he was given similar power with
res-nect to imports.
By virtue of this authority, President Wilson at various
times during the ver proclaimed an embargo on long lists of arti-
cles, 40 and prohibited the importation of other articles, 4^ except
under a system of licenses which he placed urider the supervision of
42the War Trade Board. In this way he was able to exercise complete
control over the foreign trade of the United States during the
period of the war, and thus to prevent supplies from reaching the
enemy, either directly or through neutral channels.
In time of war the President also exercises a large mea-
sure of control over business within the United States, his power
in that regard being apparently based largely on statutory pro-
visions, but also being exercised in some instances by virtue of no
specific authority. For example, President Wilson, immediately upon
the declaration of a state of war with Germany and on later occasion^
38 Act of June 15, 1917. Public No. 24, 65 Cong. (Title VII)
in Wigmore, otd. clt .. 493.
39 Act of Oct. 6, 1917. Public No. 91, 65 Cong. (Sec. 11),
in Wigmore, or>. cit .. 557.
40 Proclamations of July 9, Aug. 27, Sept. 7, Nov. 28, 1917;
Feb. 14, 1918. U. S. Stats ., 65 Cong., lSess., Procs., 39, 47,
50; ibid., 2 Sess., 76, 102.
41 Proclamations of Nov. 28, 1917; Feb. 14, 1918. Ibid. , 2
Sess., 77, 103.
42 Created under authority of the Trading with the Enemy Act,
end composed of representatives of the Secretaries of State, Trea-
sury, Agriculture, and Commerce, and of the Food Administrator, the
Shipping Board, end the War Industries Board. See executive orders
of Oct. 12, 1917 & Aug. 20, 1918. Official Bulletin , Oct. 15, 1917,
Sept. 3, 1918.
J
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pieced restrictions uuon the German insurance comranies doing busi-
ness in the United States <°nd made regulations with regard to Ger-
man letters patent, his action in each case being based, not on
43
statute, but solely on "the authority vested in me as such'.'
Considerable power was vested in the President by the
National Defense Act of 1916, which authorized him in time of war or
when war is imminent, to order any individual or firm having the
facilities to comply, to furnish supplies or equipment for the Army
in preference to any other commitments, at prices named by him; 8nd
in case of default, to seize and operate the plant. 44 Similar
power to requisition shipyards and factories for the manufacture of
supplies needed for the Navy was vested in the President by the
Naval Emergency Fund Act of 1917. 46
On July 28, 1917, the War Industries Board was created
by the Council of National Eefense , with the approval of the Presi-
dent, to serve as "a clearing house for the w8r industry needs of
the Government"; 4 ^ and in March, 1918, its functions were by a mere
letter of the President continued, expanded, and vested almost ex-
47
clusively in the chairman, Bernard M. Baruch. Finally, by execu-
tive order of May 28, 1918, the President formally made the War
Industries Board an independent administrative agency acting direct-
ly under his authority, and thereby created what one writer says
w88 "in effect an Industries Administration analogous in all essen-
43 Proclamations of Apr. 6, May 24, & July 13, 1917. U.S.
Stats
.
. 65 Cong., 1 Sess., Procs., 10, 25, 40.
44 Act o^ June 3, 1916. Public No. 85, 64 Cong. (Sec. 120),
inWiemore, p-p. cit.
.
439-440.
45 Act of Ma . 4, 1917. Public No. 391, 64 Cong. Ibid . , 458.
46 T.Var Cyclopedia (1st ed.), 293.
47 See President Wilson's letter o^ Mar. 4, 1918, to Mr.
Baruch, outlining- the functions of the board and the duty of the
chairman. Official Bulletin, Mar. 31, 1918.

tial respects to the Food and Fuel Administ rations previously
created.
. . The Board derived its legal powers directly from the
President. It therefore had the power to exercise, within its
field, all the powers of the Presiuent over industry entrusted to
him by statute or possessed by him in virtue of his position of
48head of the armed forces of the Nation."
Under the direction of its chairman and upon the sole
authority of the President, the board assumed a very large control
the industrial resources the nation. It acted as an agency
for centralizing the war demands of the several government services;
purchased supplies for the Allies; created new facilities and new
sources of supply; determined priorities of production and delivery;
fixed prices; and sought to secure the elimination of waste and un-
necessary effort, and the securing of economy of time and materials.
The chairman was in general reouired to act as the "general eye of
all supply departments in the field of industry", to be a sort of
"industrial chief of staff."
While the various orders and decisions of the board were
legally only "requests", they were backed by the President's powers
to requisition factories, to withhold fuel and transportation facili
ties, and in other ways to compel compliance; so that the 'war In-
dustries Board was well described as being able to "mold the coun-
try's industrial system almost as it will", and as "a notable demon-
stration of the power of war to force concert of effort and collec-
tive planning with centralized responsibility."49 Through these
48 Willoughby, Government Organization in V/8r Time and After ,
76-77; see also C. N. Hitchcock. " The War Industries Board; Its
Development, Organization end Functions", in Jour. Pol. Econ.T~XXVI,
545-565 {June, 1918), esp. 547, 563.
49 C. IT. Hitchcock, op. cit. , 565, 566.
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various means, the President was enabled to exercise a complete con-
trol over all businesses having any relation to war needs, which in
modern times includes practically the entire business life of the
n8t ion.
Control of Property . The President likewise has consider-
able power in time of war with regard to private property. In the
United States it has been held that a state of war justifies the
seizure and confiscation of enemy property found within the borders
50
o^ the country, in accordance with which theory the Confiscation
Acts of the Civil War^1 were passed, providing for the seizure of
rebel property under certain conditions. The general practice of
nations has, however, brought about the modern rule of international
law that such enemy property is no longer subject to confiscation,
but only to sequestration for the period of the war.
The power of such sequestration might be presumed to rest
with the President by virtue of his executive authority, without any
further statutory authorization. All doubt was removed, however,
during the recent war, by inserting in the Trading. with the Enemy
Act provisions which empowered the President, through the Alien
Property Custodian created by that r ct, to take over and administer
53for the period of the war such enemy property as he might require.
President Wilson carried out these powers through various executive
50 Brown v. U. S.
.
8 Cr., 110, 122, (1814); Miller v. U. S. t
11 Wall., 268, 305, (18 70); cf. Glenn, The Army and the Lew , 112,115.
51 Acts of Aug. 6, 1861, July 17, 1862, & Mar. 3, 1863. 12
Stat , at L,
, 31?, 589, 820.
52" Lawrence, Principles of International Law , 424-429.
53 See esp. Sees. 6, 7. Wigmore, op. cit ., 548-552. The
seizure of property by the Alien Property Custodian could not be
enjoined by the courts, his decisions as to what constituted enemy
character being held to be unreviewable preceding the transfer of
the property. Salamandra Ins. Co. v. New York Life Ins. Co. , U. S.
D. C, S. D. N. Y. (1918). cited in Yale Law Jour . XXVIII, 499
(Liar., 1919).
V
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orders, which fixed the salary of the Alien Property Custodian and
defined his powers and duties, and which entrusted him with the
management, administration, and disposition of enemy property of
all kinds, including such things as real estate, personal property,
seats on stock exchanges, and businesses of all descriptions In
short, the Alien Property Custodian was authorized "to step into the
shoes of the enemy and exercise all the rights and powers with re-
spect thereto rhich the enemy could exercise if no state of war
existed." 55
Other powers with regard to the control of property were
also vested in the President. Several acts of Congress authorized
56
the taking of land for military or naval purposes, under which
President Wilson seized such property as the Jamestown Exposition
site and large tracts of land in Maryland, and ordered the residents
to vacate immediately, the compensation to he determined later. 5 '''
58Finally, by the Act of May 16, 1918, the President was empowered
du.ring the war to seize private property of any kind, whether real
estate, buildings, furnishings, or improvements, "as he may determine
to be necessary for the proper conduct of the existing war", with
compensation to be fixed later. Although under this act nothing was
exempt from being commandeered, its chief purpose was to facilitate
CO
the seizure of housing for war workers and government offices,
54 Executive orders of Oct. 29, 1917; Feb. 26, Apr. 2, July 15,
July 16, Aug. 29, Sept .12, Sept. 13, Nov. 12,1918. Official Bullet in . Oct
.
31,1917; Mar. 2, July 18, July 23, Aug. 31, Sept . 17 , Sept . 20, 1918 ; Jan. 3, 191!)
.
55 Statement of the Alien Property Custodian (A. Mitchell
Palmer), in Official Bulletin. Mar. 2, 1918.
56 Acts of June 15, & Oct. 6, 1917; Apr. 26, 1918. Public
Nos. 23, 64, 140, 65 Cong.
57 Proclamations of June 28, Oct. 16, Dec. 14, 1917 ; June 10,1918.
U. S. Stats
. . 65 Cong.,1 Sess
.
, Procs
.
, 30 ; ibid. ,2 Sess. , 63,87,146.
58 Public Ho. 149, 65 Cong.
59 See statements of Assistant Secretary of War Crowell, in
U. Y. Times. Mar. 21, Mar. 22, 1918.
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in accordance with which the President crested a Housing Corporation
as an agency through which the Secretary of Labor might carry out
the provisions of the act. 60
By these means the President was enabled to exercise a
complete control of all private property within the United States,
whose use might in his opinion benefit the enemy or which he might
consider essential to the war needs of the country.
Control of Transportation and Communication . The impor-
tance of the transportation and communication services in the suc-
cessful prosecution of war is perhaps second only to that of the
actual fighting service. The close relation between the operation
of these lines o-p communication end the military operations, and
the necessity of securing their absolute control by the military
authorities, in order to insure the regular and systematic trans-
portation of troops 8nd supplies, were recognized quite early during
the Civil War. Congress, by Act of January 31, 1862, ^1 authorized
the President, when in his judgment the public safety should require
it, to take possession of any or all telegraph and railroad lines
within the United States, together with all their equipment and per-
sonnel; to prescribe rules and regulations for the use of these
lines; and to place them under military control.
Accordingly, President Lincoln, by order of February 11,
1862, appointed D. C. McCallum as Military Director and Superinten-
dent Railroads, giving him full authority to take possession of
the railroads end to do "all things that may be necessary and pro-
60 Executive order of Oct. 29, 1918*. Official U. S. Bulletin
,
Jan. 21, 1919. \
61 12 Stat, at I
.
,
334. By joint resolution of July 14, 1862,
this ect was declared not to authorize the President to engage in
any work o^ railroad construction. Ibid . , 625.
+ 3 +
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per" for the transportation of troops and supplies; 62 and on May
25, 1862, the President took formal military possession of all the
railroads in the United States. 63 More than 2,000 miles of railroad
64
were operated, mostly in Southern or border states, which were
turned back to their owners under certain regulations on August 8,
me. 66 & tt iw
During the first months of the recent war, an attempt was
made to meet the transportation needs of the nation by leaving the
operation of the railroads under private control, but as one system
under the direction of the Railroads War Board, a special committee
of the American Railway Association, cooperating with Mr. Daniel
Willerd, chairman o^ the Transportation and Communication committee
of the Council of National Defense. 66 This did not prove satisfac-
tory, however, end before the end of 1917, suggestions were made
^rom authoritative sources thst the President should take control
o^ the railroads and operate them for the period of the war, 67
authority for which he already possessed by virtue of the Army
Appropriations Act o 47 1916. 68
Acting under this authority, President Wilson, by pro-
69
clamation of December 26, 1917, took possession of all the rail
and water transportation systems in the United States (excepting
70
street-car and interurban lines ), and vested their administration
62 Richardson, Messages and Papers o^ the Presidents
,
VI, 101.
65 Ibid., 113. See also orders of May 26 & July 11,1862. Ibid .
,
113, 116.
64 Cong. Record . 65 Cong. ,2 Sess. , 2556 , 6923 (Feb. 19, May 13,1918)
65 Ibid
.
, 2556 ; Fleming. Document a ry History of Reconstruction .
I, 205-206.
66 War Cyclopedia (let ed.,) 229, 273.
67 See report of Int e rstat e\ ^mmiss ion, in IT. Y. Times . Dec .6.1917
68 Act of Aug. 29, 1916. U. S. Stats. , 64 Cong.,1 Se ss
.
, 619 , 64£.
69 U. S. St a ts.
.
65 Cong., 2 Sess., Procs., 89.
70 By act of Apr. 22, 1918, the President was also authorized to
take over and operate such of these as might be necessary for the
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in Secretary of the Treasury KcAdoo, who was designated Director
General of Railroads. Later the President confirmed end continued
the authority of Mr. McAdoo as Director General, 71 under the provi-
72
sions of the Railway Control Act, passed by Congress in order that
the President's authority might he complete and undoubted. 7S This
act confirmed the President's power to t8ke over, control, and
operate the railroads under the act of 1916, authorized him to com-
pensate the owners and initiate rates, and provided that he might
relinquish such control at his discretion, but that he might in no
case zeroise it longer than one year and nine months after the
declaration of peace.
Acting under the authority so conferred upon him by the
President, Director General L.cAdoo immediately assumed active charge
unified the railroads of the country into one system, made regula-
tions concerning their operation, named his subordinate officers,
74fixed both interstate and intrastate rates, increased the wages
of employees provided for the adjustment of labor disputes, and in
75general exercised complete control, not onl;. of the railroads, but
also of the coastwise steamship lines, ship canals, and express com-
panies, control of which had later been taken over by the Presi-
transportat ion of the employees at the shipyards and plants. Of -
ficial Bulletin
.
May 7, 1918.
71 Proclamation of Mar. 29, 1918. U.S. Stats . , 65 Cong. ,2 Sees.,
Procs., 119.
72 Act of Mar. 21, 1918. Public Ho. 107, 65 Cong., in Wigmore, op .
cit.
,
575-563.
73 Senator Cummins and others held, for example, that the Pre-
sident's scheme of compensation to the owners required additional
legislation, and it was doubted by many whether he had the power to
fix rates under the act o* 1916. That the President doubted his own
authority on some of these points is indicated by his statement that
he intended to recommend additional legislation. See N.Y. Times , Dec . 2 i 1
1917.
74 The right to fix intrastate as well as interstate rates was
upheld in Northern Pacific Ry. Co. v. north Dakota . 250 U. S., 135,
cited in Am. Pol. Sci. He
v
..
XIII. 619 (Nov., 1919).
75 A considerable number of the orders issued by the Director
General are liste d in En^y__&_jy l^j_fljTSJ_j^ Agca^gj^AfJl
fectine- Business. 44-49.
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dent. 76
Upon the resignation of Mr. KcAdoo a short time after
the armistice, the President appointed Walker D. Mines to succeed
7 7him as Director General, and continued through, him to exercise con.
trol of the transportation systems of the United States with the
view of rendering- adequate service at a reasonable cost."7 ^ In his
message to Congress, May 20, 1919, President Wilson announced his
intention to return the railroads to their owners ft the end of the
79
year . but no legislation on the subject of future railroad con-
trol having by that time been enacted by Congress, he postponed the
80date of return, setting it by formal proclamation at March 1, 1920.
p-i
Congress having finally enacted railroad legislation by that date,
the railroads were then returned as promised. Thus, ^or more than
two years, more than half of that time after the virtual end of the
war, the President exercised complete control of the transportation
systems of the country, a control which he might have extended con-
siderably longer, on account of the delay in the ratification of the
peace treaty and the formal declaration of peace.
With regard to shipping, a large measure of control was
exercised by the President during the recent war through the Shippin;:
Board and the Emergency Fleet Corporation, created by the Act of
76 Proclamations of Apr. 11, July 22, IJov. 16, 1918. U. S.
Stats
.
, 65 Cone-., 2 Sess., Procs., 125, 164, 245.
77 Proclamation of Jan. 10, 1919. Ibid . , 3 Sess., 278.
78 "Until the signing the armistice the Government's first
railroad duty was to run the railroads to win the war, but now that
the war is won, the Government's railroad job is to render an ade-
quate and convenient transDortat i on service at reasonable cost."
Statement of Mr. Hines on assuming- office, Jan. 11, 1919, Off icial
U. S. Bulletin, Jan. 13, 1919.
79 See his message in United States Bulletin
,
May 26, 1919.
80 Proclamation of Dec. 24, 1919. IT. Y. Times , Dec. 25, 1919.
81 The Esch-Cummins Railroad bill was signed by the President
Feb. 26, 1920. Ibid . , Feb. 29, Mar. 1, 1920.
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September 7, 1916. 82 Acting under the direction of the President,
this board and this corporation had as their war-time task the pro-
viding of an adequate merchant marine to meet tne extraordinary
transportation demands of the war and the losses from submarine at-
tacks. The Shipping Eoard controlled directly the operation of all
American ocean vessels; and by means of authority delegated to it bj
executive order, requisitioned all American ships completed or build
ing during* the war; fixed freight rates, and determined terminal
83
charges. The Emergency Fleet Corporation, acting as the construe
tion agency of the Shipping Board (and, through it, of the Presi-
dent), added a vast amount of tonnage to the shipping in use dur-
ing the rar. 84
Additional shipping wae secured through the seizure of
enemy and neutral vessels lying within United States ports at the
outbreak of the war. International law and practice allow a bel-
ligerent to requisition and utilize such vessels, if needed for war
purposes, and t-e presumed authority of the President to act
under this rule was further strengthened by the Joint Resolution of
May 12, 1917, expressly authorizing him to take over enemy ves-
sels for use end operation during the war, and by a provision in
the Emergency Shipping Fund Act o^ June 1;
,
1917, empowering him
similarly to requisition any vessel within the jurisdiction of the
82 Public i'.o. 260, 64 Cong., in Wigmore, op. cit.
,
447-454;
amended by Act of July 15, 1916, Public No. 198, 65 Cong., ibid .
.
455-457.
83 See, ^or example, its announcement requisitioning on Oct.
15, 1917, all American vessels of not less than 2500 tons capacity,
Q-^icial Bulletin. Oct. 13, 1917. See also executive orders of
June 18 & Dec. 3, 1918. Ibid . , June 20, Dec. 16, 1918.
84 Figures for the early months the war may be found in
War Cyclopedia (1st ed.), 253.
85 Lawrence, Principles of International Law
,
456, 626-628.
86 Public Res. Ho. 2, 65 Con*?-., in Emergency Legislation. 18.
87 Public He. 23, 65 Cong., in Wigmore, op. cit ., 482-464.
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United States. Acting- therefore under authority both of internation
al law end of statute, President Wilson seized the German end Aus-
trian vessels interned in the ports of the United States, 88 and
likewise requisitioned the Butch ships lying idle within its juris-
diction. 89 The docks and terminal equipment of the German steemship
com^enies were elso taken over, 9 ^ under express statutory authority?
the compensation therefore being determined by the President after
92the signing of the ermistice.
It hes already been noted that the Act of Congress eutho-
rizing military control of the railroads during the Civil war, elso
authorized the President to assume such control of the telegreph
93lines. " Acting under this euthority, the President, on February
26, 18G2, took military possession of all the telegraph lines in
the United States, end appointed Anson Stager Military Superinten-
dent of these lines, exercising military control during the remain-
der of the war. It v/as expressly ordered, however, that such con-
trol wes "not intended to interfere in any respect with the ordinary
e-^airs o^ the companies or with private business.
During the recent war, a much more comprehensive control
wes esteblished over ell the means of communication. As early as
1912, Congress had authorized the President, "in time of war or
public peril or disaster", to close, control, or take over and use
88 Executive orders of May 14, May 16, May 22, June 12, June
30, July 3, Sept. 27, Nov. 2, 1917. Emergency Legislation , 169-170,
171-173, 179, 189; N. Y. Times Current Hist. Mag. , VI, 237.
89 Proclemation of Mar. 20, 1918. U. S. Stats .. 65 Cong., 2
Sess., Procs., 117. The 87 Dutch vessels thus seized were returned
in the early part of 1919. Official U. S. Bulletin , Feb. 3, 1919.
90 Proclamation of June 26, 1918. U. S. Stats ., 65 Cong., 2
Sess. , Procs
.
, 160.
91 Urgent Deficiency Act of Mer. 28,1918. Public Wo. 109, 65 Con;-.
92 Proclamation of Dec. 3, 1918. U.S. Stats . . 65 Cong., 3 Sess.,
Procs, . 270.
93 Supre ,244.
94 ^eiTTTrder of Feb. 25, 1862. Richardson, op.cit
.
, VI, 108-109.
I
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95
all the radio stations within the jurisdiction of the United States;
and by joint resolution of July 16, 1918, he was further empowered
to take possession of and to operate, in time of war, any telegraph,
telephone, marine cable, or radio system, such control not to ex-
96tend beyond the date of the declaration of peace.
Acting therefore under express statutory authority, Presi-
dent Wilson, immediately upon the entry of the United States into
the world rar, directed the Secretary of the Navy to assume control
of ell the means of radio communication within the jurisdiction of
the United States. 97 On July 22, 1918, he took over the telegraph
and telephone systems, vesting their administration in the lostmas-
98ter General; u and shortly before the armistice was signed, he like-
99
wise assumed control of the marine cables.
The war-time control thus assumed of the wire services
differed from that assumed in the Civil War in that it was not
strictly for military purposes, but io overcome the difficulties of
8 competitive system arising out of the war, and "to broaden the
use o" the service at the least cost to the people. n ^-®® The seizure
of the cables, though vigorously assailed as an undue exercise of
executive power, was explained by the President to have been
necessary in order "to keep an open wire constantly available be-
tween Paris and the Department of State, and another between France
95 Act of Aug-. 13, 1912. 37 Stat, at I . , 302 (Sec. 2).
96 Public Res. IIo . 38, 65 Gong., U. S. stats .. 65 Cong., 2
Sess., 904.
97 Executive order of Apr. 6, 1917. Willoughby , Government
Organization in v'»ar Time and After . 40.
98 Proclamation of July 22, 1918. U. S. Stats ., 65 Cong., 2
Sess
.
, Procs
.
, 163.
99 Proclamation of Nov. 2, 1918. Ibid . . 228.
100 Statement of Postmaster General Burleson on assuming con-
trol. Official bulletin
,
July 24, 1918.
101 See argument o+ er-Justice Hughes. N . Y . T ime
s
.
tec. 28,
1918.
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and the Deportment of War, nlU£i and was upheld by the courts as a
legitimate exercise of his war power.
Complete control over these various systems of communica-
tion was exercised by the Postmaster General, acting under the
direction and authority of the President, extending to the unifica-
tion of the various competing companies, the ousting of the old
officers in many cases, and the fixing of rates, both interstate and
intrastate,-*-^ until the systems were returned to private control!^
102 Address to Congress, Dec. 2, 1918. IJ. Y. Times , tec. 3,
1918.
103 Commercial Cable Co. v. Burleson, U. S. D. C, S. D. u. Y.
(1919), cited in Yale Law Jour ., XXVIII, 513 (Mar., 1919).
104 The President's right to fix both interstate and intra-
state rates for the wire services was upheld in Dakota Central Tele -
phone Co., v. South Dakota, 250 U. S., 163 (1919), cited in Am. Pol.
Sci. Rev. ] XIII, 619 (Nov., 1919).
105 The cables were, by order of Apr. 29, 1919, returned to
their owners on May 2, 1919; the telegraph and telephone systems on
August 1, 1919. United States Bulletin , May 1, 1919; Pol. Sci. Quar , t
XXXIV, Supp., 25 (Sept., 1919).

IV. POWERS RELATING TO THE TERMINATION OF WAR.
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Chapter XIII.
Power of Terminating- War in the United States .
There are generally said to be three different ways in
which a way may be terminated: (l) there may be a simple cessation
of hostilities on the part of the belligerents; (2) there may be a
complete subjugation of one of the belligerents by the other, in-
volving the conquest and annexation of its territory and the ex-
termination of its government; and (3) there may be a formal re-
establishment o^ peaceful relations between the belligerents through
an agreement embodied in a special treaty.^"
Instances of the first method are rare, and have never
occurred in the case of wars to which the United States has been
a party. The second method is more common in the history of na-
tions, but would seem to be precluded as a possibility on the part
of the United States, because of the doctrine laid down by the
Supreme Court that wars of conquest and aggrandizement by the United
States are unconstitutional.^ A treaty of peace is therefore not
1 Oppenheim, International Law , II, 275; Lawrence, Principles
of International Law , 568.
2" For examples of each of these methods, see Oppenheim, op .
cit .. II, 275-276, 279.
3 "The genius and character of our institutions are peaceful,
and the power to declare war was not conferred upon Congress for the
purpose of aggression or aggrandizement, but to enable the general
government to vindicate by arms, if it should become necessary, its
own rights and the rights of its citizens. A war, therefore, de-
clared by Congress can never be presumed to be waged for the purpose
of conquest or the acquisition of territory; nor does the law decl8r
ing the war imply an authority to the President to enlarge the limit
of the United States by subjugating the enemy's country. . . He may
invade the hostile country, and subject it to the sovereignty and
authority o^ the United State. But his conquests do not enlarge the
boundaries o^ this Union, nor extend the operation of our institu-
tions and laws beyond the limits before assigned to them by the
legislative power." Fleming v. Page , 9 How., 603, 614-615 (1849).
Cf. 8lso S.E.Baldwin, in Am. Jour. Int .Law , XII, 14 ( Jan. ,1918 )
;
Memoirs
o* John Quincy Adams
.
XII, 144 (Jan. 10, 1845).
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only "the normal method of terminating werw
t
and the only method
heretofore employed in the case of wars in which the United States
has been a belligerent (excepting, of course, the Civil War), but
has also apparently been considered throughout our entire history as
the only possible method under the Constitution.
Recently, however, strong opinions have been expressed
that wars may be terminated by the United States in other ways than
by a formal treaty of peace. Thus, in an address before the Wash-
ington Commercial Club, March 18, 1919, Senator Lenroot (Wisconsin),
speaking against the proposed constitution for the League of Nations
and protesting particularly against the incorporation of that con-
stitution into the peace treaty, made this statement: "We have ac-
complished the purpose we had when we declared war and, while it
would be desirable to have a formal treaty of peace with Germany
,
it is not necessary . We can declare the war ended and go about our
business, end I confidently predict that this is what will be done
if the treaty is not ratified by the Senate. "^ A statement by
Senator Poindexter (Washington), issued on the same day, was to the
same effect but even more explicit: "If the American delegation re-
fuses to m8ke peace with Germany, let the Entente make peace with
Germany, and let Congress assemble and declare peace and pass a law
to bring the American army home. Congress has the same power to
declare peace that it has to declare war , and has full control over
all movements of the army and navy, including the Commander-in-
Chief." 6 A leading journal likewise expressed the opinion that
"Congress could at any time by_ simple resolution declare the state
4 Oppenheim, op. cit .
,
II, 280.
5 N. Y. Times. Mar. 19, 1919.
6 Ibid
.
. Mar. 18, 1919.
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of war at an end", and at least one distinguished jurist has con-
curred in these views, saying- that "peace could, no doubt, also be
D
restored by an Act of Congress".
Moreover, serious attempts have recently been made in
Congress to assert the power of that body to declare peace indepen-
dently of a formal treaty. Thus, Senator Knox, on June 10, 1919,
declared that any attempt on the part of the Peace Conference to
so intertwine the peace treaty and the covenant o^ the League of
Nations as to prevent their separation by the Senate, would be met
with a resolution in Congress declaring the war formally at an
9
end. On June 23, Senator Fall (New Mexico) and Senator Edge (New
Jersey) each offered joint resolutions in the Senate declaring the
state of war between Germany and the United States terminated; and
on September 15, Representative Mason (Illinois) submitted a con-
current resolution in the House declaring peace "with all the
world." 10
These resolutions were all allowed to die in committee,
but immediately after the first rejection of the treaty on November
19, Senator Lodge, Republican floor leader and chairman of the
Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, offered a concurrent resolu-
tion "that the said state of war between Germany and the United
States is hereby declared to be at an end", while Senator Knox, on
December 13, offered a joint resolution declaring simply, "That peace
exists between the United States and Germany." These two resolu-
tions were taken under serious consideration by the Senate Committee
7 The Nation, Kay 31, 1919.
8 S. E. Baldwin, in Am. Jour. Int. Law
,
XII, 13-14 (Jan. ,1918),
9 Press report in Chicago Tribune , June 11, 1919.
10 S. J. Res. 60, Mr. Fall; S. J. Res. 61, Mr. Edge; H. Con.
Res. 32, Mr. Mason. Cong. Record , 66 Cong., 1 Sess., 1629, 5808.
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on Foreign Relations , end on December 20, Senator Knox reported
from that committee a substitute joint resolution, rerealing the
joint resolution of April 6, 1917, which declared a state of war
with Germany, and providing that such repeal should be effective,
with certain stated conditions uron Germany, "upon the ratification
of a treaty of peace between Germany and three of the principal
allied and associated powers."-^
The expressions opinion noted, the presentation and
serious consideration of these resolutions by the responsible leadern
of the majority party in Congress, 8nd the later unprecedented
action in actually pressing a similar resolution to a vote, would
seem to make pertinent a brief examination into the subject of the
power, in the United States, to terminate war and declare peace.
Passing over the obviously unsound inference of Senator
Poindexter that Congress might assemble in special session on its
13
own motion, without a call from the President, it might seem evi-
11 S. Con. Res. 17, Mr. Lodge ; S. J.Res.136, Mr. Knox; S.J. Res. 139,
Mr. Knox. Cong. Record
, 66 Cong.,1 Sess.,9321; ibid . , 2Sess. ,540,981.
12 Immediately after the second rejection of the peace treaty
by the Senate on Mar. 19, 1920, Senator Knox moved consideration of
his resolution repealing the declaration of war, and several propo-
sals were again made in the House for terminating the state of war
and declaring peace by action of Congress. Apparently .the Republi-
cans reached an agreement to drop the Knox resolution, and instead tc
press the Porter resolution (prepared by the House Committee on For-
eign Affairs), which declared that "Whereas, the President of the
United States in the performance of his constitutional duty to give
to Congress information of the state of the Unio. , has advised Con-
gress that the war with the Imperial German Government has ended, .
the state of war declared to exist between the Imperial German Goverr
ment and the people o^ the United States. . .is hereby declared at en
end." This resolution also provided for the repeal of all the war
emergency legislation, and gave Germany 45 days in which to declare
a like termination of the war under the/conditions imposed, with a
penalty of an economic boycott in case of refusal. In this form the
Porter resolution was introduced into the House Mar. 31, and passed by
that body on April 9, by a vote of 242-150, and at this writing (Apr.,
1920) seems likely to pass the Senate also. This action does not af-
fect the argument of this chapter that such a method of terminating
war is unconstitutional and of no effect in the United States. See
text of Porter resolution in N.Y.T ime
s
,
Apr. 1, 1920.
15 Supra, 254.

257
j
dent that since Congress has the power to bring about a state of war
by means of a declaration, which has in every case taken the form of
an act of Congress or of a joint resolution, 14 it could also, by a
mere repeal of such declaration, terminate the state of war end
15bring about a state of peace. It should be pointed out in the
first place, however, that Congress does not have an absolute power
of repeal; that is, it cannot repeal each end every legislative
enactment and thereby restore the status quo ante . For example,
states are edmitted to the Union by means of en enebling act pessed
through the ordinery legislative channels; but no state can be de-
prived of its place in the Union by a subsequent repeal or nullifi-
cation of that eerlipr legislative act o^ admission. 16 Hence, it
does not necessarily follow that Congress can, by an act of repeal,
terminate a state of war and declare a state of peace, merely be-
cause it can, by a legislative declaration, bring about such e state
of war.
In the second place, it should be noted that such an act
of repeal, if it be considered proper at all, would be subject to
the approval or veto of the President, just as the original declara-
tion, and hence its enactment would not be so simple a matter as
these Senators seem to conclude. If such an act were passed over the
President's veto, the President could still prevent the complete
restoration of a normal state of peace by declining to resume diplo-
matic relations with the former enemy or to perform other acts that
14 The declarations in the cases of the war of 1812, the war
with Mexico, and the war with Spain were in the form of ects of
Congress; those in the recent wers with Germany and Austria-Hungary
in the form of joint resolutions.
15 This is the particular point emphasized by Judge Baldwin,
op. cit .. note 8.
16 See Willoughby, On the Const it u+ ion
.
I, 426.
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are strictly within his jurisdiction but which presuppose a state
of peace. A declaration of peace by Congress through a concurrent
resolution, such as that proposed by Senator Lodge, would clearly
be unconstitutional, since it would deprive the President of his
constitutional right to approve or disapprove every act of legisla-
17tive effect. At the most, such a resolution would amount to
nothing more than an expression of opinion, and could be entirely
18disregarded by the President. Apparently Senator Lodge and the
foreign Relations Committee of the Senate recognized the impossi-
bility of any attempt by Congress to declare peace without the co-
Dperation of the President, when the Lodge concurrent resolution was
19iropped and 8 substitute joint resolution was proposed.
Finally, while the Constitution specifically gives Congress
the power to declare war, it does not anywhere expressly confer the
Dower of declaring or making peace. Hence it is by no means certain
:hat Congress hae any power, either by a repeal of its original
ieclaration, or by an independent act, resolution, or declaration,
bo terminate a state of war and bring about a state of peace. A
study the debates in the Convention of 1787 will throw some light
m the intention of the makers of the Constitution in that regard.
When the power of declaring war was under consideration
bn August 17, Llr. Pinkney opposed vesting the power in the Legisla-
ture but ^avored the Senate as the best depository, saying that "it
ffould be singular for one authority to make war, and another peace".
S.T. Ellsworth, on the other nana
,
thought there was a material dif-
ference between the cases of making v;ar and declaring peace, adding
17 Constitution
,
Art. I, Sec. 7, CI. 3.
18 Cf. Quincy V/right, in Columbia Law Rev ., XX, 126-129, 131
(Feb. 1920)
.
19 Supra
.
256 aad note 12, 256.
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that "war also is a simple and overt declaration, peace attended
with intricate and secret negotiations." After the power of declar-
ing war had been definitely voted to Congress, Mr. Butler, evident-
ly agreeing with Pinkney that the power of making war and peace
should be in the same hands, moved to add the words "and peace"
after the word "war", thus giving to the Legislature the power over
both. Gerry seconded the motion, remarking that the "Senate are
more liable to be corrupted than the whole Legislature". However,
the motion was lost by unanimous vote of the States, the Convention
thus taking 8 definite stand against giving Congress the power to
20
make peace.
The intention of the Convention as to the proper location
of the power to make peace is further shown in the debates and in
the actions taken concerning the treaty-making power. The clause
regarding treaties 8S reported to the Convention read as follows:
"The President by and with the advice and consent of the Senate
shall hare power to make Treaties, but no treaty shall be made with-
out the consent of two thirds of the members present". When this
came up for consideration on September 7, Mr. Wilson attempted to
have the concurrence of the House of Representatives added to that
of the Senate, but his motion was lost, receiving only two affirma-
tive votes. 21 Madison's motion to except treaties of peace from
the two-thirds provision, "allowing them to be made with less dif-
ficulty than other treaties", was adopted unanimously, whereupon he
moved to authorize two-thirds of the Senate to make treaties of
peace without the concurrence of the President. "The President",
he said, "would necessarily derive so much power and importance from
20 Madison's Journal ( Hunt ed . ) , II, 188-189.
21 Ibid ., 527-528.
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a state of war that he might be tempted, if authorized, to impede a
treaty of peace." Mr. Butler seconded this motion and argued
strenuously for it "as a necessary security against ambitious and
corrupt Presidents". Mr. Gorham and Gouverneur Morris opposed the
motion, the latter holding "that no peace ought to be made without
the concurrence of the President, who was the general Guardian of
the National interests." c Madison's motion failed, but the next
day the whole clause was reconsidered, 8nd another distinct effort
was made, under the leadership of Mr. Sherman, to require the sanc-
tion of the Legislature to "rights established by a treaty of
peace." Though seconded by Mr. Morris, Sherman's motion does not
appear even to have been acted upon, the final 8ction of the Con-
vention being to adopt the clause as originally reported, the ex-
ception of treaties of peace from the two-thirds provision being
stricken out.^
The discussion throughout shows very clearly that an over
whelming majority in the Convention thought as did Ellsworth, "th8t
there w8s a material difference between the cases of making war and
declaring peace", that it did not consider Congress as vested with
the power to make peace unless given express authority. The Con-
vention declined emphatically to give Congress this express authori-
ty, but, on the other hand, did consider the power of making peace
as belonging under the treaty-making power to the President and
22 Madison's Journal ( Hunt ed .). II, 330.
23 Ibid .
24 Ibid. ,333-334.
25 Ibid
. ,
188 . "It is not at 811 necessary that the power of
declaring war and that of making peace are vested by a Constitution
in the same hands." Oppenheim, International Law. II, 283-284.
"The power to declare war -does not necessarily include that o^ mak-
ing 8 treaty of peace. . They are generally associated together,
though not always". Baker. Halleck' s International Law
,
I, 329.
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Senate. This is also the view expressed by Justice Story, when he
said that the proposal to add the power "to make peace" to the
power already given to Congress "to declare war" was unanimously
rejected, "upon the plain ground that it more properly belonged to
the treaty-making power. Ex- Just ice Hughes recently made practi-
27
cally the same statement, and other well known authorities on
American constitutional law likewise hold that the Constitution
vests the power of making peace, not in Congress, but in the Presi-
2ftdent and the Senate.
It is significant in this connection, not only that the
recent claims to a power in Congress of declaring peace are entire-
ly without precedent and contrary to the best interpretations of the
Constitution, but also that such claims are refuted by specific
declarations by Congress itself. Thus, every important legislative
enactment of Congress during the recent war which contained any
reference to the conclusion of peace, shows that Congress itself
crntemplated no possibility of terminating the state of war through
its own action. Two of the measures -- the Food and Fuel Control
Act and the Trading with the Enemy Act -- apparently considered
the President alone vested with considerable authority in that re-
gard, the former declarinp that the provisions of the act should
cease to be in effect "when the existing state of war . . . shall
have terminated, and the f?ct and date of such terminct ion shall be
26 Story, Commentaries on the Constitution
.
II, 88.
27 In Central Law Jour ., LXXXY, 206 (Sept. 21, 1917).
28 For example, Schouler says that the power of Congress under
the Confederation "embraced clearly the determination of both war
and peace, while thst of the Congress of our Constitution is in
expression confined to war alone, since the full treaty-making power
is lodged by the latter instrument (which makes no mention of de-
claring peace at all) with the new branch of government, the Execu-
tive, subject to a two-thirds ratification in the Senete." Consti -
tutional Studies
.
137.
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ascertained and proclaimed by the President " ; the latter that "the
words 'end of the war', as used herein, shall be deemed to mean the
date of proclamation of exchange of ratifications of the treaty of
peace, unless the President shall
,
by proclamation , declare a prior
date
.
in which case the date so proclaimed shall be deemed to be
the 'end of the war' within the meaning of this Act." 29
Other measures specifically contemplated the termination
of the war by means o* a treaty of peace. Thus, the Emergency Ship-
ping Fund Act provided that the authority granted in that act to
the President should cease "six months after a_ final treaty of
peace is proclaimed between this Government and the German Empire";
the Railway Control Act required that Federal control should not
continue longer than "one year and nine months next fpiloting the
date of the proclamation by the President of the exchange of rat if i -
cat ions o_f_ the treaty of peace " ; the Overman Act was to terminate
"six months after the termination of the war by the proclamation of
the treaty of peace , or at such earlier time as the President may
designate"; and the Control of Communications Act provided that con-
trol of the telegraph and telephone systems "shall not extend beyond
the date o 4* the proclamet ion by the President of the exchange of
ratifications of the treaty of peace ."3°
It seems clear, therefore, that a formal treaty of peace
is the only method contemplated by the Constitution for the termi-
nation of a foreign war and the restoration of peace, as it has
heretofore been the only method ever suggested or actually employed
29 Act of Aug. 10, 1917 (Sec. 24); Act of Oct. 6, 1917 (Sec.
2). YVigmore, Source-Book Military Law and Y/gr-Time Legislation
.
512 544.
30 Act of June 15, 1917; Act of Mar. 21, 1918 (Sec. 14); Act
of May 20, 1918 (Sec. 1); Joint Resolution of July 16, 1918. Wig-
more, op. cit .. 464, 583, 586, 602.
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in practice. The conclusion of peace rests therefore, in the United
States, with the President and the Senate, as the treaty-making
power.
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Chapter XIV.
Powers with regard to a Treaty of Peace *
Since the conclusion of a treaty of peace is the only
method by which a foreign war may be terminated by the United
States, it is necessary to note the powers of the President in
that connection. In the first place, while the Senate shares the
treaty-making power with the President and therefore enjoys con-
siderable pov.-er in connection with the definitive conclusion of
peace, certain preliminaries may be undertaken that are within the
province of the President alone. These are the armistice and the
preliminary protocol.
An armistice, strictly speaking, merely provides for a
temporary suspension of hostilities, but, If general in its scope,
2
it is usually entered into "with a view to negotiations for peace";
while a preliminary protocol is a preliminary settlement indicating
the lines along which the peace negotiations are to be conducted.
The two cannot always be clearly differentiated, however, in that
the latter may also provide for the suspension of hostilities, and
both are generally used "as devices of the executive department for
reaching a basis of negotiations without ewaiting the difficult and
4delayed conferences necessary for the final treaty." Neither re-
quires the ratification of the Senate before going into effect, each
being considered as "a proper exercise of his war powers by the Pre-
1 See preceding chapter.
2 Lawrence, Principles International Law
,
564-567; Davis,
Elements o^ International Law ( 4th ed .). 341.
~~3 Cf. Benton, International Law and Dirlomacy of the Spanish-
American V.'ar
,
2267 228.
4 Ibid
. .
227.
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sident". Both illustrate also the power of the President to enter
into important international agreements without the consent of the
Senate, in thst through them he may not only determine as to the
continuance or termination of hostilities, but may also lay down
the conditions to he imposed upon the hostile power and practically
commit the nation to a particular line of policy in the final peace
conference
.
President Madison sought in this way to bring about a
termination of the war of 1812 almost as soon as it was begun.
Jonathan Russell, the American charge d'affaires in London, acting
under instructions from Secretary of State Monroe issued only a few
days after the declaration of wftr by Congress, made two attempts
7
to arrange an armistice in the early fall of 1812. Although these
attempts were unsuccessful, the British government declining to
consent to an armistice on the conditions named, they were useful
in clarifying the issues of the war, in that Monroe selected from
among the "many just and weighty causes of complaint against Great
Britain", the orders in council and the impressment of seamen as
Q
those "considered to be o* the highest importance."
The power of the Executive thus to define the issues of
the war and to determine how far to yield in the interests of peace,
was further illustrated when the counter-proposal of the British
Government for a cessation of hostilities was rejected, on the
ground that it was based on the repeal of the orders in council
5 Foster, Practice of Diplomacy , 318.
6 Monroe to Russell, June 26, 1812. Am. State Papers , For .
Rel
. ,
III, 585-586; see also instructions of July 27. Ibid
.
, 586.
7 Russell to lord Castlereagh, Aug. 24, Sept. 12, 1812. Ibid.
589, 591.
8 Ibid
. . 585.
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alone and disregarded the question of impressment. "It will be
seen from this", says an eminent historian, "that Madison and Monroe
continued the war on the question of impressment alone.
The power of the President, as Commander- in-Chief , not
only to terminate hostilities by arranging- an armistice, but also to
formulate such conditions for the armistice as to bind the nation
to a particular policy in the peace conference, was clearly demon-
strated in 1898, when in response to the Spanish request for terms
of peace, President McKinley embodied his conditions in the protocol
of August 12, which he authorized the Secretary of State to sign on
the part of the United States.
This protocol not only provided for an immediate suspen-
sion of hostilities end a subsequent peace conference to arrange the
final terms, but stipulated that Spain shorld relinquish her claim
to sovereignty over Cuba, cede Porto Rico and an island in the
Ledrones to the United States, and evacuate these places immediately
The final disposition of the Philippines was to be left to the peace
conference, the United States meanwhile to occupy and hold the city,
12bay, and harbor of Manila. The protocol thus took on the charac-
ter of much more than a preliminary agreement governing the termina-
tion of hostilities, but committed the United States to a certain
very definite policy in the peace conference and approached very
closely to a definitive treaty of peace. *^
Similarly, the armistice conditions imposed upon Austria-
9 Warren to Monroe, SeDt. 30, 1812; Monroe to Warren, Oct. 27
1812. Am. State Papers , For. Rel . t III, 595-597.
10 Chenninjr, History of the United States
,
IV, 480; cf. Updyke
Diplomacy of the War of 1812 , 136-159.
11 For. Rel. 1898
.
825.
13 Cf. J. B. Moore, in Pol.Sci.Quar
.
.
XX, 391-392; Moore's Di-
gest, V, 213; Crandall, Treaties: Their Making and Enforcement , 103-104
12 See text of protocol. For. Rel. 1698
.
828-830.
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Hungary and Germany "by President Wilson in 1918,^ not only laid
down terms which safeguarded the victory of the Allies in a military
and naval sense, but, as embodying the famous "fourteen points",
were generally understood to have committed the United States to a
definite political policy in the peace conference, for his supposed
departure from which in that conference the President has since
undergone the bitterest criticism.
Having the power, through the armistice and the prelimi-
nary protocol, thus to terminate hostilities and to a considerable
extent define the future peace conditions, the President may also,
on his own authority alone, undertake measures which presume the
virtual ending of the war and the existence of a state of peace.
President McKinley, having proclaimed the suspension of hostilities
with Spain in accordance with the protocol of August 12, 1898, im-
mediately raised the blockade of the ports of Cuba and Porto Rico,
and on August 18 ordered 100,000 of the volunteers or as near that
15
number as practicable, to be mustered out. President Wilson like-
wise ordered a general demobilization immediately after the signing
1
6
of the armistice, and lifted many of the war-time restrictions
before the definitive conclusion of peace,-1- 7 thus assuming, as he
might, th8t the armistice wss something more than a mere suspension
of hostilities.
It might seem that the President, through such exercise
14 The texts o* these may be conveniently found in N. Y. Times
Current History Mag.
.
IX, 364-366, 396-397 (Dec, 1918).
15 Message to Congress, Dec. 5, 1898. Richardson, op. cit .,
X, 174-175.
16 Demobilization was virtually completed by Oct. 14, 1919,
the army having by that time been reduced to less than 300,000 men.
N. Y. Times Current Hist. Llag.. XI , 230 (Nov., 1919).
17 Such as restrictions on the use of ^ood and fuel, on trrde
and industry, and on the manufacture of beverages. Supra
,
235,
note 20.
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of power ps has been noted, could, of his own authority alone, not
only terminate hostilities, but bring about an actual termination of
the state of war. Thus, in 1896, many neutral powers treated the
protocol of August IE as practically ending the war between the
United States and Spain, and permitted public vessels of the United
States to enter and use their ports freely as in time of peace."'*®
So also it was reported in March, 1919, that the American peace
delegation at Paris was considering bridging over the period be-
tween the signing of the peace treaty and its ratification by the
Senate, by a. modus vivendi declaring the war ended as of date of
signature, so as to terminate the war legislation and enable an
19
earlier return to normal conditions.
It was even solemnly held in a court decision rendered at
about the same time, that the "war was brought to a close when the
armistice was signed", because President Wilson, in announcing the
armistice to Congress, used the words, "The war thus comes to an
20
end." In numerous other cases involving war-time legislation,
eminent counsel argued that the state of war was terminated by the
signing of the armistice and other acts of the President; and on
June 10, 1919, Representative Dyer (Massachusetts), a member of the
House Judiciary committee, cabled the President to "exercise the
authority which I am sure you possess" to proclaim the war ended
and demobilization completed, and thereby prevent war-time prohibi-
21bit ion from going into effect.
18 Moore's Digest
,
VII, 325.
19 Associated Press dispatch, Mar. 15, 1919.
20 Federal Judge Walter Evans, in a decision handed down in
Louisville, Ky. , liar. 24, 1919. Reported in Chicago Tribune , Mar.
25, 1919. The peace resolution passed by the House, Apr. 9, 1920,
likewise referred to these words of the President as authority for
declaring the war ended. Supra
,
256, note 12.
21 Chicago Tribune, June 11, 1919.
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However, the better opinion is that the President alone
cannot, by a protocol, proclamation, or other act, bring about the
termination of a state of war and the existence of a state of peace.
Thus, Attorney-General Griggs in 1898 held that the signing of the
protocol of August 12 and the suspension of hostilities did not
22terminate the state of war between the United States end Spain;
Attorney-General Palmer likewise ruled in 1919 that a state of war
could not be terminated by act of the President alone, but only by
8 treaty of peace; and President Wilson himself declined to at-
tempt any such exercise of pover, declaring "not only that in my
judgment I have not the power by proclamation to declare that peace
exists, but that I could in no circumst ences consent to such a
24
course prior to the ratification of a formal treaty of peace."
Finally, the courts have definitely decided that the sign-
ing of an armistice is not equivalent to the termination of a state
of war. Judge Hand, of the United States District Court of Uew
York, pointed out that "so long as the treaty of peace is not rati-
fied, there is some chance the resumption of hostilities", even
25
though that chance might be very slight; while the Supreme Court
likewise unanimously held that the cessation of hostilities in the
recent war by means of the armistice did not mean the "conclusion
of the war", and pointed to various "facts of public knowledge"
26
which showed the war emergency to be still in existence.
21 Chicago Tribune
.
June 11, 1919.
22 22 Op. Atty. Gen
.
,
190, 191.
23 See his ruling on the War-Time Prohibition Act, in IT. Y. Times
Aug. 28, 1919; also his telegram to Judge Evans, in case cited in
this chapter, note 20.
24 Letter to Senator Fall, Aug. 20, 1919 . IT .Y. Times ,
A
ug. 22. 1919
.
25 See decisions rendered by him, in cases involving the vali-
dity of wartime prohibition and wartime cable control, Jan. 20 &
Aug. 20, 1919. IT. Y. Times , Jan. 21, Aug. 21, 1919.
26 Hamilton v.Kentucky Distilleries & Warehouse Co. , decided
Dec. 15, 1919, upholding
,
velidlty of .the War Time Prohibition Act. Re-
po rted' in Chicago Tribune, Deb, lb. 1919.
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In the definitive conclusion of peace through a formal
treaty, the President, although he is of course required to obtain
the tdvice and cohsent" of the Senate before putting a treaty into
27
effect, has practically complete control of all the other functions
E8
and processes of tresty-msking. In the first place, the President
alone may appoint the commissioners who are to negotiate the treaty
of peace, and he is not required to submit their nominations to the
Senate for confirmation. This power rests upon the now well-recog-
nized right of the President to use, at his discretion, special
agents o^ a diplomatic or semi-diplomatic character -- a right which
29
one writer points out has four bases: (l) a presumptive legal
basis in the acts of Congress giving the President a contingent fund
which he may expend for foreign intercourse without specific ac-
30
counting; (2) the recognized right of the President to take the
31initiative in foreign affairs; (3) the general practice of govern-
27 Constitu" ion
.
Art. II, Sec. 2, CI. 2.
28 "As for making and declaring peace, the power . . . per-
tains no longer to Congress, but is lodged for negotiation and
conclusion in the President." Schouler, Constitutional Studies
,
140. "As the war power is shared between the President and Gon-
gress, but Congress does not sh?re in the executive power, the
breadth of the President's prerogatives as to the closing of war
becomes of special importance. The limits imposed directly by
the Constitution are few, its main one being the requirement of
the consent o* the Senate ... To make a declaration of war re-
quires the assent of Congress as well as of the President. To
end a war, it is enough for him to obtain the assent of the Senate,
if he acts under the treaty-making power." S. E. Baldwin, in
Am. Jour. Int. Law
,
XII, 13.
29 H. L~, 7/r ist on, "President ial Special Agents in Diplomacy",
in Am. Pol. Sci. Rev . , X, 481-499, esD. 482-488.
30 As the earliest acts of this sort may be mentioned the
Acts of July 1, 179C; tfeb. 9, 1793; May 1, 1610. Annals o^ Cong ..
1 Cong., II, A Pp. f 2232; 2 Cong., A pp., 1411; 11 Cong., II,
1pp., 2585.
31 Suprp . ch. II.
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32 35
ments under international lew; and (4) necessity.
Prior to 1815, the names of such special agents or com-
missioners chosen to negotiate treaties "'ere generally submitted
34
to the Senste for confirmation. According to this practice,
President Lledison even summoned the Senate in special session in
May, 1813, to consider his course in accepting the Russian offer of
mediation, and to confirm the peace commissioners he had already
appointed and sent on their way. The Senate confirmed the nomina-
tions of John Quincy Adams and Senator James Bayard, hut rejected
that of Secretary of the Treasury Albert Gallatin, on the ground
that "in the opinion of the Senate, the powers and duties of the
Secretary of the Department 4* the Treasury and thos<= of an Envoy
Extraordinary to a Foreign Power, are so incompatible that they
35
ought not be and remain united in the same person." * Upon the
failure of this attempt to open peace negotiations, the President
appointed another peace commission in January, 1814, again submit-
ting the names to the Senate for confirmation.
Since 1815, however, it has been very unusual to submit
32 "There seems to be no reason why the government of the
United States cannot, in conducting its diplomatic intercourse
with other countries, exercise powers as broad and general or as
limited and peculiar, or special, as any other government. . .
In fact, there has been no limit placed upon the use of a power
of this kind, except the discretion of the sovereign or ruler
of the country." Report of Senate Committee on Foreign Rela-
tions, 1693, quoted by H. M. Wrist on, op. cit ., 486-487.
33 See H. L. Wriston, op. cit ., 487-488.
34 Crandall, Treaties: Their leaking and Enforcement , 75-76.
35 Updyke, Diplomacy o^ the '.ar o J 1812, 146-148.
36 This commissinn consisted of John Quincy Adams, James
Bayard, Henry Clay, Jonathan Russell, and Albert Gallatin, the
first 'our names being submitted to the Senate on Jan. 14 and
confirmed Jan. 18. Gallatin's name was added on Feb. 8, and
confirmed the next day without serious opposition, he being no
longer in the Cabinet. Ibid . , 167-168.
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the appointments of treaty negotiators to the Senate at all, Bn^
especially so with regard to peace commissioners. President Polk
even felt it necessary to keep secret for a time his selection of
Nicholas Trist as peace commissioner in 1847, although he vested
Trist with unusual powers, not only to accompany the army and
negotiate peace at a favorable opportunity, but also to control
39
the military and naval operations. His later appointments of
Sevier and Clifford to negotiate the final treaty were, however,
submitted to the Senate for confirmation, though it should be noted
that Sevier was in reality selected for the permanent post of
minister to Mexico with authority to complete the peace treaty
negotiations, and that Clifford was added merely because of Sevier's
40
illness. President McKinley likewise appointed the peace com-
41
missioners of 1898 without consulting the Senate; while President
Y/ilson,in 1918, although Congress was in session, merely "announced"
the peace delegation in a "..hite House statement, and took the un-
37 For instances of such appointments without the consent of
the Senate, see inoore's Digest
,
IV, 453-457.
38 Diary of James K. Polk
,
II, 468, 483; cf. II, 262, 268,273.
39 "Should he TTrist) make known to you in writing that the
contingency has occured in consequence of which the President is
wi ' ling that further active military operations should cease, you
will regard such notice as a direction from the President to sus-
pend them until further orders from this department." Secret or-
ders to Gen. Scott and Commodore Perry, quoted by H. M. Wriston,
op. cit
.
, 495
.
40 Diary of James K. Polk
,
III, 378-383, 389-391. The treaty
had -been ratified by the Senate, liar. 10, 1848, with amendments
that required new negotiations.
41 However, fch« commissioners were appointed and the treaty
of peace completed during a recess of Congress. But in 1901, Presi-
dent LIcXinley, without consulting the Senate, although it was then
in session, appointed W. W. Rockhill as special commissioner to
China, invested with full po-Ter to negotiate with the representa-
tives of the other allied powers and of China concerning a settle-
ment o* the questions arising out of the Boxer Rebellion.
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42precedented step of including- himself.
Having the power to appoint peace commissioners with or
without the consent o^ the Senate, the President is not restricted
in his choice, but may select whom he will, without qualification.
Public opinion seems to expect, however, that distinguished men of
both parties should be chosen, and one of the severest criticisms of
President Wilson was his apparent selection of men who would reflect
merely his ov rn personal views. President Polk likewise found great
difficulty in selecting a commissioner satisfactory to the country,
probably one reason for the choice of a person in a somewhat obscure
posit ion.
There seems also to be a considerable bod;; of opinion,
that, since the Senate is constitutionally a coordinate part of the
treaty-making power, it should be represented on the commission to
negotiate peace. President Madison probably deferred to this
sentiment in appointing Senator Bayard, a Federalist, and henry Clay
formerly in the Senate but at that time Speaker of the House, to
the peace commission of 1814. President McKinley went so far in
that respect as to give the Senate a majority on the peace commis-
42 Together 'with Secretary of State Lansing, Henry 'White,
Edward M« Mouse , and Gen. Tasker H. Bliss. Official U. S. Bulletin
,
Nov. 19, Nov. 30, 1918. President "ilson's decision to participate
personally in the peace negotiations at Paris raised again the in-
teresting, though purely academic question as to the President's
constitutional right to leave the jurisdiction of the United States
during his term of office. It is worthy of note that Hamilton's
plan for a constitution definitely contemplated the consent of Con-
gress for the absence of the President from the United States, and
even then for the exercise o^ his powers by the Vice-President
during such absence. See Elliot ' s rebr tes
,
V, 567. The law and
precedents governing the President's right to leave the country
ere discussed by Park Benjamin, in The Independent
.
Mar. 29, 1919.
See also opinion o^ ex-Attorney General Wicker8ham, in IT. Y. Times
.
Nov. 27, 1918; and Taft, Our Chief Magistrate and His Powers . 50-TT.
43 Diary of James K. Polk
,
II, 466. Nicholas Trist was chief
Clerk o^ the bepertment of State when appointed peace commissioner.
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sion of 1898; and President Wilson's entire disregard of the
Senate in making- up the peace commission in 1918 called forth es-
pecially severe criticism, as though it were an utter contempt for
the constitutional position and rights of that body.
As a matter of fact, though Senators have b^en quite com-
monly appointed on commissions to negotiate treaties, including
treaties of peace, there is excellent authority for the view that
their appointment to such missions is not only inexpedient and im-
proper, but also contrary to the constitutional principle that no
civil officer of the United States shall at the same time be a mem-
45ber of either house of Congress. President Monroe, for example,
stated in 1818 that he "did not approve the principle of appointing
members of Congress to foreign missions, but, as it had been es-
tablished in practice from the first organization of the present
Government, and, as tne members of Congress would not be satisfied
with the opposite principle, he did not think it proper to make it
46
a rule for himself."
The Senete itself has upon occasion taken a positive
stand ageinst the participation of members of that body in treaty
negotiations. Thus, in 1898, the Senate declined to confirm the
44 Cushman K. Davis (Minn.), Republican, chairmen of the
Senate Committee on Foreign Relations; William P. Frye (Me.),
Republican; and George Gray (Del.), Democrat. The other members
of the commission were William R. Dey, who resigned es Secretary
of State in order to head the commission, and White lew Re id, for-
mer minister to France.
45 "No senator or representative shall, during the time for
which he v:es elected, be appointed to any civil office under the
authority of the United States, which shell heve been created, or
the emoluments whereof shell have been increesed during such time;
and no person holding eny office under the United Stetes shell be a
member o f either House during his continuance in office." Consti -
tution
,
Art. I, Sec. 6, CI. 2.
46 Memoirs of John Q,uinc.v Adems , IV, 72.
JJ
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nominations of Senators Hoar, Cullom, and Morgan to the Hawaiian
Commission "upon the ground that it would no longer consent to the
selection of members of this body to negotiate important treaties
47that were to be reported to the Senate." In fact, the feeling in
the Senate was st that time so strong against that practice that the
Judiciary Committee "almost unanimously" contemplated reporting a
bill or resolution prohibiting it for the future, and only refrained
from doing so because it was thought that such action might be con-
strued as a discourtesy to those Senators who had acted under such
appointments. The committee instructed Senator Hoar, however, to see
the President and say that it hoped the practice would be discon-
tinued; to which suggestion the President responded by assuring
Senator ^oar thst it would not occur again, although he called at-
tention to the difficulty of getting suitably qualified men outside
480"" the Senate or House.
In 1903 the question again came before the Senate, and the
judgment war almost unanimously as before. Senator Tillman said:
"7,'e had the Paris treaty or the Spanish or Philippine treaty negotiat
ed by Senators whose votes, no doubt, were influenced by the fact
that they were on that commission. I do not see why we should pal-
ter with this thing any longer. Probably we cannot convince the
Executive that this practice is improper and contrary to the will of
47 Statement of Senator Hale, in U. S. Senate, Feb. 26, 1903.
Cong. Record, 57 Cong., 2 Sess., 2695. The Senators nevertheless
served, their -position beine- stated by Senator Cull^m as follows:
"We went out by appointment of the President; but there was a doubt
about it, end the Judicial Committee of the Senate, in view of
the doubtful attitude which we occupied as receiving appointments
from the President while being members of the Senate, thought it
best not to act upon our confirmation at all; and they were not
acted uiDon. V/e were nev^r confirmed by the Senate as a matter of
fact."
'
Ibid
.
, 2695.
48
"
TbTd .
,
2695, 2698.
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the Senate, unless it is forbidden by lew." He therefore offered
an amendment to the provision under discussion providing, "that in
making appointments to any such commission no Senator or Member of
the House shall be eligible." 49
Although the amendment went out on a point of order, Sena-
tor Hale protested vigorously against the practice; Senator Bacon
said it was "distinctly in opposition to the express policy, if not
the express command of the Constitution o-p the United States";
Senator Hoar concurred in this view, and in addition stated that
"hardly a more dangerous practice can be conceived than this one";
and Senator Allison said, "I am in sympathy with the general sug-
gestion.
. . I do not believe a Senator or Representative should
50be appointed." Senators Foraker and Teller were not ready to
restrict Senators from serving on such commissions under all circum-
51
stances, but thought the practice as a rule "reprehensible". Of
all those who participated in the discussion, onl^ Senators Aldrich,
Piatt (Connecticut), and LIcComas defended the practice, and opposed
52
any limitation on such service by members of the Senate.
It would therefore seem that the recent outbursts of
criticism against President V/ilson, in the Senate and elsewhere,
for his failure to appoint members of that body to the peace com-
mission, are based on rather flimsy pretexts; and that, as a matter
of fact, while criticism of the personnel of the commission might be
49 Cong. Record , 57 Cong., 2 Sess., 2696. The provision under
consideration was one in the Sundry Civil 'bill authorizing the ap-
pointment o"" a commission to negotiate concerning rates of exchange
between silver and gold using: countries.
50 Ibid.
,
2695, 2696, 2697, 2698.
51 Ibid .
.
2696, 2697.
52 Ibid
.
.
2696, 2698. Apparently the positive assurance by
Senator Aldrich that no such appointments would be made in the case
under consideration had a great deal to do with the abandonment of
a specific prohibition.
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justified on other grounds, that based on sny constitutional or in-
herent right o^ the Senate to representation on such commission is
condemned, both by the Constitution and by the unprejudiced opinion
of the Senste itself.
In the second piece, the President has entire control of
the peace negotiations on the part of the United States. He lays
down the principles that are to form the basis of negotiation, he
determines whether to yield or to stand firm on a disputed point,
and he decides the wisdom and expediency of compromises. The power
and responsibility of the President in these respects are the same,
whether he directs the negotiations from Vv'ashingt on, as did LIcKinley
in 1896, or himself participates in the peace conference, as did
Wilson in 1919. His power is only the more strikingly apparent in
the latter case.
President McKinley was constantly in touch with the peace
commissioners at Paris in 1898, and did not hesitate to make new
demands and impose additional conditions during the progress of the
negotiations, even though he was not personally present. With re-
gard to the disposition of the Philippines, for example, concerning
which the Spanish commissioners had expected an opportunity to ne-
gotiate, President McKinley' s original instructions were to demand
the cession of the island of Luzon only. Later, however, ad-
ditional instructions were sent that "the cession must be of the
whole archipelago or none. The latter is wholly inadmissible, and
the former must therefore be required." The American commission
53
was divided as to the wisdom and justice of this demand, and
sought, moreover, to rest the claim of the United States to any part
53 See For. Pel. 1898, 932-935, 945-948.
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of the Philippines on the grounds of indemnity, the welfare of the
islands, the "broken power of Spain", and the "anarchy" that would
result from our complete withdrawal; while the President apparently
desired to press the claim "by right of conquest", holding that the
conquest o p the entire archipelago had been accomplished by Dewey's
destruction of the Spanish fleet in Manila Bay. In both matters,
the commission yielded, of course, to the views of the President .
^
President Wilson's "domination" o^ the peace commission of 1919
was not more complete, nor is there anything improper about such
domination, since it is the President who is alone responsible for
the results of the negotiations.
The Senate has, of course, the right to "advise and con-
sent" to all treaties, and that has sometimes been interpreted to
mean that the Senate has a right to "advise" and to be consulted
before or during the course of the negotiations. There have been
a few occasions upon which the President has sought the previous ad-
vice of the Senate, or has informed that body as to pending nego-
tiations. President Polk in 1846 referred to that practice as
"eminently wise", and said that since the Senate is a branch of
both the treaty-making and war-making powers, "it may be eminently
proper for the Executive to take the opinion and advice of that
body in advance upon any great question which may involve in its
54 Benton, International Law end Diplomacy of the Spanish-Amer
ican .Var
.
241, 243; See For. Rel. 1698
.
935, 937, 940, 941. A re-
cent interesting explanation o^ President McKinley'e demand for the
whole o^ the Philippines is to the effect that while his mind was
not yet made up on the point, he received a communication from
Lord Salisbury warning him that Germany was preparing to take over
the islands if the United States withdrew, that such a step would
probably precipitate a world war, and that in the interests of peace
and harmony it would be best for the United States to retain the
whole group. Latane , From Isolation to Leadership . 85.
55 For a list of these, see Finley & Sanderson, The American
Executive and Executive Methods, 280-282.
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decision the issue of peace or war."
That practice has, however, been only rarel; resorted to
in later times
,
and generally the "advice" of the Senate, as well
as its "consent", has been given only after the negotiations have
been completed and the final treaty laid before it by the Presi-
dent. There has been even less disposition to interpret that phrase
""by and with the advice and consent of the Senate") as giving the
Senate any right to participate as a body in the negotiations or
to offer its advice as to the course and subject-matter of the nego-
tiations. The determination of those has been generally held to
be the function of the President alone, and only recently has there
been any serious attempt to assert power on the part of the Senate
to interfere or to interject its "advice" during the course of im-
portant treaty negotiations, especially those for the conclusion of
peace
.
Such an attempt was made, however, during the recent
treaty negotiations at Paris, when Senator Knox, on June 10, 1919,
in an attempt to ^orce the separation of the covenant of the League
of Nations from the treaty of neace then being negotiated, proposed
a resolution declaring, among other things, that the Senate of the
United States, "being a coequal part of the treaty making power of
this government and therefore coequally responsible for any treaty
which is concluded and ratified", was "deeply concerned" over the
treaty under negotiation; that it would regard a treaty confined to
56 tlessage to Senate, June 10, 1846. Richardson, op. cit ..
IV, 449.
57 It is significant that President Wilson, in announcing
his famous "fourteen points" as the necesscry conditions of peace,
addressed Congress as a whole, and not the Senate alone. Address
to Congress, Jan. 8, 1918. McKinley, Collected Llr.terials for the
Study of the 7/ar
,
20-22.
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"the attainment of those ends for which we entered the wer", as
"fully adequate for our national needs"; that the conclusion of a
"full and complete peace "was the paramount, if not the sole duty of
the peace conference; that the question of a League of Nations
should be reserved for "future separate and full consideration" by
the people of any nation; and that the adoption by the peace con-
ference of "the foregoing reasonable limitations and positions"
58
would facilitate the early acceptance of the treaty by the Senate.
This attempt to inject the advice of the Senate into the
peace conference at Peris, and to influence the course of the
negotiations, was directly contrary, not only to the traditional
view that treaty negotiation is a function belonging solely to the
President, but also to the expressed views of Senate leaders on
former occasions that the Senate should hold itself distinctly
apart from these negotiations, and only take action when the treaty
is completed end laid before it, or when its advice is sought by
the President.
Thus, Senator Spooner, generally considered to be one of
the best constitutional lawyers of his time, said with regard to
this point: "The Senate has nothing whatever to do with the negotia -
tion of treaties or the conduct of our foreign intercourse and rela-
tions save the exercise of the one constitutional function of. ad-
vice and consent which the Constitution requires as a precedent
condition to the making of 8 treaty. . . From the foundation of
the Government it has been conceded in practice and in theory that
the Constitution vests the nower of negotiation and the various
phases -- and they are multifarious — of the conduct of our foreign
58 See text o^ resolution in Cong. Record . 66 Cong., 1 Sess.,
935. The resolution was, however, never acted upon.
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relations exclusively in the President . And he does not exercise
that constitutional nower, nor can he be made to do it, under the
tutelage or guardianship of the Senate or of the House or of the
Senate and House combined. "^9
Likewise, Senator Lodge, who recently has bitterly criti-
cized President Wilson for "ignoring" the Senate in negotiating the
Treaty o^ Versailles, had this to say in 1906: "Ho one, I think,
can doubt the absolute power o^ the President to init iat e and carry
on all negotiations . . . The action of the Senate becomes operative
and actually effective only when a treaty is actually submitted to
it. . .We (the Senate) have no possible right to break suddenly
into the middle o^ a. negotiation and demand from the President what
instructions he has given his representative. That part of the
treaty making is no concern of ours . . . It is a mere invasion of
the powers and rights of the President if we are to plunge in at
a stage of the negotiations where we have no business whatever and
demand from him the instructions which he has given to his properly
appointed representatives. When the treaty made by those represen-
tat ives comes before us, then is the time , and not before, in which
we C8n properly ask for information in regard to ell that has led
up to it." 60
In the light of these strong expressions of opinion, it
would seem that much of the recent criticism of President Wilson by
Senator Lodge and his followers, is entirely hypocritical and un-
justified, especially in so far as it is based on the relative
constitutional position and powers of the Senate and the Executive
59 Cong. Record
,
XL, Pt . 2 (59 Gong., 1 Sess.), 1418 (Jan,
23, 1906).
60 Ibid. , 1470.
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in regard to the making of treaties, -however overbearing- end
tactless the President may have been in his relations to the Senate,
clearly he has at no time in his negotiation the Treaty of Ver-
sailles exceeded the traditional view o^ his constitutional powers
nor encroached on those of the Senate.
The power of the President with regard to the conclusion
of peace does not end with the negotiation and signature of the
61
treaty. The Senate must give its consent before the treaty can
become fully effective and the state of war be actually terminated,
but the fact that the Senate "advises and consents" to the ratifica-
tion o-" a treaty is not conclusive, as the President alone can per-
form the final act of ratification. The Senate may amend a treaty,
but the President may decline to accept these changes and refuse to
ratify the emended treaty. He may withdraw a treaty from the Senate
at any time during its consideration, and he may, if he chooses,
even decline to ratify a tr<=aty that has been approved by the
Senate in its original form. In other words, while the "advice and
consent" of the Senate is a condition precedent to ratification, it
62
is not mandatory -- the President has the final word.
61 The mere signing of the treaty is of some importance, since
it operates to bring about a suspension of hostilities, if that has
not already been done by a separate armistice or protocol. Hall,
International Law 1 554-555.
6"S Crandall , Treaties: Their Making and Enforcement . 97. "The
President is so supreme under the Constitution in the matter of treaj
ties, excluding only the Senate's rat i^icat inn, that he may negotiate
a treaty, he may send it to the Senate, it may receive by way of '8d|
vice and consent' the unanimous Judgment of the Senate that it is in
the highest degree for the public interest, and yet the President is
as free when it is sent back to the White House with resolution of
ratification attached, to put it in his desk never again to see the
light of day as he was free to determine in the first instance whetheHr
he would or would not negotiate it. That pov/er is not expressly givajn
to the President by the Constitution, but it inheres in the executive
power conferred upon him' to conduct our foreign relations, and it is
e power which inheres in him as the sole organ under the Constitutio4
through whom our foreign relations and diplomatic intercourse are
conducted." Senator John C. Spooner,in U. S. Senate, Jan. 23, 1906.
Cong. Record. XL. Pt . 2 (59 Cong., 1 Seas.), T419.
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It is therefore within the power the President to de-
termine the actual date for the termination of a war and the con-
clusion of peace. That is done "by means o^ a proclamation, an-
nouncing the effectiveness of the treaty or the exchange of ratifi-
cations, in the case of a foreign war, or merely announcing the
termination of armed resistance, in the case of a civil war. The
actual exchange of ratifications, or the actual suppression of re-
bellion, apparently are not enough; there must be an official de-
claration of the event by the President. "The war commences when
government officially says it has commenced, and it ends when
government says it has ceased to exist" "government" in the
latter case means the President. 64
Thus, the war of 1812 was officially terminated on Februsr;;
18, 1815, the war with Mexico on July 4, 1848, end the war with Spaij:
on April 11, 1899, because the President's proclamation of that
date in each particular case. Onl. in the case of the war with
Spain did that date correspond with the date of the actual exchange
65
of treaty ratifications. So also the Civil fn'ar is declared by
the courts to h8ve ended on April 2, 1866, with respect to all the
insurrectionary states except Texas, and on August 20, 1866, with
respect to Texas, because of the proclamations of the President de-
63 Glenn, The Army and the Law , 64.
64 "It is necessary to refer to some public act of the poli-
tical departments of the government to fix the dates; and for ob-
vious reasons, those of the executive department. . . must be taken'.'
The Protector
,
12 Wall., 700, 7C2 (1871). Of course the Court was
here referring particularly to a civil war.
65 For the proclamations, see Richardson, op. cit ., I, 560;
IV, 627; For. Hel. 1898
.
831. In the ^irst care, the treaty was
signed Dec. 24, 1114, and ratifications exchanged Feb. 17, 1815;
in the second, the first treaty was concluded Feb. 2, 1848, and
ratifications o 45 the amended treaty exchanged key 30; in the last
case, the treaty was signed Dec. 10, 1898, and approved by the
Senate Feb. 6, 1899.
====^^
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daring ermed resistance st en end as those d8tes, although the
last rebel army surrendered in May, 1865.^
Recent war legislation also shows clearly that Congress
contemplated that the date for the termination of the state of war
with Germany and Austria-Hungary should he determined by proclama-
tion o^ the President. Thus, there were express provisions declar-
ing that "the fact and date o:*7 such termination shall be ascertained
and proclaimed by the President", or that the end of the war "shall
be deemed to mean the date of proclamation of exchange of ratifica-
tions of the treaty of peace". In other cases, it was provided
that the acts should terminate a certain time "after a final treaty
of peace is -proclaimed", or "following the date of the proclama-
tion by the President of the exchange of ratifications of the treaty
67
of peace", or similar languap-e.
The powers of the President with regard to the conclusion
of peace are therefore very extensive and quite definite. He may,
on his ovn authority, undertake preliminary measures and enter into
preliminary agreements for the termination of hostilities; through
these preliminary measures, he may to a considerable extent lay
down the conditions of permanent peace 8nd commit the nation to
them. With regard to the definitive treaty of peace, the President
has entire control the personnel o p the peace commission, and
entire control of the peace negotiations; he is required to obtain
the "advice and consent" o^ t e Senate before putting a treaty of
peace into final effect, but when that is obtained, he is again
absolute as to the fin?l acceptance of the treaty, and as to the
time for its becoming effective.
66 The Protector , 12 "all., 700, 702 (1871); Lamer v. Browne ,
92 U. S.
,
187, 193 ( 1675) ; Birkhimer, Military Government and Lartia !
Law, 367-368; Richardson, op. cit.
,
VI, 429-432, 434-438.
67 Supra. 261-262.
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Chapter XV.
Powers with regard to Reconstruction .
With the termination o^ the emergencies of war, it might
be expected that the exercise of the "war powers" should immediately
cease. Ex- Just ice Hughes thus expressed the view, shortly after
the signing o^ the armistice at the close of the recent war, that
in the harnessing of our strength for war we were acting "under the
Constitution and not in violation of it", hut that to use the war
powers to control peace conditions was a proceeding "essentially
vicious and constituting the most serious offense against our in-
stitutions.""*" Elihu Root, in his argument before the Supreme Court
in the recent prohibition cases, likewise contended that the right
to exercise the war powers no longer existed when the war emergency
had passed. "The question", he said, "is much confused by a cer-
tain vague and colloquial use of the term 'war powers'. War con-
fers no powers upon Congress. The powers are all in the Constitu-
tion o^ the United States. The condition of war does create exigen-
cies which make appropriate the exercise of powers not otherwise
existing. . . On the other hand, when the war has progressed to an
extent that the enemy has been forced into submission and there is
no longer an army or navy to be raised and maintained the power ends
because the_ exigency no longer exists .
It is generally recognized, however, that the return to
normal peace conditions can be made only gradually, that there must
be a period o^ readjustment and reconstruction during which certain
of the war powers must of necessity continue to be exercised. Thus
1 II. Y. Times
.
NOT. 29, 1918.
2 Ibid
. , WoyI 19, 1919.
4 at
*
Mr. Hughes admitted, in the speech quoted above, that "whenever,
during the war, extraordinary powers were fittingly exercised end
governmental control was assumed for war purposes, the readjustment
to conditions of peace must of course be effected gradually and
with the circumspection essential to the protection o^ all the
public and private interests involved". Professor Willoughby also
remarks that "the power to wage war carries with it authority not
only to bring it to a full conclusion, but, after the cessation of
active military operations, to take measures to provide against its
renewal";^ and the Supreme Court long ago held that "the power (to
carry on war) is not limited to victories in the field. . . It
carries with it inherently the power to gua rd against the immediat e
renewal o^ the conflict
,
and to remedy the evils which have arisen
from its rise and progress ."^
Although this opinion of the court referred particularly
to the conditions resulting from the Civil War, there would here
seem to be some warrant for the belief that the President, who as
Commander-in-Chief has the power of waging war, is also entrusted
with such powers 8S may be necessary to effect a complete return to
the normal conditions of peace.
Some of these powers, such as the resumption of friendly
relations with the opposing belligerent, may result from an ordinary
constitutional function, whose exercise in this case is made neces-
5
sary in order to completel;. restore the status of peace. In other
cases, however, the termination of war and the consequent problems
of reconstruction m.8y bring 8bout new situations which can only be
3 On the Constitution
,
II, 1212.
4 Stewart v. Kahn
.
11 Wall., 493, 507 (1870).
5 That is, the en-nointment and reception of accredited diplo-
matic agents.
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met by the assumption of unusual authority and the exercise of ex-
traordinary powers. Thus, the measures undertaken by Presidents
Lincoln and Johnson in reorganizing and reconstructing the govern-
ments of the insurrectionary states of the South by executive orders
and through military commanders, were upheld by the Supreme Court
as a legitimate exercise by the President of his powers as Comman-
der- in-Chief
,
subject to final determination by Congress.
The successful conclusion of a war frequently results in
the acquisition of additional territory, and the determination of
the status, rights, and government of such acquired territory is
one o p the problems of the reconstruction period. It is a well-
recognized constitutional principle in the United States that, when
territory is annexed by the United States or comes in any manner
under its jurisdiction, Congress has an absolute right, from the
moment of such acquisition, to determine trie political rights and
governmental organization o^ that territory.® In the case of ter-
ritory acquired by purchase or other peaceful means, Congress has
generally seen fit to exercise that right by conferring temporary
but complete governmental power on the President, until it can it-
self provide for a definite system of government.
Thus, after the cession of Louisiana, an act was passed
providing that, until Congress should otherwise provide, "all the
military, civil, and judicial powers exercised by the officers of
the existing government of the same, shall be vested in such person
or persons and shall be exercised in such manner as the President
6 See Dunning, Reconstruction: Political and Economic . 35-39.
7 Texas v. Y/hite
.
7 ..all., 7C0, 730-731 (186b).
8 V/illoughby, On the Constitut ion
,
I, 403.
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of the United States shell direct." Under this provision, the
President exercised complete governmental authority over Louisiana
until October 1, 1804, when the territorial government created by
Congress went into effect. 1^ In almost identical language, Con-
gress likewise vested the temporary government of Florida in the
President, 1 "'" all the powers of which were exercised by him through
General Jackson as governor and through other subordinates until
12Florida was made a territory in 1822. Alaska, acquired in 1867,
was governed under the sole authority o^ the President until 1900,
when Congress adopted a civil code and pro\*ided a form of civil
government for that region;-^ while Hawaii was governed by the
President for more than two years under the authority of the joint
14
resolution of annexation. The government of the Panama Canal
Zone, established and carried on by the President at first under
9 Act of Oct. 31, 1803. Annals of Cong . . 8 Cong., 1 Sess.,
Apr., 1245. Objections were made to this grant of power on the
ground that the combination of all governmental powers in one man
was unconstitutional, and that it made the President a despot.
Thomas, Military Government in Newly Acquired Territory of the
United States
,
30-31; McMaster, History of the People o^ the
United States
.
Ill, 9-10.
10 Act of Mar, 26, 1804. Annals of Cong . , 8 Cong., 1 Sess.,
App., 1293.
11 Acts of Mar. 3, 1819 & Mar. 3, 1821. Ibid . , 15 Cong.,
2 Sess., II, App., 2534; 16 Cong., 2 Sess., App., 1809.
12 Act o^ Mar. 30, 1822. Ibid . , 17 Cone:., 1 Sess., II, App.,
2578; cf. Thomas, op. git, , 65-70~~95, 98.
13 Act of June 6, 1900. 31 Stat, at L. , 321. The Presi-
dent exercised his authority in Alaska principally through the army
commanders and through the Secretary of the Treasury (Alaska hav-
ing, by executive order, been mede a revenue district). Thomas,
op. cit
.
, 279-280. Alaska was definitely organized as a ter-
ritory by Act of Aug. 24, 1912. 37 Stat, at L ., 512.
14 Joint Resolution of July 7, 1898. 30 Stat, at L .. 750.
A territorial government was established Dec. 3, 1900, by Act of
Apr. 30, 1900. 31 ibid . , 141.

the authority of Congress, 10 was, upon the -failure of Congress
to continue that authority, nevertheless continued by authority of
several executive orders, until congressional sanction was again
"1 7given in 1912. "Beginning with a government which might be termed
political, it ended as a government by executive order, controlled
by one man answerable only to the President of the United States,
through the Secretary of War." 1 ^
7/hile the status end government acquired territory
ere clearly subject to the jurisdiction and control of Congress,
it would seem that another constitutional principle may be derived
from these examples, namely, that in the absence of Congressional
legislation, the President may exercise temporary governmental
power on his own suthority. In feet, the presumption seems to have
existed from the time of the ecquisition of Louisiana that the
President could exercise such authority by virtue of his powers as
1 9Commende r- in-Chief
.
In the case o^ territory acquired after conquest end oc-
cupation in war, the rower of Congress likewise constitutionally
15 Acts o^ June 28, 1902 (Spooner Act) & Apr. 28, 1904. 32
Stat . at L
.
,
481; 32 ibid . , 429. The former authorized the Presi-
dent to establish judicial tribunals in territory acquired for the
canal, in order to enforce the rules and regulations which he might
deem necessary end proper for the preservation of order and public
health; which authority was considered sufficient to permit the
establishment of "such form of government as the President might
determine." The latter act provided that the President should be
vested with all the powers of government until the expiration of the
58th Congress, unless other provisions for a government were sooner
mede. See Goethals, Government of the Canal Zone , 11-20.
16 Executive orders o? Apr. 1, 1905; IIov. 17, 1906; April,
1907; J8n. 8, 1908. Goethals, op. cit .. 43-50. The 56th Congress
adjourned without meking any further provision -for the government
of the Canal Zone.
17 Panama Canal Act of Aug. 24, 1912. 37 Stet . at I. , 560.
18 Goethals, op. cit ., 51.
19 Willoughby, On the Constituion
,
I, 390; Thomas, op. cit .,
31-32.
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attaches from the moment of acquisit ion. However, the problem of
the temporary government of such territory, in the absence of pro-
vision by Congress, is somewhat different from that in the case of
territory acquired peacefully. It involves the question of the con-
tinuance of the military government already existing under the au-
thority and direction of the President, or of the power to set up
some other form of government under other authority.
President Polk, after the ratification of the treaty of
peace with Mexico in 1848, at first held that he had no power to
continue the governments established by him over ITew Mexico and
California during the war, but that upon the definitive conclusion
of peace, these governments "necessarily ceased to exist". He also
held that he had no power to establish other temporary governments
without the sanction of Congress. "The war with Mexico having
terminated", he said, "the power of the Executive to establish or
continue temporary civil governments over these territories, which
existed u^der the laws of nations whilst they were regarded as con-
quered provinces in our military occupation, has ceased. By their
cession to the United States Mexico h8s no longer any power over
them, and until Congress shall act the inhabitants will be without
any organized government . "^^ In order to prevent anarchy and con-
fusion, the President therefore recommended the immediate establish-
ment Of territorial governments in New Mexico and California, he
himself proposing in the meantime merely to maintain a small mili-
tary force in those regions in order to "hold the country and pro-
tect the inhabitants againat Mexican, Indian, or other enemies who
20 Messages o^ July 6 & July 24, 1848. Richardson, Messages
and Papers o^ the Presidents
,
IV, 589, 596.

might disturb them.***
The failure of Congress to provide a government for these
newly acquired territories before adjournment, seemed to make neces-
sary the establishment of a government by some other authority.
Senator Benton, in a letter of August 27, 1848, addressed to the
people of California, advised them to meet in convention, form a
"cheap and simple" government, and take care of themselves until
Congress should act. President Polk, considering this move "of-
fensive" and "arrogant", and principally intended to make Colonel
John C. Fremont (Benton's son-in-law) governor of an independent
government in California, felt that so^.e greater exercise of Exe-
cutive power was- necessary, confusion, anarchy, and possible
revolution were to be avoided. He therefore summoned his Cabinet
to consider the "question of difficulty", namely, "whet Government
existed over the country until Congress should act, and what power
to govern it the Executive possessed," and an agreement was reached
that the temporary military governments established during the war
should be regarded ae governments d_e_ facto , still existing by the
presumed consent o^ the people, and to "which the people should be
22
advised to submit.
Accordingly, Secretary of State Buchanan, in a letter of
October 7, 1848, drew up instructions to the people of California,
in which he expressed the position o^ the Administrat inn as follows:
"The termination of the war left an existing Government, a Govern-
ment d_e facto
.
in full operation; and this will continue with the
presumed consent of the people, until Congress shall provide for
21 Richardson, op. cit ., 589; Diary of James K. Polk , IV, 136.
22 See Thomas, op. cit ., 130; Diary of James K. Polk . IV, 136-
137, 140-143.
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them a territorial Government. The great law of necessity justifies
this conclusion. The consent of the people is irresistibly inferred
from the fact that no civilized community could possibly desire to
abrogate an existing Government, when the alternative presented
would be to place themselves in 8 state of anerchy, beyond the pro-
tection of all laws, and reduce them to the unhappy necessity of
submitting to the dominion of the strongest ."23
Similar instructions vere drawn up for the people of New
Mexico by Secretary of far Marcy, 24 and President Polk himself an-
nounced the new policy to Congress in December, stating that "the
very limited power possessed by the Executive has been exercised
to preserve and protect them from the inevitable consequences of a
state of anarchy. The only government which remained was that es-
tablished by the military authority during the W8r. Regarding this
to be a de facto government, and that by the presumed consent of
the inhabitants it might be continued temporarily, they were ad-
vised to submit to it for the sh^rt intervening period before Con-
25gress woulcl again assemble and could legislate on the subject."
The same doctrine concerning the governmental power of the
26President wa^ asserted also by the succeeding administration,
but there seemed to be a distinct effort on the part of the Presi-
dent in each case to emphasize the civil rather than the military
authority of the governments so recognized as existing by necessity
and presumed consent. The authorities apparently believed that "at
the conclusion of the war the military government became merged into
23 Buchanen to l£r« Voorhies, 8gent of the Post-Off ice Lepart-
ment in California. Moore, Works of James .Buchanan
.
VITI, 211-216,
esp. 213; cf. Diary James X. Polk, IV, 143, 146-149.
24 Thomas, op. cit ., 132-133.
25 Iuess8ge of Tec. 5, 1846. Richardson, op. cit .. IV, 638.
26 Thomas, op. cit ., 211.
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a sort d_e faoto civil government." Thus, President Polk selected
General P. F. Smith as commander in California, because he was "a
man of education and intelligence and possessed of much knowledge
of civil government as well as of military command, and it was
desirable to have such an officer in chie^ command in California
in the present anoraylous state of that country."^ 7
During the administration of President Taylor, General
Riley, then commanding officer in California, issued 8 proclamation
(June 3, 1849), in which he sought to correct the impression that
the de facto government was still military in character. "The
military government ended with the war", he said, "and what remeins-
is the civil government, recognized in the existing laws of Cali-
fornia. Although the command of the troops in this department and
the administration of civil affairs in California are, by the exist-
ing laws of the country and the instructions of the President of the
United St8tes, temporarily lodged in the hands of the same indivi-
28
dual, they are separate and distinct." President Fillmore like-
wise held that the civil and military departments in these temporary
governments should be kept separate and distinct, and ordered the
military governor of ilew Mexico not to interfere with civil and
political 8-^fairs. "Temporary departure from this principle may be
required occasionally, but it should close with the passing of the
29
necessity. No necessity now seems to exist in Hew Mexico."
Y/hile the President himself in these early cases based
his claim to temporary governmental power upon the doctrine of
27 Diary of James K . Polk
,
IV, 149. Apparently Gen. Smith
never acted as civil governor, however, but only as the senior com-
manding officer for a short time. Thomas, op . cit . , 212.
28 Thomas, on. cit., 211-212.
29 Ibid., 146.
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necessity and the presumed consent the people rather then upon
his "war powers", the Supreme Court seemed to take the view that the
war powers might continue to be the basis for the exercise of such
governmental power even after the conclusion of peace. The Court
held that the restoration of peace did not, as a matter of course,
terminate a military government established over conquered territory,
but that an inference that it was to continue subsequent to the con-
clusion o^ peace arose from the failure of the President or Congress
to dissolve it. It therefore sustained the right of the President,
in the exercise of his powers as Commander-in-Chief, not only to
establish governments over conquered territory, but also to continue
these governments in existence after the termination of the W8r, un-
30
til Congress should act.
Whether acting as civil or military governor, however, the
military com ander, as the President's most immediate representative,
apparently may exercise as absolute powers in these de_ facto govern-
ments 8f in the military governments during the war-time occupa-
81tion.^ In Hew Mexico, Governor Vigil continued in office as civil
governor for some time after the ratification of the treaty of peace,
but Colonel John Price, the military commander, exercised the real
authority. He approved, by special order, the acts passed by the
legislature elected under Kearney's organic law, and even abolished
the offices named in the statutes (secretary, district attorney, and
marshal). Colonel John Munroe, when he became military commander
and
in New Mexico, assumed both the title and functions of "civil/mili-
tary governor", and continued to act as such until New Mexico became
30 Cross v. Harrison , 16 How., 164, 190, 193, 195 (1853);
Leitensdor^er v. ',/ebb , 20 How., 176, 178 (1857).
31 Cf. supra , Ch. IX.
32 Thomas, op. cit ., 129; cf. supra , 180.
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33
e territory in 1651. Likewise in California, the military com-
mander issued orders and decrees having the force of law; appointed
special tribunals; defined the jurisdiction of the courts; organized
a supreme court; appointed and removed officials; and, finally,
ordered an election for delegates to a constitutional convention,
submitted the constitution to the people, and declared it ordained
and established nearly a year before the state was actually admitted
34by Congress.
In the case o^ the territories acquired es a result of the
Spanish-American War, Congress likewise failed to make immediate
provision for taeir government, and the President therefore con-
tinued to exercise all the powers of government over those terri-
tories ""or some considerable time after the definitive conclusion
of neace with Spain. Thus, in Porto Rico the military government
instituted on October 18, 1896, continued to operate under the sole
authority of the President until Lay 1, 1900, when it was superseded
by the civil government established under the provisions of the
35Forsker Act. The military governor, during that period, exercised
absolute power over the affairs of the island, maintaining law and
order, reorganizing the judiciary, reforming the criminal procedure,
providing a new system of taxation, and gradually introducing free
and self-governing institutions.*' In the words of a native writer,
the military governor, as the representative of the President, "had
absolute and complete control, not only over the army, but also over
the civil populati-n of the island, and whatever orders he saw fit
33 Thomas, op. cit ., 147.
34 Ibid
.
,
229-234, 264-265, 269, 273-275. Gen. Riley yielded
his authority on Dec. 20, 1849, to Peter Burnett, the governor elect
ed under this constitution, although California was not admitted
till Sert. 9, 1850.
35' Act of Apr. 12, 1900. 31 Stat, at L . , 77. 206-208
36 See Ro^e. The United States and Porto Rico 1
1
8-1 26 1 90-1 91
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to issue had the force of law."
Cube, though not ceded to the United States by the treaty
of peace, was likewise kept under military occupation from the time
of its seizure in 1898 until the inauguration of the republic on
Hay 20, 1902; and during that time the President, through the Secre-
tary of War and the military governor, administered the affairs of
that island at his discretion. The suffrage qualifications were
determined upon by "general agreement" of the military governor with
"leading Cubans", while election laws and other statutes were pro-
mulgated, and the self-governing powers of the municipal govern-
ments were enlarged or the municipalities suppressed altogether by
38
military order. Finally, when the Executive deemed the time ripe
for complete self-government, the military governor summoned a con-
stitutional convention, determined the number and distribution of
39
lelegates, carefully instructed them as to their duties, and saw
to it that the provisions suggested by the Secretary of War as the
37 Pedro Capo-Rodriguez, in Am. Jour. Int. Law, IX, 904. In
jonnection with the transfer of the government from the military to
the civil authorities, there occurred an interesting illustration
)f the power of the military governor to meet an extraordinary situa-
tion. The civil officials provided for in the Foraker Act not hav-
ing all been able to qualify by the time set for the transfer, and
the military officers being forbidden by statute to hold civil of-
fice, the military governor on April 30 simply reorganized the mili-
tary government so as to conform to the plan of the Foraker Act and
appointed civilians to fill the offices until those selected by the
President could qualify. See Rowe. op.eit . ,134-136 ; Thomas, op. cit . ,310.
38 Of the 138 municipalities in Cuba, 56 were suppressed "on
the ground that they had neither the resources nor populatinn suffi-
cient to maintain a well organized municipality." Gen. Leonard Wood,
'The Military Government of Cuba", Ann. Am. Acad .
,
XXI, 160-161.
39 See order of July 25, 1900, calling the election for dele-
rates; also the opening statement of the military go\Ternor to the
jonvention, Nov. 5, 1900, in which he said: "Under the order pur-
suant to which you have been elected end convened you have no duty
2nd no authority to take part in the present government of the island
Your powers are strictly limited by the terms of that order." Root,
ailitary and Colonial Policy of the United States, 195, 196.
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basis for the future releticns between Cuba and the United States, 4U
were adopted by the convent ion.^ He also passed upon the constitu-
tion adopted by this convention, and not before it hed been treated
by him "as an acceptable basis for the formation of the new govern-
ment" was the transfer to that new government permitted to take
place. 42 In effect, the President not only exercised all "the powers
of government over the island of Cuba while it was under military
occupation, but himself determined when and under what conditions
such military occupation should cease and the troops and authority
of the United States be withdrawn, the assumption of this authority
being upheld by the Supreme Court as a legitimate function of the
43
"political branch" of the Government, in this case the Executive.
In the Philippines, the President likewise carried, on the
government for about two years after the definitive conclusion of
peace, "untremmeled or unaided by any word from Congress." Although
40 Instructions of Secretary of V/ar Root to Ha j • Gen. Wood,
Feb. 9, 1901. Root, op. c it., 208-212. With regard to these pro-
visions, Secretary Root instructed Ma J • Gen. Wood as follows:
"These provisions may not, it is true, prove to be in accord with
the conclusions which Congress may ultimately reach when that body
comes to consider the subject, but as, until Congress has acted,
the Executive must necessarily within its own s-phere be controlled
by its own judgment, you should be guided by the views above ex-
pressed." Ibid
.
. 212. These provisions were, however, embodied in
the famous Piatt Amendment to the Act of Mar. 2, 1901. 31 Stat, at
L^, 895, 897.
41 "On receipt of the instructions by c8ble I imne diately as-
sembled the Committee on Relations to Exist between Cuba and the
United States and made known to them the five articles or provisions
which, in the opinion of the Executive branch of the Government,
represent the wishes of the United States in all that pertains to
the proposed relations between the Government of the United States
and the people of Cuba. I was particularly careful to impress upon
them that Congress might in its wisdom insist upon different condi-
tions or relations, but that the proposition submitted embodied
those which in the opinion of the Executive branch of the Government
should exist and that they were the only ones which t jaey could at
present cons ider ." Laj. Ge n. Wood to Secretary of War Root, FebT
19, 1901. Root, op. cit ., 186.
42 Ibid. , 215.
43 ITeely v. Henkel , 180 U. S., 109, 124 (1901).
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Secretary of War Root announced that all -"ormal and o^en resistance
to the authority of the United States had terminated in the spring
44
of 1900, President McKinley, by virtue of his authority as Comman-
der-in-Chief, 4^ continued the military governor as the executive
authority in the islands, but vested the legislative power in a
civilian Commission. 46 He outlined the duties of this Commission
and the general policy towards the Philippines in elaborate instruc-
tions, which came to be considered the "organic act of the Philip-
47pines", and under which more than 400 laws were enacted "by autho-
rity of the President of the United States" and subject only to the
4fi
approval of the Secretary of War.
In 1901, however, the President was given express authorit;
49by Congress to govern the Philippines temporarily, and was thus
no longer "orced to base his actions on his "war powers". Under
this new authority, the Philippine Commission was continued as be-
fore, but the military and civil authority in the islands were still
further separated, the military governor being relieved of all his
civil duties, and the president of the Commission, Mr. Taft, being
appointed civil governor, with power to exercise the executive au-
44 Root, op. cit ., 238.
45 "The sole power which the President was exercising in the
Philippine Islands was a military power derived from his authority
under the Constitution as Commander-in-Chief of the Army and Navy."
Ibid
.
,
252, 295.
46 The second Philippine Commission, appointed Mar* 16, 1900,
and composed of William H. Taft, Dean C. Worcester, Luke E. Wright,
Henry C. Ide, and Bernard Moses. For the first Commission, see
surra
,
175, note 21.
47 Instructions of Apr. 7, 1900. Root, op. cit ., 287-294.
48 Ibid
.
, 294-295. "While the President vested and could vest
in it no greater legislative authority than the military co (mender
previously held, it has exercised that authority in accordance with
legislative forms." Ibid . , 254.
49 By the so-called Spooner Amendment to the Act o^ Mar. 2,
1901. 31 Stat, at I
., 895, 910.
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thority in civil affairs heretofore exercised by the military gover-
50
nor. The organization of separate executive departments and the
creation o^ the office of vice-governor, were further steps in the
development of civil government undertaken by the President by virtu£
of his general power as Chief Executive and the authority vested in
51
him by Congress.
Finally, the last insurgent leaders having surrendered
52in April, 1902, and the Philippine Commission created by the
President having been given express legislative sanction and autho-
5*5
rity, the President, on July 4, 1902, terminated altogether the
office of military governor in the Philippines, made the military
forces subject to the call of the civil authorities "for the mainte-
nance of law and order and the enforcement of their authority" ,
^
and thus, in the words of Secretary Hoot, "a complete system of
civil government, built up under the authority of the President
.
55
was in operation, ready to go on under the authority of Congress."
In other matters, also, the President may be said to have
considerable power with regard to reconstruction 8fter war. Several
of the most important war enactments of Congress, conferring large
powers upon the President during the recent war with Germany and
Austria-Hungary, show that Congress contemplated a period of recon-
50 o e e order of June 21, 1901. Root, op. cit ., 262. 'Jaft was
inaugurated civil governor on July 4, 1901. On the same day Maj.
Gen. Chaffee succeeded Ma j . Gen. KacArthur as military governor,
but with duties applying only to the unpacified regions 0* the
Philippines
.
51 Ibid
. ,
262-287. Luke E. './right was appointed vice-gover-
nor, the order reading "by virtue of the authority vested in me as
President of the United States." Ibid . , 264.
52 Ibid., 316-317.
53 Philippine Government Act of July 1, 1902. 32 Stat, at I .,
691. From this time the laws parsed by the Philippine Commission
were enacted "by authority o* the United States", instead of "by
atithority of the President ."Root
,
op^cit.. 295.
54 * Order of July 4, 1902. Ibid
.
f 31 7 - 316
.
£5 Ib i d , , 319.
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struct ion during which the President might continue to exercise
those war powers and gradually bring about an adjustment to the
normal conditions of peace.
Thus, by the terras of the Emergency Shipping Fund Act and
of the Overman Act, trie President was expressly authorized to exer-
cise the powers therein granted for a period of six months after
the termination of the war by the proclamation of a final treaty of
peace; while, by the Railway Control Act, he was empowered to con-
tinue his control of the railroads for a period of one year and nine
56
months after that event. The long delay in securing the final
termination of the state of war made the armistice period virtually
a period of reconstruction, during which President Wilson exercised
his war powers as he deemed such exercise necessary to bring about
the readjustment to normal conditions. The control of trie rail-
roads was thus continued until Larch 1, 19£0, frankly not as a war
measure, but "to render an adequate and convenient transportation
57
service at reasonable cost."
Similarly, the President revived and exercised his war
powers under the Food and Fuel Control Act at various times during
this reconstruction period. Thus, so ,.e of the war-time food restric
tions, which had been lifted shortly after the signing of the armis-
tice, were revived about a year later, end the powers of the Food
Administrator transferred by executive order to the Attorney-General
in an attempt to avert a sugar famine and lower the high cost of
living.^ The war-time powers of the Fuel Administration were like-
wise revived by executive order of October 50, 1919, and exercised
56 Acts o^ June 15, 1917; Bar. El, 1918, (bee. 14); iylay 20,
1918 (Sec. 1). Wigmore, Source-Book of Military Law and Y/er-Time
legislrt ion
.
464, 563, 586.
57 Statement of Director General Hines. Supra, 247, note 78.
58 N. Y. Times. Nov. 22, 1919; cf. supra . 235.
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to meet the situation caused by the coal strike of that time, and
later (December 10), in that connection, virtually transferred to
59
a wage commission of three men. By executive order of February
28, 1920, the President again formally continued the Fuel Adminis-
tration, "because of the present emergency, and in order to insure
an adequate supply and equitable distribution, end to facilitate
the movement, 8nd to prevent locally or generally, scarcity of
60
coal"; and vested its powers in a commission of four men. Finally
only a month later (April 1), President 111son accepted and affirmed
the majority report of the commission appointed in lecember to fix
miner's wages, and at the same time removed all governmental con-
61
trol over the fuel industry, except as to export coal.
The exercise of these war powers by President Wilson is
in every instance clearly warranted by the ^act of the continuance
of the state of war. However, but for the unusual and unexpected
delay in terminating that state of war, these same problems and
situations would have arisen during a time of technical as well as
virtual peace, and they seera to demonstrate the necessity for an ex-
tension of the President's war powers into the period of reconstruc-
tion and readjustment, in order to meet effectively just such pro-
blems that arise out of war conditions, except in the extraordinary
cases mentioned, where the courts have held that necessity and the
failure of Congress to act are a sufficient justification, the
exercise of such power is dependent upon definite statutory eutho-
_
59 Supra ,236- ; see statement o^ the former Fuel Administrator,
Er. Garfield, before the Senate Committee on Interstate Commerce,
Dec. 13, 1919. II. Y. Times Current Hist. Mag. , XI, Pt. 2, 30
(Jan., 1920). The commission was composed of Henry Robinson,
John P. White, and Rembrandt Peele.
60 1 . Y . T ime
s
,
Feb. 29, 1920. This commission was composed
of A. W. Howe, Rembrandt Peale, F. II. Whittacker, and J. F. Fisher.
61 See announcement in United States Bulletin , Mar. 29, 1920.
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rity. The grant of such authority during the recent war is likely
to neve set a precedent that will be followed without much question
in case o 4" similar emergencies in the future.
The exercise o? war powers during- a period of reconstruc-
tion cannot be a source of danger, since it is always subject to a
check by Congress. In no case can it be said that the President has
any absolute powers with regard to reconstruction problems, as he
has with regard to the actual conduct of the war. It has been noted
that any povers in this respect may be exercised by the President
only because of the failure of Congress to act, or by virtue of ex-
press statutory authority. Hence, Congress may at any time check any
undue exercise of Executive power, either by taking definite action
itsel^ in the one case or by repealing its grant of power in the
othe r.
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Chapter XVI.
Conclusion
In summing up the results o* this stud] , it may be rioted
again th^t the war powers o r the President are derived principally
from the Constitution. There is only one clause in that instrument,
however, which expressly confers upon the President rny power relat-
ing directly to war, namely, the clsuse which makes him Commonder-
in-Chief of the army end navy of the United States end o** the mili-
tia of the several states v/hen celled into the actuml service of the
United Stetes. Sven the powers of the President as C ommo nde r- in-
Chief ere undefined in the Constitution, end hence it has been
necessary to determine them more exactly by reference to interna-
tionel lew end practice, to the statutes of the United States, to
custom and usage, end to euthoritat ive opinion.
However, the Constitution vests in the President other
powers end duties which do not necessarily or primarily imply the
existence of wer for their exercise, but which mey have a close
relation to the initiation and conduct of war, and must therefore
be considered in this connection. The most important of these are
the powers o^ the President with regard to foreign relations and
the powers that mey be derived from his position as the Chief
Executive of the nation. The scope of these powers is likewise un-
defined in the Constitution, and must again be determined through
necessary implication end authoritative interpretation. Other
powers o^ the President thet heve been noted as bearing upon the
conduct o* war are his powers of erpointment end removal, his power
of pardon, and his power 8nd influence with regard to legislation.
Again, other clauses of the Constitution, while not ex-
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pressly conferring any power uron the President, have "been taken
into account because they may, by necessary implication, add to his
war powers. These are particularly the clauses which relate to the
suspension of the writ of habeas corpus, and guarantee to the
states a republican ^orm o^ government and protection from in-
vasion, insurrection and domestic violence.^ Those clauses of the
Constitution which confer powers relating to war expressly upon
Congress have also been taken into consideration.
]?rom our study of these express powers, as interpreted
and applied in the various emergencies that have arisen, it may be
said, in the first place, that the President, through his control of
foreign relations, his power as Commander-in-Chief, and his in-
fluence end authority as Chief Executive, may virtually compel or
prevent a war, act his discretion. He may very largely influence a
declaration of war by Congress, and he may even begin a "defensive"
war without such a declaration.
In the second place, it is the President, not Congress,
who wages war, his military powers as Commander-in-Chief making him
supreme in that respect and solely responsible ^or the actual con-
duct of war. His constitutional powers in this regard are customer!
ly supplemented with considerable statutory authority, so that he
has l»rre powers with regard to raising end organizing the armed
forces; he directs end controls all military operations; he exer-
cises complete powers of military jurisdiction; and he establishes a
carries on military government — in fact, when a war has been de-
clared or begun, the President may do pr^cticall;, anything, in a
military sense, that he deems necessary to carry on that wer to a
1 Cf. supra
,
12, notes 34-36.
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successful conclusion, subject only to the rules of civilized war-
fare.
Thirdly, the civil powers of the President ere greatly in-
creased in time of war over those powers in time of peace. Prin-
cipally by virtue of statutory authority, but in part also by virtue
of his express constitutional power of appointment, snd his im-
plied powers of removal and direction, together with his authority
as Commender- in-Chief , the President, during such a period of emer-
gency, is vested with almost complete control of the administrative
machinery o^ the government; he exercises extensive powers of police
control end supervision over individual action and opinion; end he
may even, as in the recent world war, practically control the
economic resources of the country.
In the fourth piece, the President, es Commander-in-Chief,
determines when end upon what conditions hostilities are to cease;
and, since a treaty of peace is the only constitutional method pro-
vided for terminating a war on the part of the United States, he may
also, by virtue o^ his treety -making powers, very largely determine
the definitive conditions of peace and the time for the final ter-
mination of the state of war.
Finally, it has been pointed Out 'hat the President may, L|l
the absence of Congressional ection, provide for and carry on the
government of territory that may have been acquired es a result of
war, end in other ways exercise certain of his war powers during the
period of reconstruction following war, in order to meet extraordi-
nary situations that may arise during such a period, and to bring
about a gradual readjustment to the normal conditions of peace.
At least one definite conclusion c8n be drawn from this

study, namely, thet the so-called "war powers" of the Executive
constitute no isolated group of powers derived from 8 single source,
but that they ere intimately connected with and indeed derived from
practically every phase of the President's authority. In general,
the war powers of the President cannot he precisely defined, but
must remain somewhet vague end uncertain. "The Constitution", says
President V/ilson, "is not a mere lawyers' document: it is a vehicle
2
o^ life, end its spirit is always the spirit of the age." !That
statement is particularly true of that portion of the Constitution
dealing with the war powers. The exigencies and circumstances of
war can never be foreseen or provided against in advance, to any
appreciable extent. Hence, the interpretation of what may actually
be included within the war powers depends very largely on the
gravity of the particular occesion for their exercise end the pecu-
liar necessities that arise in connection.
Thus it was, for example, that the power to arm merchant
ships in defense was first asserted by President Adams as the pre-
rogative o^ the Executive, under the stress of the troubles with
France in 179G. likewise, the power ot the Executive with regard
to military government in occupied territory was firmly established
as a pert of American constitutional lew by President Polk, because
of the necessities of the wsr with Mexico. Under President Lincoln
and the stress of civil war were developed especially the powers of
censorship snd arbitrary arrest, and of military government over
territory within the United States; while under President Wilson,
probably the control exercised by the Executive over the administra-
tive machinery of the government and the economic resources of the
2 Constitutional Government in the United States. 69.

307.
country are the outstanding features of the war powers, as exercised
during the recent world war.
Clearly, the tendency has been towards a great increase
in the wer powers o^ the Executive as compered with those of Con-
gress, 8 tendency quite inevitable when one considers the growing
complexity of war, with its consequent greater need for singleness
of direction, unity of commend, end the coordination of every re-
source of the nation. On the other hand, there is also a tendency
to pay more attention to constitutional forms in bringing about
this necessary concentration of power, rather than to rely upon an
arbitrary exercise of power when the occasion may demand. Thus,
while President Wilson undoubtedly exercised a vastly greater power
during the recent world war then did President Lincoln during the
Civil V/er, he was careful to consult with Congress almost continu-
ously during the war, and to secure express authority from that
body in almost every case where there might be any doubt as to his
own power to act without t:uch authority; while President Lincoln, in
cases of doubtful authority and even of undoubted lack of autho-
rity, such as increasing the regular armed forces, suspending the
writ of habeas corpus, and issuing the emancipation proclamation,
usually acted first and secured the sanction of law afterwards, if
at all.
Although, as has been noted, many of the President's war
powers are derived from express statutory grants rsther than direct-
ly from the Constitution, end are therefore subject to modificetion
8t the discretion of Congress, it may safely be a sumed that powers
thus grrnl ed will, upon occasion, be granted again with more readi-
ness, the necessity for such exercise of power having been too cleer4
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ly demonstrated in the pest. It is probable, for example, that Con-
gress would not hesitate, in case of a future war of similar im-
portance, to vest the President immediately with the powers exer-
cised by President Wilson under the Food end Fuel Control Act, the
Railway Control Act, or the Trading with the Enemy Act. A precedent
of centralization of power and concentration of effort in time of
war is not apt to be ignored, but, on the other hand, is more liable
to be accepted as a principle to be followed in the future, if oc-
casion arises. It may be noted here that, in the parliamentary
governments of Europe, such as Great Britain, v/here the direction
of war is vested in a Cabinet of several members rather than in a
single Executive, the tendency, as shown especially during the re-
cent world war, has been distinctly towards a concentration o^ the
war powers in the hands of a smaller group, approaching singleness
of control. In the United States, the experiences of a multiple
direction of war through the activities of the Congress during the
Revolution and 0* the Joint Committee during the Civil .Var, have not
been forgot* en, but were sufficient to prevent the institution, dur-
ing the recent war, of any similar checks on single Executive autho-
rity.
While the President, in critical times, thus becomes prac-
tically a dictator, that does not necessarily mean a disrepard of
the principles 0^ constitutional government nor require further
limitations 0* his war powers. One of the foremost students of
contemporary American politics says that the ability to act prompt-
ly and energetically in the presence of emergency being of para-
mount importance, "no government can survive that excludes dictator-
ship when the life of the nation is at stake", and he points out
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ttiet the reel difference between a despotism and constitutional
government lies in the location of responsibility rather than in
the limitation of rower.
Certainly the tendency in the United States has been to-
wards the concentration of the wsr powers in the hands of the Execu-
tive. Llore and more, hov/ever, hes that been done by express legal
sanction; end more and more is the responsibility for anything in
the "'ay of executive action being definitely located in the Presi-
dent, so that, at the most, the President may be said to be in time
of war, a "constitutional dictator". Even so, the authority of the
Executive under his rar powers is so extensive that one can only
reflect the words ©f James Bryce when he wrote about the President
that "when foreign affairs become critical, or when disorders within
the Union require his intervention, . . everything may depend on
his Judgment, his courape, and his hearty loyalty to the principles
o* the Constitution." 4
3 H. J. Ford, "The Growth of Dictatorship", in Atlantic
Monthly
,
CZZI, 652-640 (Kay, 1918), esp. 634.
4 American Commonwealth
,
I, 67.
jjc sfc 5jC J^C
***
*
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